THETICS

WESTERN ÆSTHETICS

BY

K. C. PANDEY

THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE
BANARAS.
1956

THE

CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES

STUDIES VOL. IV

COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS

VOL. II

WESTERN ÆSTHETICS

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THE

CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE,

BANARAS. (India)

1956

See Cassell's Encyclopaedia

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INTRODUCTION

A careful study of the æsthetic theories of the Western thinkers from Sophist Gorgias (about 470 B. C.) and Socrates (469-399 B. C.) to Croce (1866-1952) produces an impression on the mind of one who is familiar with Indian Æsthetics that the East and the West have thought on the problem of the beautiful in ways which have marked similarity and, therefore, there is ample scope for a comparative approach to the problem of æsthetics. Such an impression has been responsible for my thesis "Comparative Æsthetics."

To prove the correctness of the thesis, this Volume presents the imitative, hedonistic, pedagogic, kathartic, mystic, intellectualistic, emotive, transcendental, absolutist, intuitive and other allied theories of art generally in a chronological order, grouping together the thinkers of a particular country; shows how each æsthetic thinker influenced his successors; states in the beginning of each chapter the points of similarity between the æsthetic thought of a Western thinker and that of an Indian; and in the concluding chapter gives a summary of comparative approach.

A detailed comparison of Western æsthetic thought, past and contemporary, with Indian, is the subject-matter of the Third Volume, Indian and Western Æsthetics.

Æsthetics is a part of philosophy. The majority of æstheticians have been influenced in their theories of art by their metaphysical, epistemic, psychological and ethical views. The relevant aspects of the philosophy of every important thinker, who propounds his own system or follows an already existing school of thought, therefore, have been given as the background of his æsthetic theory and it has been shown how he was influenced in his theory of art by his general philosophical outlook.

In the present work also as in the earlier, fidelity to the original texts has been the guiding principle. In order to convince the reader of this fact, foot-notes have been given, indicating the texts on the bases of which the statements have been made in the body of the book. The foot-notes are of two kinds, with asterisks and without them. The former refer to the Sanskrit texts, the quotations from which are given in Appendix A. The latter refer to the texts in or translations into English. The original texts of many Western æsthetic thinkers have been accessible to me in their English translations only, as I do not know all the languages, in which they were written by their respective authors. The reader, therefore, I hope, will excuse me for any inaccuracy that may be due to this short-coming.

The present volume, like the earlier, has benefited very much from the learned suggestions of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President of India. It is, therefore, my sacred duty to acknowledge respectfully my deep debt of gratitude to him.

My sincere thanks are due to Professor N. K. Sidhanta for help in dealing with Aristotle; to Professor E. Ahmad Shah for going through the type-script and giving many helpful suggestions; to Professors K. A. S. Iyer, Kali Prasad and A. V. Rao and Dr. Raj Narain for occasional help; to my research assistants, Mr. Aditya Prakash Misra, Mr. A.K. Banerjee and Mrs. Lila Pandey, for their whole-hearted devotion to work; and above all to my late learned guide, Professor N. N. Sengupta, who helped me in understanding such difficult texts as Kant's Three Critiques.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. C. Dra. — Ancient Classical Drama : Richard G. Moulton. (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1898.)

Add. — The works of Joseph Addison, Vol. III. (London, Henry G. Bohn 1856.)

A. In. — Ancient India : Bulletin of Archaeological Survey of India (Jan. 1947.)

Apo. — Apology : Works of Plato, translated by B. Jowett.

B. Art. — Buddhist Art : M. Anesaki. (London : John Murray ; Albemarle Street, W. 1916.)

Ber. — Kant : Critique of Judgement : translated by Bernard. (Macmillan & Co., London 1892.)

Bh. — Bhāskarī : K.C. Pandey. (Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1938-54.)

Bos. — Bosanquet : History of Æsthetic. (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1922.)

Bur. — The Works of Edmund Burke, with a general introduction by Judge Willis.

Cas. — H. W. Cassirer : A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgement. (London : Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1938.)

C. H. I. — Cultural Heritage of India. (Shri Rama Krishna Centenary Memorial.)

Com. Æ. — Comparative Æsthetics, Vol. I, Indian Æsthetics: K.C. Pandey.

Cro. — Benedetto Croce : Æsthetic : translated by Douglas Ainslie. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1922.)

De. An. — De Anima : Aristotle : translated by R. D. Hicks. (Cambridge University Press 1907.)

De. S.	Demetrius on Style : Edited by T. A. Moxon (1941.)
Dh.	Dhvanyāloka. (Nirnaya Sagar 1924 or Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras 1940.)
Dh. L.	Dhvanyāloka Locana. (Chowkhamba, Banaras 1940.)
D. R.	Daśarūpaka (Nirnaya Sagar 1917.)
Fro.	The Frogs : Aristophanes : Plays of Aristophanes Vol. II translated by J. Hookham. (London : J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. New York : E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1938.)
Ful.	Fuller : A History of Philosophy. (New York : Henry Holt and Company 1938)
Gil.	Gilbert and Kuhn : A History of Æsthetics. (New York : Macmillan Company, 1939.)
Gra.	Alexander Grant : The Ethics of Aristotle. (London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1874.)
Grote.	George Grote : Aristotle. (London : John Murray, Albemarle Street 1883.)
Hald.	The Philosophical Works of Descartes : translated by Elizabeths Haldane (Cambridge University Press, 1912.)
Inge.	W. R. Inge : The Philosophy of Plotinus. (Longmans, Green & Co., 1923.)
Ion.	The Works of Plato : translated by B. Jowett. (Tudor Publishing Company, New York.)
I. P. V.	Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series.)
I. P. V. V.	Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī. (Kashmir Sanskrit Series.)
Ka. S.	Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana (Chowkhamba, Banaras.)

Kno.	Israel Knox : The Æsthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer. (Columbia University Press, 1936.)
K. P.	Kāvya Prakāśa, (Calcutta 1886.)
K. S.	Kemp Smith : A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1918.)
Laws.	Works of Plato : translated by George Burges Vol. V.
Mem.	Memorabilia of Socrates : Xenophon. (London : George Bell and Sons, 1887.)
Mich.	Hegel and C. L. Michelet : The Philosophy of Art : An Introduction to the Scientific study of Æsthetics : translated by W. Hastie B.D.
M. M.	Kant : Critique of Pure Reason : translated by Max Muller. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1907.)
M. S.	Māna Sāra : P. K. Acharya. (Govt. Press, Allahabad)
N. S.	Nāṭya Śāstra. (Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1929.)
Oed.	Oedipus The King : Sophocles : The Tragedies of Sophocles : translated by Richard C. Jebb.
Pat.	H. J. Paton : Kant's Metaphysics of Experience. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937.)
Pet.	Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle : translated by F. H. Peters. (Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co., 1886.)
Ph. A.	Hegel : Philosophy of Fine Art : translated by F. P. B. Osmaston. (G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1920.)
Phae.	Phaedo : Works of Plato, translated by B. Jowett. (Tudor Publishing Company.)
Phaedrus.	Phaedrus. Works of Plato, translated by B. Jowett. (Tudor Publishing Company.)

Ph. E. W.	History of Philosophy Eastern and Western. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953.)
Ph. Heg.	What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel : Croce : translated by Douglas Ainslie. (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1915.)
Ph. M.	Phenomenology of Mind : Hegel : translated by J. B. Baillie.
Ph. R.	Philosophy of Right : Hegel : translated by S. W. Dyde. (George Bell and Sons 1896.)
Poe.	Poetics : Aristotle : translated by Theodore Buckley. (George Bell and Sons 1888.)
Pri.	H. A. Prichard : Kant's Theory of Knowledge. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909.)
P. S.	Pāśupata Sūtra. (Trivendrum Sanskrit Series.)
Psy.	Psyche : Erwin Rohde. (Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1925.)
Re. or Rep.	Republic : Plato : translated by B. Jowett.
Rhe.	Rhetoric : Aristotle : translated by Theodore Buckley. (George Bell and Sons 1888.)
R. In.	Ṛgvedic India : A. C. Dass (R. Cambray and Co., Calcutta, 1925.)
Ross.	W. D. Ross : Aristotle. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1923.)
R. V.	Ṛgveda.
S. K.	Siddhānta Kaumudī. (Nirnaya Sagar 1908.)
S. R.	Saṅgīta Ratnākara. (Ānandāśrama Series, 1942.)
St.	W. T. Stace : The Philosophy of Hegel. (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1924.)
Sym.	Symposium : Works of Plato : translated by B. Jowett in one volume.
T. A.	Tantrāloka (Kashmir Sanskrit Series.)
Thil.	Frank Thilly : A History of Philosophy. (Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1923.)

Ueber.	Ueberweg : A History of Philosophy. (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1872.)
Vāt.	Vātsyāyana.
V. Dh.	Viṣṇu Dharmottara. (Venkateshvara 1912.)
V. J.	Vakrokti Jīvita (Calcutta 1928.)
V. P.	Vākya Padīya. (Chowkhamba, Banaras.)
Wal.	Hegel : Philosophy of Mind : translated by William Wallace. (Oxford. At the Clarendon Press, 1894.)
W. W. I.	World as Will and Idea : Schopenhauer : translated by R. B. Haldane and John Kemp. (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1891.)
Yaj.	Yājñavalkya Smṛti. (Nirnaya Sagar 1926.)

CHAPTER I.

BACKGROUND OF ÆSTHETIC THEORY OF PLATO

1. PRELIMINARY.

"ÆSTHETICS" AND ITS SCOPE.

The word "Æsthetics" is borrowed from Greek. It is a modified form of the Greek word "aἰσθητikόs", which meant 'of or pertaining to things perceptible by senses, things material, as opposed to things thinkable or immaterial'. It is the plural of "Æsthetic", used as collective singular. It was used in its singular form "æsthetik" by Baumgarten in his doctorate thesis for the first time as the name of a special science. In 1750 he brought out a voluminous treatise wherein the word "Æsthetica" appeared as its title. According to Baumgarten 'æsthetic' was 'a science of sensitive cognition only',[1] or 'a science that was concerned with the 'obscure' knowledge as 'obscure', the knowledge in the form of feeling, the knowledge that does not admit of adequate presentation in words'.[2]

From the Hegelian point of view it means "Philosophy of fine art". From popular use of the word it seems to mean a theory of beautiful in general, whether in art or nature. In the context of Indian æsthetics it means "science and philosophy of fine art". (1) "Science of fine art", because the problem of art was originally a problem of the technique of art. The works, wherein the philosophy of art is discussed, are primarily concerned with the technique; and the philosophy

1. Cro., 212. 2. Ph. E. W., Vol. I, 472.

is closely related to it. (2) "Philosophy of fine art", because the experience that a work of art arouses in an æsthete is accounted for in terms of different Schools of philosophic thought in India and also because the authorities on three arts, poetry, music and architecture, hold that art presents the Absolute as conceived by them. Thus, there are three Schools of the philosophy of art: (i) Rasa-Brahma-vāda, (ii) Nāda-Brahma-vāda and (iii) Vāstu-Brahma-vāda. (3) "Of fine art" because fine art is recognized to have an independent value inasmuch as its product gives rise to an experience that no product of nature can, unless it be looked upon as a piece of art; and because the useful or mechanical arts are distinguished from the fine and the philosophical discussion is related to the latter only.

In the present context we are generally using the word in the last mentioned sense, because we are approaching the problem of 'beautiful' not only from the philosophical point of view but also from the technical. But it may be pointed out here that some writers, dealt with here, refer not only to fine art but to useful art also in their treatment of 'beautiful'. Socrates, for instance, refers to his theory of selective imitation in the course of his talks not only with Parrhasius, a painter, and Cleito, a statuary, but also with Pistias, a corslet-maker. Addison holds that pleasure of imagination is possible from both art and nature. And Kant recognises the distinction between 'beautiful' and 'sublime' and refers to the phenomena of nature as instances of sublime. A more comprehensive meaning that fits better in the present context seems to be "Science and philosophy of beautiful and sublime in both art and nature".

THEORIES OF ÆSTHETICS.

Different theories of Æsthetics, known to the historians of Æsthetics, represent different points of view, from which

"Beauty" has been studied by different thinkers at different times. The earliest theories, (i) hedonistic (ii) rigoristic and (iii) moralistic or pedagogic, represent a study of the problem from the point of view of the end of Art, of what the products of Art aim at. Similarly the theories of (i) imitation (ii) illusion and (iii) idealised reproduction have been advanced from the point of view of the artist. They show what the artist does in artistically dealing with the object that inspires him. (i) Confused cognition (ii) inference and (iii) mysticism are the theories of art from the point of view of the spectator. They show the nature of experience that a work of Art arouses in the spectator and the means of knowledge, which are employed by him in the acquisition of such experience.

In the West these theories have been propounded on the basis of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry and drama. But in India similar theories are propounded primarily and mainly in relation to the products of the dramatic art. In fact, Bharata, the author of the Nāṭya Śāstra, the earliest available work on the theory of Art, gives all other arts only a subordinate position to the dramatic. He emphatically says that there is no such lore, experience, spiritual discipline, science, art (fine or mechanical), craft and object as is not employed on some occasion[1] or the other in dramatic presentation. The authorities, however, on two fine arts, (i) Music and (ii) Architecture, assert the independence of these arts in giving rise to the æsthetic experience. But the influence of Bharata is traceable in the treatment of the emotive aspect of art in the works on the other two arts also.

Indian æstheticians do not recognise sculpture and painting as independent fine arts as does Hegel in his Philosophy of Fine Art. They recognise them as subordinate to

*1. N. S., 9.

architecture. Hence the number of independent fine arts from Indian point of view is three and not five, as from the point of view of Hegel.

RELIGION AND ART.

Religion and Art are closely related. Hegel supports this view. For, according to him, Art logically precedes religion in the final triadic manifestation of the Absolute Spirit. Art is thesis, religion is antithesis and philosophy is synthesis.

Opinions may differ on the nature of the relation of one of this triad with the others, e.g. Croce differs from Hegel on the relation between art and religion as thesis and antithesis. But gods of religion seem to be artistic conceptions of the phenomena of nature. This can very definitely be said with regard to religions which have grown on Indian soil. In the Vedas we find phenomena of nature artistically conceived as gods, which are recognised as the objects of religious worship. The earlier hymns of the Ṛgveda are addressed to the shining sun, the gleaming moon in the nocturnal sky, the fire, blazing on the hearth or on the altar or even the lightning, shooting forth from the cloud, the bright sky of day, or the starry sky of night, the roaring storms, the flowing waters of rivers, the glowing dawn and the spread-out fruitful earth. All these natural phenomena are, as such, glorified, worshipped and invoked. But gradually is accomplished, in the songs of the Ṛgveda itself, the transformation of these natural phenomena into mythological figures, into gods and goddesses such as Sūrya (Sun), Soma (Moon), Agni (Fire), Dyaus (Sky), Maruts (Storms), Vāyu (Wind), Āpas (Waters), Uṣas (Dawn) and Pṛthivī (Earth), whose names still indubitably indicate what they originally were. So the songs of the Ṛgveda prove indisputably that the most prominent figures of mythology have proceeded from personifications of the most striking natural phenomena.

The imitative faculty is inherent in humanity. Greater part of the progress, that humanity has made, is due to this faculty. We hear of the stories of children, brought up by wolves, who remained at the stage of mere animality, for no other reason than that they had no example to imitate, which would have enabled them to acquire the distinctive human characteristics such as the manner of walking and talking.

As humanity progresses from the stage of mere savagery to that of an early form of culture, its thought turns towards higher powers, it begins to believe in gods. But because the view of life at this stage is not and cannot be spiritual, it does not believe in things and powers that are unseen. Its gods, therefore, whom it loves, fears and worships, are not invisible powers. In early history of Vedic religion in India they are visible natural phenomena. And in Hellenic belief also they have definite forms and attributes and are believed to live on earth in some temple or on some hill and to show themselves in all gracefulness to the naked eyes of those, whom they favour, and in fury to those with whom they are angry. For, such are the pen-pictures of gods, drawn by Homer and Hesiod[1] ,who, according to Herodotus, determined the forms and attributes of gods for Hellenic belief.

As humanity marches forward on its path of progress and the imitative faculty develops, it finds in clay the readiest and most pliant medium to exercise its developed faculty of imitation and in gods the best objects to imitate.

This accounts for the rise of the plastic art at the dawn of Hellenic civilisation and its adoption of the Homeric gods as the objects of imitation. It is not symbolic. It is not an interpretation of something that is beyond the reach of

1. Bos., 11.

sense and, therefore, difficult to reproduce. It is simply an imitation of forms which are well determined.

In India also the instances of close relationship between art and religion are not wanting. Of course such instances are not the products of the plastic but of the sculptural art. Buddha proclaimed the ideal of realizing, through spiritual experience and in moral acts, the continuity of life in man and nature and the fellowship of all beings. And it was the pious remembrance of his person, on the part of his followers, that gave the Buddhistic art its first impetus.

The oldest Buddhistic sculptures are perhaps the palings of Bharhat and the carved palings of Buddha-gaya and Sanchi. These carvings represent, for the most part, assemblies of believers before the master. In the centre of the assembly there is always a symbolic[1] representation of Buddha's person, such as the holy wheel, symbolising the eternal truth revealed by him, or a vacant seat, on which he used to sit, or Bodhi tree, under which he attained Nirvāṇa.

Casting a glance at the pre-Aryan period of Indian civilisation as revealed by the finds in Mohenjo-daro, we discover the same relationship between religion and art. Among the finds are the traces of religious culture, prevalent about 3000 B.C. in icons,[2] which include the mother goddess, the phallus and a male god, who has been regarded as Śiva.

Thus, it is clear that religion and art are the two factors, which are found invariably related in the early history of mankind; that religious faith has invariably found expression in art, which in its turn has derived inspiration of its highest achievement from religion; and that the earliest products of art are imitative.

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1. B. Art., 11. 2. C. H. I., 6.

THEORY OF IMITATION.

It has been shown in the preceding section that the first principle that was followed by the artists in their production in the hoary past, both in the West and the East, was imitation. It consisted in the production of a copy of what was directly perceptible in some medium such as clay or stone. It is interesting to note that the word 'mimesis,' the Greek equivalent of 'imitation', continued to be used by successive writers on æsthetics, though each of them considerably altered or modified the original meaning of it, exactly as the Sanskrit word 'anukṛti', used at first by Bharata, the earliest available authority on Æsthetics, was retained by the subsequent writers, though each put his own meaning upon it. According to Sophist Gorgias, imitation implies illusion; Socrates takes it to mean selective imitation: and Aristotle effects the last improvement. Similarly in India, earlier authorities took "Anukṛti" (imitation) to mean a copy of an external fact: Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was represented to have interpreted it as illusion: Śrīśaṅkuka related imitation to inference and Abhinavagupta finally fixed its true implication in the course of discussion on it in the first and the sixth Chapters of his Abhinava Bhāratī.

II. THE BACKGROUND OF PLATO'S THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS.

Plato is looked upon as the founder of Æsthetics, not because his predecessors remained silent on the problem of Art, but because he was the first to put his views on Art in the setting of his school of thought. He was not the first to refer to imitative theory of Art. Long before him the principle of imitation had not only been unconsciously employed by producers of works of art in the field of plastic, sculptural, pictorial, poetic and dramatic arts, but also had

attained remarkable success in the creation of the products of art so like the original that they deceived and deluded the spectators.

The fact that various arts had developed to the stage of creating illusions is fully recognised by Sophist Gorgias, (about 470 B.C.) who held that "tragic[1] representation is a deception, which turns out to the honour of both, of him who deceives and of him who is deceived, in which it is shameful not to know how to deceive oneself and not to let oneself be deceived."

Socrates (469-399 B. C.) also is represented to have accepted the theory of imitation and applied it to the arts of painting and sculpture. According to Socrates, however, imitation in art does not consist in pure and simple copying of the exterior of an external object of nature; the success of the imitative art does not lie in the creation of illusion. He discovered in the then existing works of art selective imitation. According to him, production of beautiful works of art depends on selective imitation, that is, the combination of beautiful points in different objects of direct perception. This is what he discloses in the course of the talks with Parrhasius, a painter, Cleito[2], a statuary, and Pistias, a corslet-maker. Kālidāsa seems to echo this view in his description of the beauty of Umā in the first chapter of the Kumāra Sambhava, where he says :—

"In the laboured production of Umā, the Creator was, as if it were, prompted by the desire to see the beauty in her totality at one spatial point and, therefore, put all the standards of comparison together in a harmonious whole."

Socrates was the first to discover the symbolic element in the works of art of his time. Imitation, according to him, is not confined to copying of the sensible. It extends to

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1. Cro., 158. 2. Mem., III. Ch. X.

the supersensible, the states of mind such as sorrow, friendliness and joy. But they by their very nature do not admit of direct representation.[1] Their representation can be indirect, that is, in terms of the physical expressions thereof. Such representation of the mental states in terms of the expressions thereof in physical changes is technically called Anubhāva by Bharata and his followers.

According to Socrates, beauty is not absolute but relative to purpose. An arrow[2], which is beautiful for shooting, is not beautiful for saving oneself from the dart of an enemy; a man, who is beautifully formed for wrestling, is unlike another, who is beautifully formed for running.

The end of art, according to him, was pleasure. He believed in æsthetic hedonism as is evident from the following questions, which he put to Parrhasius, a painter :—

1. Do you think that people look with more pleasure on paintings, in which beautiful and good and lovely characters are exhibited ?

2. Does not the representation of passions of men, engaged in any act, excite a certain pleasure in the spectators ?

The following question, put to Cleito, a statuary, leads to the same conclusion :—

"How do you put into your statues that which most wins the minds of the beholders............?"

Thus, we find that the early theory of imitation, as mere representation, in a material medium, of the perceptible aspects of an external object of nature, had been considerably improved before it came to the hands of Plato. To Sophist Gorgias imitation was not mere likeness to the original, which may be able to arouse the memory of the copied through the consciousness of similarity, but such perfect representation as

1. Mem., III. Ch. X. 2. Mem., III. Ch. VIII.

leads the spectator to take the product of art for the creation of nature.

The discovery of allegory in Homeric art, wherein the reflective meaning and its sensuous embodiment are not fused into one but run in separate though parallel lines, made people doubt that the principle of imitation, as it was then understood, was the sole principle of artistic production. Socrates had extended the principle of imitation to the supersensuous, the states of mind, and put art on the way to symbolism. He had also replaced the theory of faithful imitation by selective imitation and introduced the conception of relative beauty. From the point of view of the end, however, art remained hedonistic even in the hands of Socrates. Such in brief was the background of Plato's theory of Æsthetics. In the next Chapter we will deal with the picture, as drawn by Plato, on such a background.

CHAPTER II.

RIGORISTIC HEDONISM OF PLATO

IMPORTANCE OF PLATO.

Plato (427-347 B.C.) is important for comparative Æsthetics, because of his theory of reflection in the context of both, metaphysics and Æsthetics. The objective world, according to him, is nothing but 'reflection' of the world of ideas on 'matter' and a product of art is but a reflection of a natural object. Kashmir Śaivaism also asserts that the objective world is nothing but a reflection,[1] but the implication of 'reflection' here is very different from what it is in Plato. And Kashmir Æstheticians like Ānanda Vardhana[2] and Abhinavagupta refer to the theory of reflection in art and reject it, though on grounds different from those put forward by Plato.

The theories of reflection and imitation in art are closely related. For, reflection is the guiding principle of an imitative artist. He presents in his work as much of an object of nature as is perceptibly reflected on a smooth surface like that of water or mirror. When, therefore, Plato substitutes the word 'imitation' for 'reflection', his view is very much like the one that is attributed to Śrīśaṅkuka, the first exponent in India of a theory of art on the basis of a system of Philosophy, like Plato. His condemnation of imitative art is very much on the same lines as Abhinavagupta's criticism of the imitative theory of Śrīśaṅkuka.[3] The theory of illusion in art, which Plato inherited from the Sophist Gorgias, has marked similarity with the one that is, rightly or wrongly, attributed to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa by the later writers, like Viśvanātha.[4]

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*1. T. A., Vol. II., 4. *2. Dh., 546-7.

3, Com. Æ., Vol. I, 53-8. 4. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 43.

In the hands of Plato the problem of Æsthetics becomes a full-fledged problem of philosophy. He, for the first time, puts it in the proper setting of metaphysics. He attempts it from three angles of vision: (i) Metaphysical (ii) Ethical and (iii) Æsthetical.

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF PLATO'S ÆSTHETICS.

Plato condemns art because of its irrationality in every way: it presents what is irrational and appeals also to what is equally so. He represents art to be a shadow of a shadow, a reflection of a reflection and definitely says in the course of his Republic that full understanding of the reason for rejection of tragedy and other products of art depends on a clear knowledge of the distinctive aspects of the soul. It is, therefore, necessary to state clearly but briefly such philosophic doctrines of Plato as are closely connected with his theory of Æsthetics and in the light of which his conclusions on art are reached.

HIS DUALISM.

He sticks to dualistic metaphysics in the context of his theory of art. The world of ideas and what Aristotle called Platonic matter, exist independently of each other, according to him. The former is real, the latter is 'unreal'. The ideas exist in and for themselves; they have the character of substantiality. They are real universal forms, they are the original, eternal transcendent archetypes of things. They exist prior to things, apart from them and independently of them and are uninfluenced by the changes, which things undergo.

Matter, on the contrary, is the substratum of the world of sense, nature. On this the world of ideas impresses its forms. Unimpressed by the ideas, matter is devoid of all qualities. It is formless, indefinable and imperceptible.

MYTHICAL ELEMENT.

Plato's philosophy is not free from mythical element. To the most important philosophical problem, which every dualistic system has to face, namely, "How do the two independent principles, world of ideas and matter, get related ?" Plato offers only a mythical solution. He brings in Demiurge to put the two principles together. All the three kinds of soul, which form an essential part of his system, (i) World-soul, (ii) Planetary souls and (iii) Human souls, are represented to be the creations of the same Demiurge.

THE WORLD OF IDEAS.

Ideas are the essences of things. They are the necessary forms. They hold together the essential common qualities belonging to many particulars. They are universals, not as mere mental processes or thoughts in human or divine mind, but perfectly independent of both. Both human and divine minds rather depend on the world of ideas ; they are eternal. The particulars are mere reflections or imperfect copies of the ideas. Every class of particulars has an idea, of which all the particulars, forming a class, are only imperfect copies. There is an idea for every class of objects. There is nothing in the world of nature so insignificant as not to have an idea ; the ideas, therefore, are quantitatively innumerable.

THE LOGOS.

The ideas, however, are not in a chaotic state. They form a well organised and thoroughly ordered whole. They are arranged in a logical order. They constitute a rational whole. They are organised and synthesized under the highest idea, "the Good" on which all the rest depend and beyond which there is nothing. It is called Logos, (cosmic purpose). The world of ideas is, therefore, an organic spiritual unity, governed by universal purpose, Logos.

THE WORLD OF NATURE.

To account for common experience, Plato maintains that there is the world of nature besides the world of ideas. The two worlds are essentially different. In contrast to the world of ideas, as presented above, the world of nature is fleeting, changing and irrational.

To explain the essential difference of the world of nature from that of the ideas, Plato postulates another principle, which, according to Aristotle's interpretation, is called "matter". It is undifferentiated mass. It is the 'receptacle' of forms. It is unlimited potentiality for taking on all possible forms. Impressions of forms do not change the essential character of the matter. It remains basically the same under all forms, much as does gold under the forms of various ornaments, into which it is shaped. The impressions of forms on matter are momentary, they come and go. Continuity of form on matter is due to the continuous repetition of the impression of the same form.

When an idea comes into contact with matter, it breaks up into many particulars, exactly as does a ray of the sun into many rays of different colours, when it passes through a prism. Thus, the world of nature is due to the contact of the world of ideas with "matter". Each idea having been split up into many particulars, we have multiplicity of objects, which are subsumed under one universal. Thus, the entire world of nature is due to the influence of ideas on the external matter. All reality, which things possess, is due to the influence of ideas. The objects owe their being to the presence of ideas.

IMPERFECTION EXPLAINED.

In spite of the participation of ideas in the things of the objective world, the latter are imperfect and transient.

Imperfection, changeability, diversity and all that goes to make the objective world a world of lower order than the world of ideas, are due to matter, which resists the full expression of the ideas.

Thus, according to Plato, there are two principles (i) the world of ideas and (ii) matter. The former is a permanent principle. It is the true reality, form and essence of all that exists in the objective world. It is the principle of law and order in the objective world. It is of the highest value. It is the active cause of the world of phenomena.

Matter is the secondary principle. It is the co-operative cause of the world of nature. It is dull and irrational. It resists the influence of the world of ideas. It takes on the forms only imperfectly. It is, therefore, responsible for all physical and moral evil and all change and imperfection.

PLATONIC CONCEPTION OF SOUL.

According to Plato, souls are of three kinds, as has been stated above. (i) The world-soul is the principle of law and order in the material world. It is made up of the indivisible and divisible, identity and difference, and mind and matter. Hence, according to the principle "Like knows the like" which Plato inherited from his predecessors, it is capable of knowing the ideal and perceiving the material. It has its original motion and is the cause of beauty, order and harmony in the world. It is intermediary between the ideal and the phenomenal world. It moves according to the fixed laws of its nature. (ii) The planetary souls reside in planets. They are wholly rational. (iii) Human souls are partly rational and partly irrational. The rational part was created by Demiurge ; but the irrational part is added on to them when they enter the bodies. The latter fits the souls for existence in the world of sense. The irrational part is

divided into two (i) nobler impulses such as anger and love of power etc., which are situated in the heart, and (ii) lower appetites such as passions, feelings and sensuous desires.

In sensation and opinion soul depends on the body, the irrational part. In beholding pure ideas it depends on the rational aspect, the pure reason. Body is an impediment to true knowledge. It is, therefore, necessary that one should do one's utmost to free oneself from it. The way to attain this freedom is the checking of both higher impulses and lower appetites. Attainment of freedom consists in return to celestial world, from which the souls fall because of sensuous desire.

IMMORTALITY OF SOUL.

The soul possesses the ideas before it enters the body. Sense-perceptions of the phenomena simply arouse or excite the ideas. They are not the creators of ideas. Just as sense-perception revives the memory of the ideas experienced in the past existence, so the perception of sensuous beauty arouses the idea of the truly beautiful. Thus, reminiscence proves the immortality of the soul.

FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE.

1. Ideal knowledge : It is the knowledge, which is got through the dialectical method, the way of the rational aspect of the soul to rise to the universal from the observed particulars, that enables the soul to realise the world of ideas. It alone is the true and rational knowledge.

2. Sense-perception : It does not give rise to true knowledge, because it is the work of the irrational part of the soul, which gives appearances only and not the reality.

3. Opinion : This also does not come in touch with reality, because it is based upon the persuasions and beliefs of the individual.

THREE ASPECTS OF HUMAN SOUL.

1. Motion : Human soul has its original motion. It is self-moving ; it cannot be started by anything outside itself ; and, therefore, in moving itself it moves the body.

2. Eros : It is the original urge or impulse. It manifests itself in sensuous love as well as in yearning for the truly beautiful and the truly good. The former is responsible for the fall of human soul from the planet, which it once inhabited. The latter is the cause of its return to the original home.

3. Complexity : Plato inherited from his predecessors the doctrine that like knows the like, as has just been stated. In order, therefore, to explain the contemplation of the ideal and the perception of the real he maintains the human soul to be of a composite nature. It is made up of mind and matter, rational and irrational, identity and difference and indivisible and divisible.

PLATO'S ETHICS.

Plato's theory of art, or rather his condemnation of art, is dictated by his ethical views, which themselves are based upon his metaphysics. Let us, therefore, take a bird's-eye view of his ethics.

Socrates had raised the following ethical problems :—

What is the highest good ? What ought to be the guiding principle of a rational being ?

Plato attempted their solutions as follows :—

According to his metaphysics, the objects of senses are mere fleeting shadows of the eternal and unchanging ideas. They are of no real value. Reason alone has absolute worth and is the highest good, because it is the immortal aspect of human soul.

But body is only a prison house. Freedom of the soul

from body and contemplation of the world of ideas, therefore, is the ultimate goal of life. Self-control, the rule of reason, therefore, ought to be the guiding principle. For, a life of reason is the means to the ethical end. It is nothing but self-control, the mastery over certain kinds of passions and desires. It consists in the submission of will and appetite to the authority of reason, the commander. It is nothing but harmonious working of reason, will and appetite. It is the rule of reason, which exercises the virtues of wisdom, courage, self-control and justice, over the will and appetite.

HAPPINESS AND PLEASURE.

Happiness consists in a virtuous life, submission to the dictates of reason; in subordination of the lower functions of the soul to the highest and in checking the irrational appetite. It is the highest factor in the life of soul. *Pleasure,* on the contrary, consists in the satisfaction of the lower appetite to the neglect of the commands of reason and in the self-assertion of the lowest, most transient and irrational aspect of the soul, which is not only to be subordinated to the highest but also to be ultimately cast off.

PLATO'S PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF ÆSTHETICS.

With such a metaphysical and ethical background, Plato formulates the problem of Æsthetics as follows :—

"Is art, mimesis,[1] a rational or irrational fact ? Does it belong to the noble region of the soul, where philosophy and virtue are found, or does it dwell in that base lower sphere, with sensuality and crude passionality ?"

HIS THEORY OF IMITATION.

Plato discusses the meaning and implication of imitation

1. Cro., 158.

in the context of poetry and painting in the 3rd and the 10th Chapters of his Republic. He does not improve upon or modify the conception of imitation as it was prevalent among his predecessors. He simply elaborates it.

IMITATION IN POETRY.

In poetry, imitation, according to him, consists in the presentation of what different[1] characters have to speak in such a manner as to make the readers or hearers believe that the characters themselves are speaking. It consists in the poet's taking on the person of each character of the piece, his speaking in the person of another, his assimilation of his style to that of another and so his completely concealing himself from the reader. To make the meaning of imitation clearer let us contrast it with that of narration. In narration the poet speaks as himself, he does not conceal his individuality from the reader, as for instance, in the introductory portion of Homer's Iliad. From the very beginning to the prayer of Chryses against the Greeks, there is nothing but narration. In this portion the reader recognises Homer as Homer. But in the prayer he speaks, not as Homer but as Chryses. It is, therefore, imitation.

Thus, poetry is only partly imitative and imitation in it is confined to the linguistic style only. But the dramatic compositions are wholly imitative and in their presentation on the stage imitation extends to gesture, tone and so forth.

IMITATION IN PAINTING.

Pictorial art, according to Plato, is confined to copying the exterior only of the objects of sight, found in nature or made by workmen, carpenters and smiths etc. It gives us appearance only, because it cannot produce anything better than a reflection of an external object in a mirror which is held up before it.

1. Re., 95.

PLATO'S CONDEMNATION OF ART.

Plato's condemnation of art, his refusal to give a place to art in his ideal Republic, is based on metaphysical, ethical and political grounds. We are familiar with the illusion-theory of art as propounded by Sophist Gorgias from the point of view of the artist. We also know that the end of art, the effect that art produces in the spectator, was recognised to be nothing more than pleasure even by such a person as Socrates, whose pupil Plato was. Thus, the two theories of art, that Plato inherited from his predecessors, were imitation and hedonism. Plato, therefore, whose ethical sense revolted against hedonism, and who inherited the prevalent view of art as imitation, took up the task of fighting and refuting both hedonism and imitation.

HIS CONDEMNATION OF IMITATION.

According to his metaphysics, as we have shown above, the entire world of nature is nothing but an imitation, an imperfect copy, a mere reflection, of the world of ideas on irrational matter. Whatever reason or harmony we find in the objective material world is due to the influence of the ideal world. Therefore, if a work of art is simply an imitation of material objects of sense, it is an imperfect copy of the already imperfect copy of an idea; it is a shadow of a shadow, a reflection of a reflection. It is three degrees removed from reality. It is not even so useful as a work of nature nor even as a product of a workman, such as a carpenter or a smith. For, while creations of nature and those of workmen have practical utility, a tree affords protection against the sun, a cow gives milk, a chair provides comfortable seat; painted trees, cows and chairs are utterly useless. And if the imitations arouse the same tumult of sensations and feelings as do the imitated, to imitate is to waste human energy unnecessarily. For, what the work of

an artist aims at doing is already done much better by nature.

The imitator knows the appearance, the sensuous, only. He knows nothing of the ideal, the true, the real. He, therefore, represents the sensuous only. And for the effect, that he aims at producing in the spectator, he has to depend upon human weakness, the liability of the sight to illusion about colours. Painting, therefore, proceeds from the intellectual defect and is addressed to physical defect. The illusions, created by this defect or weakness, are corrected or removed by measuring, numbering and weighing. This correction is the work of the rational aspect of the soul. The better part of the soul is that which trusts to measure and calculation.

We know that body and, therefore, senses are irrational. Therefore, painting that springs from the sensuous knowledge of the sensible and is addressed to the sense of sight, particularly its weakness, its liability to illusion, is irrational in every way and therefore, according to Plato, is wholly condemnable and as such ought to have no place in the ideal Republic.

IRRATIONALITY OF POETRY AND DRAMA.

We know that the symbolic element in art was recognised by Socrates. He discovered that art is not confined to the representation of the sensuous only, and that the artistic activity extends to the states of mind also, which, because they do not admit of direct representation, are represented in terms of the perceptible physical effects thereof, such as bright or watery eyes and gloom or bloom of face. Plato is conscious of the predominance of such symbolic element in poetry and drama and proceeds to prove its irrationality as follows :—

When one and the same thing draws us in two opposite directions we have naturally to assume two opposite princi-

ples of mind. For instance, when a great misfortune befalls a good man, he takes it calmly, does not cry or beat his chest. He simply checks its free expression. This moderation he uses only when he is in society. In private, however, he gives free expression to his sorrow.

There are, therefore, two principles in him; (i) the principle of law and reason, which bids him to "resist" and (ii) the feeling of sorrow which forces him to indulge in the free expression of it. The one is rational and the other is irrational.

Poetry and drama are either tragic or comic. The subject-matter of their presentation is sorrow or joy. The heroes, chosen by poets and dramatists, are not of calm, temperate and moderate character, but such as utterly lack in rational principle of moderation, such as are weak and irrational enough to indulge in the free expression of sorrow or joy. The wise and calm temperament, being difficult to imitate and even to appreciate, is generally neglected.

Plato himself says in his Republic[1] that full understanding of the reason for rejection of tragedy and other products of art, which are thoroughly imitative, depends on a clear knowledge of the distinctive aspects of the soul. Let us, therefore, remember the Platonic conception of soul. Human souls are partly rational and partly irrational. The irrational part is divided into two, (i) nobler impulses such as anger and love of power and (ii) lower appetites such as passions, feelings and sensuous desires. Poetry and drama, therefore, are irrational inasmuch as they present the sensuous; and even when their presentation extends to the supersensuous, it is symbolic. It consists in the presentation of the supersensuous, passions, feelings and sensuous desires, which in themselves constitute the irrational aspect of the

1. Re., 378.

soul, in sensuous terms, their apparent effects in facial and other bodily changes which are also irrational. Further, the poetic and the dramatic presentations are addressed to the irrational aspect of soul, passions, feelings and sensuous desires, inasmuch as the aim of the dramatist is to arouse them. Furthermore, just as in a state, where two opposite powers exist, to give opportunities to one power to function is to strengthen it at the cost of the other; so in the case of soul to stimulate the irrational aspect of it is to weaken the rational. Thus[1] poetry and drama awaken, nourish and strengthen feelings and passions and impair reason. They feed and water what is irrational instead of drying it up.

Thus, poets and dramatists are like painters in two ways :—

1. Their creations have inferior degree of truth.
2. They are concerned with inferior parts of soul.

Plato's general condemnation of art is based on his view that art presents the particular, which is irrational, and completely ignores the universal, the ideal, the rational.

EXPLANATION OF DELIGHT AT THE SIGHT OF TRAGEDY.

At the sight of a tragic presentation even the best men take delight in giving way to sympathy. The reason for this may be stated as follows :—

In misfortune, we feel a natural desire to relieve our sorrow by giving free expression to it in tears and cries. But, being guided by reason and so not to look womanish in society, we check it. At[2] the sight of a tragedy, however, knowing that the misfortune is of another and that there is no shame in sympathetic expression of feeling, we let loose the current of sorrow, the flow of which was kept in check at the time of

1. Re., 395-6. 2. Re., 394.

our personal calamity. Delight, therefore, is due to the feeling of relief, consequent on the free flow of what had been kept in check for long. And the same reason applies to comic delight. The way to Kathartic theory of Aristotle was thus paved by Plato.

PERMISSIBLE FIELD OF IMITATION.

In spite of his condemnation of the imitative art in general and of painting and tragedy in particular, Plato realised the importance of imitation in life. He knew that imitation is an indispensable medium of education and that children learn to talk and to walk through imitation. He was aware of the fact that imitation, if continued for long, grows into habit, becomes a second nature, and affects body, mind and voice. He, therefore, influenced by political considerations, chalked out the permissible field of imitation. According to him, bad things are never to be imitated by those who are to manage the Republic. Imitation[1] has to be confined to good things only, and out of these also only to such as are suitable to different professions which the individuals choose to follow. One man can do only one thing well: and if he attempts many, he is bound to fail in all. An individual, therefore, should be allowed to imitate one good thing only.

SOLUTION OF THE ÆSTHETIC PROBLEM SUMMARISED.

Plato had a fine æsthetic sense. He was tender at heart towards art. He himself declared in his Republic (Book X. Steph. 607 D) that he would have been very glad to justify art, to prove its rationality and to give it a place in the ideal Republic if some one could tell, how. But it seems that what he said about the principle of artistic production, the imitation, and its object, and about the prevalent hedonistic

1 Re., 98-100

tendency of the lovers of art and the effect of works of art on them, was so true that no serious thinker could justify art. His ethical consciousness rebelled against the then existing forms of art and his metaphysical theory compelled him to banish it from the ideal Republic.

In summarising the solution we may say that (i) since matter and the world of phenomena, which is but matter imperfectly impressed by the world of ideas, are both irrational (ii) since the body, to which all impulses, passions and feelings belong, is irrational (iii) since out of the three forms of human knowledge (a) comprehension of ideas (b) sense-perception and (c) opinion, the last two are irrational and (iv) since imitative art is confined to partial copying of the objects of the phenomenal world, and its products are the objects of sense-perception and arouse passions and feelings, it is irrational all round. It does not, therefore, strengthen the mind but corrupts it. Hence it should have no place in the ideal Republic.

This is the theory of art as presented by Plato in his Republic. But in his Laws, to which we shall refer soon, he seems to allow all arts, as sources of pleasure, to live in the ideal Republic, provided their exhibitions are strictly regulated and are used, not for the mere satisfaction of sensuous desires, but for encouraging people in moderation. His view on art, therefore, is called 'Rigoristic Hedonism', because he insists upon the strictest and severest enforcement of the law in the exhibition and enjoyment of Arts. And if we turn our attention to the Dialogues, such as Ion, Phædo and Phædrus, and put together what he says on the various aspects of the problem of art, particularly in the context of Katharsis, we get a very different idea. There he seems to anticipate Aristotle. We shall discuss this point in the context of Katharsis in our presentation of the Kathartic tradition in Plato in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III.

PEDAGOGISM OF ARISTOTLE

IMPORTANCE OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is interesting from a comparative point of view, because of his metaphysics and æsthetics. According to him, ideas are not transcendent but immanent. They are in things as their formative principles. They are universal. That the idea, the universal, is inherently present in the particular is the view, maintained by the Vaiśeṣika also. But the universal of the Vaiśeṣika is not a formative principle. It does not fix the direction of growth and development of the matter in which it inheres. It is merely responsible for the recognition of a thing as belonging to a particular class and for the use of a word for it which stands for the universal. The universal of the Vaiśeṣika is an epistemic and not a metaphysical concept as in the philosophy of Aristotle.

In his æsthetics, Aristotle is an exponent of the moral purpose of art, the view that the end of art is to improve its lover morally. His theory is technically called 'pedagogism'. This theory is, however, propounded in the context of tragedy. And tragedy, he holds, brings about the moral improvement of the spectator, not through sermons, put in the mouths of important characters, but through effecting a Katharsis of the emotions, through bringing about a purgation or discharge of the excessive element of the emotions, through freeing the emotions from the unwanted and thus producing harmony among them i.e. bringing them to 'the mean'. Aristotle thus discovers for the first time that art brings about the elimination of certain elements of personality. He paves the way for the Plotinic conception of Katharsis as complete deindividualisation.

In Indian Æsthetics also, there is the pedagogic view of art, but it is not presented in terms of Katharsis. There are two views on the moral end of art, one propounded by the poeticians and the other by the dramaturgists. The former hold that poetry improves her lover morally like a curtain lecture, which proverbially is recognised to be more effective than a hundred sermons from the pulpit. But the latter assert that drama improves the spectator morally by bringing about identification with the focus of the situation and thus making him experience the goodness of the path of virtue and the wickedness of the path of sin.

Aristotle is an exponent of the recognitive nature of æsthetic experience in the context of the ugly and admits that in the experience from a work of art there is a kind of inference. On both these points he has marked similarity with Śrīśaṅkuka. The similarity between Aristotelian and Indian dramatic technique also is very striking.

BACKGROUND OF PEDAGOGISM OF ARISTOTLE.

From the earliest time, to which the history of Æsthetics goes back in the West, the problem of Æsthetics has been attempted from three points of view, as we have already stated. Plato accepted the view of the Sophist, Gorgias, that art creates illusion and, therefore, in spite of his fine æsthetic sense, was compelled, in his Republic, to refuse a place to art in the ideal Republic partly because of his peculiar metaphysical theory and partly because of the then prevalent extreme hedonistic tendency of the lovers of art.

But Plato himself was not fully satisfied with the conclusion on art, to which he came in his Republic. His fine æsthetic sense rebelled against it. In the Republic itself he slightly modifies his position. He allows at least two forms of poetry, (i) hymns addressed to gods and (ii) poems in

praise of great men, to live in the ideal Republic. And in his *Laws*, Book II, he appears to abandon definitely the position maintained by him in the Republic. He seems to declare that all arts may be allowed to live and flourish in the ideal Republic if their exhibitions are well regulated and are used not for the mere satisfaction of sensuous desires but for encouraging and helping people in moderation. His statement in the concluding paragraph of Book II, where he adds a final word to his discourse on drink runs as follows :—

"I would say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasure, designing to gain victory over them,–in this way all of them may be used."

Jowett, Vol. IV, 406.

The fact is that sensuous pleasure and satisfaction are essential elements in the effect that a product of art generates in the minds of the spectators. They are well recognised all over the world where art has grown. The desire for the satisfaction of æsthetic senses,[1] the eye and the ear, is represented to be the prompter of the request, which the gods jointly made to the Creator, Brahmā, and which led the latter to bring into being the dramaturgy, which Bharata presents in his famous Nāṭya Śāstra. The view of Plato on art, as presented in his Republic, could, therefore, not be endorsed by the general public, which independently of the rationalistic and the moralistic principles, which it may be holding, is extremely tender towards art and can, under no circumstances, abandon it.

Aristotle, therefore, looked for a compromise, the way to which had already been paved by Plato himself in his

*1. N. S., 2,

Laws, Book II, as has already been stated above, and in the Symposium, as will be shown subsequently. This compromise takes the form of the well-known Pedagogic theory of art, which is associated with the name of Aristotle, not because no predecessor of his ever thought of the moral end of art: for, Aristophanes in his Frogs had already declared that what[1] school masters are to children, poets are to youngmen: but because Aristotle was the first to put the pedagogic theory against the background of his school of thought.

Imitation in art, for instance, according to Aristotle, does not consist in the faithful representation of objects as they are actually found in nature, but in idealisation, in presenting them as they should be under the control of the 'ideas' which are immanent in them: it aims at the 'mean' and the finest works of art are those which seem to have realised the subtle grace. He holds that the hero of tragedy must be a virtuous character and that the emotions, which the tragic Katharsis brings to 'mean', belong to an aspect of soul. He accounts for the ugly in terms of the form-resisting power of matter. His theory of art is thus based upon his metaphysics, psychology and ethics. We, therefore, state briefly here such philosophical doctrines of Aristotle as are directly related to his theory of art.

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF ARISTOTLE'S ÆSTHETICS.

Aristotle was a pupil of Plato. He knew the defects of his master's metaphysical and æsthetic theories. He tried to remedy them in his own ways. The philosophy of Plato gave rise to the following problems:—

1. If the ideas are really transcendent, if they exist beyond the world of stars, if they are separate from the

1. Fro., 57.

world of matter and if matter is inert, lifeless, undifferentiated mass, how do the ideas impress matter, how does the objective world or nature come into being ?

2. How to account for the being of human soul and its relation to body ?

3. How to account for the progressively changing forms of things ?

To seek the aid of the mythical being, Demiurge, is to admit failure to offer any really philosophical solution of these problems.

IMMANENCE OF IDEAS.

Aristotle, therefore, brings the ideas from beyond the region of stars to earth. According to him, they are not transcendent but immanent. They have existence, not separately from matter but in matter. They are forms and as such are ultimate essences or causes of things. They are the directing forces or purposes of things. They make things what they are. They give things their form and life. They are progressively realised in matter. They are not only principles and essences of things but also principles of reason. They are potential in mind. Experience is necessary to bring them out, to bring them to consciousness. They are implicit in the mind and are made explicit by experience. They are both forms of things and forms of reality itself. Idea or form is the possibility of matter. Realisation of form by matter is the realisation of its own possibility.

HIS DIFFERENCE FROM PLATO.

Our world of experience is not a mere shadow of the ideal world. It is not merely a world of appearances. It is not merely lifeless matter, on which the ideas are somehow imperfectly impressed, as Plato held. It is, according to

Aristotle, a real world of form and matter in union. It is the true object of science.

MATTER.

Matter is not not-being and inert. It is dynamic. In the world of experience it is always found together with form. It realises the form. It moves, changes, grows and evolves forward. It is of two kinds : (1) Primary and (2) Concrete. Only the primary matter, which we can think, but which is never the object of experience, is mere possibility, mere logical postulate. Concrete matter always has form. It is in a sense actuality. But it is a possibility in regard to some other form.

MATTER AS THE GROUND OF CHANGE.

Change is a universal phenomenon. All that we perceive changes. Things exist at one moment and do not exist at another. They change their qualities. How is this to be explained ? What explanation is there of this process of change ? Aristotle's answer is that matter is the ground of change. It is something that persists in the midst of changes. It is something that has different qualities. It does not disappear. It does not figure in experience without qualities. Some qualities, the constituents of an idea, which expresses itself in a variety of objects belonging to a particular class, must always be present in it. Thus, when we say that an object changes its form, our meaning, according to Aristotle, is not that the form changes ; for, it is changeless. But what we mean is that matter assumes a new form, which organises and fashions the matter. When a thing has reached its full growth, has realised its form, another form begins to fashion it.

MATTER AS THE CAUSE OF THE DEFORMED, UGLY AND MONSTROUS.

If forms are directing purposes, which realise themselves

in matter ; if every organism becomes what it is through the action of form ; if form controls the becoming of matter ; how is it that objects of nature are so often incomplete and imperfect presentations of the ideas ; how is it that we so often meet with the ugly, deformed and monstrous in nature ?

Aristotle's reply to this is that matter is not mere passive recipient of form. It offers resistance to form. The plurality and diversity of individuals, belonging to a class, are due to the form-resisting power of matter. To this power, deformity, ugliness and monstrosity in nature are to be attributed.

SOUL.

The ideas, as we have seen above, are not detached from the world that we perceive. They are part and parcel[1] of it. They are immanent in it. They give it form and *life.* And as the soul is nothing but the principle[2] of life, it is in reality nothing more than an idea, a purposive cause of motion, a principle of life, which is present wherever there are traces of life, which determines the structure and movement of the body and is connected with the body exactly as idea is with matter.

DIFFERENT GRADES OF SOUL.

The vital functions of life, according to Aristotle, are mere expressions of different aspects of the soul. He, therefore, enumerates the attributes of the soul in terms of the functions of life. According to him, the distinctive aspects of the soul are as follows :—

(i) Nutritive, (ii) Sensitive (iii) Imaginative (iv) Appetitive and (v) Intellective.

Although others mention two[3] more (i) concupiscent and

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1. **Thil., 78.** 2. **Thil., 87.**

3. **De. An., 147.**

(ii) passionate, yet, according to Aristotle, the difference of these from the appetitive is not great enough to justify their separate enumeration. Thus, passions and, therefore, emotions belong to the appetitive aspect of the soul. Such a relation between appetency and emotion is fully brought out by him in the course of the analysis of emotions in his Rhetoric, where he shows that desire, which is only just a form of appetency, is involved in all emotions.

There are different grades of the soul corresponding to different forms of life. Different souls live in different specific bodies. There is a graduated series of souls from the plant soul, which governs the functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction, to the human soul, which possesses higher powers.

HUMAN SOUL.

Man is the microcosm and the final goal of nature. He is distinguished from other living beings by the possession of the reason. The soul of man resembles the plant soul in so far as it controls the functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction. It resembles the animal soul in so far as it possesses the faculties of perception, common sense, imagination, memory, pleasure and pain, and desire and aversion.

REASON AS THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

Besides governing the functions common to plant and animal souls, the human soul possesses the power of conceptual thought, the power of thinking the universal and necessary forms of things. In its aspect of the animal soul it perceives the sensible and in its rational aspect it 'aperceives' or 'beholds' the concepts.

TWO KINDS OF REASON.

According to Aristotle, nothing can become actual for

which the actual cause does not exist. He, therefore, maintains that an actual cause, the form, exists, which the concrete matter, the matter of a particular organism, has to realise. Accordingly he admits reason to be of two kinds: (i) passive and (ii) active.

In the passive reason concepts are potential. It is like matter on which the form, the active reason, acts. The forms, which lie potential in it, are actualised by the active reason. Just as perception, memory and imagination are connected with the body and perish with it, so does the passive reason, which contains the elements of sensuous images. Such elements are the occasions for the arousal of the concepts in passive reason by the activity of creative reason. The active or creative reason is pure actuality. The concepts lie realised in it. It beholds them directly. Thought and being are one in it. It is like Plato's pure soul, which contemplates the world of ideas. It does not rise in the course of the development of the soul, as do other functions, such as perception. It exists before and after the body. It is immaterial and immortal. It is the spark of the Divine mind coming to the soul from without.

HIS ETHICAL THEORY.

Aristotle attempts the problem, raised by Socrates, "What is the highest good?" more philosophically. According to him, as we have stated before, the idea or form of a thing is immanent in it. It is the purpose, the motive force, which determines the direction of the development of matter where it inheres. Goodness of a thing, therefore, according to him, consists in its realisation of its purpose, essence, form, notion or idea.

Applying this principle to human action, we may say that goodness of human action lies in the realisation of its purpose. But one action and its realised purpose leads to

another and that to another and so on. But the series of purposes, in order that it may not be an illogical series, must end somewhere. The highest good, therefore, is that which marks the culminating point of the series of purposes. As man is the microcosm and the final goal of nature and as he is distinguished from other beings by the possession of reason, so the highest good is realisable only in man. But, as man is distinguished from other living beings by the possession of reason, the highest good for man is not mere bodily existence, nor mere exercise of vegetable and animal functions, but consists in the habitual exercise of his distinctive feature, the reason.

But man is not reason alone. He is a composite of the rational and irrational parts ; and the exercise of the former depends upon the latter. In order that the realisation of the highest good be possible, the body, with all that is invariably connected with it, the sensations, feelings, desires and appetites, which constitute the irrational aspect of man, must submit to the direction and control of reason.

VIRTUE AND GOOD.

As virtue consists in the right relation between the rational and the irrational aspects of the soul, in the right and rational attitude towards body, senses and appetites and in 'middle state' or the *mean* between two extremes, (i) foolhardiness and cowardice, (ii) extravagance and avarice and (iii) bashfulness and shamelessness ; courage, liberality and modesty, therefore, are good.

FREE WILL.

Potentiality, according to Aristotle, is of two kinds (i) physical and (ii) mental. It is the characteristic of the mental potentialities that they are capacities of producing one of the contraries no less than the other. The physical potentialities, on the other hand, are capable of producing

only one of the contraries. Fire, for instance, can produce heat only. Thus, the mental potentiality is equally capable of producing good or evil, or virtue or vice. Hence it is apparent that mind is not bound up with any physical necessity and that mind is free. For, while it is necessary for the physical potentiality to act in a particular manner, if the requisite conditions are present, it is not so for the mental potentiality. It is, therefore, necessary to admit some other influence, which controls the mental potentiality and determines into which side of the contraries it should develop. This controlling influence is either (i) desire or (ii) rational purpose. That factor, which is responsible for the choice of one of the two determining factors, is free will.

VIRTUE NOT INNATE BUT ACQUIRED.

Another noteworthy point in this connection is that not only in the use and exercise of moral capacity is the individual above the control of mere external and physical circumstances, but the very acquisition[1] of this capacity depends upon the individual. For, moral capacity is not inherent but acquired.

VIRTUE AS HABIT.

Virtue is a habit[2] or trained faculty of choice, which is always guided by reason. Its chief characteristic lies in observing the "mean" relatively to the person concerned.

According to Aristotle, everything mental is either

1. Passion or emotion, or
2. Power or faculty, or
3. Habit or trained faculty.

1. Passion or emotion means appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, emulation and pity. In general, however, passion means that which is accompanied by pleasure or pain.

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1. Gra., Vol. I, 238-40.
2. Pet., 46-7.

2. Power or faculty means that in respect of which we are said to be capable of being affected in any one of these ways.

3. Virtue, therefore, is neither an emotion nor a faculty of mind. It is simply the trained habit of mind to choose the "mean" between two extremes.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN.

There are various applications and implications of this doctrine. It implies the maxims such as "Moderation is best" and "Excess is to be avoided." All that is contained in these popular and prudential sayings is of course contained in the doctrine of the mean, which is so conspicuous in the Ethics of Aristotle.

But the full implication of the Aristotelian "mean" can be brought out only if we view it in relation to what Plato had said on an allied topic. Plato in his Philebus represents Socrates as giving a new classification of existence as follows :—

(1) Infinite (2) Limit (3) Things created out of the mixture of infinite and limit (4) The cause of this mixture.

1. Infinite is that where no fixed notion of quantity has yet come in e.g. more or less, greater or smaller.

2. The limit is the fixed notion of quantity e.g. equal and double.

3. The things created out of union of the two, exhibit the law of the limit introduced into the infinite.

(a) Thus, in the human body, for example, the infinite is the tendency to extreme, to disorder, to disease. But the introduction of the limit here produces the balance of constitution and health.

(b) In human mind the limit checks into submission the wild and wanton passions and gives rise to all that is good.

(c) In things physical and moral, these two opposites, infinite and finite, play into each other. They are the joint causes of beauty and excellence; out of their union spring all ideas of symmetry, proportion, balance, harmony, moderation etc.

This idea seems to have been taken up by Aristotle and modified slightly. He made it more exact and more capable of a close analytic application to the various instances. This modification assumed the form of the doctrine of extremes and their relation to the *mean.*

Aristotle does not ignore the physical and artistic meaning of the principle. He holds that moral virtue is only another expression of the same law which we see in nature and art. The first argument, adduced by Aristotle to show that virtuous action consists in the balance between extremes, is drawn from the analogy of physical life. He says, for instance, "For immaterial things we must use material analogies." "Excess and deficiency equally destroy health and strength; while what is proportionate preserves and augments them."

He further points out that art aims at the mean and the finest works of art are those which seem to have realised the subtle grace which the least addition to any part or diminution of it would overset.

THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF ARISTOTELIAN MEAN.

It is by a mathematical expression of the formula, by reducing it to an absolutely quantitative conception, that his use of 'mean' is chiefly distinguished.

According to him, all quantity, whether space or number, admits of the terms more, less and equal. On making these terms relative, we have excess, deficiency and the mean. The mean, therefore, is in geometrical proportion what equal

is in mathematical progression.

The opposition of the mean to the too much and the too little is a principle almost of universal application. It is not a mere negative principle. It is not a mere avoiding of the extreme, but the realisation of a law. When he says that the virtuous[1] action is the *mean* between the extremes, he means that our action must correspond to the standard, which exists in the rightly ordered mind. What is subjectively the law or standard is objectively the balance.

WHERE DOES STANDARD EXIST ?

According to Aristotle, each of our senses is or contains a sort of standard of its proper object, which gives us the power of judgement. He attributes to us a similar critical faculty in regard to morals. According to him, it is peculiar to man that he has a sense of good and bad, just and unjust. The moral sense is analogous to the musical ear, which, in some degree, is almost natural to all men. But it exists in different degrees in different individuals. It may also more or less be cultivated.[2]

HIS IMPROVEMENTS ON PLATONIC ÆSTHETICS.

After tracing the metaphysical and ethical doctrines of Aristotle it will be easier to state clearly the improvements which he effected on the various aspects of the Æsthetic theory of his teacher. Let us, therefore, recall to our minds the following chief points, discussed by Plato in his treatment of the problem :—

1. What does art represent ?
2. Theory of imitation.
3. The effect of art on the spectator.
4. Essential nature of the products of Art.

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1. Gra., Vol. I, 256.
2. Gra., Vol. I, 257.

5. Explanation of pleasure from the presentation of tragedy.

6. Æsthetic facts on which his theory is based.

Aristotle was the first æsthetician to move in the direction of Bharata, the earliest Indian æsthetician whose work is available. The æsthetic facts, on the basis of which he built up his theory, were not the products of the pictorial, plastic, sculptural or architectural art, but those of the poetic in general and of the tragic in particular. In fact the whole of his æsthetic theory is summed up in his famous definition of tragedy, in which he touched upon all the topics, which were separately taken up by his teacher as has just been stated.

The definition of tragedy, according to Buckley's translation, runs as follows :—

"Tragedy is an imitation of a worthy or illustrious and perfect action, possessing magnitude, in pleasing language, using separately several species of imitation in its parts, by men acting, and not through narration, through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions."

This definition is aphoristic. It is full of technical expressions, which need explanation. Aristotle himself attempts to bring out their full implications in his Poetics and Rhetoric. Let us, therefore, put together the explanatory notes taken from the Aristotelian and other sources.

HIS MEANING OF IMITATION.

His teacher meant by imitation the production of an exact copy of the exterior of an external object so as to delude the spectator to take it for the real phenomenon and to arouse the same tumult of feelings as the original arouses. And it was because of such a conception of imitation that he condemned art, the product of imitation, and therefore, illusion and deception. Aristotle improves upon this conception. He dis-

cusses the meaning of imitation in respect of (i) the object (ii) the means and (iii) the manner.

I. THE OBJECT OF IMITATION.

If we remember the metaphysical views of Aristotle, there will be no difficulty in understanding and accounting for the difference of Aristotelian conception of imitation from the Platonic. For Plato the external world was mere irrational matter, on which form was somehow imperfectly impressed. The idea was beyond the world of stars and, therefore, beyond the reach of the imitative artist. The objective world, therefore, to him was a material symbol of the ideal, a mere illusion, a pure and simple world of sense. Imitation, therefore, according to him, naturally consisted in deceptive reproduction of the sensuous.

According to Aristotle, however, the objective world is idea and matter together. The idea is the soul, the essence, the purpose, the motive force, which determines the direction of the growth, evolution, or development of matter, where it inheres. It is not beyond the reach of the creative artist. For, art is one of the two kinds of virtue (i) moral (ii) intellectual.[1] It is intellectual virtue. It is creative activity under intellectual direction. If, therefore, an artist is not guided by intellect in his creative activity, if he is concerned with the realm of senses only, if he presents the sensuous only and completely ignores the idea, which can be grasped through intellect only, he is no artist at all. Imitation, therefore, according to Aristotle is *idealisation*, the presentation of things, not as they are, but as they should be; not as they are known to senses, but as they are visualised by the intellect; not as they exist in the external world, but as they are to be under the controlling force of ideas.

1. Pet., 184.

In applying the theory of idealisation to the works of the Poetical Muse we have to keep two points in our minds (i) his conception of the soul and (ii) distinction between virtue and philosophy. Tragedy is not a presentation of pure abstract idea. For, such an idea is to be realised only in philosophic contemplation. Tragedy is not philosophy. It is imitation of worthy or illustrious and perfect action. It is, therefore, not concerned with the pure intellectual aspect of the human soul. Its aim is to present the appetitive aspect, to which all passions and emotions belong and which is the spring of all actions. It presents human soul, not in its blind pursuit of the objects of sensuous satisfaction, but in its effort to strike the *mean* between two extremes under the guidance and control of reason; or rather a soul which, because of long and continuous obedience to the dictates of reason, has got into the habit of always following the middle course between two extremes, a soul, which is virtuous, worthy or illustrious and exhibits its worthiness in all actions.

But tragedy is not the only product of the Poetical Muse. Epic and comedy are also her products. The meaning of imitation, as has just been stated, is the particular meaning in the context of tragedy. In general, however, imitation means presentation of action of worthy and virtuous persons no less than that of the depraved and vicious. Men are of three kinds: (i) better or (ii) worse than we are and (iii) like ourselves. Epic, such as that of Homer, imitates better men than we are. Tragedy and comedy differ from each other because of the difference in their objects of imitation. The former imitates better and the latter worse men. The former is the presentation of the beautiful and the latter that of the ugly.

IMITATION IN COMEDY.

The full meaning of comedy, we can understand only if we remember Aristotle's conception of the ugly. According

to him, as we have already stated, there are two principles, idea and matter. And although they are always together, yet matter does not always submit to the directing force and control of idea. It resists the force of idea. Thus, when matter refuses to submit to idea and asserts itself in disobedience to the dictates of reason, we have the ugly and deformed. Therefore, while tragedy is concerned with the presentation of the supremacy of idea over matter, comedy is concerned with the presentation of self-assertion of matter, paying no heed to the commands of reason.

But the principle of imitation, which consists in presentation of an advance on the given reality and not as it is, holds good both in tragic and comic presentation. The difference between them lies only in this, namely, while tragedy presents a more advanced stage in the expression of idea in the material medium than we can find in the objective world; comedy presents a more advanced stage in the self-assertion of matter, in utter disregard of the commands of reason, than can be met with in the phenomenal world.

But comedy does not cease to please simply because it is a presentation, not of the beautiful but of the ugly. There is an inherent tendency in man to take delight in imitation, irrespective of the fact whether the presented is beautiful or ugly. The mere consciousness that the object present before us is an imitation of something that exists in the world of nature, though that object in itself may be ugly, is sufficient to please the human mind. It is the *recognition* of a natural object in an artistic production "This is that" which is responsible for pleasure. There is a kind of *inference* and, therefore, some exercise of the intelligence is involved in such a recognition. And as the exercise of reason, the highest aspect of the human soul, is always pleasant to the mind, comedy is pleasant.

It was Aristotle, who first noticed that presentation of ugliness in representative art has its own fascination. He was the first to contradict the Platonic view that the artistic presentation affects us as does the corresponding reality. According to Aristotle, it is not the content of likeness but the fact of likeness, which is the secret of attraction in comedy.

WIDER MEANING OF IMITATION.

Imitation, therefore, has a wider meaning for Aristotle than it has for Plato. It is not merely production of a thing, so like what we perceive in nature as to create an illusion of reality, but of things better or worse than they are to be found in the external world. It is the presentation of an advance on a given reality. It is not confined to the perceptible. It extends to the mental. Voices and figures are to be imitated no less than the passions and feelings.

II. THE MEANS OF IMITATION.

Colours, figures, voices, rhythm, words and harmony are the means of imitation. They may be used separately or jointly. The arts of the flute and the lyre, for instance, employ rhythm and harmony, but dancing employs rhythm without harmony. Dancers, through figured rhythm imitate passions, manners and actions. Epic alone imitates by means of mere words or metre. It employs either a certain kind of metre or mixes various kinds of metre in the composition. But tragic, comic and dithyrambic poetry employ three means, rhythm, melody and measure.

These arts are different from one another according to the means by which they produce imitation. The characteristic of imitation, which consists in producing or making similar to the ideal, which is present before the mind's eye of the artist, is common to all of them.

III. THE MANNERS OF IMITATION.

Imitation by means of words may be effected in three ways. (i) The poet may himself narrate the whole thing from the beginning to the end in his own person, without in any way concealing his identity. (ii) He may assimilate himself to any person or persons, character or characters of the plot, which he is poetising, so as to conceal completely his personality from the hearers and readers, making them think that it is not the poet but the character or characters of the plot who are speaking. This is what is done in tragedies and comedies. (iii) He may combine the two aforesaid manners, as is done in the epic; as, for instance, Homer does in his Iliad.

Here Aristotle differs from Plato. While according to the latter, narration is not imitation and assimilation alone is imitation: according to the former, narration and assimilation both are equally manners of imitation. The reason is obvious. Imitation, according to Plato, consists in producing an illusory likeness of what already exists as an object of sense in a medium which is the object of the same sense as the original. But narration is not a presentation in words so similar to the original as to lead the hearer to mistake it for the original. For, even if we do not take other points of difference into account, the difference in the 'person' is so striking that it will force itself upon us and make us realise the difference from the original. Plato, therefore, had to reject narration as a manner of imitation.

IMITATIVE FACULTY AND INTEREST IN IMITATION INBORN.

We observe that children like to imitate. They are most imitative. All acquisition of knowledge in childhood is through imitation. We delight in seeing the imitations not only of those, the sight of which is pleasing, but also of

those the sight of which is painful or dreadful; for instance, the imitations of loathsome worms and dead bodies.

The reason for delight is that learning, the extension of knowledge, is equally delightful to both philosopher and layman. And by means of imitative production we are able to get the knowledge of the external realities which may, under the circumstances, not be otherwise possible. The consciousness that the object present before us is an imitation frees it from the horrible and disgusting elements. Hence the imitations of the disgusting also are pleasant.

Imitations are pleasing only when they are recognised to be imitations of known realities; otherwise pleasure from imitation is not because it is imitation, but because of the goodness of workmanship or of colours.

Having thus briefly surveyed the entire field of art, to which Aristotelian theory of imitation applies, we turn to tragedy with which he primarily deals in his Poetics.

ACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF TRAGEDY.

Action is the object of tragic imitation. It is not, however, every action that tragedy imitates. Imitation in tragedy is confined to action of a certain type only, worthy, perfect and illustrious action. In order to get at the full meaning of this part of the definition we have to recall to our minds the Aristotelian conception of the soul, the principle of life and, therefore, the mainspring of all actions.

All the five aspects of the soul, admitted by Aristotle, (i) Nutritive (ii) Sensitive (iii) Appetitive (iv) Imaginative and (v) Intellective, are responsible for action of some kind or another. Of these the first is thoroughly irrational. The second, third and fourth are partly rational and partly irrational, inasmuch as they submit to the control of reason,

but not necessarily always. The last is purely rational. The first is responsible for motion or activity of growth, procreation and decay ; and represents the plant soul. The second and third characterise the animal soul in so far as they are not under the direction of reason. The animal possesses the sensitive power. It sees, hears, tastes, touches and smells the variety of objects of the external world, and according as the sense-activities are furthered or impeded, he feels pleasure or pain in them and, therefore, being prompted by desire or appetite for sensuous pleasure, acts in a variety of ways to acquire the object, if it is known or discovered to be the object of pleasure, but tries to shun or get away from it if the case be the reverse.

The tragic imitation has nothing to do with the action of these types, because tragedy is not an imitation of action of plant or that of animal, and for that matter, not even of that which, though found in man, is essentially the characteristic action of plant or animal, in which the nutritive, sensitive and appetitive aspects of the soul do not submit to the command of reason. It is strictly confined to the action, which is characteristically human; which is the result[1] of long and continuous struggle between the two opposing forces, nutritive, sensitive and appetitive on one side and rational on the other, of victory of the latter over the former and of consequent habitual submission of the first three to the last.

The relation between the former and the latter aspects of the soul is very much like the one that exists between matter and form in external nature. Just as matter does not always readily submit to the rule of form, but resists it and consequently gives rise to what is deformed and ugly, so the nutritive, sensitive and appetitive aspects of the soul do not

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1. Pet., 41.

necessarily always submit to the dictates of reason; on the contrary, they resist it occasionally and so are responsible for what is immoral and sinful in man.

Tragic imitation has nothing to do with the immoral and sinful action. Nor has it to do with the accidental and isolated action that follows from equally accidental and isolated victory of the rational over the irrational and partly rational and the consequent unwilling and grudging submission of the latter to the dictates of the former. On the contrary, it has to do with a series of actions which is due to the habitual submission of the irrational and partly rational aspects to the purely rational aspect of the soul, a series that leads to one end.

PERFECT ACTION.

We have shown above that the soul, according to Aristotle, is not all reason. It is made up of irrational as well as rational parts. The human soul is not only rational but also nutritive, sensitive and appetitive. Perfection in action, therefore, consists, not in the enslavement of the latter by the former, but in the harmonious working and perfect co-operation between the opposing forces. In order that the end of human life may be fully realised, different aspects of the soul must act in the right way; there should exist right relation between reason, feeling and desire. Hence *perfect action*, which is the object of tragic imitation, is not the perfect action of reason as such, the contemplation of pure ideas, in which intellectual efficiency, wisdom or insight consists; but the perfect action of the emotional aspect of the soul, which consists in the rational attitude towards bodily appetites, fear, danger, anger, desire for economic good, fame and so on; in keeping the *mean* between two extremes. In short, perfect action is virtuous action, which springs from moral disposition or habit of will, voluntary action, consciously purposive action, freely chosen action, the action, which is the realisation of the specific

human nature, which makes manifest the essential nature of human being as such, which distinguishes man from every other creature and which consists, not in mere bodily existence or sensuous feeling, the exercise of the vegetable and animal functions, but in harmonious co-operation between the rational and the irrational aspects of the soul.

IMAGES AND ACTION.

The question is, "What is it in the soul that initiates action?" And the answer is that the appetite, which is nothing but desire, is responsible for action, when the senses are affected by external objects and the affection is realised to be pleasant or painful, according as the sense-operations are furthered or impeded and consequently there arises the desire to gain or shun the object. This is a point, which we discussed in a preceding section. But action is not always necessarily consequent on the immediate affection of the senses. Man is not always aroused to action by what is directly present. Action of a higher type, the characteristic human action, is not that, to which man is forced by the directly present object of sense. It is rather that which he initiates independently of the immediate sense-stimulus. The question, therefore, now is, "What is it that is responsible for independent initiation of action ?" Aristotle's reply to this is that images move us to action.

He holds[1] that the affection is not only in the organs of sense, while they are perceiving, but also in the deeper parts when they have ceased to perceive; it is in their deeper parts as well as at the surface. This is evident in those cases in which perception of an object is continued for a long time. For, when we turn the sense in another direction, the impression follows. When, for instance, we look away from the sun, the movement produced in the eye

1. De An., 463.

by the light persists. The fact is that perception sets up a repercussion both[1] in the body and in the soul. This effect, which is more lasting than perception itself, remains in a potential state. It is not a conscious state of mind but an unconscious modification of it. It is capable of being revived and of being brought to the conscious state from the unconscious. The potential can be actualised. Hence images, less lively and less trustworthy than the sensuous, are formed and attended to. *The faculty which is responsible for revival is imagination.* Dream, memory and recollection, which are made up of the residual traces of past sensations, are due to this faculty. Both thought and desire presuppose imagination. Desire presupposes imagination[2] of the good or the pleasant. And it is impossible to think without images before the mind. The use of images in thinking implies their use in that process of deliberation, in which the mind balances the present against the future and decides upon a course of action.

Thus, the process[3] and faculties involved in the initiation of action may be summed up as follows :—

1. The appetitive faculty fixes upon an end.

2. The practical intellect, as distinct from the speculative intellect, calculates the means to the end and decides upon the course of action.

3. Imagination co-operates with both. Hence, according to Aristotle, practical intelligence and appetency in co-operation with imagination initiate action.

SOURCES OF ACTION.

Tragedy is a presentation of action. Every action presupposes an agent, by whom it is effected or performed. The

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1. **Ross., 143.**
2. **De An., LVIII.**
3. **De An., 151.**

question, therefore, is, "What is it in the agent that is responsible for the action that tragedy presents?" And the answer is that the manners and sentiments are the mainsprings.

MANNERS.

Manners are nothing but moral habits, which are formed by repeated efforts at the subordination and subjugation of the irrational aspects of the soul to the rational in a variety of situations, in which the agent finds himself and is called upon to act. They constitute one of the mainsprings of action and are responsible for giving a certain quality to it.

There are four requisites of manners :—

1. They ought to be good. Goodness of manners consists in goodness of deliberate intention in the performance of action. And the presentation of good manners is necessarily through the manifestation of deliberate intention in words and deeds.

2. They should be adapted to the person concerned. They should be such as befit the sex and social status of the person. It would, for instance, be improper to represent a woman[1] as brave and terrible.

3. There is a difference of opinion among the interpreters about the third point. Buckley says that they must be similar. Butcher says that they must be true to life. Bosanquet says that they must be natural and, therefore, seems to follow the latter.

4. They should be uniform. Whatever be the moral habits, which the hero is represented to have, he should consistently be made to show them in all actions and situations. It is undramatic to show one and the same person reacting to similar situations in different ways.

1. Poe., 435-6.

RELATIVE POSITION OF MANNERS AND ACTION.

Manners give a certain character to the hero. But his actions are responsible for his happiness or misery. Therefore, tragedy, which is a presentation of action, cannot exist without action. It may exist without manners. The end of tragedy is not the imitation of manners. It may involve manners because of action. Action and fable are the end of tragedy. Such tragedies exist as are without manners. Manners are responsible for the deliberate choice of both word and action. Hence those speeches and actions are without manners, in which there is no evidence of choice.

SENTIMENT.

Sentiment is the means adopted by the speakers "to demonstrate anything or to explain their meaning". It may be defined in a general way as the discursive energy of reason. But accurately speaking it is that power of the soul, which reasons scientifically, deriving the principle of reasoning from the intellect. The latter definition is appropriate to the Greek word "dianoia"—which Aristotle has used in the present context and has been translated as "sentiment"—so far as the power of the soul is not influenced in its reasoning by imagination and opinions. But it does not fit in with the context of action. In Buckley's opinion, therefore, it means the discursive energy of reason, not expressed but in the mind and forming the mainspring of action.[1] This opinion seems to have been followed by Bosanquet, who interprets "dianoia" as intellectual reflection.[2]

LIMITATION OF THE TRAGIC ACTION.

In the preceding paragraphs we have discussed perfect action and shown that it is nothing but virtuous action, such as is characterised by habitual submission of the irrational aspects

1. Poe., 417-8.
2. Bos., 69.

to the rational and consists in following the mean between two extremes. We have also shown that such an action is not only stimulated by the sensuous objects and situation but also is initiated by the co-operation of imagination with practical intellect and appetency. But perfect action is not identical with the tragic action. For, tragedy presents a complete action and the completion of an action lies in the attainment or realisation of the fruit, aimed at by the agent. Presentation of the attainment of the objective by the hero, however, can never excite the tragic emotions of pity and fear in the spectators. In order to show clearly the reasons why it does not do so, we have to discuss the nature of the tragic emotions themselves and the causes, which are responsible for their arousal.

GENERAL NATURE OF EMOTION.

Pity and fear, which the tragic action aims at arousing, are emotions. And emotions as such are, according to Aristotle, psycho-physical. For, according to his system, everything has two aspects, (i) formal and (ii) material. Even the animate subject is form[1] implicated in matter. Every action and emotion, therefore, naturally has a formal side, as concerns the soul and a material side, as concerns the body. Every emotion is a fact of the soul as well as a fact of the body. Anger, for instance, may be defined in its spiritual aspect as a desire for hurting one, who has hurt us, and in its physical aspect as boiling of the blood and heat round about the heart. Thus, emotion, which rises in an animated subject, is a complex fact having two aspects, which implicate each other, though they can be logically distinguished.

Emotions exist in the mind;[2] pleasure and pain are their

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1. Cro., 459.
2. Rhe., 105.

attendants. Their operations bring about a change in animated beings and influence decision. Aristotle considers them under three heads. Confining our attention to pity and fear, with the arousal of which tragedy is concerned, we may present these heads as follows :—

1. How are those, who are susceptible to pity and fear, affected ?

2. Whom do they usually pity and fear ?

3. On what occasions do these emotions rise ?

FEAR.

Fear is a sort of pain or agitation arising out of an idea that an evil[1] capable of either destroying or giving pain is impending over us. Only such evils cause fear as are capable of causing considerable pain or destruction and such as are not far removed, but about to happen. The distant evils are not feared.

Such evils are the hatred and anger of those who are powerful enough to harm, and who possess both will and power, so that they may execute their will at any moment. Injustice possessed of power, insulted virtues, accomplices in guilt, those who have been wronged, those who are rivals for the same objects and generally speaking all those things, which happening to others, excite compassion, are the objects of fear. Those persons, who think that they will not suffer anything, are free from fear. For fear arises out of apprehension of some destructive evil.

Confidence is the opposite of fear and that, which inspires it, is the opposite of what arouses fear. Confidence is the hope of things conductive to safety, accompanied by an idea that they are near.

1. Rhe., 121-3.

PITY.

Pity is a sort of pain,[1] occasioned by an evil, which is capable of hurting or destroying, which appears to befall one, who does not deserve it, and which one may oneself, or some-one closely connected, expect to endure. The evil excites pity when it is near.

Those persons do not feel pity, who are under the excitement of courage : for, they do not calculate the future : nor do those, who are violently affected by fear.

Pity is felt towards friends and acquaintances, if they be not of close connection. About the person, very closely connected, people feel just as they do about themselves. The former is the circumstance for pity and the latter for horror. Horror is distinct from pity and has a tendency to expel pity from the breast.

Pity is felt if the evil appears to be approaching. It is felt towards those, who are equal in age, temper, habits, rank and social standing. For, in all these cases, evil is seen with greater clearness as possible to befall oneself also. Whatever men fear in their own cases they pity when they see it befalling another.

Indications such as garments etc. and actions of those, who have suffered, excite pity. Pity is particularly excited if the person bears the evil virtuously.

THE EFFECT OF DRAMATIC PRESENTATION.

Only such disasters as are near at hand excite pity. Past and distant future disasters either do not do so or do so faintly. Hence the characters, which are got up with the help of *gestures, voice, dress and acting, generally have greater effect in producing pity. For, through acting the evil appears close at hand.*

1. Rhe., 136.

FRIENDLY FEELING.

Aristotle maintains[1] that pity is felt towards friends and acquaintances. For a clearer understanding of his idea of pity, therefore, it is necessary to state here summarily his views on friendship. Friendly feeling is the wishing a person what we think good for his sake and not for our own and the exerting ourselves to procure it so far as it lies within our powers. Hence a friend is one, who entertains and returns this feeling, who participates in joy at good fortune no less than in sorrow at what agrieves, to whom the same things are good and evil and who is friend and foe to the same persons.

Friendship is felt towards those, who have the same ideas and ideal, who have the same friends and enemies, who have the same interest and to whom the same things are good or bad as in the case of ourselves. It is felt towards those who are good in respect of moral excellence, who are of approved character, who are neat in their appearance, dress and whole manner of living, who do not inspire us with fear and before whom we feel confidence.

CHORUS AS FRIENDS OF THE HERO.

Pity from tragic presentation, according to Aristotle, is possible only in those spectators who are friendly towards the hero. This will become clear if we remember Aristotle's conception of the chorus. They are the ideal spectators. The psycho-physical conditions, therefore, necessary in the audience for the tragic experience from a dramatic presentation, are just those, in which the chorus are presented. They are the friends of the hero. This involves identity of interests, feelings and relations, no less than identity of values and responses. In short, the tragic experience presupposes identification of the spectator with the

1. Rhe., 116-8,

hero, not such as involves complete merging of the individuality of the former into that of the latter. For, in that case the feeling of pity, which presupposes the objective cognition of him who is pitied, will be out of the question. It presupposes identity of interests, values and responses only, while the individuality of the individual spectator remains in tact.

TRAGIC ERROR.

Now the question is, "If tragedy is a presentation of perfect action and, therefore, of perfect man, how can there be anything in it such as can be responsible for the excitation of pity?" For, pity arises from the sight of suffering. But how can a person, who is morally perfect, meet with what is pitiable? To present such a man falling into adverse conditions from the prosperous, is impious. Such a presentation is neither a subject of commiseration nor of terror.[1]

To answer this question, Aristotle seems slightly to modify the definition of tragedy. He maintains that the hero of tragedy should neither be a worthy or morally perfect man, nor a depraved person, who falls from prosperity into adversity, but a character between the two, who neither excels in virtue and justice, nor is changed through vice and depravity from a state of great renown and prosperity into that of disrepute and adversity, but who experiences this change through some great error as does Œdipus. What he actually means by this becomes clear if we fully understand his theory of error as discussed in his Ethics and apply it to the action and consequent fate of Œdipus.

THREE TYPES OF ACTION.

There are three types of action: (i) voluntary (ii) involuntary and (iii) not-voluntary. Voluntary action is that, on

1. Poe., 430-1.

account of which the agent is praised or blamed, according as it happens to be in accordance with the moral principle or otherwise. Involuntary action, on the other hand, is that, for which the agent is either excused or pitied. It is divided into two kinds (i) that which is done under compulsion and (ii) that which is done through ignorance.

I. ACTION UNDER COMPULSION.

Compulsory action is that, which is wholly due to an external cause to which the agent does not contribute anything, which he is forced to do without being given any choice or to which he is dragged by someone of overwhelming power per force. There are, however, actions, to which, though a man is forced by an external cause, yet the force is not so overwhelming as not to leave any room for choice to the agent. For instance, a tyrant bids a person to do something, which is positively disgraceful, and threatens to kill his nearest relations, parents and children, in case of refusal to carry out the behest. Or take another instance. A ship is overtaken by a storm and to save the lives of the passengers and crew it is necessary to throw away the cargo. The question arises, "Is the committal of the disgraceful deed or the throwing away of the cargo under the circumstances, voluntary or involuntary?" It is not a voluntary act in so far as it is done under the compulsion[1] from outside, yielding to which is a lesser evil than total indifference to it. But, in spite of the compulsion, there is still a choice left to the agent. Such actions, therefore, are of mixed nature, partly voluntary and partly involuntary.

II. ACTION THROUGH IGNORANCE.

The other kind of involuntary action is that which is done through ignorance, not of the principle, which determines the choice, nor of the universal, but of the particular, agent,

1, Pet., 58-9,

object, means, circumstances, end, deed or manner. An act, done through ignorance of any of them, is involuntary, provided the agent really feels sorry when he discovers the particular, in the ignorance of which the deed was done. Such acts are the ground of pity and pardon. For, they are really involuntary.

Thus, when Aristotle talks of error, as the cause of change of hero's condition from prosperous into adverse and holds it to be primarily responsible for the tragic emotion in the spectator, he means the ignorance of some of the particulars of action. This will become clear, if we apply what we have said in regard to action, done through ignorance, to the case of Œdipus.

THE FACTS, ŒDIPUS WAS IGNORANT OF.

Laius, King of Thebes, had been told at Delphi by the Oracle that a son would be born to him, who would slay him and marry his wife. Therefore, when Iocasta, the queen, bore a son, the babe was given to a shepherd to be exposed on a mountain. This man, out of pity, gave it to another shepherd, who took it to Corinth and there it was brought up as the son of King Polybus and was named Œdipus.

Years went by. Once, at a feast, young Œdipus was taunted with not being the real son of Polybus. He went to ask the Oracle at Delphi and there he was told that it was his destiny to kill his father and to marry his mother. He, therefore, resolved never to go near Corinth again and took the road going towards the East. On the way he met Laius. He was ignorant of the fact that the person in front was his father. A quarrel occurred. Œdipus slew Laius and three of his followers. Only that shepherd, who had been asked to expose the child (Œdipus) on a mountain, escaped. Œdipus reached Thebes at a time when Thebes was being plagued by the Sphinx, who proposed a riddle to the Thebans and killed all those who could not guess it. He solved the

monster's riddle and the monster hurled herself from the rock on which she sat and died. Œdipus was made the king of Thebes and married Iocasta. After sixteen years a great calamity visited Thebes and the drama begins with Œdipus on the stage, facing a crowd, led by a priest.

We find that the life of Œdipus is nothing but a series of errors. He kills his father and marries his own mother. But all this is done in ignorance of the particulars. While he is killing his father he is ignorant of the fact that the person, at whom he is aiming his blow, is his father. The same is true in the case of his marriage with the mother. The fact is that he fled from Corinth, where he was brought up as the son of the king of the land, for the simple reason that in case he lived there, there could be a possibility of the fulfilment of the prophecy of the Oracle at Delphi. He is a man of very strong character and strict moral principles. But he is ruled by the destiny, which keeps him ignorant of the particulars. Thus, Œdipus errs inasmuch as he is ignorant of the particulars; and his acts are involuntary, because he feels extremely sorry for them as soon as the particulars are revealed to him and suffers the doom from his own hands and, therefore, arouses pity and fear. As such he is a fit hero for the tragedy.

We have so far been concerned with that part of Aristotle's definition of tragedy, which defines the nature of action that tragedy presents. The part, which is now going to be discussed, states the aim of tragic presentation. To effect purification or Katharsis from the excessive elements of emotions, such as pity and fear, is the aim of tragedy.

KATHARSIS.

Kathartic doctrine is difficult and controvertial. It had a long historical development before it came into the hands of Aristotle. It developed slowly from the earliest Katharsis

of the visitor to the house of the dead person. The influence of the Cult of Dionysus on Greek religion played an important part in its development. Plato at many places in his Dialogues refers to the various aspects of the Kathartic doctrine and seems to anticipate Aristotle. It is, therefore, necessary to bring out the full implication of "Katharsis" by tracing out the history of the Kathartic doctrine and by putting together what Plato says on the subject.

Thus, the Kathartic doctrine was not a new creation of Aristotle. It was prevalent in Greece as a religious doctrine long before philosophy and, therefore, æsthetics came into being in that land. Aristotle has simply adopted it with some modification to explain the nature of the effect of a tragic presentation on the spectator. For a clear understanding of Aristotle's doctrine of Katharsis it is necessary to have a definite idea of what Katharsis meant to his predecessors, what were the elements of the then existing doctrine, which he retains, as well as those, which he rejects, and in what respects he has modified it to suit his own purpose.

The accepted meaning of Katharsis is purification. It is the removal of something that is undesirable. Thus, it involves (i) that which is removed (ii) that from which something is removed and (iii) the means of effecting such removal. It is the soul or the body that is purified. It is the impurity from which it is purified. The means of purification, however, are different, according as the impurity, from which the soul or the body is intended to be purified, differs.

TYPES OF KATHARSIS.

I. KATHARSIS OF VISITORS TO FUNERAL CEREMONY.

The Greeks believed that the persons, who visited the house of the dead person, incurred a religious defilement

by coming into contact with the corpse. And at the door of the room, where the corpse lay, a bowl, full of water, brought from another house, was placed. And those who left the house purified themselves with it.

II. KATHARSIS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY.

When the funeral ceremony was over, the members of the family, who incurred more defilement than mere visitors, performed solemn rite of religious[1] Katharsis with the blood of the sacrificed animals, taken in bowls. The belief that the persons attending the funeral get defiled and need purification before they can perform the religious rites, is recorded by Yājñavalkya[2] and other authors of the Smṛtis. According to the Mitākṣarā, the defilement so incurred does not mean simply disqualification for the religious rites but implies certain positive element which gets into the man. The period of impurity and the nature of purificatory rite differ, according as the relation of the person so defiled is near or remote to the dead. The belief is still current in India.

III. KATHARSIS FROM THE BLOOD OF THE SLAIN.

It was the duty of the nearest members of the family of the murdered to avenge the murder. And even the state took upon itself the duty of directing the blood-feud along constitutional channels. The trial was in essence a religious act. It was directed to the satisfaction of the invisible powers, the injured souls of the dead or the ghosts that represented them. Hence[3] all was not over when the human verdict on the case had been given and abided. On his return from exile the man, guilty of involuntary homicide, besides receiving the pardon of the relatives of the dead man, had still a double duty to perform.

1. Psy., 194.
*2. Yaj., 294.
3. Psy., 179.

He had to get purified and had to offer propitiatory sacrifice. Katharsis from the blood of the slain was necessary to remove the impurity, that attached to the murderer, to entitle him to participation in the religious gatherings of state and family.

While Homeric poems know nothing of any such religious purification or Katharsis,[1] Plato had full knowledge of it, as is evident from his Laws, wherein he declares that his state shall take its regulations for Katharsis and propitiation from Delphi.

IV. RELIGIOUS KATHARSIS IN ELEUSINIAN MYSTERY WORSHIP.

Eleusinian princes were instructed by goddess Demeter in the performance of rites[2] due to her. They were kept secret by the princes, who considered it sacrilegious to reveal them to any one outside the circle of their family. These rites ensured the performers a blessed life both here and hereafter.

In consequence, however, of the union of Eleusis with Athens, the Eleusinian mysteries came into Athens, where the Eleusinian system of worship was raised to the position of an official cult. Although Eleusinian mysteries became public soon after the union of Eleusis with Athens and any one could take part in the worship, yet religious Katharsis was a necessary condition of participation in them. Hence those, who were guilty[3] of murder or even shedding of blood, for whom, according to the then prevalent belief, it was impossible to get purified, were excluded from the mysteries.

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1. Psy., 181.
2. Psy., 219.
3. Psy., 222.

V. EMOTIONAL KATHARSIS AND THE CULT OF DIONYSUS.

The four types of Katharsis, which have been discussed so far, were purifications from certain elements of impurity, which entered a person because of either polluting contact with the dead bodies or some such heinous crime as murder. The Kathartic theory of Aristotle has no reference to them. We introduced them to give an historical account of the progress of the Kathartic doctrine, which culminated in the emotional Katharsis, with which Aristotle is primarily concerned in the course of his definition of tragedy.

The emotional Katharsis owes its origin to (i) the adoption of the cult of Dionysus by the Greeks (ii) its psychopathic effect on them and (iii) the discovery by the priests and physicians that the initiation of the persons, suffering from the religious mania, into the Dionysiac ritual was an effective means of purgation or purification of the pent up religious emotion so as to bring the patient to the normal condition.

The cult of Dionysus considerably affected the existing Apollonian religion in Greece. It was responsible for the change in the conception of the soul and consequent rise of mysticism and inspired prophecy. There are occasional references, as has already been stated, in the works of Plato to Katharsis and cult of Dionysus, which throw considerable light on Aristotelian doctrine of Katharsis. We shall, therefore, present the important features of the cult of Dionysus, its adoption by and its effect on the Greeks and references to this cult and Kathartic tradition in Plato, before stating Aristotelian conception of Katharsis.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE CULT.

The cult of Dionysus had its origin in Thrace. It was particularly honoured among those who occupied the southern-

most part. The Greeks had innumerable occasions to come into contact with the Thracian people in many ways at a fairly early period of their history and so came to know of this cult[1].

The cult of Dionysus was essentially different from the Greek worship of the gods, known from Homeric sources. It was closely related to the Phrygian cult of Kybele. It was thoroughly orgiastic in character. It was held on the tops of mountains in the dark night. Various musical instruments such as bronze cymbals, kettledrums and particularly the Phrygian flute were played upon. Excited by this wild music, chorus of worshippers danced with shrill crying and jubilation. The dancers, who were mostly women, whirled round in circular dances till the point of exhaustion[2] was reached. They were strangely dressed in flowing garments. They carried snakes in their hands and brandished daggers. In this way they raged wildly until every sense was wrought to the highest pitch of excitement. In this *sacred frenzy* they fell upon the beast, selected as their victim, tore it to pieces and devoured it raw.

ITS EFFECT ON THE PARTICIPANTS.

The desired effect, which was actually produced by this dance-festival, was ecstasy. Its distinctive features were: (i) Excessive stimulation of senses, such as produced hallucination in those, who were made susceptible to it by the delirious whirl of dance, wild music, darkness etc., which were the characteristic features of Dionysus-worship. Hence all the external objects appeared to the worshipper in accordance with his fancy and imagination. The worshipper was transported from the world of reality to that of imagination. (ii) The violently induced exaltation of senses had a religious purpose. It brought the worshipper into union and relationship with the god and his spiritual attendants.

1. **Psy., 256.** 2. **Psy., 257.**

(iii) It broke the physical barriers of the worshipper. It made him feel raised high above the level of everyday *existence.* The super-human and infra-human were mingled in his person. (iv) It developed powers[1], of which, in everyday life, thwarted by the body, the worshipper knew nothing. It freed him from the limitations of time and space so that he saw what the spiritual eyes only could behold.

ADOPTION OF DIONYSIAC RELIGION IN GREECE AND ITS EFFECT ON ART.

The Greeks received the Dionysiac religion from Thrace and amalgamated it with Apollonian religion. It was no longer the old Thracian Dionysus, who now took the place beside other gods of the Greek Olympus as one of themselves. He was completely Hellenized. He was worshipped as the incarnation of all natural life and vigour, as the typical exponent of the most eager enjoyment of life. (i) *Even art took much of its inspiration[2] and aspiration towards the infinite from the worship of Dionysus.* (ii) Drama arose out of the chorus of Dionysiac festival. (iii) That strange power of transfusing the self into another being, which the really inspired participator in the Dionysiac revel achieved in his ecstasy, was responsible for the growth and development of the art of actor, which consists in entering into the personality of the impersonated character and in speaking and acting like him. In the drama "Bacchants" of Euripides we find a beautiful presentation of exaltation that overwhelmed the senses and enthralled the will and consciousness of the Bacchants, who gave themselves up to the powerful influence of Dionysus.

PSYCHOPATHIC EFFECT ON THE GREEKS.

Dionysiac festival was celebrated in Greece at the temple

1. Psy., 260. 2. Psy., 285.

of Delphi once a year in the spring. It grew in popularity. Large number of the Greeks participated in it. It was continued for a long time. The result was that because of the repeated volitional effort at religious ecstasy, a psychopathic tendency to fall in such an ecstatic state developed and showed itself in the abnormal states of mind, which consisted in the seizure by religious emotion and perception of things which had no corresponding objective reality. At times so many persons were affected by this religious mania that it had the look of an epidemic. The religious mania was well recognised both by psychologists and physicians.

TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS MANIA.

The only means of curing the seizure by the religious mania was the initiation of the patient into Dionysiac ritual. The performance of the ritual, the essential elements of which were the Phrygian music of well-recognised efficacy to arouse an emotion to the highest pitch, whirling dance and burning of incense, brought about the discharge, purgation or purification of pent up religious emotion and so restored the patient to the normal condition. This ritual afforded the opportunity to the religious emotive tendency to have full scope for self-expression to the point of *exhaustion of the excess and so coming to the normal.* The religious minds believed that Dionysus as Bacchus aroused religious[1] madness to the highest point at first and then himself, as Lysios and Meilichios, stilled and tranquilised it.

THE EFFECTS OF DIONYSIAC CULT ON APOLLONIAN RELIGION.

I. INSPIRED PROPHECY.

Greek religion, before it came under the influence of Thracian cult of Dionysus, knew nothing of the inspired

1. Psy., 287.

prophecy. In fact, it knew nothing of the inspiration itself, which consists in the elevation of the human to the divine. For, according to it, there was such an essential difference between humanity and divinity that the two had always to remain separate. There could, therefore, be no question of the rise of the former to the latter, nor could there be merging of the one into the other. Such knowledge, therefore, as is due to the realisation of identity of the one with the other, was out of the question.

The Greeks knew of prophecy, but it did not go beyond intelligent interpretation of such signs of God's will as either occurred accidently or were purposely sought out by men. Prophecy, therefore, was simply an art, in which the would-be prophets could be instructed. To such prophecy Homer refers. Such were the prophets in the temples of Zeus and Apollo. The inspired prophecy came to the Greeks with the advent and acceptance of the cult of Dionysus.

II. MYSTICISM.

Thracian cult of Dionysus was essentially mystic. It believed (i) that a highly exalted state of feeling, enthusiasm or ecstasy, could raise the human soul above the level of everyday consciousness, could free it entirely from the limiting conditions of the body, could raise it to the divine level and could, in reality and not in mere fancy, make it live for a while the life of divinity: (ii) that there is the essential identity of the human and the divine : therefore, as soon as the human soul could free itself from the prison of the body, the sphere of its knowledge would extend beyond the limits of time and space ; it would see things both past and future in all clarity with the spiritual eyes.

Such a belief was not possible so long as the Greeks adhered to their ancient conception of the soul. The element of mysticism also, therefore, was brought to Greece by the cult of

Dionysus, which was responsible for the rise of inspired prophets and completely changed the traditional conception of the soul, as presented by Homer, into a mystic conception, as a spark of the Divine light, as Aristotle puts it subsequently.

III. APPLICATION OF DIONYSIAC ATTRIBUTES TO APOLLO.

Before the advent of the Thracian Dionysiac cult in Greece, the seers of Apollo could prophesy by means of interpretation of omens[1]. They knew nothing of ecstatic prophecy. But prophecy of this kind was preceded by prophecy through premonitory dreams. In Plato's Crito, for instance, Socrates talks to his friend, Crito, (who was so anxious to effect the escape of Socrates from the prison where he was confined before his execution) of the appearance of a woman[2] in a dream, who told him of the things to come, which actually happened. Socrates seems to be referring to the oracular earth-spirit, Python, who prophesied through premonitory dreams. According to a legend of the Delphic temple, this earth-spirit was overthrown by Apollo. Both the forms of prophecy, through premonitory dreams and through interpretation of omens, were replaced by direct prophecy from the mouth of ecstatically inspired prophetess of Apollo.

This may be said to be the beginning of the acquisition by Apollo of the attributes of Thracian Dionysus. Consequently Apollo ceased to be the cold, aloof and sober deity of ancient Greece and was addressed by titles that implied Bacchic excitement and self-abandonment.

IV. ADDITIONS TO THE SEER'S ACTIVITY.

Thracian cult of Dionysus came to Greece at a time when the minds of people were full of superstitions. They believed in invisible spirits and ghosts of all kinds. The diseases, they

1. Psy., 289. 2. Crito, 142 (Jowett).

thought, were due to the influence of spirits. The souls of the departed hovered round and polluted them, according to the then prevalent belief of the Greek people. Therefore, when the doctrine of ecstasy came to Greece, when the invisible spirit-world became visible to the ecstatic priests, their duties remained no longer confined to prophesying the future, but extended to (i) curing of diseases of various kinds, particuarly those of the mind and (ii) averting of evil of every kind, due to impurity, by means of Katharsis. For, both the diseases and impurities were due to the influence of spirits which, though hidden from the physical eyes of the ordinary people, were visible to the spiritual eyes of the priests in ecstasy.

NO IMPLICATION OF MORAL STAIN IN KATHARSIS.

The impurities, for the removal of which Kathartic rites were used, were many and different in nature. But it is evident that Katharsis did not imply any moral stain. The woman with child, the new-born babe, the dead and all those who touched or even accompanied the dead to the graveyard, were regarded unclean and required Katharsis. Equally necessary was Katharsis after bad dream, recovery from illness and touching the offerings, made to the spirits of the nether world or graves. Nobody will admit moral stain in these cases.

No doubt Katharsis was used in the cases of murder and spilling of the blood. But it is clear that even in the case of murder Kathartic rite was not for removing the moral stain. For, it was equally necessary in the cases of voluntary murder, involuntary homicide and just and unjust spilling of blood. The fact, that the remorse and the will to amend on the part of the impure were regarded as superfluous to the efficacy of Katharsis and that the impurity was regarded as something that came from outside, could spread like infection and could be removed by some such thing as the water of a particular

spring, proves the same.

KATHARTIC DOCTRINE IN PLATO.

Aristotle was a famous pupil of Plato. In order, therefore, to find out the correct nature of the influence that Plato had on the Kathartic doctrine of Aristotle, which explains the nature of the effect that presentation of tragedy has on the spectator, according to him, it is necessary to summarise briefly the Kathartic tradition as found in the works of Plato.

DISAPPROVAL OF SOME ASPECTS OF EXISTING KATHARTIC PRACTICE.

I. Two brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, while entreating Socrates to help them in arriving at the truth about the nature of justice and injustice and their relative advantages, speak of the Kathartic priests and their claim to purify by means of mysteries with disapproval. It is clear from their statements that, at that time, there were mendicant prophets[1], who used to go to the doors of richmen and persuaded them that they had a power, committed to them by gods, of *purging a person from his own no less than his ancestors' sins by* sacrifices or charms, and that by magic arts and incantations they could compel gods to execute their will.

II. The same tone of disapproval we find again when in reply to the question of Socrates whether he (Socrates) was right in saying "He, who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher ?" Glaucon says that if curiosity makes a philosopher, many a strange being will have a title to the name. For instance, musical amateurs, who run about[2] at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus.

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1. Rep., 53—6 2. Rep., 214-5.

III. Megillus of Lacedamon, while praising the laws of Sparta regarding pleasures, draws pointed attention to the inexcusability of the use of intoxicating drink at the Dionysiac festivals. No Spartan officer, according to his statement, would let a person, revelling from intoxication, go unpunished. The excuse of[1] Dionysiac festival could not save a reveller from punishment.

THE ASPECTS OF KATHARTIC DOCTRINE APPROVED BY PLATO.

Plato did not disapprove of the cult of Dionysus in its entirety. His disapproval was confined only to those aspects of it, which were in conflict with his ethical theory or which were harmful to the state, according to him.

We have already stated in an earlier section how Apollonian cult at Delphi was influenced and modified by the advent of Thracian cult of Dionysus in Greece. Plato accepts the efficacy of Katharsis in purifying a person who is guilty of the involuntary deeds of violence. For, he holds that if any one in a contest or at the public games involuntarily kills a friend, he can be purified according to the law[2] brought from Delphi, touching such matter. Similarly if a husband kills his wife in a passion or if a wife kills her husband in a similar state of mind they have to undergo the same purification.

EXILE AS NECESSARY ACCOMPANIMENT OF RELIGIOUS PURIFICATION.

From the earliest time, of which we have any information, exile was a recognised form of suffering that people voluntarily underwent for murder and similar crimes. Plato, therefore, in his Laws, Book IX, held that religious purification

1. Laws, B. I, 20. 2. Laws, B. IX, 373.

by itself was not sufficient to purify the sinner from the sin. The suffering or punishment, according to him, was for the benefit of the sinner himself. For, according to the contemporary popular belief, a person,[1] who had lived with the feelings of a free man, having been violently put to death, was, when recently dead, angry with his murderer and, therefore, seeing the murderer passing his time in his own land, terrified and disturbed him. It was, therefore, necessary for the sinner to withdraw himself from the sufferer and to cause a void in all his own places for different periods, according to more or less serious nature of his crime.

But if a person does not obey the law, dares to go to temples and sacrifices unpurified and is not willing to be in exile, let the nearest relative of the deceased prosecute the murderer on charge of blood and let his punishment be doubled if found guilty.

DIONYSIAC AND CORYBANTIAN ANALOGIES IN PLATO.

The interpreters of the Kathartic doctrine of Aristotle differ from one another, according as they hold the analogy, implied by Aristotle in his definition of tragedy, to be medical, or religious. We have no evidence in support of either view in the Poetics itself (which has come down to us only in fragments). Let us, therefore, see if Dionysiac and corybantian analogies, used by Plato, can in any way help us in this connection.

I. Plato, while laying down the laws for nurses and mothers in charge of the infants, says (i) that motion is profitable both to the body and the soul of everyone, particularly to those of the youngest and (ii) that one can conjecture what ought to be done from this fact, that both the nurses of infants and those, who are initiated in the remedies relating to the Corybantes, have adopted the said idea of motion from experience. For,[2] what mothers, when they desire to put to sleep their children, who sleep with

1. Laws, B. IX, 374. 2. Laws, 253.

difficulty, do, is not that they produce a state of quietness and silence, but, on the contrary, what they do is that they produce a state of motion by constantly shaking the children in arms and of fullness with sound by constantly singing to them. Thus, children are soothed by gentle shaking and sweet songs exactly as mad Bacchants are by the violent dance and the sound of the Phrygian windpipe.

The psycho-physical explanation of the effect of motion and sound on the restless person, according to Plato, may be stated as follows :—

Both restlessness in child and Bacchic madness in full-grown youth, are due to fear. And fear is innate in everybody because of the natural depravity of human soul. In the case of superstitious youth, conscious of a crime, fear may also be generated by the imagining of the fury of the unseen vindictive powers.

Agitation, according to Plato, is due to psychological or physical causes. It may be due to inner causes, which do not allow the infant to fall easily into sleep, or which produce Bacchic madness in full-grown youth. It may also be due to outer causes such as motion and song in the case of infant and violent dance and sound of flute in the case of youth, overpowered by Bacchic madness.

Plato holds that agitation that is due to inner causes, is overcome by that for which the outer causes are responsible. The effect of such overcoming is psychological inasmuch as the soul gets calm; and physical in so far as it produces quietness in the leaping heart, which is troublesome in both the cases. Thus, the ultimate effect of agitation, caused by external stimuli, in the case of infant, is that it gets long and sound sleep and in the case of youth, overpowered by Bacchic madness, the final result is that he gets the habit of sound sense in place of a maddened state.

II. In the Symposium, Alcibiades, while praising Socrates, compares him to a flute-player in Corybantine festival as follows :—

Are you not a flute-player? That you are and a far more wonderful performer than Marsyas, from whose teaching melodies of Olympus are derived. He, with his instrument, charmed the souls of men by the power of his breath. His melodies were inspired. They, therefore, possessed the souls of hearers and revealed the wants of those who had needs of gods and mysteries.

But you produce the same effect with voice only. Even the fragments of your speech, at second hand and imperfectly repeated[1], amaze and possess the soul of every man, woman and child, who comes within hearing of them.

Alcibiades gives an interesting description of the psycho-physical and ethical effect of the speeches of Socrates on himself as follows : —

As a result of hearing your speech, Socrates, my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveller and my eyes rain tears; my soul is stirred and I am angry at the thought of my own slavish state. I am conscious of the fact that your speeches are so interesting that if I do not shut my ears against them they would detain me until I grow old. The ethical effect of your speeches is such that I am made to confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my soul and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians. You, and no one else, make me ashamed of myself. The implication of analogies is thus religio-medical.

INFLUENCE OF DIONYSIAC IDEA OF KATHARSIS ON PLATO'S THEORY OF ETHICS.

We have stated in the preceding sections that before the

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1. Sym., 348.

advent of the idea of emotional Katharsis from Thrace, there was purely formal ritual Katharsis in Greece and that it was only after the adoption of emotional Katharsis by the Greeks that they discovered the only means of curing the seizure by the religious mania, which was nothing but initiation of the patient into Dionysiac ritual, the performance of which afforded an opportunity to the religious emotive tendency to have full scope for self-expression to the point of the exhaustion of the excess. Thus, the old conception of Katharsis was widened, inasmuch as now it meant not only freeing a person from the sinful effect of murder and other similar deeds but also from the excess of religious emotion.

Plato made the conception wider still by applying it to his theory of Ethics. According to him, there are four cardinal virtues: (i) wisdom (ii) courage (iii) temperance and (iv) justice. Just as true ideas are essentially different from the shadows of them in the phenomenal world, so true virtue is essentially different from the shadow of it.

This distinction is particularly important for our present purpose, because it is drawn in terms of purification, in Socrate's discourse on the special attributes of a philosopher in an impressive context.

It is the last day of Socrates. His friends gather round him, but they can hardly believe that they are present at the death of a friend. His language and behaviour are so noble and fearless that he appears blessed. He seems to have got a divine call to go to the other world where he would be happy. They, therefore, do not pity him. A discussion naturally starts on the special attributes of a philosopher. Courage and temperance are pointed out as the special attributes of a philosopher.

Philosopher is one, who does not care about pleasures. He despises everything that is more than nature needs. He tries

to dissever body from the soul in every possible way. He is as good as dead in respect of bodily pleasures. He realises that even sight and hearing, which are the best of senses, have no truth in them and that the whole body hinders the acquisition of true knowledge. He is, therefore, very anxious to get rid of the body. He knows that the knowledge of the absolute justice, absolute beauty and absolute good is possible by approaching them through mind alone. He has no doubt about it that while his soul is mingled with the mass of evil, the body, his desire for truth will not be satisfied. He has made the nearest possible approach to truth by rising above the body in moments of deep contemplation. He has no interest in the body, is not saturated by bodily nature and believes that when God is pleased to release him from body, he shall attain purity and will be able to commune with the pure souls, because "he has his mind *purified*." To him *purification*[1] is nothing but the separation of the soul from the body, the habit of the soul to gather and to collect herself into herself, the dwelling of the soul in her own place alone, the release of the soul from the chains of the body.

COURAGE AND TEMPERANCE.

We find that in the course of presentation of his conception of a philosopher, Plato has freed the conception of Katharsis from the ritualistic association and has used the word in the wider sense of separation of the evil from the good. This meaning he applies to two cardinal virtues when he draws distinction between true courage and temperance and shadows of them.

True courage consists in freedom from fear of every kind. Similarly true temperance consists in "the calm,[2] and control, and disdain of passions." Thus, these two virtues belong only to philosophers, who despise the body. But

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1. Phae., 199. 2. Phae., 200.

non-philosophers are not truly courageous and temperate; their courage and temperance are really a contradiction, because neither their courage is entirely free from fear, nor is their temperance so from desire. They face death, because they are afraid of an evil, which they regard as greater than even death, for instance, disgrace, humiliation and bad name. Similarly there are pleasures, which they are determined to have at all costs. They, therefore, abstain from one class of pleasures, because they are overcome by another. But the exchange of one fear for another is not true courage, nor is the exchange of one pleasure for another true temperance. True courage and true temperance are necessarily the companions of wisdom, independently of fears, pleasures and pains or similar other goods or evils. But a cardinal virtue whether courage, temperance or any other, which is influenced by the consideration of pleasures etc., is only a shadow of it. True courage and true temperance involve *purging away* of all fears and pleasures, in fact, all bodily considerations.

Thus, it is evident that Plato was influenced by the Kathartic doctrine in his theory of Ethics. He has used a purely religious doctrine to explain the essential nature of the basic elements of his ethics, the cardinal virtues.

INFLUENCE OF ECSTATIC ASPECT OF DIONYSIAC CULT ON ÆSTHETICS OF PLATO.

Plato's Socrates refers to two points of literary criticism in the course of his talk with Phaedrus on the discourse of Lysias on love in the following context:—

Lysias, the greatest rhetorician of his time, was a contemporary of Socrates. He wrote a work, proving that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover. Phaedrus, while returning from Lysias after hearing

the discourse on love, met Socrates. On hearing that Phaedrus had come from Lysias after listening to a discourse on love, Socrates requested Phaedrus to repeat it to him. As they were talking, Socrates caught sight of a roll in the left hand of Phaedrus under the cloak, which, as was suspected, was nothing but the written discourse. They retired to a beautiful country place. Phaedrus read out the whole discourse and started literary criticism saying "Is not the discourse excellent, specially the language ?"

The two aspects of the discourse, to which Plato's Socrates draws the attention, are (i) Sentiment and (ii) Language. The sentiment, according to him, is responsible for putting the hearer in ecstasy[1]. This ecstasy, which in the present context is called poetic, is due to suspension of judgement and following the example of the reader, who is in ecstasy. It is one of the four types of ecstasy, recognised by Plato, as will be shown in the next section. Its effects are admitted to be similar to those on the participant in the Dionysiac festival, such as (i) excessive stimulation of senses going so far as hallucination (ii) union and relationship with the god (iii) breaking of the physical barriers (iv) freedom from limitations of time and space. The effects of poetic ecstasy on the poet or dramatist, rhapsodist or actor and hearer or spectator are recognised to be very similar. This point is fully brought out by Plato in his Ion. This we will discuss in a subsequent section "Analogy of magnet and iron rings."

Reading of the discourse on love by Phaedrus accordingly is represented to produce ecstatic state in Socrates, because of its sentimental aspect. Socrates is poetically so inspired[2] that he immediately gives a discourse on love,

1. **Phoedrus, 388.** 2. **Phaedrus, 393.**

which Phaedrus himself recognises to be better than that of Lysias.

TYPES OF ECSTASY RECOGNISED BY PLATO.

(I) PROPHETIC MADNESS.

It is a special gift[1] of heaven. It is the source of the choicest blessings among men. It throws the inspired out of their senses, enables them to tell the future of people and guides them aright.

(II) ECSTASY OF THE WORSHIPPER.

This is essentially the same as we have already discussed above in the context of Dionysiac cult.

(III) POETIC ECSTASY.

It is the possession by the Muses. It enters into a delicate and virgin soul. It inspires frenzy and awakens lyric and all other numbers to adorn innumerable actions of the ancient heroes *for the instruction* of posterity.

(IV) ECSTASY OF THE LOVER OF THE BEAUTIFUL

For a proper understanding of this type of ecstasy it is necessary to refresh our memory of Plato's conception of the soul.

SOUL IN THE CONTEXT OF ECSTASY.

The soul is immortal, because only that, which is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases to live. The soul, however, is self-moving and, therefore, immortal. It is beginningless. It is figuratively spoken of as winged. It is in terms of the figurative wings that Plato draws a distinction between god and human being. This soul when perfect and fully winged, soars upward. But an imperfect soul loses her wings and, drooping in her flight, at last settles on the solid ground.

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1. **Phaedrus, 401-2.**

Here she receives earthly frame which, though appearing to be self-moved, is really moved by her power. This composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature. The wings decay when they are fed upon evil, foulness etc., rather than on beauty, wisdom and goodness.

Mind is the lord of the soul. It is capable of beholding the colourless, formless and intangible essence, round which is the heaven of heavens, the place of true knowledge. A soul, which is rightly nourished and is fed upon pure knowledge, beholds the truth.

Very often Plato figuratively speaks of the soul not as winged, but as a charioteer with two winged horses under her control. In such a context he distinguishes between gods and human beings as follows :—

"The winged horses and the charioteer of the gods are all of them noble, and of noble breed, while ours are mixed[1] and we have a charioteer who drives them in a pair, and one of them is noble and of noble origin, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble origin, and as might be expected there is a great deal of trouble in managing them."

The souls, which follow God, are like him and are able to behold the Truth[2] in different degrees, according as desire for earthly pleasure asserts itself more or less in them. But when any soul is unable to follow God, fails to behold the vision of truth, sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, loses her wings and drops to earth, then, according to the law of the goddess of Retribution, she is first born as man.

The soul, which has seen most of truth, is born as a philosopher, artist, musician or lover. But the soul, which has seen the truth in the sixth degree, is born as an imitator.

1. Phaedrus, 403. 2. Phaedrus, 406.

Here Plato seems to draw a distinction between a producer of a true work of art, who is concerned with the presentation of the truth, and an imitator, who attempts to copy the sensible only. The one he classes with philosopher and the works of the other he condemns and refuses them a place in the ideal republic.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE IN THE LIGHT OF PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF LOVER OF BEAUTIFUL.

The fourth kind of madness or ecstasy has been associated with the lover of the beautiful. It is necessary to remember in this connection that the whole discourse on love is addressed to an imaginary youth. Therefore, there are references to the sex-love. If, however, we free the discourse from this imaginary context and take it to be on love of beautiful in art, ignoring references to the sex-love, which come in because of the imaginary context of the discourse, we get a fair idea of the æsthetic experience as Plato thought it to be. The following are the characteristic elements of the experience :—

1. THE RECOLLECTION OF TRUE BEAUTY.

We have discussed above the Platonic conception of the soul. According to this, human soul was once in the company of gods and being possessed of wings could fly with them and have the vision of the true beauty. But, having lost the wings because of being affected by desire for earthly pleasures, it has come down to earth and is born as a philosopher, artist or lover, if she has seen the truth in the highest degree. A lover of the beautiful (shall we say "in Art" ? though Plato himself, for reasons of imaginary context, talks of the natural physical human beauty only) when he sees the beautiful on earth, is transported with the recollection[1] of the true beauty, which he

1. Phaedrus, 408,

experienced while in the company of gods. He would like to fly away, but he cannot, because of the loss of wings. He looks upward and is careless of the world below. He is, therefore, looked upon as mad. This is the noblest and best of all inspirations and he, who is possessed of a part or lot of this madness, is called a *lover of the beautiful*.

But all men do not easily recall the things of the other world. For, they may have either seen the true beauty for a short time only or may have had some evil and corrupting influences and, therefore, may have lost the memory of what they saw there. Just a few only are able to retain the memory of them sufficiently. Whenever, therefore, they see the image of what they saw in the other world, they are rapt in amazement. But they are not able to realise the true meaning of it, because they have no clear perception.

II. PSYCHO-PHYSICAL EFFECT.

The necessary conditions of recollection of the true beauty at the sight of the beautiful on earth are (i) recent initiation and (ii) freedom from corrupting influences. A person, in whom these conditions are present, is *amazed* when he sees a god-like[1] face or form, which is the expression or imitation of divine beauty and at first a *shudder* runs through him and some *misgiving* of a former world steals over him. The shudder naturally passes into an unusual *heat and perspiration*. During this process the whole soul is in a state of *effervescence* and *irritation*. As the soul looks at the beautiful on earth she receives the sensible warm traction of particles, which flow towards her and, therefore, are called attraction, is refreshed and warmed by them and so 'ceases from her pain with joy'. This is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time.

1. Phaedrus, 410.

III. DIFFERENCE IN CHOICE.

Beauty of one object of art differs from that of another, much as does that of one object of nature from that of another. And just as the choice of one individual differs from that of another in regard to the latter so it does in regard to the former. The reason for the individual choice is the individual character, which is determined by the influence, that the company of a particular god exercises on individual souls which follow him. Each soul imitates the god, which it follows in every way as far as possible, in the way of life and the manner of general behaviour. Thus, individual character is predetermined, is fixed before the earthly life of a soul begins. The character determines the choice. Hence it is that different persons love different objects in the world of art as well as in that of nature. A product of art or nature becomes the object of choice to a person of a particular character because of its resembling the god whom he followed in the other world.

IV. IDENTIFICATION WITH THE GOD.

The soul, while in the company of a particular god, is compelled[1] to gaze on him. Recollection of that god, therefore, clings to her. It is revived at the sight of an object similar to the god. Thus, drawing the inspiration from him like Bacchic nymphs, she becomes possessed and gets identified with him.

POETRY THROUGH INSPIRATION.

The inspiration in the case of the spectator is the effect of contemplation on beautiful in the world of art. But the work of art is the effect of direct inspiration. For, poets[2] write poetry not by wisdom but by a sort of *genius* or

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1. Phaedrus. 412.
2. Apo., 108.

inspiration. They are possessed by the *Muses* exactly as diviners or soothsayers are possessed by gods in whose names they prophesy. Good poets compose their beautiful poems as works of art, not through the knowledge of the rules but through inspiration. They are not in their right minds when they are composing their beautiful strains but *like corybantian*[1] *revellers they are inspired* and possessed by the Muses. They gather their strains from the honeyed fountains out of the gardens and dells of the Muses. Thither, like the bees, they wing their way. There is no 'invention' in them till they are inspired and out of their senses.

God takes away the minds of poets and uses them as his ministers. Poets do not speak the priceless words of themselves, but it is God that speaks through them. Poets are only the interpreters of gods,[2] by whom they are severally possessed.

ANALOGY OF MAGNET AND IRON RINGS.

The fact that poets, rhapsodists, actors and spectators are all possessed while producing, reproducing or hearing good poems, is explained by means of analogy of magnet and iron rings. Analogy is intended to bring out the following points :—

1. Just as the first iron ring receives its power from the magnet directly so does the poet from a particular Muse.[3]

2. Just as the successive rings, though they draw their power from the magnet, yet do so, not directly, but through the intermediate rings, so do the rhapsodists, the actors and the spectators. Though they are possessed by the inspiring god, yet the possession takes place through

1. **Ion, 286.**
2. **Ion, 288.**
3. **Ion, 289.**

the intermediary or intermediaries. Poet alone is the intermediary in the case of rhapsodist or actor. But both poet and rhapsodist or actor mediate in the case of the spectator.

PSYCHO-PHYSICAL EFFECT OF POSSESSION.

Just as the power that flows from the magnet is less and less in each succeeding ring, so the possession by the Muse is weaker and weaker as the number of the intermediaries grows. The poet is best possessed, less is the actor and still less so is the spectator. Thus, the poet is completely possessed. His personality is totally transformed. He is utterly forgetful of himself. He does not even know the meaning of what he says. He has no consciousness of the physical level. The actor, however, being under the constraint to act, is not so utterly self-forgetful : for, then, all conscious physical action would be impossible. His physical self-consciousness persists. He, however, is occasionally carried out of himself. His soul is in ecstasy and seems to live among the persons or in places, of which he speaks, or which the scenic arrangements on the stage represent. At the tale of pity his eyes are filled with tears and when he speaks of horrors his hair stands on end and his heart throbs. He is possessed exactly like a *corybantian reveller* at a festival. The effect on the spectators is similar. They show various emotions of pity, fear and wonder stamped on their faces as they see and listen to the dramatic presentation.

THE CONCLUSION.

After discussing at some length the various aspects of the Kathartic doctrine we may, in conclusion, summarily state our view on the controvertial Aristotelian doctrine of Katharsis as follows :—

A particular conception of the soul has been the

chief presupposition of different types of Katharsis from the earliest time. The conception of Katharsis has evolved according as has the conception of the soul in Greece, due to various influences. The types of Katharsis, which presuppose disembodied soul only, such as Katharsis (i) of visitors to the house of the dead man (ii) of members of the dead man's family (iii) from the blood of the slain and (iv) in Eleusinian mystery worship, are of historic value only to us. They do not seem to have much influenced Aristotle's theory of Katharsis. For, the necessary presupposition of his theory is not the essential difference between the humanity and the divinity, as in the case of the said types of Katharsis, but their essential identity, as in the case of the Kathartic doctrine which came from Thrace. Aristotelian doctrine of Katharsis, therefore, does not seem to have been much influenced by purely religious purification as was known to the Greeks before the adoption of the Thracian cult of Dionysus and its incorporation in their own Apollonian religion. The main influence that gave it a definite shape was the emotional Katharsis, which presupposes the true immortality of the soul and involves ecstasy and, therefore, (i) excessive stimulation of senses going so far as to produce hallucination and transportation from the world of reality to that of imagination (ii) breaking away of the physical barriers (iii) freedom from limitations of time and space and (iv) union with the ideal to some extent. Our view that Aristotelian conception of Katharsis is due to the influence of the Thracian cult of Dionysus, is supported by the fact that the influence of this cult in allied spheres is well recognised in authoritative quarters. For instance, it is admitted that (i) it was the ecstatic aspect of the cult of Dionysus, which gave Greek art much of its inspiration towards the infinite : (ii) the Chorus of Dionysiac festival gave rise to Greek drama : (iii) the power of transfusing the self into another being,

which the really inspired participators in the Dionysiac revel achieved, was responsible for the growth and development of the art of acting. Thus, long before Aristotle, Dionysiac cult had influenced the production of the works of art. It was for the genius of Aristotle to discover that the effect of a work of art on the spectator, who is a lover of the beautiful, is identical with that on the participant in the Dionysiac festival. What he had particularly in mind was Katharsis as a cure of the religious mania, which occasionally had taken the form of an epidemic and had been recognised by both psychologists and physicians ; and the only recognised cure of which was the initiation of the patient into Dionysiac ritual. Katharsis as a cure of religious mania involved excitation of the religious emotion to the point of exhaustion of the excess and so its coming to the normal. The analogy, implied by Aristotelian Katharsis, therefore, is religio-medical.

According to Aristotle, virtue is the mean, the absence of *excess*. And the religious minds in Greece believed that Dionysus as Bacchus aroused religious madness to the highest pitch at first and then himself as Lysios and Meilichios stilled and tranquilised it. This suggested the pedagogic theory of Art to the genius of Aristotle. For, all extremes he held to be vices. If, therefore, participation in Dionysiac revel brought about the exhaustion of the excess of emotion and produced normal condition of the mind ; the same must hold good of tragedy that grew out of Dionysiac festival.

One point has to be clearly remembered in this connection. Though, according to the earlier belief of the religious minds in Greece, only the participators in the revel attained freedom from the excess in emotive tendency, yet Aristotle maintains that tragedy effects purification or purgation of the spectator also from the extreme or excess in emotive tendency.

He was encouraged in this extension of the Kathartic doctrine by his teacher, Plato, himself. For, Plato in his Ion had recognised that the psycho-physical condition of the spectator, consequent on witnessing a dramatic presentation, is almost the same as that of the dramatist at the time of production and of the actor at the time of representation.

Even the ethical effect of a literary work on the hearer had been recognised by Plato, in his Symposium, on the analogy of Corybantian reveller. For, Alcibiades is made to confess such an effect of the speech of Socrates on himself.

The fact is that Aristotle had been anticipated by his predecessors in general and his teacher in particular. But Plato was not a poetician. He was primarily a political philosopher. He probably met with a large number of pleasure-seeking theatre-goers, who were not the lovers of the *Beautiful*, according to the Platonic conception, as we have discussed above. He, therefore, for political and philosophical reasons, condemned art in his Republic, though not without a feeling of hesitation. Aristotle seems to have taken up his teacher's statement about the condition, on which he was prepared to allow Art to live in his ideal Republic in Laws, B. II. Accordingly, he tries to prove philosophically, by putting forward the theory of Katharsis, that Tragedy at least is capable of bringing about moderation in people. With improved philosophy and freedom from political bias, as a true poetician, he took a forward step in the field of æsthetics and recognised art to be the hand-maid of morality.

If we put the Kathartic theory in the light of Aristotle's ethical doctrine of the *Mean*, we get a clear idea of the nature of the effect of tragic presentations. The effect of tragic presentation on good audience in the light of this

theory can be nothing else than moderation, removal of excess, harmony, coming to the mean. Hence it is that his æsthetic theory is called "Pedagogism". Thus, Aristotle improves upon the æsthetic theory of his teacher by raising art from the sphere of mere sensuality to that of *morality*.

CHAPTER IV.

DRAMATIC TECHNIQUE

LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF TRAGEDY.

In the preceding chapter we have discussed the introductory and the concluding parts of Aristotle's definition of tragedy. There is a logical connection between the two parts. The former states the cause and the latter the effect. The one deals with the action, which is primarily to be presented in tragedy and the other states the effect which it aims at producing in the spectator. These two parts together deal with tragedy philosophically. They presuppose a thorough understanding of his metaphysics and ethics on the part of the reader for their appreciation. It was, therefore, to refresh the memory of our readers that we discussed briefly some of the relevant aspects of his philosophy.

Having thus dealt with tragedy in relation to metaphysics and ethics, let us subject it now to the logical analysis. The fact is that Aristotle himself is concerned with the logical analysis of tragedy. We know that of the ten categories of Aristotle, the first four are (1) substance (ii) quantity (iii) relation and (iv) quality. In the present context we are concerned with these four only.

The subject of a proposition, according to Aristotle, is identical with his first category, the substance. The rest of the categories are simply answers to various possible questions in regard to the first. Having, therefore, represented tragedy to be a substance by putting it as a subject of a proposition, he proceeds to define it in terms of relation by speaking of it as an imitation of action.

The Chapters, which follow the one, in which he defines tragedy, are primarily concerned with the analysis of tragedy, according to quality and quantity and elaboration of the elements which such an analysis reveals.

The fact is that Aristotle himself, as if to impress upon his readers the idea that his analysis of tragedy is strictly logical, says in the beginning of chapter Twelve :—

"But we have before spoken of the parts of tragedy which are requisite to constitute its quality. The parts of tragedy, however, according to quantity and into which it is separately divided are as follow :"

We deal with the two analyses successively.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRAGEDY.

The following are the six parts of tragedy, which give it its quality :—

1. Ornament of the spectacle or scenery.
2. Diction.
3. Song.
4. Manners.
5. Sentiment.
6. Fable or plot.

They are related to imitation in one of the three ways : (i) as means (ii) as manner or (iii) as object. The ornament of the spectacle and diction are the means of imitation. Appeal of tragedy is confined to two senses only, the eye and the ear. It is, therefore, an imitation of what is visible to the eye and audible to the ear. The means of presenting the visible is the *ornament*[1] *of the spectacle*. It comprehends scenery, dress and the whole visible apparatus of theatre.

1. Poe., 417.

ORNAMENT OF SPECTACLE NOT ESSENTIAL.

Of all these six parts of a tragedy the ornament of the spectacle, the theatrical apparatus, is the most unessential. No doubt, it is alluring but it is more a product of the art of the mechanic than that of the poet. It is not essential to tragedy, because the power of tragedy to arouse, to exhaust and to harmonise emotions, remains totally unaffected by the absence of the theatrical apparatus and actors. A man of taste for tragedy has the same experience by reading a tragedy in an easy chair as he has when he witnesses it staged.

DICTION.

Just as theatrical apparatus is the means of presenting the visible so diction is the means of imitating the audible. It is primarily an interpretation, presentation, of the meaning that the entire field of stimulus, internal or external, has to different persons involved in the plot, in such words as have the same power to stimulate the ideas, for which they stand, in the reader or hearer both in prose and verse.

But the linguistic presentation has to extend to all such details as are necessary to put up a complete pen-picture before the reader so as to enable him to visualise the tragedy independently of the scenic arrangements and the actors.

For a successful presentation of such a pen-picture, two things are necessary on the part of the poet or dramatist :—

(i) He should look at his work from the point of view of the spectator. For, this is the only way to discover what is becoming and what is repugnant in his production. His pen-picture of the whole tragedy should be so clear as to give the impression that he was present at the transactions themselves.

(ii) He should work himself, as far as possible, into the passion that he is about to present by even assuming the

countenance and gestures, which are its natural expressions. For, only they have most probability and truth in their 'imitations', who themselves feel the passion : and no one else can express the agitation of the mind so naturally as the one who is himself agitated.

Tragedy is a presentation, in words, of the psycho-physical conditions of the hero and other characters, involved in the plot, in befitting situations. The power of visualisation and clear objectification helps in the presentation of the physical conditions and situations. And the power of identification with the ideal characters helps, in depicting the psychological conditions. Hence these two are absolutely essential for a successful and effective linguistic presentation. The 20th chapter of Aristotle's Poetics, in which the parts[1] of diction from letter to sentence are dealt with, is believed to be a later interpolation. We, therefore, need not discuss its contents here.

PERSPICUITY AS A VIRTUE OF DICTION.

Perspicuity is distinct from 'meanness'. It is due to avoidance of the exclusive use of 'proper nouns' i.e. the nouns in their usual signification in common use, and introduction of a fair proportion of the unusual words, the words, which are 'foreign', metaphorical or extended. For, extensive use of metaphors produces enigma, which unites things impossible but really true. Similarly frequent occurrence of foreign words smacks of barbarism. Beautiful perspicuity[2], therefore, is due to the proportionate mixture of foreign, metaphorical and extended words in the presentation of tragedy. The exclusive use of 'proper nouns' gives to the composition only mean and vulgar perspicuity but not the beautiful.

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1. Poe, 447 F. N.
2. Poe., 454-5.

SONG

Song pertains to the manner of imitation.[1] While Aristotle devotes a chapter or so to each of the other five parts of tragedy, to song he does not give any separate chapter in the course of his available portion of the Poetics. According to him, it is the greatest of embellishments and its power is apparent.

MANNERS AND SENTIMENT.

They together with fable or plot are the objects of imitation. We have dealt with them in the preceding chapter as the sources of action. We can, therefore, pass over them here.

FABLE OR PLOT.

Fable, in this context, according to Aristotle, means a series of logically connected incidents. Incidents involve actions, because they are fruitions of actions or are related to them as their circumstances etc. According to Aristotle, therefore, "Fable is indeed imitation of action."[2] It is the end of tragedy, because presentation of one isolated, incomplete and imperfect action cannot make a tragedy; nor can a series of actions, without a logical connection, though related to one person, make a tragedy. A series of actions, complete in themselves, but logically connected with one another, co-operating in the production of one end, is necessary for tragedy. Just as different colours, thrown on canvas without design, are not attractive, so are not unconnected actions. It is the fable or plot that necessitates putting actions in the logical connection and arrangement of the parts of transactions in such a way that any one of them being transposed or taken away the whole becomes different.[3]

1. Poe., 418. 2. Poe., 418.
3. Poe., 423.

It is, therefore, the principal part and as if it were the soul of tragedy. Its greatest parts, by which it allures the soul, are revolution and discovery. The action that it imitates or presents should be whole or complete and possess magnitude. For, it is the magnitude of action that gives it magnitude and makes it beautiful: because fable is beautiful only when it possesses proper magnitude. Here, therefore, it is necessary to deal with the magnitude or length of action.

LENGTH OF ACTION.

Tragic action is not to be confined to such deeds as are immediately responsible for the arousal of pity and fear. It should have magnitude also. For, nothing that is very small is beautiful, because the survey of the small, being effected in insensible time, is confused. Nor is that, which is too big to be surveyed at once, beautiful: for, its existence as a well-ordered whole escapes the view of the spectator. Hence magnitude of action should be such as may be surveyed distinctly in a definite duration of time and can easily be remembered. The greater the magnitude of action, the more beautiful it is, provided it is perspicuous. Action has magnitude[1] when the time taken in its presentation is such as renders probable the transition from prosperous to adverse or vice versa.

It is mainly the completeness of action that can give it magnitude. For, every action that is conceived as complete has well-defined stages. They form a subject-matter of discussion in the works on dramaturgy in both the West and the East. Bharata, for instance, admits five stages of action, similar to those admitted by Shakespearian critics.[2] But Aristotle admits three only: (i) Beginning (ii) Middle and (iii) End.

1. Poe., 421.
2. Com, Ae., Vol. I, 356,

BEGINNING.

Although in his Poetics, he deals with it only summarily and is contented with saying that beginning is that which is posterior to nothing but from which something is expected to follow ; yet we can get a clear idea of it, if we turn our attention to his Ethics. The question, therefore, arises "What is that element of action, which is posterior to nothing ; what is the starting point of action ; at what point does action begin ?" Answer to this question will not be difficult if we remember that action, according to Aristotle, is not merely physical but psycho-physical. The physical action, the movement of various parts of body, necessary for the attainment of an end, is not independent but is always controlled and directed by the will, which chooses the means, necessary for the realisation of an end. The first stage of action, as presented in tragedy, is, therefore, constituted by what is involved in the choice, the selection of and fixing upon the means to the desired end. Let us, therefore, find out what does the choice of means involve.

CIRCUMSTANCES OR SITUATION AND CHOICE.

Action is, as we have discussed above, of two kinds : (i) Voluntary and (ii) Involuntary, though Aristotle talks of the not-voluntary also. The first[1] is that which is originated by the agent with full knowledge of the particulars of the circumstances ; and the second is that which is done either under compulsion or through ignorance of the particulars of the circumstances. Tragedy is concerned with the action of the latter type, that which is done through ignorance. It is in the ignorance of the particulars that the tragic nature of action lies.

The hero of tragedy is confronted by a situation, Oedipus, for instance. Sixteen years after his coming to the

1. **Pet., 65.**

throne of Thebes, a great calamity has visited the land. A pestilence has come upon the land. Farms, orchards and gardens yield nothing. People, therefore, headed by a priest come to him to seek relief. He is told that the only thing that can bring relief is the banishment of the person, who murdered the late king of the land. He is called upon to make a choice, to fix upon the means to the end. It is not an instinctive response, like that of a child or an animal, to a situation, that he is called upon to make. It is not mere appetitive faculty of the soul that he has to exercise, but the imaginative faculty in full co-operation with the rational. He has to deliberate, to take into account the various particulars of action, time, place, occasion, person, object, manner, in order to be able to make a choice out of the various means, which are available to him. He has not simply to wish the end but to attain or fail in the attainment, according as he chooses the right or wrong means. For, while wish may refer to what is impossible, a man, for instance, may wish to escape death, choice deals with what is in our power.

The essential characteristic of choice,[1] that which distinguishes it from mere wishing, is that it is always preceded by deliberation on the things which are in our power, on the matters in which there are rules, which generally hold good, but in which the result cannot be predicted, in which there is always an element of doubt. Deliberation is not on the end but only on the means. When the end is fixed upon, deliberation on the means begins. If there are many means, deliberation is on the comparative value of them in relation to the particular end in view. If, however, there is only one means, deliberation is on the best manner of employing and the best method of securing it. The same may be said about other particulars of action. Choice,

1. Pet., 68.

therefore, consists in the selection of certain particulars of action to the exclusion of the rest in planning an action for the attainment of an objective. As action, according to Aristotle, as we have said before, is a psycho-physical fact and as the psychological aspect of it precedes the physical, if we take an action as a whole, the choice of the particulars of action in a situation, that is made after due deliberation and in accordance with which the physical movements are made, is the beginning.

If, for instance, we take Oedipus of Sophocles, we find that the part of the drama from the time when Oedipus comes upon the stage and talks to the citizens, who come to seek relief from the calamity, that has visited Thebes, to the arrival of the prophet, who reveals Oedipus himself to be the murderer of the late king, the drama is concerned with the presentation of choice, necessitated by the situation that has arisen, after due deliberation on the particulars of action. In fact he himself says :—

"I have[1] wept full many tears, gone many ways in wandering of thought. And the sole remedy which, well pondering I could find, this I have put into act."

THE MIDDLE.

We shall be able to get a clearer idea of what constitutes the middle of a complete action, if we have a clear notion of Aristotle's conception of different kinds of fable or plot.

Plot is of two kinds : (i) simple and (ii) complex. For, so is the action that it imitates. The one differs from the other inasmuch as the latter has complication and resolution, and revolution and discovery, the former is without the last two.

1. Oed., 5.

COMPLICATION.

All external circumstances and some of those that are internal, frequently constitute complication.[1] It is constituted by that part of plot, which extends from the beginning to that point, at which change in the fortune of the hero begins. It consists of occurrences, which stand in the way of fruition of hero's action. These occurrences obscure the immediate issue so that the end recedes farther and farther from the hero. They may be due to the fact that the means, employed by hero, unexpectedly turn out to be most unsuited to the end, so that they create further difficulties and render the already rough path to the attainment of the objective rougher still. They embarrass rather than help the hero. In them he gets entangled in the course of his progress towards the destined end. Hence complication is also called entanglement.

If we take, for instance, Oedipus of Sophocles, we find that complication begins with the arrival of the prophet, who was expected to reveal the name of the murderer of the late Thebian King. He, however, declares that Oedipus himself is the murderer. And Oedipus is particularly surprised at the declaration, because it is against the fact of his personal experience no less than against the persistent rumour that the late king was killed by robbers. It shakes his faith in prophet to its very foundation. It obscures the immediate issue and arouses the suspicion of Oedipus that Creon, his present wife's brother, is plotting against him to turn him out of Thebes in order to get the throne. It leads to the exchange of hot words between Oedipus and the prophet and so on till comes a messenger from Corinth, where Oedipus was brought up as a prince and wherefrom

1. Poe., 443.

he fled for fear of the possibility of his killing his supposed father and marrying his equally supposed mother.

RESOLUTION OR DISENTANGLEMENT.

Resolution or disentanglement[1] is that part of fable which extends from the beginning of change in hero's fortune to the end. We have said before, that error, the mistake about the particulars of action, is a very important fact in tragedy. Resolution, therefore, is concerned with the exposure of the error, with the removal of the shroud, which conceals the particulars of action from the hero, and with the dismissal of doubt about the efficiency of the means, which are employed, however surprising the complications brought about by them may be, and about the outcome of action, howsoever unwelcome it may be. The idea of resolution will become clear if we take into consideration that part of the plot of Oedipus, in which the person, who knew the secret of hero's birth and parentage comes and reveals the secret, which he had kept to himself so far, clears the mystery, in which the birth of Oedipus was shrouded, and determines the end, which is marked by suicide by the queen and putting out of the eyes and infliction of banishment by the hero on himself.

REVOLUTION OR IRONY.

Revolution[2] is a change, which consists in the production by an action of an effect, which, though probable, is yet contrary to what it was intended to produce by the agent. Thus, for instance, the messenger, who comes with the intention of delighting Oedipus with the news of natural death of King of Corinth, (mistaking whom to be his father and, therefore, fearing lest he should kill him, as the Oracle had

1. A. C. Dra., 134.
2. Poe., 427.

foretold, he had fled from Corinth) produces a contrary effect when he makes himself known. He seals the doom of Oedipus.

DISCOVERY.

Discovery is a change from ignorance to knowledge, which grows into friendship or hatred, according as the knowers are destined to good or bad fortune. There are also discoveries of things inanimate and casual. Discovery consists in recognition of a fact also such as whether some one has or has not performed a certain thing.

Oedipus is a good example of discovery also. For, the tragic end of the hero follows from discovery of his parents and recognition of the fact that he himself was responsible for the murder of the Thebian King, who was his real father.

We may state here by the way that discovery in a complex plot is a part of resolution. The two are not essentially different. Some events of the resolution are called discovery in so far as they dispel ignorance and bring true knowledge of facts. But resolution as a whole is concerned with complete disentanglement of the complication or entanglement. It completely removes the suspension and clears up the mystery.

Discovery, however, has some consequence. It must, therefore, be clearly understood, that discovery is only a part of the resolution. It ends with recognition of some sort, with discovery of some person or thing. It does not extend to the end. It does not include the consequence that follows from it. Discovery and the consequence, that follows from it, together constitute the resolution. And revolution is distinct from resolution or disentanglement. It is only a turning point in hero's fortune. It is a point, at which action produces

result contrary to the intended.

It may be pointed out here that Aristotle in the course of his treatment of the complex fable in chapters X and XI does not talk of complication and resolution; that in chapter XVIII he says "In every tragedy, however, there is a complication and development," and that development has been referred to by comparatively modern critics of the ancient classical drama as resolution.

There is now no difficulty in understanding Aristotle's conception of the middle. In complex plot it is made up of complication, resolution, revolution and discovery i.e. excluding that part only, which is concerned with the final result of discovery and which, therefore, may be called End. But in simple plot it is constituted by complication and resolution only. Thus, we find that the five stages of action, admitted by Shakespearian critics, are nothing but an elaboration of the three maintained by Aristotle. The middle is divided into growth, climax and fall, very much on the lines already chalked out by Aristotle in his conception of complication, resolution etc.

COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THESE PARTS.

I. Fable[1] is the most important part. It is the end or the soul of tragedy, because Greek drama was primarily drama of action, of plot, of situation.

II. Manners, which give a certain character to hero, come next in importance. To the Greeks, character always remained a subordinate to action, though a highly important element of tragedy. It enteres into tragedy only so far as it directly bears upon the main action. It gives action its quality.

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1. Poe., 419.

III. Sentiment, which has already been discussed on page 53, comes third in importance.

IV. Diction occupies the fourth position.

V. Song is the greatest embellishment and comes fifth in importance.

VI. The least important is the scenic presentation. Though it is alluring, yet it can be dispensed with. For, the power of tragedy remains the same even without it.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRAGEDY.

The following four are the parts of tragedy according to quantity. Into these parts the whole subject-matter of tragedy is divided. They are common to all tragedies :—

(I) PROLOGUE.

Prologue is that part of tragedy, which is prior to entrance of the chorus. The function of prologue is to convey information to the audience about the circumstances of action, the situation, from which the main action of tragedy arises. It is a part of the dramatic technique. It is one of the means of conveying the necessary information about the unpresentable part of the plot. The point will become clear if we take the introductory part of "Agamemnon" for example. It may be summarised as follows :—

A watchman is seen on the tower, leaning on his elbow and gazing into the distance. He begins to talk to himself about the hardness of the task, assigned to him. And, while thus complaining, he discovers the beacon fire, a sign of victory of his master and so of his freedom from the task. He gets down and goes inside the palace to tell the news of

the victory of his master. A noise of pleasure is heard and attracted by that noise, twelve elders of Argos enter. The whole group is the Chorus. The part of drama before the entry of chorus is prologue.

(II) CHORUS.

Chorus is a group of elders of the state. All its functions are classified under the following three heads :—

1. Chorus as spectators in the drama.

2. Chorus as spectators of the drama.

3. Chorus as a part of dramatic technique.

The following functions are put under the first head :—

Chorus serves the purpose of the crowd. The heroes of Greek tragedies were leaders of democratic states. We know what the importance of a crowd, particularly of elders, is, in a democratic state. Hero of every tragedy, therefore, was in occasional need of a crowd, such as the chorus represented. Hence chorus was necessary in Greek tragedy.

It serves as body of people, to whom hero can express his thoughts and feelings. In modern drama it does not exist. We have soliloquy and confidant instead. Expression of thoughts and feelings is natural to human beings. Therefore, while Greek tragedians, influenced by the then existing form of state and nature of the object to which the action was directed, felt it necessary to introduce a crowd in the form of chorus : modern tragedian, being concerned with the action, the object, the end, of which is private and not public in its nature, finds it better to introduce him thinking aloud to himself e.g. Shakespeare in his Hamlet. The other form, which is occasionally felt necessary, is *confidant*,

Under the second, Chorus as spectators of the drama, comes the following function :—

Chorus stands for the public in the theatre. The very impression that the dramatist wishes to leave on the minds of his audience, he outwardly embodies in the words of chorus. This enables us to know what was the nature of the experience, the ultimate effect of the whole tragic action on the minds of the audience, that the author intended to produce.

The third function of chorus, as a part of dramatic technique, may be presented as follows :—

The whole plot, which is the object of dramatic imitation, is divided into two parts, (i) presentable and (ii) unpresentable. The one is to be acted out on the stage. The other is to be informed about. The two together produce a connected idea of the whole plot. The audience is informed about the unpresented by various means. One of such means is the chorus. In Agamemnon, for instance, the chorus, that enters after the prologue, dramatically conveys the information about the necessary facts and incidents, which it is necessary for the audience to remember in order to be able to appreciate the drama, but which cannot be acted out on the stage.

PARTS OF CHORUS.

The parts of chorus, as a whole, have been put under the following two heads :—

(i) Common parts and (ii) peculiar parts.

Common parts, which are found in all tragedies, are the following :—

(1) PARODOS.

It is the first speech of the chorus. We remember that

one of the functions of the chorus is to inform about the unpresentable. The dramatic purpose of Parodos will become clear if we recall to our minds what the chorus in Agamemnon, that enters immediately after the prologue, says.

It brings to light the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Ten years back she was sacrificed by her father in order to appease the unseen power, which was withholding the favourable wind for the campaign of victory to start. It is very essential for the audience to know and remember it, because it is the very basis of the whole action. The picture of the sacrifice, therefore, is very vividly drawn by the chorus to enable the spectator to know the circumstances, under which action of the plot is to take place.

It hints at the necessary fatalistic attitude also that the audience is to take towards the presented by saying :—

"But as things are now, so are they.
So, as destined, shall the end be."

PRELUDE.

Prelude[1] is the concluding part of the introductory speech of chorus. The Parodos ends by saying :—

"Sing a strain of woe.
But may the good prevail."

It is in this part that chorus hints at the action which is going to be presented in the play.

(2) STASIMON.

Stasimon is the other common part of chorus. The difference between the first part and the second, as the words imply, is, that while parodos is what chorus say as they come on to the stage, stasimon is what they say when fixed on the stage. It was because of this that trochaic and

1. A. C. Dra., 29.

anapaestic measures, being lively and full of motion, were adapted to parodos and not to stasimon.

PECULIAR PARTS OF CHORUS.

The parts, which are found in some tragedies only, are the following :—

1. Songs from the scene : i.e. by the actors.

2. Commos : It is common lamentation of chorus and from the scene.

(III) EPISODE.

Episode is the third part of tragedy as revealed by quantitative analysis. It is that part of tragedy, which comes between two choric odes.

(IV) EXODE.

It is that part of tragedy, after which there is no further melody of the chorus.

PRESENTABLE AND UNPRESENTABLE IN GREEK DRAMA.

The presentable is acted out by characters of the piece. But dramatic machinery is employed in conveying the information about the unpresentable. Those parts of the plot[1] are unpresentable which are external to the drama. They are of three types : (i) Those which happened before the commencement of the dramatic action and, therefore, which it is not possible for the audience to know. (ii) Those which happen afterwards and require to be previously announced. (iii) Acts of violence. For, it was also the fixed custom of the Greek drama that no deed of violence could be acted on the stage, though showing the effects of such deeds was permissible.

1. Poe., 437.

Three means employed for conveying information about the distant and immediate past are (i) Prologue (ii) Chorus and (iii) Messenger. We have illustrated the first two in the preceding sections. The illustration of the third is the messenger in Oedipus.

The means of informing about the near or distant future are gods and prophets, who were credited by the Greeks with the power of knowing the future. For instance, in Agamemnon the means of conveying information about what was going on behind the curtain, is the prophetic art of Cassandra. She tries to intensify the effect of her statement by depicting the vision with ever increasing vehemence, because she was doomed to be disbelieved.

UNITIES IN GREEK DRAMA.

Three unities are generally accepted to have been admitted by Aristotle: (i) unity of fable (ii) unity of time and (iii) unity of place. The unity of fable in recent times has been very often spoken of as unity of action, because fable is an imitation of action. But fable is not only an imitation of action but also combination of incidents. And Aristotle seems to draw a distinction between action and event or incident. For, in the 8th Chapter of his Poetics he says :—

"Accordingly, just as in the other imitative arts the object of each imitation is a unit, so, since the fable is an imitation of an action, that action must be a complete unit, and the events of which it is made up must be so plotted that if any of these elements is moved or removed the whole is altered and upset."

Thus, unity in the context of action means both completeness and oneness. In fact the word "unity" has two meanings: (i) oneness and (ii) completeness. We have

discussed what, according to Aristotle, constitutes the completeness of action in a preceding section, dealing with the qualitative analysis of tragedy. We have, therefore, to discuss here what constitutes oneness of series of actions and incidents and, therefore, of fable.

UNITY OF FABLE.

Unity of fable[1] in the sense of its oneness, according to Aristotle, consists, not in the relation of whole series of incidents and actions to one man, but in its being logically connected with one end, and in each succeeding member of the series being necessarily or probably connected with the preceding. Tragedy is the highest product of imitative art. Artistic imitation is an imitation of one thing only, not only in the case of the art of painting but also in that of tragedy. The only difference in the latter case is that it imitates not one thing but one action. This must be a whole, the parts of which are so related with one another that if any one of them be displaced or taken away the whole will become wholly different or changed.

UNITIES OF TIME AND PLACE.

The unity of place and the unity of time imply such division of the original plot into presentable and unpresentable that the presentable part, which has to be addressed to the eyes and not to the ears, is concerned with incidents which may be presented as happening in one single place and at one single time. They also imply conveying information through the ears to the audience about such incidents as are unpresentable in or through action by such means as chorus, messenger and prologue etc.

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1. Poe., 422.

The unities of time and place were necessary in Greek drama, because of its peculiar constitution. Chorus was an important part of it. It remained in the orchestra even during the interval between two episodes. It was presented by a group of elders who were sympathisers of the hero and, therefore, to whom he expressed his thoughts and feelings. It represented spectators in the drama. The whole tragedy, therefore, from prologue to exode was naturally one single continuous scene without any break such as could permit the change of place and time.

CHAPTER V.

MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS IN THE CONTEXT OF ÆSTHETICS

PROBLEM OF ÆSTHETICS AFTER ARISTOTLE.

Aristotle was an encyclopaedic thinker. There is hardly any philosophical problem that he did not handle. He wrote on logic, ethics, metaphysics, and æsthetics. His Poetics was written from the point of view of the dramaturgist. It was meant to give the necessary guidance to those who intended to try their hands in the production of drama. Instructions for dramatists, contained in the Poetics, are supplemented by those in the Rhetoric. The various aspects of the problem of æsthetics, on which he wrote, became separate centres of interest to his successors. Some of them studied the technical aspects of the dramatic production. They ignored philosophy.

Thus, Theophrastus[1] concentrated his attention on the word as æsthetic unit. He also refined and elaborated the desirable qualities of style. Aristotle had admitted two qualities only, (i) clearness and (ii) propriety. Theophrastus added two more, (i) correctness and (ii) ornateness, and emphasised the importance of figures of speech. Similarly Stoics interested themselves in the grammatical problems and pointed out five virtues of literary style, (i) faultlessness (ii) lucidity (iii) economy (iv) fitness and (v) freedom from colloquialism. Quintilian[2] spoke of (i) force and (ii) compactness of language and of more and less muscular styles. The analysis of the sources of literary charms by

1. Gil., 94.
2. Gil., 97.

Dionysius went to the length of examining the agreeable and disagreeable effects of single syllables and even letters.

The problem of the poetic qualities has been discussed in India by writers from Bharata to Mammaṭa. Bharata admitted ten qualities. Bhāmaha reduced them to three and Mammaṭa and others followed the latter. Similarly the analysis of the sources of literary charm went to the length of tracing them to single syllables and even letters in the hands of the exponents of the suggested meaning (Dhvani).

PLOTINUS.

Plotinus (204-269) belongs to the line of writers who took certain aspects of the whole of the æsthetic problem, discussed by Aristotle. His predecessors busied themselves with the discussion of the means of artistic production: they examined the powers of language which is the means of dramatic and poetic production. Plotinus occupies himself with the end of art. He takes up the problem of experience, for which art is responsible. He attempts the problem from metaphysical, epistemic and psychological points of view. He improves upon the Aristotelian position in this respect. According to Aristotle, æsthetic experience was only an emotive experience, the experience of emotion at a high pitch: and the end of Art (Tragic) was the production of the "mean" to which an emotion is brought by the Kathartic effect of tragedy. According to Plotinus, it is beyond the emotional level, it belongs to the transcendental, the spiritual, level. Plotinus thus frees art from subordination to morality and recognises the experience that it arouses as akin to mystic experience of the Ultimate, the One, the Good.

HIS IMPORTANCE.

Plotinus is of special importance to us; because of his

mystic explanation of æsthetic experience; because of his view that æsthetic experience is akin to mystic experience, the highest experience according to his system of thought. For, the similarity of this conception of æsthetic experience to that, expounded by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinava and accepted as the most accurate even by the modern Sanskrit Scholars, is indeed very great. Æsthetic experience, according to Sanskrit tradition is akin to mystic experience, technically called Brahmānanda (Brahmānanda Sahodaraḥ).

Importance of Plotinus lies in the additional fact that his ultimate metaphysical principle is also the highest level of experience, the mystic experience, which he himself had. His system is not an outcome of mere arm-chair thinking. It is based upon the solid foundation of personal experience. He[1] was a citizen of Rome and as such was living the life, not in any way different from that of his fellow-citizens. He, however, according to his pupil and biographer, Porphyry, had mystic experience four times. This means that he rose from the ordinary sense-level to the mystic level and descended to the sense-level four times at least in his life time. He was, therefore, familiar with the way to mystic experience. His metaphysical principles represent various levels of experience in descending order.

He recognises a hierarchy of values.[2] He holds that it is necessary that Reality shall be actualised in every manner and degree, that each principle in the hierarchy shall create something, which, though necessarily inferior to its creator, yet reflects faithfully, not its creator but something next above its creator, the ideal towards which the gaze of its creator is turned.

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1. Ful., 282-3.
2. Inge, Vol. I, 137.

He is, therefore, important to us from another point of view also, namely, his theory of emanation as distinct from evolution. His theory of emanation has close similarity with the Ābhāsavāda of Abhinavagupta. In Plotinus, therefore, we have a thinker whose conception of æsthetic experience is similar to that of Abhinavagupta and who employs a similar philosophic technique to explain its essential nature.

HIS ÆSTHETICS AND METAPHYSICS.

The problems, which Plotinus attempts in the context of æsthetics, are closely related to his metaphysics.

(1) Æsthetic experience according to him, as has already been stated, is akin to mystic experience.

(2) He raises the questions: "Is phenomenal world beautiful?" or "Is the gnostic attitude towards it right?" and answers them from the metaphysical point of view. He accounts for the beautiful at both the levels, spiritual and physical. He explains why the spiritual and physical worlds are beautiful, though in different degrees.

(3) He attempts the problem of "beautiful" from the psychological and the epistemic points of view also and accounts for æsthetic experience in terms of the faculties or powers of the soul, such as sensation, intellectual imagination, recollection, contemplation, love etc.

(4) He is an exponent of symbolic Art and accounts for the products of the symbolic art, in terms of strong contemplation. He rejects imitation to be an artistic principle. He controverts the view that beauty is symmetry.

(5) He distinguishes between beautiful and ugly and accounts for the ugly in terms of predominence of matter over form.

It is, therefore, necessary to deal with his metaphysical system in order to get a clear idea of the nature of the mystic experience and so of the æsthetic experience, which is akin to it, and to find out the comparative position of the æsthetic experience among other experiences, represented by graded levels in his system.

HIS THEORY OF EMANATION.

The objective world, according to Plotinus, is not due to reflection of ideas on matter as Plato said, nor is it due to evolution of matter under the control of form, as Aristotle held. It is an emanation from the One. It proceeds from the One exactly as do the rays from the sun. It is a manifestation of the One, which is beyond both the Platonic world of ideas and the Aristotelian Reason and to which no category applies.

THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY.

Plotinus tries to convey the idea of the nature of creative activity of his Trinity,[1] God, Spirit and Soul, metaphorically, by means of analogy or imagery. The ideas that he wishes to emphasise are (i) that the creative principle loses nothing in the act of creation, that Spirit can act upon Soul and Soul upon Matter without losing anything (ii) that relation between higher and lower order of beings is one-sided; it is above and beyond the mechanical laws and involves no reaction; the lower needs the higher, but the higher is complete without the lower; and (iii) that the higher has got certain qualities, which necessarily impel it to creative activity.

The analogy, that he prefers to convey these ideas, is that of the sun pouring forth his light: because his contemporary scientists held that the sun loses nothing by shining upon this world,[2] that the material world does not affect the

1. Inge, Vol. I, 196.
2. Inge, Vol. I, 196.

sun in any way and that it is in the nature of the sun to shine. The world, therefore, according to Plotinus is a manifestation of the character of the creative principle and not a constituent of its being.

EMANATION AND EVOLUTION DIFFERENTIATED.

Emanation is quite distinct from and the opposite of evolution. Every successive stage in evolution is an advance on the preceding and leads to higher stages till the highest point of excellence is reached; it is an upward march to greater perfection. But emanation is downward march to lower stages. Every successive stage is less excellent than the preceding. Just as rays of the sun, the farther removed they are from the source the less luminous they become, so the farther an emanation is from the source the inferior it is. Thus, according to Plotinus, everything emanates from the *One.* Strictly speaking it is not creation, for, creation implies will and determination. But the One is free from even such limitations. It is an inevitable outflow of his infinite energy. The universe flows from the One and the flow is marked by three distinct stages (i) Spirit (ii) Soul and (iii) Matter. And each preceding stage is the source of the succeeding.

TRIADS OF PLOTINUS.

There are two fundamental triads in Plotinus.

1. Trinity of Divine principles, (i) the One or Absolute (ii) Spirit and (iii) Soul.

2. Tripartite division of man into (i) Spirit (ii) Soul and (iii) Body.

According to this tripartite division, he recognises three levels of human experience, which in their objective aspect no less than in the means, employed for getting the different types of experience, are different.

1. The object of experience at the lowest, the physical level, is the world as perceived by senses and the means to such experience are the bodily senses.

2. The object of experience at the second level is the world, interpreted by the mind as spatial and temporal order, and the means to such experience is the *discursive reason.*

3. The object of experience at the highest level is the spiritual world and the means to experience is the spiritual perception.

Plotinus tries to explain the nature of æsthetic experience in terms of the first two principles, the One and the Spirit or Nous. Mystic experience, according to him, is the experience of the One and the experience that has the nearest touch, the nearest approach and the nearest relation to and is immediate next and akin to it, is the experience of the Spirit. If, therefore, we want to understand the meaning of "akin to mystic experience" as the æsthetic experience is represented to be, we must fully grasp the metaphysical principles and the levels of experience that they represent. For, the One, the Spirit and the Soul are not only metaphysical principles, according to Plotinus, but they represent levels of experience also. Let us, therefore, first take up the One.

THE ONE.

In his presentation of the *One*, Plotinus mixes up the two points of view, mystical and metaphysical. Thus, on the one hand, he speaks of the One as so transcendent that it is beyond the reach of mind and speech. Whatever we speak of it simply limits it. It cannot be represented even in terms of the highest categories such as truth, beauty, goodness, being and consciousness. It cannot be grasped even through intellectual contemplation. It is realisable in mystical ecstasy

only, through communion with and absorption in it. On the other hand, he presents the One as the source and goal of everything, from whom all oppositions and diversities emanate, and as infinite energy, from which everything emanates.

Such a contradiction in the conception of the ultimate principle is inevitable in all mystic systems. In fact, everything, if looked at from different points of view, would look to be made up of opposite elements. All the objects of experience can be looked at as unity from one point of view and as multiplicity from another. Thus, the Vedānta also speaks of the ultimate principle, the Brahman, as beyond the reach of senses, speech, mind and intellect, from the point of view of the final mystic experience, but as the cause of creation, from that of the metaphysics.

The fact is that Plotinus inherited the conception of Reality from Plato,[1] according to whom Reality is that which is uncreated, indestructible, unchangeable, motionless, indivisible, unextended, simple in quality, single in essence and without the taint of variety, multiplicity and alteration. He had, therefore, to reject the reality of both the Platonic world of ideas, because of its multiplicity, and the Aristotelian Reason, because of its involving duality at least of thinking and what is thought about. In this rejection, he was helped by the mystic experience which, according to the authority of his pupil, he himself had at least four times in his life, which, according to him, is totally free from all sensible and intelligible elements and is marked by the absence of multiplicity and diversity, of distinction between thinking and being thought about and of the difference between subject and object. He, therefore, maintained the ultimate principle to be not numerically but logically One.

1. Ful., 284.

MYSTIC ECSTASY.

The ultimate metaphysical principle of Plotinus, on the basis of which he explains the entire field of experience, including both material and spiritual, is not a rational principle. It is not what the discursive reason, which seizes upon the elements of truth in a certain order of succession, reveals. It is beyond the reach of discursive reason. For, it is absolutely simple. It is to be reached by a kind of spiritual intuition. It is what Plotinus had a genuine experience of. It is nothing but a sudden light that comes upon the soul and is self-luminous. This light is absolutely formless and comes upon that soul only, which has freed itself from all forms, not excluding even the spiritual. It can be realized only when the soul has freed itself from all that is good and evil, turns away from visible things and becomes like the One.

When this appears, the seer and the seen merge into each other, they are no longer two but one. There is no distinction of any kind so long as the vision lasts. The soul is no longer conscious of body ; no thought of anything whatsoever can enter in this state. The soul contemplates the light and not itself. There is nothing better or more blessed than this. This is the highest state attainable by the soul ; there is nothing higher. The Blessedness of this state is no titillation of bodily senses. It is the happiness of the reunion.

This state is higher than that of spiritual experience : for, it is free from movement, while the spiritual perception involves movement. When the soul attains unity with the One, it leaves the modes of spiritual perception.[1] Beauties of the spiritual world draw the soul only so long as the light of the One does not appear. But when the light suddenly dawns, the soul gets absorbed in it, exactly as a traveller, entering into a palace,

1. Inge, Vol. II, 135.

admires beautiful things, which are in it, only so long as the king does not appear. But as soon as the master appears, he becomes the sole object of attention.

Continuous contemplation of the One confounds vision with the object, brings about the disappearance of the object and thus that which was an object at its appearance becomes a state of apprehension to continuous contemplator.

It is not annihilation of what truly exists that the mystic strives for but simply breaking down of the barriers, which constitute separate existence. All distinct consciousness is consciousness of not-self, of externality. This is just what is lost in mystic experience.

KATHARSIS AS THE WAY TO MYSTIC EXPERIENCE.

Katharsis in Aristotle has an emotional reference. He discusses it in the ethical context. As has been shown in an earlier chapter, he was influenced in his exposition of the Kathartic theory in the context of his theory of tragedy by the prevalent belief in the religious circle that Katharsis purifies emotions. He was concerned with the ethical effect of tragedy on the spectator. He intended to show how the excitement of emotion to a high pitch by tragedy was responsible for the removal of excess in emotive tendency in the spectator and for bringing it down to normal. He found such a state being brought about in the participants in the Dionysiac festival and so expounded his theory of tragical Katharsis on the analogy of religious Katharsis, which was recognised to have an emotive effect similar to that which he thought that the tragic presentation produced on the spectator.

Katharsis (purification), according to Plotinus, refers, not to emotions but to the soul itself. It consists in detaching

the soul from body and elevating it to spiritual world[1], in freeing it from all impurities and attaining the purity of Spirit, which the soul essentially is, in purifying the soul from all its lower nature and external stains, and in chiselling away from it all that is adventitious and superfluous.

Conception of Katharsis in Plotinus is very closely related to his second triad, according to which human being is divisible into spirit, soul and body. Accordingly he admits three steps to complete Katharsis. The first step consists in freeing the soul from the irrational aspect of humanity, from body and all that is associated with it, such as sensuous tendency, interest in sensuous aspect of the external world, passions, emotions and all that humanity has in common with animals. It is marked by ascent of the soul from the physical to the intellectual level, which is characteristically human level. The second step consists in freeing the soul from discursive reason and all that is associated with it, such as memory, limited self-consciousness and sensuous imagination. It culminates in the rise to the spiritual level. The third step consists in the realisation of the inner-most principle of humanity. It is the attainment of the highest spiritual form, good, true or beautiful. The complete Katharsis, thus, consists in the rise from the spiritual level through freedom from even the highest spiritual form. It leads to merging in *the One*, to the attainment of the mystic ecstasy.

TYPES OF MYSTIC ECSTASY.

Mystic ecstasy[2] is of two types, (i) Wild and (ii) Calm. The former is characterised by wild excitement, loss of self-control and temporary madness. It originates from dancing and wild music. Such an ecstasy was believed to be attain-

1. Inge, Vol. II, 165.
2. Inge, Vol. II, 143.

able through participation in Dionysiac rites, which influenced Aristotle in the formation of his Kathartic theory.

Plotinus, however, is an exponent of the other type of ecstasy, which is intense, though quiet and calm. It is either spontaneous or it is due to mental causes rather than physical, such as dancing and music. It is experienced in solitude. It is due to the exercise of a faculty which all have but few use, a faculty which is not different from normal mental operations, but arises from concentration of these mental operations on the return of the soul to the "Father".

ECSTASY AS IDENTIFICATION.

Identification, at the ordinary worldly level, is not possible so long as there is no freedom from preoccupation with any extraneous object of thought. For, mind cannot think two things at once. Hence final absorption in the One, which is nothing but identification with it, is not possible so long as mind has any extraneous image to conceive of the *One*, while that image distracts attention. Just as the matter must be without qualities of its own, if it is to receive forms of all things, so the soul must be formless if it is to receive the illumination of the first principle.

The soul, in order to get identified with *the One*, has to rise from the empirical level to the spiritual. At this level, being free from all that separates the soul from the spirit, it can unite with its like without hindrance. For, all that is empirical is hindrance to union.

At the spiritual level, separation of spirits from one another is not due to bodies, it is not spatial; but it is due to unlikeness. In the spiritual world, therefore, spirits, which have no unlikeness, unite with one another. When a spirit loses its unlikeness it gets united or identified with the One, which has

no unlikeness. The Union with the One is the end of human existence. It is the repose.

REASON IN MYSTIC EXPERIENCE.

In the vision of God that which sees is not reason[1] but something greater than and prior to reason, something that is presupposed by reason. For, it is the realisation of the One. It is not objective vision of something outside. Distinction between seer and seen disappears in it. It is a state of perfect freedom from passions, reason, spiritual perception and personality. It is a state of perfect stability. The soul in this state does not occupy itself even with beautiful things ; it is exalted above the beautiful.

Realisation of the first principle is attained by rising to the first principle. For him, who ascends above all things, that which remains to see is that which is above all things. The nature of the soul cannot pass to absolute not-being. But if it moves up, it arrives at, not something else, but at itself. It ceases to be 'being'. It is above being, while in communion with the *One*.

THE WILL IN MYSTIC EXPERIENCE.

The soul must rise above body, senses and formative principle and so become Spirit by contemplating spirit as its own principle. But as the source of all beings still remains unrealised, it should rise above the spiritual world also.

Mystic experience is consequent on intense mental concentration. It is, therefore, necessary to refuse resolutely the entrance into mind to such crowd of distracting images as continually assail it. The will has to be entirely passive except in stern repression of imagination.

1. Inge, Vol. II, 140-1.

Mystic experience is not 'annihilation'[1] of what truly exists. The soul has to reach the level of the spirit, before the One can appear to her. She, as spirit, has two powers, (i) spiritual perception of what is within and (ii) spiritual intuition, by which it apprehends what is above it. It is the latter which is responsible for the realisation of the ultimate, the mystic ecstasy.

NOUS (SPIRIT).

Having completed our brief account of the One, both as a metaphysical principle and as a level of experience, we have now to turn our attention to Nous or Spirit.

It is the direct emanation from the *One.*[2] It is not discursive reason, the characteristic functions of which are to separate, to distribute and to recombine the data of experience.[3] These are the activities of the soul and not of Nous, which is a higher principle and beholds all things in their true relation without the need of the above process. As a product of the One, Nous[4] turns towards the One in order to grasp or comprehend it and through this very turning towards its source it becomes pure reason. Duality of knowing and known dawns here for the first time in a logical sense. For, though the subject and the object are identical, because Nous is nothing but self-consciousness, yet the ideal difference cannot be denied. Ideas are immanent in it. Among the categories of rest and motion and unity and difference, rest and unity are applicable to the subjective and motion and difference to the objective aspect of it.

There are two possible approaches to it. We may approach it either as a metaphysical principle or as a level of experience. As a metaphysical principle, it is reality as opposed

1. Inge, Vol. II, 159.
2. Inge, Vol. II, 43.
3. Inge, Vol. II, 37.
4. Ueber., Vol. I, 248.

to appearance. It is the original of which the phenomenal world is a copy. It is the substance of which the world of empirical experience is a shadow. As a level of experience, it is that which is just below that of mystic ecstasy. It is the level of experience of the Beautiful. Here it is that we have the æsthetic experience.

METAPHYSICAL APPROACH TO NOUS AS REALITY.

Reality, as opposed to appearance, according to Plotinus, consists in Nous, Noeta and Noesis; or, we may say, for lack of better expressions in English, Spirit,[1] Spiritual world and Spiritual perception. But let us not forget that Plotinus,[2] while thus analysing the first manifestation of the One, maintains that it is only our habit of dealing with sensible phenomena that makes us prone to separate Spirit, Spiritual world and Spiritual perception from one another. They constitute unity in multiplicity. There is no such division as the subject, the object and the means of knowledge in the first emanation. This division is attributed to the spiritual reality, because human mind can think in no other way.

Reality is the spiritual world as known by spirit, or spirit as knowing the spiritual world. It is neither thought nor thing alone in isolation, but their 'indissoluble union'. It alone is fully real and perfectly true. It has universality and harmony. It exists eternally and in perfection.

NOUS AS SUBJECT.

If we attempt an intellectual analysis of Reality, we split it up into subject, object and means of knowledge, as we are in the habit of doing at the empirical level. We divide

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1. Inge, Vol. II. 38-9.
2. Inge, Vol. II. 47.

it into Spirit, Spiritual world and Spiritual perception, though it is not so divided.

Nous, therefore, looked upon as subject, is admitted to apprehend spiritual world. It is the centre and source of the apprehensive energy, which is the means that it employs in apprehending. It is in direct touch with its object. Its object is not external to it. It does not simply receive the reflection of the object. It possesses the object. For, to deny direct touch or possession would mean to deny truth to its apprehension and to reduce it to the level of the limited.

NOUS AS UNIVERSAL AND INDIVIDUAL.

In the conception of the first direct emanation from the One, Plotinus was considerably influenced by Plato's[1] conception of the world of ideas. He, however, differs from Plato in one important respect, that is, the conception of individuality. According to Plato, the individuality, both subjective and objective, is not ideal and, therefore, not real. It has no place in the world of ideas. For, according to him, individual souls, though immortal are created by the mythical being, Demiurge, and the individual objects are due to the peculiar nature of the matter, which splits up the universal into numerous individuals or particulars, just as prism splits up the light of the sun into rays of different colours. According to Plotinus, however, individuality is real and independent of the material condition. There are individual spirits in the real world, of which the individual souls are the images.

The individuality of spirits at the spiritual level, however, does not imply any limitation in their knowledge. To explain this he puts forth his *theory of compenetration.* According

1. Ful., 288.

to him, individuality of spirit is no bar to its knowing all the contents of the spiritual world. For, spirits are not separated from one another by physical barriers as souls are. They penetrate one another. The spiritual world is like a transparent sphere[1], placed outside the spirit, in which it can see all the contents of the spiritual world.

UNIVERSAL AND INDIVIDUAL SPIRITS.

Individual spirits[2] are related to the universal Spirit exactly in the manner in which individual souls are related to the universal or World-Soul. They are related to the universal exactly as particular sciences are to the general. The universal Spirit contains all individual spirits and gives them all that they possess. They are implied in each other. Each particular spirit exists both in itself and in the universal spirit; and the universal Spirit also exists both in itself and in every one of the individual spirits. The universal Spirit is totality of them actually, but each individual is totality of spirits only potentially. Particular spirits are an internal expression of the spiritual energy, just as the World-Soul is an external expression of the same energy.

THE OBJECT OF NOUS.

The object of experience of Nous is the spiritual world, which is made up of ideas, forms, archetypes of everything that can possibly figure as object in empirical experience. It is more than Platonic world of ideas inasmuch as it contains not only universal ideas but the particular or individual also. 'In the spiritual world finite[3] beings exist as pulse-beats of the whole system......' Ideas[4] have their material constitution, but it is of supersensible nature. They are immanent in Nous, they

1. Inge, Vol. II. 194.
2. Inge, Vol. II. 82.
3. Inge, Vol. II, 88.
4. Ueber., Vol. I, 248.

do not exist externally to it. They are not representations of the truly existent. They are not shadows of truth but truth itself. The intelligible, the world of ideas, is not substantially but only ideally distinguishable from Nous. The same existence is intelligible, in so far as it possesses the attributes of repose and unity, and Nous, in so far as it performs the act of knowing.

Ideas are eternal forms of being. As every thought in Spirit is such, all thoughts of Spirit are ideas, Spirit embraces all ideas, as a whole does its parts. Kingdom of ideas is true Reality, the true Beauty.

MEANS OF NOUS.

The third aspect of Nous, which is revealed by an intellectual analysis, is the means, employed by Nous in spiritual apprehension. This means is spiritual perception. It is the activity of Nous involved in apprehending the world of ideas. It is the apprehension of the incorporeal and invisible. It is energy that proceeds from Nous. Truth, beauty and goodness are not strangers to it, but identical with it. It is not bare identity but identity in difference, otherwise there could be no thought. Beholding is the being of Spirit, because the activity of beholding is the very essence of spirit.

NOUS AS A LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE.

Nous presents a level of experience just below that of mystic ecstasy. It is the experience of Spirit which occupies a place midway between the One and the Soul, which is characterised by discursive reason.

If we look at this level from the point of view of the soul, that has ascended to spiritual level, we find that distinction between the subject and the object just appears and is on the

verge of disappearing, that all variety and multiplicity of the universe is reduced to a single inter-connected system of types and laws and is apprehended as a whole at a glance ; that there is perfect forgetfulness of distinction between subject and object and identification of thinker with what is thought about ; and that the vision[1] of truth is synoptic and not synthetic. It is timeless. Thought and being arise at this level. Being is the first limitation, in which the One manifests itself. It is a state of pure universal self-consciousness, which may be represented as "am".

It is interesting to note here that the first emanation from the *One* is just like the second emanation from the first principle, technically called Anuttara by monistic Śaiva philosophers. For, they admit that consciousness of being "am" arises at the level of Śakti, the second emanation.

PROBLEM OF ÆSTHETICS IN PLOTINIC SYSTEM.

We have so far confined ourselves to the presentation of the first two principles of the first fundamental triad in Plotinic system, in terms of which he accounts for the essential nature of æsthetic experience. Before we attempt to explain æsthetic experience in terms of these two metaphysical principles, it is necessary to point out the exact place of the problem of æsthetics in the Plotinic system.

Plotinic philosophy is an ontology of intellectual, moral and æsthetic values. It[2] is concerned with bringing out the essential nature of three values, universally recognised by humanity, true, good and beautiful. They are the constituents of Reality. They are the attributes under which Reality is known to humanity. They are the highest forms,

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1. Ful., 287-8.
2. Inge, Vol. II, 74-5.

in which Reality can be apprehended by spirits. Things truly are in proportion to their participation in these forms of Reality. They are the essence of Reality. They belong to the sphere of supratemporal and supraspatial existence.

Problem of æsthetics, therefore, is not a separate and independent problem for Plotinus. It is inextricably mixed up with ethical and intellectual problems. Æsthetic value is not separate from and independent of moral and intellectual values. Beautiful is not distinct from true and good but identical with them. The same reality, approached through intellect, will and love, is spoken of as true, good and beautiful respectively.

Plotinus does not separate the intellectual ascent from the moral and the æsthetical. Three paths, according to him, begin to join long before the end of journey. He holds that the three attributes[1] of Divine nature, true, good and beautiful, are ultimate in our experience. They cannot be fused or wholly harmonised. Intellectually they are parallel, but spiritually they are mutually inclusive.

RELATION BETWEEN THE MYSTIC AND THE ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE EXPLAINED.

The Absolute[2] is spoken of as True and Good but not as Beautiful by Plotinus. In Ennead 1. 6. 9. he seems to put Beautiful in a slightly lower position than True or Good. He holds that the forms, which belong to the spiritual world, are beautiful. The One is beyond the forms and lies as it were behind the beautiful. It is the source and beginning of the beautiful. In order to distinguish between the beautiful, the spiritual world, and the source of it, the One, the former he calls Beautiful and the latter the First-Beautiful.[3]

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1. Inge, Vol. II. 80. 2. Inge, Vol, II. 213. 3. Inge, Vol. II, 124.

At other places, Ennead 6. 7. 32. and 6. 7. 33., Plotinus calls the One "Beauty" and reserves "*beautiful*" for the spiritual world. According to this statement, soul is beautiful through Spirit, bodies are beautiful through soul, which forms them, and so are beautiful actions and practices. Beauty is identical with the One and beautiful with Spirit. The One, being formless, cannot be said to be beautiful. Beauty is not embodied in form, but beautiful is. The First-Beautiful and Beauty stand for the formless source of beautiful forms of the spiritual world. Beautiful is thus restricted to the first emanation from the One, the objective aspect of Nous, and consequently to all that partakes in it.

Thus, the reason, why Plotinus represents æsthetic experience to be akin to mystic experience, is clear. Æsthetic experience is the experience of the spiritual form, beautiful, and, therefore, is distinct from formless experience which characterises the merging of the individual in the One, the mystic ecstasy. In it the duality, however vague, still persists; there is something of which the subject is conscious, though as identical with itself. In it there is consciousness of being. But in mystic experience there is absolute unity, there is not even so much as self-consciousness, it is above the consciousness of being.

Presentation of æsthetic experience as akin to mystic experience is metaphorical. We know that, according to Plotinian metaphysics, Spirit is the direct emanation of the *One*. Spirit, therefore, is metaphorically conceived as the offspring of the One. And because both the One and the Spirit are not only metaphysical principles but also the levels of experience and the latter is nearest to the former and has nearest approach to it, therefore, on the analogy[1] of father and daughter, æsthetic

1. Inge, Vol. II. 139.

experience is spoken of as akin to mystic experience. It is also on this metaphorical conception that the conception of love that draws soul to Beautiful (spirit) and the latter to the One, is based.

IS PHENOMENAL WORLD BEAUTIFUL ?

Plotinus recognises three values, meanings or purposes, as ultimately realisable by humanity, true, good and beautiful. Love of these differentiates humanity from mere animality and characterises it chiefly. They are the attributes, under which Spirit is known to man. They are the aims, which philosopher, man of character and poet or lover of art realize. They are the subjects, with which metaphysics, ethics and æsthetics, three recognised branches of philosophy, deal.

True, Good and Beautiful being the ultimate values to humanity, the questions arise : "What is the relation of these values to the world, in which we are living, the world of sense ?" "Is the world of sense true, good and beautiful ?" or "Is the gnostic attitude towards the world of sense right ?" Answer of Plotinus[1] to the last question is "No". The world of sense is a true, good and beautiful shadow, reflection, expression or emanation of a higher world, the spiritual world, which is true, good and beautiful in itself. Gnostic attitude towards it is not right. It is not totally worthless. It has value and reality, though lower than those of the spiritual world. It is a creation of the World-Soul and without it none of the Divine principles would be knowable for what they are ; they would remain hidden from humanity. It is the manifestation of the potentiality of the World-Soul.

According to Plotinus, "being" of a principle depends upon its manifesting something that is of lower order. The

1. Inge, Vol. I. 167.

Good, the Spirit and the World-Soul, therefore, would not be what they are if each of them did not manifest itself in something that is inferior to it. Thus, the world of sense faithfully reflects, so far as it is possible in so imperfect a medium as Matter, not its creator, the World-Soul, but the principle next above it, the principle towards which the World-Soul, like a worker in wax, turns its gaze. The world of sense is, therefore, a true copy of the Spiritual world and, therefore, is true, good and beautiful, though in a lower degree.

The world of common experience should not be confused with the world of natural sciences. It is not a self-consistent harmonious system of laws, as the scientists interpret it. It is only a picture of the Spiritual world, but it appears to be confused, because of the defective perceptual power of the limited subject. It is limited by temporal and spatial conditions. But, for all this, it is as good a picture of the Spiritual world[1] as there can possibly be in so defective a medium as matter. There is nothing in this world, which does not represent some content of the Spiritual world. It is a picture, drawn by the World-Soul, who, like an artist, keeps its eyes fixed on the ideal, the Spiritual world.

Plotinus condemns gnostic despise of the world of sense and holds that just as real love that a man has for another, means love for his children also, so true love for the Divine means love for his creation also. Thus, for Plotinus, despise of this world, which is so nearly akin to the spiritual, means no true love for the Divine either. To deny beauty, harmony and worth to it, means to deny these to the ideal also. If some aspects or parts of it are not as perfect as the ideal, it is so because it is not ideal but material.

He appeals to experiences of those who have had a

1. Inge, Vol. I, 198.

glimpse of the spiritual world from æsthetic point of view and asks if the world of sense is not an echo of the spiritual world of beauty. This world is an order of graded values, some contents of it having more value than others. That is of most value in it which reflects a purpose or meaning, which is responsible for its being.

Beautiful[1] forms in the physical world have a real resemblance to their archetypes in the spiritual world. Beauty, that we find in objects, is not the subjective element, contributed by individual soul, which admires it. It is not individual mind that gives "meaning" to inert matter by impressing forms upon it. That would make the individual soul the creator of the world, which is against Plotinic philosophy.

Physical objects have beauty proportionate to their participation in form. According to Plotinus, objects are made up of matter and form. The form combines and co-ordinates the parts, which make a unity, and this unity is beautiful.[2] The more, therefore, does an object express form, the principle of unity, life and order, the more beautiful it is. But as in the order of manifestation the succeeding is less than the preceding, beauty that is to be found in the material world, is inferior to that of the spiritual world. It is only a faint representation of the spiritual beauty ; because the World-Soul, encumbered as she is by adventitious matter, is the moulder of matter according to form. But the form belongs to the spiritual world, which she can see only imperfectly. Imperfection in beauty of material objects is, therefore, natural.

Even this imperfect beauty[3] in the material world is to be found in the objects of sight and hearing only. For, Plotinus admits only two *æsthetic senses*, sight and hearing. He

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1. Inge, Vol. II, 214. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 212.
3. Inge, Vol. II, 211.

recognises beauty in the intellectual sphere no less than in the moral. Sciences, the products of human intelligence, and acts, prompted by moral sense, are beautiful. The objects of this world are only partly beautiful inasmuch as their beauty is proportionate, to the form which they possess and which they can possess only imperfectly, because their creator, the World-Soul, can know the form only imperfectly. Virtue, however, is beautiful in itself, because it is not a creation of the World-Soul, nor is it in any way related to matter.

METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF PHYSICAL BEAUTY.

Just as the conception of æsthetic experience as "akin to mystic experience" is metaphysically explicable in terms of the first two principles, the One and the Spirit, so the physical beauty is metaphysically explicable in terms of the other two such principles, the World-Soul and the Matter. Let us, therefore, deal with the World-Soul.

WORLD-SOUL OR UNIVERSAL SOUL.

World-Soul is the Logos, that is manifested outwardly by Spirit. It is unity in diversity of creative energy and reason. It is not an aggregate of individual souls, but "the Soul of the All". It is free from temporal and spatial relations. It remains at rest while giving all life and being to the phenomenal world. It is not in the world, but the world may be said to be in it, because it embraces and moulds the world. World-Soul emanates from Spirit. It is, therefore, spiritual and its spirituality is manifested in discursive reason.

The World-Soul,[1] according to Plotinus, binds the extremes together. While perceiving and beholding, it receives the contents of the transcendental Spirit and after this model

1. Inge, Vol. I, 203.

forms the world of sense. 'It stands midway between the phenomenal world, of which it is the principle, and the world of Spirit, which is its principle'. 'Contrasted with the creative Spirit it is the receptive, contrasted with matter, the active principle'. It is the offspring of Spirit, which, having perfect life, must necessarily procreate and not be barren. It is an energy thrown off by Spirit. As an image of Spirit, it resembles its principle closely. It is not matter and form, but form only, and power and energy second to that of Spirit. It is of an intelligible nature. It admits of no separation into parts. For, it is without parts and impartible.

It is the mediator between the ideas and the corporeal world. The whole of the phenomenal world proceeds from it through the process of emanation. Life of the world is an energy of the World-Soul. This energy[1] descends as low as vegetable life and slumbers even in inorganic nature. The World-Soul is not incarnate in the world. It directs the world from its abode on high without being involved in it.

NATURE AS CREATIVE POWER OF WORLD-SOUL.

The World-Soul marks the lowest limit of the spiritual order. It is the creator of sensible world through its creative power, *the nature*,[2] which is its active faculty, its outer life, the expansion of its energy, that without which it would remain inactive and shut up within itself. This creative energy, when directed to *matter*, is responsible for raising *matter*, from the level of mere abstraction and nonentity to that of substantiality. It casts upon matter the reflexion of forms, which come to it from the World-Soul. As the lowest limit of the spiritual world, it is spiritual and real. It is not unreal, like material bodies, which receive, through nature, the impressions of the World-Soul. It is the direct producer of *four*[3] *elements.*

1. Inge, Vol. I, 209. 2. Inge, Vol. I, 155. 3. Inge, Vol. I, 156.

Thoughts of the World-Soul are not mere ideas but creative powers. Nature, therefore, is sum total of thoughts of the World-Soul. The original source of creative powers (Logoi) is the Spirit. These Logoi flow continuously from Spirit up to the point, which divides reality from appearance. Nature is not only creative power but reason also. If we take nature in its entirety we include seminal reason also. It is the formative power and first mover and, therefore, immovable. It is pure form and not a composite of matter and form. In its rational aspect it is the creator of another *reason,* the reason, which is nothing but *visible* form. This reason, which is a creation of nature, is the lowest type of reason. It is lifeless and, therefore, cannot produce another reason. We shall say more on this subject in section on contemplation.

NATURAL BEAUTY AND RIGHT ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT.

Plotinus holds that there is an unbroken chain[1] from the highest order of creation to the lowest and that the world of nature is the world of graded values and existence. It is matter and form together. The more the matter constituting an object of nature is moulded and ordered by spiritual form the more beautiful it is. The more a body expresses life the more beautiful it is and the wiser a soul is the more beautiful it is. Natural world, therefore, is spiritual throughout and full of life, though its life may seem to be asleep and though its spiritual character may be faint and, therefore, difficult to realise.

But perfect beauty[2] is not to be found in the world of sense, because it is ideal and spiritual and, therefore, free from spatial and temporal limitations. The world of sense,

1. Inge, Vol. I, 161. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 77.

however, is subjected to the spatial and temporal order. But that is no justification for gnostic attitude of contempt towards it. If the sensible world has no perfect beauty that does not dislodge it from the position of an important medium, through which the perfect beauty can be realised by humanity. Imperfect beauty of sensible world is just the right means to be adopted by imperfect souls, that we are, to proceed to the realisation of the perfect beauty. Admiration of earthly[1] beauty is the first step to the vision of the spiritual beauty. The means has to be suitable to the agent, who employs it. Imperfect beauty of natural world is the most suitable means that is available to imperfect soul. There is nothing wrong if an imperfect soul confines itself to admiration of earthly beauty for the time being.

BEAUTIFUL AND UGLY.

According to Plotinus, there is hierarchy[2] of values and existence; it is necessary that Reality shall be actualised not only in every manner but also in every degree. The highest grade in the hierarchy of existence is the Spirit and the lowest is the Matter. Similarly the highest grade in the hierarchy of values is the beautiful and the lowest is the ugly.

Ugly is the opposite of *beautiful.* Just as beauty is that property in things, which the soul recognises as akin to her own essence[3], so ugly is that which she feels to be alien and antipathic to herself. Just as beautiful is that which participates in the spiritual form, so ugly is that which is characterised by the comparative absence of such form. Absolutely ugly is that which is almost devoid of such form, the Divine meaning.

It is not the total absence of form that constitutes ugly,

1. Inge, Vol. II, 86-7. 2. Inge, Vol. I, 137. 3. Inge, Vol. II, 211-12.

but predominence of matter over form, obscuration of form by matter, hiding of unity by multiplicity. It is not absolute not-being of form, but such being as borders on not-being, exactly as matter is not absolute not-being but the lowest limit of being. He holds bad and ugly to be the same, just like the good and the beautiful. Bad character, according to him, is that which is soiled by base passions, exactly as ugly body is that which is caked with mud. In order to restore goodness to one and beauty to the other it is the purification (Katharsis) that is necessary. One must be freed from base passion and mud must be removed from the other.

PSYCHO-EPISTEMIC APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF ÆSTHETICS.

We have so far been concerned with the metaphysical aspect of our problem and have shown how Plotinus metaphysically accounts for the beautiful at different levels, the spiritual and the physical. Let us now see how does he account for the æsthetic experience from the epistemic and the psychological points of view. In so doing we have to take into account the subjective and the objective aspects of the experience, the means, which are employed, and the process that is involved in getting it.

Plotinus recognises "beautiful" as one of the values, which the human soul is capable of realising. It is definitely a human value. It is beyond the reach of the grades of life below the human. It is, therefore, necessary to have a clear idea of Plotinic conception of the soul to understand the psycho-epistemic explanation of the æsthetic experience.

SOUL IN PLOTINIC METAPHYSICS.

We have dealt with the spirit, the spiritual world and the spiritual perception in an earlier section. We have also

shown that in the conception of the spiritual world Plotinus was considerably influenced by Platonic conception of the world of ideas and that in spite of this influence, his conception presents an advance on that of Plato, in so far as he holds that there are the ideas of the individual objects also, which are archetypes of the individual objects in the physical world and that there are individual spirits also corresponding to individual souls in this world.

Plotinus holds that the phenomenal world is only a reflection of the spiritual world. According to him, there is nothing "here" which is not "there". Individuality is a fact. There are individual spirits in the spiritual world and the individual souls are their Logoi. They are free, not only from temporal and spatial limitations, but also from limitations of mutual exclusiveness and incompenetrability, to which bodies are subjected. The only point of distinction between an individual spirit and an individual soul is that the latter possesses *unfulfilled desire.* It is separated from spirit as word is from thought. It is indivisible even when it is divided ; for, it is all in all and all in every part.

Human soul is the central point in the Plotinic system of thought. It stands midway between the phenomenal world and the world of Spirit. It is the connecting link between the Spiritual world and the Phenomenal. It binds the extremes together. All the metaphysical principles are represented within it. It is in touch with everything from the Absolute to the Matter. It is a microcosm ; it is the Logos of Spirit.

It is capable of infinite expansion. It can rise to the level of Spirit, realise its identity with 'the All' and have the vision of the Absolute. The realisation of this identity is a gradual process. As it rises higher, it finds it impossible to

determine where it ceases to be itself and consequently gives up the attempt to distinguish itself from the Universal Being. It realises itself by turning towards its principle. It is not matter and form but form only. It is the nature of the soul to look up to the spiritual world and down to the world of sense. It can understand itself only by contemplating the Universal Soul. For, to understand anything is to know it in relation to what is next above it. The individual is identical with the Universal,[1] when we free it from all that is accidental and consider it in its purity. It is of the same form as the Universal.

Plotinus combats the view that individual souls are only parts, into which the universal soul is divided. According to him, they are Logoi of spirits, corresponding to distinct spirits in the spiritual world. The point may be clarified as follows :—

Spirit (Nous) persists in itself. It does not descend into body. From *Spirit* proceed the universal Soul and individual souls. Individual souls are related to universal Soul as particulars to universal. Individual souls remain united in their higher sides. But at lower level they diverge, just as light divides itself into various habitations of men, though it still remains one and indivisible.[2]

In the spiritual world there is distinction without division. The part in a sense contains the whole. Each individual has its own character and uniqueness, which give it its individuality. *But in the spiritual world this is no obstacle to their complete communion with each other.*

At lower level, however, they get separation without disparity and resemblance without unity. It is body that

1. Inge, Vol. I, 207. 2. Inge, Vol. I, 213.

makes these illusory divisions. The soul, even when in relation to body, is divided in 'appearance' only.

SOUL AND BODY.

Soul is not in body[1], but body is enveloped and penetrated by the soul. There are three causes of association of soul with body. (i) Free attraction or voluntary inclination. (ii) The law of necessity proceeding from nature of things. (iii) The desire of the soul to bestow order and beauty on things just below itself. Connection of the soul with a body is mediated by Pneuma, which has been interpreted by his followers as vehicle of the soul. It is the etherial form, which soul receives from celestial spheres and which it does not quit even after separation from body.

FACULTIES OF SOUL.

(I) SENSATION.

Sensation is a characteristic of the embodied soul. It is not simply an impression passively received from external object by the perceiving faculty. It is an activity. Plotinus holds that there is external physical world, which is only an imperfect image of the spiritual world, and that there is pneumatic or seminal soul vivifying a human body. There is a sympathy between objects and sense-organs. Objects come into contact with sense-organs and impress forms. Such forms, when recognised by soul, are sensations. Sensation, thus, is reception of form. Powers of the sensitive soul are localised in certain parts of body. But the real organ of sensation is the seminal logos, just as the soul is the organ of discursive reason. The difference between sensation and spiritual perception is one of degree only. Sensation is dim, but spiritual perception is clear. Spiritual perception is clear

1. Inge, Vol. I, 218.

sensation. The objects, perceived by senses, are only images of the contents of the spiritual world. Thus, sensation is a kind of dream of soul.

PLEASURE AND PAIN.

Pleasure[1] and pain belong neither to body nor to soul alone, but to both of them together. It is only the *lower* or *seminal* soul that feels pleasure and pain. The higher (rational soul) does not feel them ; it is simply aware of them. We feel pleasure when there is harmony between body and soul. Pain is due to disturbance of the harmony. Pleasure and pain are not pure sensations. They are states of consciousness ; their chief characteristic is that they tell us nothing beyond themselves and suggest no object or idea.

They are associated exclusively with the lower soul and cannot pass beyond it. The higher soul, (the rational) can conquer them by remaining at its high level. It will then be conscious of them but not as states of itself.

(II, III) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.

They belong to discursive reason. Memory has no place in the spiritual world which is above time. The difference between memory and imagination, which Plotinus calls "capricious", is that the latter carries with it no idea of truth or falsity with reference to external object and implies no relation to any past time, in which its contents were first experienced.

TWO TYPES OF IMAGINATION.

Imagination,[2] according to Plotinus, is of two kinds : (i) sensible and (ii) intellectual. The first is simply

1. Inge, Vol. I, 225.
2. Inge, Vol. I, 231.

'the impact from outside on the irrational soul'. It is attached to irrational soul. The second is attached to rational soul. Perception, as an act of knowledge, seizes the forms of sensible objects. Sensible imagination is nothing more than the final stage of perceptual operation, when a percept becomes a purely mental representation. The perceptual faculty, in the last stage of its operation, takes the name of imagination in the presence of the object. Imagination forms into images both the forms of sensible objects and our thoughts about them. It is midway between sensation and reasoning. As an image-making faculty, related to perception, it is the summit of the perceptual faculty. As such, it is identical with perceptual faculty and requires an object to excite it to act. But it also works independently of immediate presence of the object. As such, it is capricious.

INTELLECTUAL IMAGINATION.

Intellectual imagination[1] and intellectual love are in indissoluble union. Intellectual love in such union is responsible for creation of images, which are the reflection of reason in her most exalted mood. These images are the guiding stars of the soul in her onward march towards God. Religious and other symbols are merely representations of such creations of intellectual imagination and, therefore, have a high truth. Intellectual imagination clothes intellectual and spiritual conceptions in appropriate forms. It can also spiritualise what is visible and corporeal, filling it with a higher meaning. It is pre-eminently truthful and truth-seeking faculty. It perceives those aspects of truth which would remain hidden but for it. It is accompanied by a delight in the object or truth so beheld, a thrill which is one of the most exquisite modes that man can ever experience. Plotinus

1. Inge, Vol. I, 232-4.

explains artistic imagination and Art in terms of this conception of intellectual imagination.

(IV) RECOLLECTION.

Recollection[1] demands a higher kind of volitional and rational activity than memory. It is confined to man. But memory is found in lower animals also. As a faculty of the soul it gives actuality to notions, which soul possesses potentially. Memory is always of something, which the soul has already experienced at some point of time. Recollection, however, is of something that is innate in the soul. It refers to innate ideas, which belong to the soul. It is the expression of the innate spiritual energy of the soul. It is the actualisation of what lies potential in soul. It is the visualisation of the innate spiritual ideas. In recollection soul rises above limited self-consciousness, which is involved in memory. Contemplation is the means to such recollection.

The distinction, that Plotinus draws between memory and recollection, is different from that drawn by Aristotle. For, while, according to Aristotle, memory is passive faculty of retention, which retains sensuous pictures of the objects of experience, and recollection is the power of soul that recalls the pictures so retained ; recollection, according to Plotinus, has no reference to the empirical experience. It is the faculty, which, according to him, is responsible for visualisation of the innate ideas.

It is interesting to find that this is the kind of distinction that Abhinavagupta draws between memory (Smṛti) as conceived by the Naiyāyikas and recollection (Smṛti) as conceived by Kālidāsa[2] and presented in his famous verse in the Abhijñāna Śākuntalam "Ramyāṇi vīkṣya" etc. It is also interesting

1. Inge, Vol. I, 227-9. 2. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 164-5.

to find that both Plotinus and Abhinavagupta make use of this particular conception of recollection in explaining æsthetic experience.

(V) REASON.

Reason is of two types: (i) discursive and (ii) pure. Discursive[1] reason is the characteristic activity of the soul. The material, formal and final conditions of its thinking are not its contents. It reasons about the data supplied by senses in order to gain knowledge. 'Its powers are directed to transcending the conditions of their own activity.' It seizes upon the elements[2] of truth one after another and, therefore, as such, it has no place in æsthetic experience.

It works on sense-data. It may simply become aware of them and proceed no further; or it may employ rational faculties and find out the meaning and import of what has been supplied to it by sensation. It may employ memory and connect the presented sense-data with a past experience. It may make use of imagination and develop the fragmentary sense-image into full image, complete in all its parts. It may recognise certain ethical, intellectual or æsthetic value, good, true or beautiful.

If discursive reason, (after it has worked out the details of the synoptic sense-image, supplied by the faculty of sensation, and built a complete sensible image by means of the faculty of imagination) proceeds to affirm regarding the presentation that "it is good" or "it is true" or "it is beautiful", it still speaks of things known through senses. But there is a noteworthy addition in this judgement; i.e. though the subject of the judgement belongs to the world of sense, the predicate "beautiful" is taken by the discursive reason from itself.

1. Inge, Vol. I, 238. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 133.

For, while the standard of the sensible aspect of knowledge is in the sensible world and, therefore, exists outside the judging subject, the reason; the standard of the predicate, "beautiful", is in the reason itself. The reason has within itself the standard of the beautiful.

Plotinus admits the trinity, Soul, Spirit and the One. In the order of manifestation, soul is a manifestation of *spirit.* Therefore, three values, which in experience we find transcending the level of soul and belonging to the spiritual level, are reflected on soul from Spirit.

Thus, reason is that which judges the values, which has the standard of value in itself and which receives the print of spirit, which is just above it. It cannot, however, rise to spirit. It is confined to examination of the external, but cannot examine itself.

Æsthetic experience, according to Plotinus, is not an experience, which can be attained by reason, which judges, because it is not a judgement of reason, which involves subject-predicate relation. It is above judgement inasmuch as the subject in it is lost in the predicate. Experience is not "It is beautiful" but simply "beautiful". It is beyond the level of soul. It belongs to spiritual level.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Self-consciousness[1] belongs to *reason.* It is nothing but self-awareness. It is self-objectification. It is the consciousness of one's own self as an object.

We do things best when we are not self-conscious, when there is no consciousness of externality, when there is no objective consciousness. Poetic activity is such.

Self-consciousness is an experience, which has its place

1. Inge, Vol. I, 236.

in mental growth. It is useful for certain purposes. But it is not the ultimate state of the human spirit. In our best and most effective moments, when we really enter into our work, we leave it behind. Similarly in our identification with the object of our knowledge there is a kind of unconsciousness. Soul rises above the level of self-consciousness in higher spiritual experiences, though we can as little doubt them as our own existence. At the spiritual level thought and consciousness of thought are inseparable.

(VI, VII, VIII) INTELLECT, WILL AND LOVE.

Corresponding to three values there are three powers of the soul, intellect, will and love. Soul determines its rank[1] in the scale of beings by fixing upon the object in relation to which they are to be used. A man is free to choose an object. If he directs them to the sensuous, he degrades himself to the animal level. But it is his nature to aspire to eternal values. Unselfish interest, such as *love* of art and beauty, is the true life of soul. Consciousness[2] of values and love for them are primary affections of the soul.

IRRATIONAL SOUL.

Irrational soul is that aspect of the soul which allows itself to be entangled among temptations. Covetousness, self-indulgence, ambition and fear are its characteristics. It is entangled in the illusions of bodily existence. It is in immediate contact with the world of sense. It[3] is always occupied with the thoughts of pleasure and pain. Passions[4] and emotions belong to body and, therefore, to irrational soul.

HIGHER AND LOWER SOUL.

Soul is not a fixed entity. It[5] has two aspects:

1. Inge, Vol. II, 27. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 83.
3. Inge, Vol. I, 256. 4. Inge, Vol. I, 239. 5. Inge, Vol. I, 218.

(i) higher (ii) lower. Higher soul is spirit. Lower soul is principle of psychological life. As the former, it[1] knows what it is or what is in it. As such it realises true, good and beautiful which it is in itself. As the latter it examines what is external to it. The higher soul is not always active. It functions on rare occasions only when we realise the true values. It is operative when we rise above body. It does not need a body for exercising its powers. The lower soul[2] is ever active. It functions when united with a body.

According to Plotinus, there are three planes on which a man may live. (i) He may live a purely external life, obeying his natural instincts and not reflecting. (ii) He may, in accordance with discursive reason, live the life of an intelligent but unspiritual man. (iii) He may live on super-human plane. He may live the life of Spirit.

Soul is a microcosm. It has potentialities of all the three lives. It is free to choose the faculties which it desires to develop. The discursive reason, however, is the characteristic of humanity. For, merely sensuous life is infrahuman and in the life of spirit we rise above the conditions and limitations, of the earthly existence.

Soul is potentially 'all things'. Our personality is constituted by what we are able to realise of the infinite wealth, which our divine-human nature contains hidden in its depth.

Each soul is characterised by the faculty that it uses. Some unite themselves to spiritual world by using the faculty of spiritual perception. Some use discursive reason and discover moral, physical and æsthetical laws. But others make use of their faculty of desire for finite ends and sink to the animal level. Souls, while they contemplate diverse objects, become that which they contemplate. They cannot ascend

1. Inge, Vol. I, 235. 2. Inge, Vol. I, 236.

to the spiritual level all at once. The lower levels are the rungs to climb by.

Love[1] or rather contemplation of physical beauty is the legitimate first stage in the ascent to the love of divine ideas. Three classes of men have their feet on the ladder to spiritual union; philosopher, artist or poet and lover of art. The intellect, the æsthetic susceptibility and the love are three faculties, which enable them to realise their respective ideals.

CONTEMPLATION.

Plotinus discusses his conception of contemplation in relation to Spirit, World-Soul, nature and human soul, and in the context of ethics, religion and æsthetics. General nature[2] of contemplation consists in turning towards the higher and filling oneself with it. It is a kind of spiritual vision. All creation is due to contemplation, turning towards the higher principle.

Contemplation at the spiritual level, which he qualifies as living, true and perfect, is the interplay, mutual reaction, reciprocal action, of Spirit and Spiritual world.

The World-Soul contemplates Spirit and is responsible for the being of Nature, which is rational and, therefore, a soul. Nature also turns towards the source of its life and creates fainter image of the spiritual world on the mirror of matter, which we call phenomenal world.

The meaning of Plotinus, when he says that Nature contemplates may be stated as follows :—

The preceding discussion has shown that Nature, taken in its entirety, is creative energy of the World-Soul and reason.

1. Inge, Vol. II, 187-8.
2. Inge, Vol. I, 160-1.

The very fact that Nature is reason implies that it must itself be contemplative. For, Nature, being a product of contemplation of a contemplator, the World-Soul, and so inheriting the nature of its creator, does contemplate. Its contemplation[1], however, is distinct from that of the discursive reason of human soul, which considers piecemeal what is external to itself and what it does not possess. Nature is contemplative and not discursive reason. It possesses what it contemplates. Its contemplation does not refer to anything that is external to it. It is both the 'contemplation and the object contemplated': and to be what it is and to produce what it produces are for it the same. It is what it contemplates. In it thought and being are identical and so are being and production. Hence production, in the case of nature, is nothing but contemplation. Creative energy and reason are spoken of as two aspects of Nature: and the latter is spoken of as assisting and presiding over the activity of the former, because in common parlance thought and action are so conceived.

Just as works of art are products of artist's contemplation, so the forms, which introduce order in the disorderly Matter, are products of Nature's contemplation. The only difference between the contemplation of Nature and that of an artist is that the latter needs a medium[2] and an instrument for production, the former simply lets fall the form and needs no instrument or medium.

Nature, as creative energy of the World-Soul, is not totally free in the act of creation. It is thoroughly controlled in it by the creative principles, the Logoi, the rational principles of creation. The World-Soul and Logoi are the outcome of contemplation of Spirit. And Nature, as creative energy and reason is the product of contemplation of the World-Soul,

1. Inge, Vol. I, 159. 2. Inge, Vol. I, 157.

whose contemplation is clearer than that of Nature. Nature is only a faint image of the higher contemplation of the World-Soul and, therefore, its products are weak. For, weak contemplation produces a weak object.

HUMAN SOUL AND CONTEMPLATION.

There is a hierarchy of contemplations as there is a hierarchy of values, in Plotinus. There is living contemplation, which Spirit has or rather is. There is strong contemplation as that of an artist, poet or philosopher. There is weak contemplation such as that of a manual worker. Thus, in human beings contemplation can either be strong or weak. The strength of human contemplation lies in its being able to rise to the spiritual level, to visualise the spiritual reality and to realise the spiritual aspect of the soul. The less the contemplation[1] is able to visualise Reality, the weaker it is.

CONTEMPLATION IN RELATION TO BEAUTIFUL.

In æsthetic contemplation we rise above the level of discursive reason : we lose distinct consciousness of the contemplating subject. We lose ourselves in the object that we contemplate. Thus, in æsthetic contemplation there is complete loss of personality. The subject becomes the object. The soul ceases to be a personality. Discursive reason comes to a standstill. There is ascent to the spiritual world, where there is identity of thought and things. He, who contemplates eternal varieties, is one with the object[2] of contemplation. In contemplating beauty, the soul identifies itself with the formative activity[3] of its own higher principle and attains to living contemplation, which is possible at the spiritual level only and does not involve self-consciousness.[4]

1. Inge, Vol. I, 160.
2. Inge, Vol. II, 199.
3. Inge, Vol. II, 214.
4. Inge, Vol. I, 237.

ARTIST'S CONTEMPLATION.

According to Plotinus, there is similarity between the productive activity of nature and that of an artist, for instance, that of a worker[1] in wax, who moulds wax into beautiful figure and gives such colours to it as win universal approval of lovers of Art. The question, therefore, arises: "Wherefrom does the artist get the shape and the colours which he gives to wax?" The answer, according to Plotinus, is that the artist gets them from elsewhere. That which controls his choice of colours is the model, existing outside in the external world, if he is an imitative artist, or the ideal, if he is a genius. It is *model* or *ideal* which directs the creative activity of the artist. The faculty, which enables him to get a vision of the ideal, is contemplation, turning towards higher and fixing the gaze on it.

CONTEMPLATION AND ACTION.

Action is of two types[2], (i) necessary and (ii) free. Necessary action turns contemplation chiefly towards external things. Free action does so to a lesser extent. Necessary action[3] proceeds from the weakness of contemplative power and consequent inability to rise to Reality. Such action is a shadow of contemplation. It springs from failure to see spiritual reality. It proceeds from soul's intense desire to see with physical eyes what it could not behold with the spiritual. In such a case action is due to the weakness of contemplation and is meant to give a sight of reality, as far as it can be expressed in action, to both the agent and the beholder. It provides no occasion for rising to higher level.

But action is not always due to the weakness[4] of contemplation. It may be due to its strength. When it proceeds from

1. Inge, Vol. I, 157.
2. Inge, Vol. I, 157.
3. Inge, Vol. I, 160.
4. Inge, Vol. II, 161.

the strength of contemplation, it is an accompaniment. The product of action, which accompanies contemplation, leads to contemplation of something better than itself. Such action is that of the artist whose products lead to higher contemplation.

Contemplation in relation to free action (such as that of an artist, a painter for instance, in producing a picture) is a mental activity of inner visualisation of the ideal. As such, contemplation directs action.[1] Action is the necessary result of contemplation. But contemplation is not for the sake of action but for its own sake.

ART AND REALITY.

A work of art that leads to the contemplation of the spiritual, is the product of artist's activity, which automatically accompanies his contemplation, as has just been stated. It is a symbolic representation of reality, as it figures in his vision. It is the expression of his vision of the underlying principle of the physical beauty. It is form, externalised in a material medium.

It is the form which combines and co-ordinates parts, which are to make a unity, which is beautiful both as a whole and in all its parts. It is that which the soul recognises as akin[2] to itself and which reminds the soul of its spiritual nature.

A work of art symbolises an idea in a material medium. It is, therefore, beautiful in proportion to its faithful representation of the real. For, the real is the ideal, and the ideal is beautiful. True artist fixes his eyes on archetypal Logoi and tries to draw inspiration from the spiritual power that creates the forms of bodily beauty. Art, therefore, is a mode of contemplation, which creates because it must.

1. Inge, Vol. II, 170. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 211.

ART AND IMITATION.

Plotinus refuses to recognise the external world to be the standard of art. A work of art, according to him, is not an imitation of an object in the physical world, as Plato held. It is a product of imagination,[1] the sphere of whose activity extends beyond that of imitation. For, while imitation can copy the perceptible only, imagination can picture up what is beyond the perceptual sphere. Its activity extends to suprasensuous.

We have shown above that imagination, according to Plotinus, is of two types, (i) sensuous (ii) intellectual. It is the intellectual imagination and not the sensuous, which is responsible for beautiful works of art. It is the latter,[2] which creates images which are reflections of reason in her most exalted mood. Artistic symbols are merely representations of such creations of intellectual imagination.

According to him, art is not representative but symbolical. It is essentially the direct expression of reason[3], meaning, or idea that belongs to the spiritual world, in sensible material medium, by æsthetic semblance. The reply to the question "Why some artistic forms symbolise Divine idea[4] ?" is that because soul recognises in them certain form, the meaning, that she understands and loves; because the sensuous forms have a certain natural affinity to certain spiritual ideas. The sensuous forms, which are recognised to be beautiful, have real resemblance to their archetype in the spiritual world.

ART AND MORALITY.

Plotinus does not recognise art as subordinate to morality, as does Aristotle. According to him, art is co-ordinate with

1. Inge, Vol. II, 215.
2. Inge, Vol. I, 232-4.
3. Inge, Vol. II, 213.
4. Inge, Vol. II, 211.

morality. For, the same reality, approached through intellect, will and love, is true, good and beautiful, as we have already shown.

BEAUTY AND SYMMETRY.

Plotinus presents a distinct advance on the æsthetic thought of his predecessors in refusing to admit that symmetry[1] is the essence of beauty. According to him, beauty is form in matter, life in body, spirit in soul and light, that emanating from the Absolute Good, plays over the spiritual world. The fact that life is the beauty of organic bodies becomes clear if we take our experience of the physical beauty into account. We find that a living face[2] is more beautiful than a dead one. A statue, which expresses life, is more beautiful than one that is dull and lifeless. A living animal is more beautiful than a picture of it : and similar is the case with flowers, plants and trees, though their pictures may be more symmetrical.

We find more beauty in the presence or expression of life, because life is the manifestation of the soul, which is more like the Absolute Good than the matter and which, coloured by the light of the Good and so being enlightened, is more widely awake. The greater beauty of organic bodies, is due to the soul, which enlightens them and so makes them more desirable.

The view of Plotinus on beauty of nature and that of art is essentially different from those of his predecessors. According to him, beauty does not consist in symmetry and harmony. For, in that case the whole only will be beautiful and not the parts. But can beauty result from a combination of parts, which are not beautiful in themselves ? In case beauty be admitted in parts also, the theory that beauty lies in symmetry and harmony falls to the ground. Further,

1. Inge, Vol. II, 213. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 130.

according to this view simple colour such as that of gold, sun or star would not be beautiful.

WAY TO ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Beautiful, whether in nature or in art, has two aspects, (i) sensible and (ii) intelligible. The sensible aspect is confined to visible and audible. For, only two, the eye and the ear, are æsthetic senses. We have already discussed the metaphysical implication of the natural and the artistic beauty, which are the objects, or rather the mediums, of æsthetic experience. We have also shown the complex nature of human soul, which is the subjective aspect of æsthetic experience. Therefore, we have to turn our attention now to the process that leads to this experience.

THE FIRST STEP.

Just as moral and virtuous life is the first step to the realisation of the Good, so love of the natural beauty or, we may add, the artistic, is the first step[1] to the realisation of the Beautiful. The test of our really pursuing the beautiful, is that we love the natural or the artistic beauty for its own sake and not for any reason outside itself. Pursuit of the beautiful is disinterested. Detaching the mind from the flood of extraneous ideas, which constantly attack it, and fixing it on the visible or audible beauty of nature or art is the first step to æsthetic experience.

The first stage in the process, involved in æsthetic experience, therefore, is characterised by freedom from interest in sensuous particulars as means of sensuous pleasure and animal gratification and, therefore, in the material aspect of the object. This naturally means freedom from desire to have anything to do with matter. Hence æsthetic experience is represented to be disinterested.

1. Inge, Vol. II, 187.

THE SECOND STEP.

But the experience, that refers to an image of an object[1], as formed in mind through the distorting medium of lower faculties, is not *true*. The next step, therefore, is an effort to rise to the archetype[2], the form, the underlying principle of unity.

Plotinus holds that the same reality, approached from different points of view, intellectual, ethical and æsthetical, is spoken of as true, good and beautiful and that intellect, will and love are the means to its realisation. The next step, after disinterested love of sensible beauty of nature or of art is the true understanding of it. A man, therefore, can take the next step to the realisation of perfect beauty by understanding nature or art. But to understand anything truly is to know the underlying principle that controls, orders and gives it form. Therefore, in order to understand a natural phenomenon or a work of art, we have not to confine ourselves to what appeals to senses, but to rise from the sense-level to the intellectual and to look for and to find out the principle, the vital law, which gives meaning to it. This is just what scientists and poets do. The way to understand nature or art, therefore, is the way of poets or scientists.

What is most real and, therefore, most beautiful in this world of sense, is that which reflects the purpose, the meaning, the principle that is responsible for its being. By fixing our attention on this, by looking at it in relation to what is next above it, we take the only path that is open to us to realise the beautiful.

The will to fix attention and the intellect to find out the principle, are the two faculties necessary for taking the next

1. Inge, Vol. II, 147. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 86-7.

step to æsthetic experience. It involves intense concentration[1] of mind and will on what is believed to be the essential of the quest. It presupposes the conviction that all truth is shadow except the last: that all experiences of soul half reveal and half conceal reality: that the Beautiful is always given through something i.e. through material medium. Realisation of the beautiful, therefore, involves a continual rejection of the outward show, the sensuous element of the presented.

CONDITIONS OF CONCENTRATION.

1. Distracting[2] ideas, by which our minds are constantly attacked, have to be resolutely refused an entrance into mind.

2. Will has to be completely passive, except in stern repression of sensuous imagination and fixing the attention.

3. Tendency of mind to construct premature syntheses out of what it has apprehended, has to be checked. But if, in spite of the check, they are constructed, they have to be destroyed.

THE THIRD STEP.

Discursive reason can lead to but cannot grasp the form, the underlying principle, because it is spiritual. "Like knows the like." How can then reason know the spiritual form? For, it is discursive; it knows its object bit by bit, but the form, the beautiful, is indivisible.

We have shown, while dealing with intellectual imagination, that intellectual love, in union with intellectual imagination, is responsible for creation of images, which are the reflection of reason in her most exalted mood, that these images are the guiding stars of soul in her onward march towards the spiritual level and that religious and æsthetic symbols are merely representations of such creations of

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1. Inge, Vol II, 146. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 154.

intellectual imagination and have a high truth. Thus, it is clear that reason in its highest flight can give us only a guiding star to beauty and not a vision of it.

Further, reason has its own limitations. Condition of its operation is not so much the presence of subject-object relation as the consciousness of opposition between self and not-self. How can it then have the vision of beauty, which is marked by the absence of this opposition ?

Apprehension, therefore, of form, true beauty, is possible only through becoming like spirit. Soul, therefore, has to free[1] itself from all that is non-spiritual in it by rising not only above body and senses but also above memory and reason. Thus, the third, the final, step to æsthetic experience is the rise from rational to spiritual level.

When soul rises to spiritual level its finite relations are superseded by complete communion and its faculties are so changed as to suit the eternal conditions of the eternal world. It is freed from discursive reason and memory, because the eternal world is free from spatial and temporal limitations. It attains calm and rest. Its calm, however, is not a static condition, but a state of constant activity and its rest is unimpeded energy. Living contemplation takes the place of reasoning[2] and recollection substitutes memory. Opposition between tension and free action and rest and motion is transcended.

Thus, we find that contemplation of higher type, the living contemplation, and recollection are the two higher faculties, which are essential for the third, the final, step to visualisation of and identification with the Beautiful, in which æsthetic experience consists. We have shown in a preceding section that recollection is distinct from memory ; that while

1. Inge, Vol. II, 133. 2. Inge, Vol. II, 88.

memory is found in lower animals also, recollection is confined to man only : that it gives actuality to notions, which the soul possesses potentially and which are innate in it ; that it is the visualisation of innate ideas ; that in it the soul rises above limited self-consciousness and that strong contemplation, such as that of a poet, on the reflection of reason in her most exalted mood is the only means to it.

Therefore, when the soul rises above rational level through strong contemplation on the reflection of reason in her most exalted mood and looks beyond, the faculty of recollection is aroused to work and actualises the innate idea in the soul no less than its potential spiritual nature. The strong contemplation then is replaced by the living, which involves interaction of spirit and idea and, therefore, identification of the two.

Thus, the soul rises to the spiritual level beyond the physical and the intellectual. It is, therefore, free from sensation, emotion and passion, which are associated with the physical level. It is also free from memory, imagination, opinion and limited self-consciousness, which are associated with the intellectual level.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Soul, in contemplating the Beautiful, identifies[1] itself with the formative activity of its own higher principle. It gets rid of petty personal interests, which are vestures of decay. It rises to the spiritual level by freeing itself from all that is of opposite nature, so as to be able to recognize the idea in the guise of the material medium, in which a genius presents it. Æsthetic experience is recognitive experience, consisting in cognising the idea itself in the reflection of it and forthwith entering into spiritual life.

1. Inge, Vol. II, 214.

RECOGNITIVE NATURE OF ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Plotinus has inherited the Greek doctrine "Like knows the like". Beautiful, therefore, being spiritual, can be known by spirit only. We know that in Plotinic system the soul, in essence, is the spirit, though this essence is obscured by lower aspect of soul, the pneumatic soul. The spiritual ideas, therefore, are not completely foreign to it. We also know that memory is an essential element in the process of recognition and that recognition needs the presence of object under an imperfect cover, in a disguise as it were.

When soul, through strong contemplation on a work of art, which symbolises the highest spiritual form or idea in a material medium, rises above the level of discursive reason, its reason is replaced by spiritual perception and its memory by recollection, as we have stated above. It turns to itself and recollects the highest spiritual form, a similarity with which the present beautiful physical object bears, and is led to the recognition[1] of the spiritual form, disguised in material cover. Æsthetic experience is, therefore, recognitive experience inasmuch as it consists in the recognition of form, appearing in the guise of matter. It is the recognition of the archetype in its imperfect expression in matter.

1 Inge, Vol. II, 216.

CHAPTER VI.

ÆSTHETIC CURRENTS IN EARLY CHRISTIAN ERA, MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

IMPORTANCE OF THINKERS OF EARLY CHRISTIAN ERA, MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE.

During the early Christian era, Middle ages and the Renaissance some new problems of art and some old problems in the new setting were attempted, which are interesting from a comparative point of view.

(I) One of the problems that exercised the minds of thinkers of the period was: "Is artistic presentation true or false?" And St. Augustine attempted to distinguish the artistic falsehood from the practical. In India also it was pointed out by Śrī Śaṅkuka[1] that the artistic presentation cannot be called true or false, dream or reflection in the conventional sense.

(II) Another problem that arose was: "What is the principle of unity?" And emotion was recognised to be the unifying principle in a work of art, much as Bharata[2] admitted the basic and persisting emotion to be such a principle in India.

(III) The third problem was the essential nature of genius. And it was admitted that artistic genius is a gift of God or nature and that it can be supplemented by learning and experience but not replaced. The admission of Pratibhā by Ānandavardhana[3] in India is very much like that of genius during renaissance.

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1. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 50-52.

*2. N.S., 81.

*3. Dh., 29. and Com. Æ., Vol. I, 151.

(IV) The later renaissance thinkers emphasised the importance of the intellectual background of the artist. And it is recognised in India as one of the causes of the poetic production by such poeticians as Mammaṭa (Nipuṇatā Kāvya-śāstrādyavekṣaṇāt).

ÆSTHETICS IN EARLY CHRISTIAN ERA.

It was a period, which generally echoed Plato's two main objections to art. Actor was disapproved, because he was supposed to counterfeit voice, sex and age and to make a show of false love and hate, and false sighs and tears. And dramatic presentation was admitted to demoralize the spectator.

There are, however, stray remarks[1], in defence of arts and beauty, made by those who were acquainted with the classical literature and philosophy. Thus, in early Christian era and the middle ages we find only two writers of interest to us from a comparative point of view, St. Augustine and St. Thomas: the former, because of his peculiar conception of artistic falsehood and of his giving a place to the ugly in art; and the latter, because of his views on æsthetic senses and quiescence of desire in æsthetic experience. For, these are the aspects of the æsthetic problem, which are taken into account by Indian æstheticians.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S DEFENCE OF POETRY.

St. Augustine[2] (353–430 A.D.) defended 'lying' in poetry and illusion of theatre on conventional ground: because convention recognised that an actor to be a true actor must be a fictitious person.

He found in poetic fiction a kind of truth. False,[3] according to him, is that which pretends and tends to be

1. Gil., 125.
2. Gil., 167.
3. Gil., 12

what it is not. He divides falsehood into :—

(i) Deceptions, brought about by nature.

(ii) Deceptions, brought about by living beings.

The latter he subdivides into :—

(a) Practical and deliberate deceptions.

(b) Deceptions only to amuse.

The poetic or artistic deception he puts under the last head.

Thus, poets, according to him, are not liars, because they do not intend to deceive: their free handling of historical matter does not detract merit from it.

PLACE OF UGLY IN ART.

He gives a place to ugly in art. He recognises ugly as a subordinate element in the beautiful[1]. Ugly serves to bring beauty to prominence by contrast and contributes to the effectiveness of beauty, if put in right and proper relation with it.

AIM OF POETRY.

The aim of poetry, like that of eloquence, according to him, is to melt and to arouse. Poetic presentation tends to awake the idle and to stimulate the dull.

GROUND OF ATTRACTION IN ART, ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS.

St. Thomas (1227—1274) was influenced by Plotinus in his conception of the ground of attraction[2] in art. He, like Plotinus, holds that 'the affinity, revealed in 'symmetry' between percipient and perceived,' is the ground of attraction in art. He, however, makes the senses the direct bearers of this affinity. Senses are, according to him,

1. Bos., 134.
2. Bos., 147.

charmed by symmetrical and well-proportioned objects, because the latter are analogous to the former.

DESIRE IN ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

He holds that desire[1] is quieted in æsthetic experience. He is not very clear on this point. But he seems to mean that the quiescence is due to the satisfaction of senses and cognitive power ; because, according to him, beauty is addressed to senses of sight and hearing in particular and cognitive power in general.

ÆSTHETIC SENSES.

Sight and hearing alone are æsthetic senses, because they are greater instruments of reason and more perceptive than taste and smell. Ear and eye recognise the artistic presentation as distinct from reality, which arouses desire, more clearly than do smell and taste. The former are capable of apprehending the structural whole better than the latter.

BEAUTY DEFINED.

Beauty[2], according to him, or rather according to the intellectual æsthetics of middle ages, is revelation of reason in sensuous form. This definition of beauty seems to have been due to the influence of Plotinus, who, as we have stated earlier, held that intellectual imagination in union with intellectual love creates images, which are the reflexion of reason in her most exalted mood and that the artistic and other symbols are merely representations of such creations of the intellectual imagination.

ÆSTHETICS DURING RENAISSANCE.

It was only during Renaissance[3] that æsthetic consciousness, which had been suppressed by ascetic Middle ages, was restored to humanity. Minds of Renaissance thinkers, were,

1. Bos., 148. 2, Bos., 149. 3. Gil., 162.

however, dominated by Greek theories of art. They were mainly occupied with the following problems :—

1. What are the means of artistic production? What are the methods, which are employed, and mental equipment that is necessary for creation of what is capable of giving æsthetic pleasure?

2. What is the aim of art? Is Art intended to improve its lovers morally or simply to please them?

3. What are the characteristics of art?

4. What does art present? Does art present truth or falsehood? Is art deception or illusion? Does art present nature or ideal?

5. What is the criterion of beauty?

IMITATION AND IMAGINATION AS MEANS OF ARTISTIC PRODUCTION.

Early Renaissance thinkers discussed the theory of imitation in relation to that aspect of human mind, which is necessary to produce imitative works of art. Their investigations showed that such an aspect of mind was the faculty of imagination. The path to this discovery had been paved by the medieval thinkers.

To the medieval mind nature, the Living Book, was a mirror[1], which reflected God's perfection; it was true mystical mirror of the highest wisdom and so was the "*Written Book*" "The Bible". During the Renaissance the analogy of mirror was freed from religious implications and was given poetic or artistic implication instead. Renaissance thinkers employed the analogy of mirror to explain the function of such arts as painting and poetry. Art, according to early thinkers of Renaissance, was a mirror

1. Gil., 163.

that faithfully reflected common life and nature. Analogy of mirror was adopted to guide the Artist[1], whose mind was looked upon as a mirror that reflected nature faithfully. This capacity of mind to receive the reflection of external nature was subsequently called artistic imagination.

The theory of reflection in the context of art, as presented by the early renaissance thinkers, seems to be essentially the same as that of Plato. But it was acceptable at that time, because the world of nature was not regarded to be a shadow of the world of ideas in the distorting medium of matter, as Plato held, but to be a mirror which reflected God's perfection.

ART AS HUMAN INVENTION.

To later renaissance thinkers, however, art was not simply a copy of the mental image of an external object; it was not imitation but invention. Nor was it simply a product of God's[2] gift. The cause of beautiful artistic production, according to them, was human power of choice and determination to select the brightest parts from the best and loveliest features of nature.

To choose from the infinite wealth of nature, which involves entering into a situation with the characteristic human capacity and selecting out of the 'presented' or 'given' certain points, which are most suited to represent certain characteristic elements of humanity, was the first step to invention. The next step after the choice was to harmonise the selected points into a harmonious whole so that it would beautifully depict the aspect of human life, intended to be presented. This echoes the Socratic theory of selective imitation.

EMOTION AS THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY.

If artistic invention is a harmonious whole, in which all

1. Gil., 164. 2. Gil., 186.

parts are well related to each other and to the whole, the question arises : "What is the principle of unity ?" And the reply is that it is the emotion[1], which is primarily intended to be aroused in the spectator, that serves as unifying principle of various parts of the whole. The function of every part is to contribute to one emotional effect.

ART AS CREATION OF HUMANITY.

Artist's invention, according to thinkers of renaissance, does not consist in finding out what already exists, but in the selection of material from products of nature and in creating a mental image, better than any physical object, by means of human strength alone.[2]

Renaissance thinkers regarded that to be artistic,[3] in the invention of which the artist labours and exercises his genius to the fullest extent, which is a product of learning and intellectual background, which involves subtlety of genius and which cannot be fully apprehended by ordinary mind.

Accordingly the conception of intellectual background of artist was such as required him to be familiar with the largest possible number of branches of learning, both philosophical and scientific ; it also required him to be thoroughly familiar with the works of his predecessors. It was this conception which was responsible for raising poets from the position of common workman to the rank of equality with philosophers and scientists.

INTELLECTUAL NATURE OF PLEASURE FROM ART.

Renaissance mind regarded figurative[4] and allegorical presentations pleasant, because they exercise the mind of the learned with their hidden truth. Accordingly pleasure from artistic presentation was said to be due to the consciousness of

1. Gil., 137. 2. Gil., 186. 3. Gil., 171. 4. Gil., 167.

overcoming the difficulties.[1] Appreciation of art was appreciation of difficulties overcome. Here Renaissance thinkers seem to have anticipated Descartes.

CONTRIBUTION OF RENAISSANCE.

Renaissance[2] was the period of almost religious devotion to the classical authority. But this authority was only intellectual and, therefore, was subjected to intellectual tests. It was a period, when all authorities, howsoever great and high, were put below the authority of man's own judgement. The two tendencies of renaissance mind, (i) devotion to authority and (ii) consciousness of independence of human judgement, resulted in various interpretations of the authoritative statements. And they are the real contribution of renaissance to human thought.

IMITATION AND "VERISIMILITUDE".

Renaissance naturalism did not mean blind imitation of nature. It meant right interpretation of nature in accordance with speculative philosophy. It[3] involved the use of all mental faculties from memory to contemplation. It was fusion of the naturalistic ideal of art with that of harmonious design. It subjected the observed sense-data to mathematical and anatomical discipline. It made use of special departments of knowledge, such as perspective, anatomy and psychology, in handling the sense-data and created as if it were a second nature. It was guided by the Poetics[4] of Aristotle and Horace in the field of poetry no less than by mathematics etc. in that of painting. Accordingly it interpreted imitation as 'verisimilitude'.

As a natural accompaniment of this rationalistic naturalism came a change in the conception of the cause[5] of beauty in art.

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1. Gil., 171. 2. Gil., 194. 3. Gil., 176.
4. Gil., 182. 5. Gil., 186.

It was not the "gift of God" that was looked upon as the cause of artistic beauty ; on the contrary, it was the selective and harmonising capacity of man. It was the freedom of human will, not in ethical but in æsthetical context, that was looked upon as the necessary basis of artistic achievement Accordingly the *conception of genius* changed.

DURER'S CONCEPTION OF GENIUS.

Thus, we find that Durer's (1471-1528) conception of genius is a compromise between two views of the cause of artistic beauty, (i) gift of God and (ii) mechanical skill, controlled by scientific laws. He held that no amount of favourable nurture can take the place of natural gift.[1] The former supplements the latter. Genius, the gift of God, according to him, is an imagination, which harnesses figures. It is a creative power so rich and spontaneous that it can continue new production indefinitely. But this gift needs cultivation through study of nature and mathematical and natural sciences. Genius, according to him, is unaccountable and inexhaustible. Brought to perfection by study and observation it is the true source of original works of art.

FRACASTORO ON ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

According to Fracastoro (1483-1553), a poet, after he has presented his subject in beautiful expressions, feels a wonderful[2] and almost divine harmony steal into him. He is carried out of himself. He can as little contain himself as can those who take part in the mysteries of Bacchus and Cybele. Here we find something like Aristotelian view of æsthetic experience combined with the feeling of harmony.

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1. Gil., 197.
2. Gil., 190.

REACTION AGAINST ANCIENT AUTHORITY IN ABOUT SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

In and about the Sixteenth century the classical authority was defied.

(I) In 1536, Ramus[1] (1515-1572) declared in the University of Paris that utterances of Aristotle were false and vain imaginations. He asserted freedom of human thought.

(II) Castelvetro (circa 16th century) asserted that pleasure[2] and not moral instruction was the aim of poetry. Invention, according to him, meant new creation of something quite original and distinct from what had been done before.

(III) According to thinkers, who flourished about the Sixteenth century, poetry is pure fiction. It is not a presentation of the universal, the Platonic archetype or Aristotelian form. In poetry we are not shocked by sad and wicked, as we are in real life, because in it we are not concerned with truth or falsehood, but only with the success of artist in fitting his persons and actions well together, in harmonious presentation and in filling the mind with fresh and glorious visions.

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1. Gil., 195. 2. Gil., 196.

CHAPTER VII.

INTELLECTUALISTIC ÆSTHETICS OF DESCARTES

INFLUENCES ON PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES.

(I) INFLUENCE OF THE BIBLE.

Descartes (1596-1650) was a Christian. He was, therefore, influenced in his conception of the philosophical principles by the Holy Bible. But he was a rationalist to the core. Accordingly he asserted 'it is beyond belief that any man should seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to that right reason that constitutes a man, in order that he may cling to the faith through which he is a Christian[1].' Thus, the nature of human mind, was to him beyond all doubt, not simply because the Holy Scripture tells us what it is but because the scriptural view has the support of reason also.

The statements concerning faith, contained in the Bible[2], should, according to Descartes, be divided into two types :—

(i) Those which are believed through faith only, such as the mystery of the Incarnation, the Trinity etc.

(ii) Those, which have a bearing on faith, but nevertheless can be investigated by the natural reason, such as the existence of God and the distinction of mind from body.

(II) ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE.

(a) Aristotle held that a proportion[3] subsists between sense and the object thereof. This Aristotelian conception was accepted by Descartes to explain how pleasure and beauty are related. He holds that æsthetic pleasure depends on

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1. Hald., Vol. I, 439. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 438. 3. Gil., 193.

certain proportion of the object to the sense. Those objects are most pleasant, which are neither most easy nor most difficult to apprehend, but are neither so easy that natural desire, which makes the senses run to their respective objects, is fully satisfied, without much effort, nor so difficult as to make the senses tired in the act of apprehension. Harmony means proportion of stimulus and response. (b) In his mechanical explanation of passion and action also he followed the path pointed out by Aristotle.

(III) BACON'S INFLUENCE.

Bacon had suggested a mechanical theory of mental states. Hobbes based his world-view on it. Descartes applies it in detail to a large portion of psychic life.

HIS CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

According to his own statement in his "Notes against a Programme", he was the first to consider thought to be the predominant attribute of the immaterial substance and extension to be the predominant attribute of the material substance.[1]

Descartes gives full exposition to his theory that mental and physiological phenomena can be explained by simple mechanical process. Whatever be the advance that has been made on this theory, it was Descartes, who made a completely new departure to state that such phenomena could thus be interpreted. His theory has had a fundamental influence on psychology and physiology of the present time.

HIS PROBLEM.

Descartes' problem was to reconcile mechanism and notions of God, soul and freedom. He follows his empiricist predecessor, Bacon, in rejecting old authorities. In his conception of external nature he agrees with his contemporary

1. Hald., Vol. I. 435.

great natural scientists. He holds that everything in nature, not excluding even the physiological processes and emotions, must be explained mechanically. But rationalism predominates in him. Mathematics is a model of philosophical method for him. He seeks to construct a system of thought, which may possess the certainty of mathematics. Accordingly we find the mechanistic and rationalistic tendencies fused together in his treatment of the problem of æsthetics.

HIS IMPORTANCE FOR COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS.

Descartes is of great importance for a student of comparative æsthetics, because of the following reasons :—

In "The Passions of the Soul" he deals with emotions in a manner very much like that followed by Bharata in his Nāṭya Śāstra. He divides emotions into primitive and derived, primary and secondary and genus and species, very much as Bharata divides them into Sthāyin and Vyabhicārin. He divides the external signs of emotions into two classes, (i) voluntary and (ii) involuntary, exactly as Bharata does into Sāttvika Bhāvas and Anubhāvas. He also explains emotions in terms of the conditions of heart, very much as does Dhanañjaya[1]. He asserts that emotions are not simply states of human organism and emphasises that the physical states, involved in emotions, are correlates of the states of the soul.

Æsthetic experience, at one level, is an emotive experience, according to eminent Indian æstheticians. And emotion is admitted by Descartes also as the necessary accompaniment of the intellectual joy in which æsthetic experience consists.

HIS ÆSTHETICS AND GENERAL PHILOSOPHY.

Descartes accounts for the poetic productions in terms of the faculties of soul such as imagination, intellect and will.

*1. D.R., 97.

Æsthetic experience, according to him, is intellectual joy, accompanied by a 'passion' or emotion that may be aroused by reading a strange adventure, a creation of free imagination, or by presentation of it on the stage. For a clear understanding of his theory of æsthetics a clear grasp (i) of his conception of soul and its faculties and (ii) of his theory of emotion is necessary. God, soul and freedom are the fundamentals of his philosophy.

GOD.

The arguments, which Descartes puts forward in support of his view that God exists, are the results of long and concentrated meditation, according to his own statement in the "Notes Against a Programme". There are only two main arguments[1] in this matter, to which the rest can be subordinated. (i) We have such a notion or idea of God that when we sufficiently attend to it and ponder over it in a manner given in the "*Meditation*", we realise that God exists and that his existence is not contingent but necessary. (ii) We would not have had the faculty for conceiving all the perfections, which we recognise in God, had it not been true that God exists and that we are his creation. God is not only the cause but also the archetype of our existence.[2] He is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent and creator of everything. He is substance in absolute sense, if we mean by substance that which exists independently of any other thing. For, He alone is such a real substance. All other things, even soul and body, are dependent on Him.

SOUL, THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.

Descartes assumes that everything that ever enters into mind is no more true than the illusion of dreams; because thoughts and conceptions, which we have, while we are

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1. Hald., Vol. I, 444. 2. Thil., 278-9.

awake, may also come to us in sleep, without any one of them being true. But, while assuming that everything is false, he realises that it is absolutely essential that the subject, the "I", which assumes or thinks of the falsity of everything, cannot be so thought and that the truth, "I think, therefore I am[1]" is so certain and so assured that no amount of sceptic reasoning can shake it. The "I" accordingly he maintains to be the first principle of philosophy.

NATURE OF THE "I".

The "I" is independent of the body and of the whole of external nature. It is the thinking being. Its essence is thought. It is a substance, the essential nature of which is to think. It does not need a place to exist, nor does it depend on material things. It is the soul, which is easier to know than the body, with which it is united. As a general rule, the things, which are very clearly and distinctly conceived, are true, therefore, the "I" the "Soul" which is so conceived, is true.

SOUL AS A SUBSTANCE.

Soul, according to Descartes, is not thought itself. It is something where thought is, where processes of thought are accomplished. Thought is an attribute and as such cannot have its being independently of a substratum. Soul, therefore, he holds, is a substance.

It is an entity, very distinct from body. It is actually separable from body. It is capable of existing apart from and independently of body. However, so long as it is in body, it is affected by the affections of body, no less than it affects body. Thus, there is correspondence between the dispositions of body and the processes in mind.

It has no extension and no parts. Therefore, the question, whether it exists in parts or wholly in each particular part of

1. Hald., Vol. I, 101.

organism, is meaningless. It is a creation of God. It has no innate ideas. Its faculty of thinking is sufficient to accomplish the entire thought-process without the aid of innate[1] ideas.

THOUGHT AS THE ATTRIBUTE OF SOUL.

Thought is the principal attribute[2] of soul, which is an immaterial substance, exactly as extension is the principal attribute of material substance. Thought is not inherent in the substance, if inherence means an existence in isolation from the substance, where it inheres. One has no entity independently of the other. Thought, as the attribute of mind, is the very essence of mind. There are various modes of thought such as affirmation and negation.[3] But thought itself, which is the inward source, from which these modes arise, is not in itself a mode. It is the attribute, which constitutes the very nature of *mind*.

Of the two terms, in which Descartes defines the soul, one represents the genus and the other the differentia. "Substance" is genus and the "faculty of thinking" "the inward source" is the differentia. In regard to the differentia he claims originality and asserts that no one before him maintained that mind consists in one thing alone, namely, the faculty of thinking[4].

SOUL AS SIMPLE ENTITY.

Entity is of two types, (i) composite, and (ii) simple. Composite entity is that in which there are more than one attribute.[5] Each of these can be comprehended distinctly and apart from every other : because each can be cognised without any other. Every one, therefore, is an attribute and not a mode.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 433.
2. Hald., Vol. I, 435.
3. Hald., Vol. I, 436.
4. Hald., Vol. I, 434.
5. Hald., Vol. I, 437.

Simple entity is that in which there is no multiplicity of attributes. Thus, the material substance, in which we recognise only one attribute, namely, extension with variety of modes, is simple. Similarly mind also, in which we recognise "thought" only with all its modes, is also simple entity. Man, however, in whom we find thought and extension co-existing, is a composite entity consisting of body and mind.

PRINCIPAL SEAT OF SOUL.

The general view is that although the soul is united to whole body, yet it exercises its functions particularly in the brain[1] or possibly in the heart. It is admitted to do so in the brain, because all sense-organs are connected with the brain, and in the heart, because apparently it is in the heart that we experience emotions. A careful examination, however, shows that the seat of the soul is neither the heart nor whole of the brain, but merely the innermost part of brain i.e. certain very small gland (i) which is situated in the middle of the brain-substance and (ii) which is suspended above the tube, through which the *animal spirits*, which are in the front cavities of brain, have communication with those in the back. Thus it is that the slightest motion in this principal seat of the soul, alters the course of "animal spirits" and accordingly smallest change in the course of spirits changes the movement of the seat of the soul.

MUTUAL REACTION OF SOUL AND BODY.

Soul has its principal seat in the gland,[2] which exists in the middle of brain. Therefore, it radiates forth throughout the rest of body, by means of (i) the animal spirits (ii) nerves and (iii) blood. The last two participate in the impressions of the spirits and carry them by means of arteries into all the members of body.

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1. Hald., Vol. I, 345. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 347.

The little filaments of our nerves are so distributed in all the parts of body that as soon as they are stimulated by an external object, they open in a variety of ways the pores of brain. This causes the animal spirits, which are contained in the cavities of brain, to enter into muscles in many ways and to move various parts of body in different ways. Thus, Descartes seems to account for reflex action. The animal spirits are contained in two groups of cavities of brain, one of which is in either side of the gland, where soul primarily dwells. This gland is moved by animal spirits in as many ways as there are sensible diversities in external objects.

And soul is such by its very nature that it receives in itself as many diverse impressions and has as many diverse perceptions as there are diverse movements in the gland. But movement of the gland is not solely dependent upon animal spirits. It can be caused by soul also. The machine of body is so formed that as soon as this gland is diversely moved by soul, animal spirits, which surround it, move towards the pores of brain and then into nerves and muscles so that various parts of body are moved.

ASPECTS OF THOUGHT AND THEIR SUBDIVISIONS.

There are two aspects of thinking faculty, (i) Intellect or power of knowledge and (ii) Will.

(i) POWER OF KNOWLEDGE.

The power, by which we know things properly, is purely spiritual.[1] It is distinct from body. It cannot be identified with any part of brain. (i) It receives impressions from the common sense simultaneously with imagination. (ii) It applies itself to those which are preserved in memory. (iii) It forms new ideas and images.

In these three operations, power of knowledge functions

1. Hald., Vol. I, 38-9.

either as seal or as wax. (i) This power of knowledge is said to see, to touch and so on, when along with imagination, it applies itself to the common sense. (ii) If it applies itself to imagination, so far as it is the container of impressions, it is said to remember. (iii) If it turns to imagination, in its aspect as a receiver of impressions, in order to create fresh impressions of new ideas and images, it is said to imagine or conceive. (iv) If it acts alone, in its freedom from association with corporeal imagination, it is said to understand. Thus, it is one and the same power of knowledge, which, discharging various functions, is said (i) to understand (ii) to imagine (iii) to remember and (iv) to sense. It is properly called *mind*, when it forms new ideas in fancy or imagination or attends to those which are already formed.

SENSES OF PERCEPTION.

Descartes admits seven senses. Two of them are internal and five are external. With internal senses we shall deal in the context of emotion. Five external senses are those of (i) sight (ii) hearing (iii) smell (iv) touch and (v) taste. They are passive and receive impressions of external objects just as[1] wax does that of a seal.

COMMON SENSE.

Common sense is that to which the figures, impressed upon an external sense, are carried instantly. Like external senses, the common sense also is a part of body. External senses and common[2] sense are like the lower and upper ends of a pen, both of which move in the same manner almost simultaneously.

COMMON SENSE AND IMAGINATION.

Common sense functions like a seal. It impresses on imagination,[3] which is like wax, those very figures and ideas,

1. Hald., Vol. I, 36. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 37-8. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 38.

which come uncontaminated and without bodily mixture from external senses. This imagination, on which common sense impresses figures and ideas, is a genuine part of body. It is of sufficient size so that its different parts assume figures, which are distinct from one another. These parts retain the impressions for sometime. This imagination in its aspect of retaining impressions is called memory.

MECHANICAL EXPLANATION OF PERCEPTION.

There are nerves extending from brain,[1] like filaments, to all other members of physical organism. They are so connected with other members that whenever anything touches the outer ends of these nerves, they are moved in such a manner that the motion passes to the inner ends, which are collected in brain round about the seat of soul. Movements are thus excited in the common sense. Imagination is then impressed. These movements set animal spirits (which are contained in the groups of cavities, between which the gland, which is the main seat of the soul, is suspended) in motion so that the small gland is moved in various[2] ways, according to the variety of sensible objects. Thus, soul is affected in various ways, according to the variety of motions themselves. All the affections of soul, which arise in this way, are called perceptions of senses or sensations; e. g. when an external object is reflected on eyes, two images of it are formed, one on each eye. By means of optic nerves these images form two others in the interior surface of brain, facing the two groups of cavities, where animal spirits dwell. Then by means of animal spirits these images radiate towards the gland and fuse into one. This image immediately acts upon soul and causes it to see the object.

Two things, however, may be pointed out here, (i) that the process from impression on common sense to impression on

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1. Hald., Vol. I, 289. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 347.

imagination and soul is not temporal, but logical, and (ii) that nerves do not convey anything to mind but local motion. This local motion excites in us not only sensations of pleasure and pain but also sensations of sound and colour. For, if we receive a blow on eyes, the optic nerves may be so moved that they may cause us to see thousands of sparks, which do not exist outside eyes.

IMAGINATION.

Descartes' conception of imagination is interesting, because it is in terms of free imagination that he accounts for poetic and dramatic productions. He deals with it in the context of (i) sense-perception (ii) memory (iii) hallucination and dream and (iv) free poetic imagination.

(i) We have shown, while dealing with sense-perception, that imagination is a part of brain, which receives impressions from common sense.[1] These impressions are called images. They are conveyed by the operation of animal spirits to the pineal gland and there they impress the soul.

(ii) Imagination, as a part of brain, is not only capable of receiving impressions from common sense but also of retaining them for sometime : and mind in making use of these residues of impressions on imagination is said to remember. Thus, memory is nothing but the traces of past impressions on imagination.

(iii) There are three causes[2], which prompt imagination to work, (i) body (ii) animal spirits and (iii) soul. (a) When imagination is prompted to act by an external body, (as in the case of sense-perception) it passively receives impressions from common sense. In this case imagination is independent of will. (b) When it is prompted by animal spirits, it draws pictures, which appear in dream and illusion. Such pictures proceed

1. Hald., Vol. I, 39. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 341.

from the fact that the spirits, being agitated in diverse ways and meeting with traces of past impressions in brain, take their course through certain pores. Dreams and illusions are thus pictures of pictures. The one characteristic of pictures of imagination, described so far, is that in their formation the will has no part to play.

(iv) The products of imagination, which are due to the fact that imagination is prompted by soul through free will, are of special importance for understanding the æsthetic theory of Descartes.

When imagination is prompted to act by soul through free will, the images, which appear before the mind's eye, are not those, which are due to the stimulation of nerves by an external object, nor those which are mere reproductions of the images of past experiences in memory ; nor even those which are due to the accidental movement of animal spirits, such as strange constructions out of the residual traces, which appear in dream and illusion. The free will, prompting the imagination, is responsible for new creations. It produces what does not and cannot exist in common world.

Thus, poetic imagination, according to Descartes, is distinct from that which is employed in sense-perception, as well as from that, to which remembrance, dream etc. are due. It is free, inasmuch as it is prompted by soul through free will and is controlled neither by nervous stimulation nor by movements of animal spirits. It has the capacity to draw so vivid and forceful picture of what does not exist[1] that it is as good as what is materially present before our eyes and excites the same emotions as does the material.

The soul, by means of these new ideas or images, sends animal spirits to muscles and causes the movements in body

1. Hald., Vol. I, 341.

such as accord with the new creation and are necessary for the rise of the exterior passions. The capacity to arrange ideas and to give them systematic expression is one of the features that distinguishes man from animal. And the other is reason.

SUSPENSION OF OTHER FUNCTIONS IN FREE IMAGINATION.

Imagination, when it is prompted by free will, is so beset by original and new creations that it cannot at that time receive the ideas[1] or impressions from common sense, nor can it cause any other movement in nerves, by setting the animal spirits in motion, than that which accords with the new creation.

THE PROCESS OF FREE IMAGINATION.

When we desire to imagine[2] something, which we have never seen, our desire (free will) has the power of causing the gland, which is the principal seat of soul, to move in a manner, which is necessary to drive animal spirits towards the pores of brain, by the opening of which the thing intended to be imagined may be represented.

UNDERSTANDING.

Understanding, as we have stated above, is nothing but intellect itself, if it acts alone, in its freedom from corporeal imagination. It is the faculty of knowing the truth. It is either helped[3] or hindered by three other faculties, imagination, sense and memory.

Pure understanding, which deals with that in which there is nothing corporeal,[4] cannot be helped by animal imagination and animal memory. The two hinder rather than help

1. Hald., Vol. I, 39.
2. Hald., Vol. I, 350.
3. Hald., Vol. I, 27.
4. Hald., Vol. I, 39.

the operation of pure understanding. In thinking pure thought, therefore, we have to eliminate the sense and free the imagination from every distinct impression. When, however, understanding examines something that refers to body, the method of true knowledge is the reverse of the above. It has two classes of object, (i) simple and (ii) complex[1] or composite, which may be spiritual or corporeal or composite of the two.

FUNCTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING.

There are two functions of understanding, (i) intuition and (ii) deduction.[2] The work of intuition is comparable to that of eyes. Just as a person, who attempts to view the multiplicity of objects with one and the same glance, sees none of them distinctly ; so a man, who attempts to attend to many things by means of a single act of thought, is confused in his mind. And just as a workman, who is in the habit of directing his eyes attentively to separate points, is capable of distinguishing minute objects from one another, so one, who does not allow his thought to be distracted by various objects at the same time, but concentrates it on single simple point, is most clear-headed.

INTUITION AND DEDUCTION DIFFERENTIATED.

Intuition,[3] is not the fluctuating testimony of senses, nor is it the misleading judgement, which proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination. It is the conception, which an unclouded and attentive mind gives readily and distinctly and which is absolutely free from doubt. It springs from the light of reason. It is more certain than deduction. It does not imply succession or movement. It requires immediately presented evidence. It is immediate knowledge.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 27. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 28.
3. Hald., Vol. I, 7.

Thus, each individual can have an intuition of the fact that he exists, that he thinks, that a triangle is bounded by three lines only and so on.

Two things are necessary for mental intuition. (i) The object of intuition must be clear and distinct.[1] (ii) It should be grasped in its totality at the same time and not in succession.

But deduction is discursive reasoning. It presupposes intuition. It is a necessary inference from facts known with certainty. It is a process, which is involved in coming to a certain conclusion from true and well known principles by means of continuous and uninterrupted[2] action of mind. It does not require immediately presented evidence as does intuition. The element of certainty comes to it from memory. It implies succession or movement. It is mediate knowledge.

UNDERSTANDING AND IMAGINATION.

Understanding can be stimulated by imagination no less than it can stimulate imagination[3]. It acts on imagination and is also acted upon by imagination. Imagination is distinct from understanding. For, the mind in its pure intellectual activity turns upon itself in some way and considers some of the ideas that it possesses in itself. In imagination, however, it turns towards the body, which is immediately present, and beholds in it something which conforms to the idea, which it has conceived of itself or perceived by senses. The following example brings out the distinction[4] between imagination and pure intellection clearly in another way :—

When we imagine a triangle, we do not conceive it only as a figure grasped intellectually as made up of three lines, but we also intuit three lines as present, because of the operation of the power of inward vision of mind. This is

1. Hald., Vol. I, 33.
2. Hald., Vol. I, 8.
3. Hald., Vol. I, 39.
4. Hald., Vol. I, 18 .

what is called imagining. But if we desire to think of a figure with thousand sides, we may grasp it intellectually with as much ease as we do a triangle, but we cannot so exercise the power of inward vision as to intuit thousand sides as present. Although with the fixed habit of mind, which always employs imagination whenever it thinks of a corporeal thing, it may happen that we draw an imaginative picture of the thousand-sided figure, yet the picture so drawn will not be a clear picture of a thousand-sided figure ; it will be so confused that it cannot be distinguished from myriad-sided figure, it will not be such as will enable us to discover the properties, which distinguish a thousand-sided figure from one that has myriad sides.

Further, if we consider a five-sided figure in relation to imagination and understanding, we discover that there is the necessity of a particular effort of mind for imagining it, such as is unnecessary for understanding it. For, we can conceive five sides of the figure by employing our understanding as clearly as thousand sides of thousand-sided figure. But if we want to imagine them, we have to attend not only to every one of the sides but also to the space that they enclose. This effort is unnecessary for understanding.

(ii) WILL.

The will is free.[1] It can choose either of the two opposites in any field. It is self-determined. We have stated earlier that according to Descartes, the thought is the principal attribute of the soul ; the soul consists in one thing alone, namely, the thinking faculty, and that there are two aspects of it, (i) Power of knowledge and (ii) Will. Thus, there is nothing which can be attributed to the soul, excepting our thoughts.[2] But they admit of being divided into two, according to the said two aspects of thought. Those which

1. Hald., Vol. I, 434. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 340.

are due to the power of knowledge are called "passions", but those which owe their being to the will are called "actions", the chief characteristic of which is that they are initiated by soul itself in virtue of its freedom from and independence of any external prompting cause or stimulus. All our desires, the expressions of free will, come under action ; for, experience reveals to us that they proceed directly from soul and depend on it alone. They are of two kinds, (i) those actions, which spring from the operations of free will, which terminate in soul itself and which have no reference to material body, for instance, love of God and application of our thought to something which is not material ; (ii) those actions, which terminate in the body e.g. our desire to walk, which is followed by the movement of legs.

Passions, or rather 'perceptions', forms of knowledge, are also of two kinds, (i) free and (ii) controlled. (i) Free forms of knowledge are those which are caused by our soul and to which body does not contribute anything. Such forms of knowledge spring from the operations of free will e.g. the imaginative construction, created by a poet or any other artist, such as an enchanted palace, which has no material existence. Such imaginative constructs are not caused by body. They do not primarily depend upon the movement of nerves. (ii) Controlled forms of knowledge are those which are in some way due to external stimulus.

DESCARTES' THEORY OF EMOTION.

Æsthetic experience, according to Descartes, as has been stated earlier, is intellectual joy accompanied by emotion. In order, therefore, fully to grasp his æsthetic theory, it is necessary to have a clear idea of his theory of emotion.

Emotions, according to Descartes, are to be attributed neither to mind nor to body alone, but to intimate union[1] bet-

1. Hald., Vol. I, 238.

ween them. They are forms of knowledge, which we relate solely to soul and the effects of which we feel as if they were in soul itself, e.g. joy, sorrow etc. They are passions, as opposed to action, and as such they are caused by external objects, which are represented by perception and sometimes by other causes also.

Some hold that emotion is felt in heart, because it involves an experience of changes, which take place there and therefore, the soul is in heart. But Descartes asserts that emotion is felt by soul, not because soul is in heart, but because heart is connected with brain[1] by small nerves, which descend from brain to heart; as in the case of eyes.

ORGAN OF EMOTION.

We have stated in the course of our treatment of sense-perception that Descartes admits seven senses, five of which are external and two are internal. The functions of the former we have already stated. The latter are (i) appetite and (ii) organ of emotion. The nerves, which extend to stomach and other such interior parts and serve for the satisfaction of natural wants, constitute the internal sense, called appetite.[2] The minute nerves, which extend from brain to heart or its neighbourhood and operate in the rise of emotions, constitute the organ of emotion.

PROCESS IN THE RISE OF EMOTION.

An image, received through external senses, if it has close association with what has been hurtful in the past, arouses different emotions such as fear or courage, according to individual temperament and other causes such as the sense of security from or exposure to danger. This image makes animal spirits flow in a variety of ways (i) partly in the nerves, which either incline us to fly from the object or to take a bold

1. Hald., Vol. I, 346. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 290.

stand against it and (ii) partly in the nerves, which so widen or narrow down the doors of heart or agitate the parts from which blood is sent to the heart, which (blood), being rarefied there, sends to brain animal spirits, which are adapted to maintenance and strengthening of the emotion, which has arisen.

The animal spirits, which enter the pores of brain, excite a particular movement in the gland and cause the soul to be sensitive of passion. Emotions are experienced for the most part in heart, because these pores, from which animal spirits flow, are directly connected with the nerves, which serve to contract or enlarge the orifices of heart.

MECHANISM OF EMOTION.

Descartes holds that there is a definite mechanism in body, in terms of which emotion has to be explained. His classification of emotions depends upon the difference in the movement of blood, coming into and going out of heart and consequent changes in it. He holds that emotions are maintained, strengthened and fortified by animal spirits. Therefore, before classifying emotions and describing the important ones among them, it is necessary to state briefly his idea of (i) Functions of the main parts of body (ii) Heart and (iii) Animal spirits.

(i) FUNCTIONS OF MAIN PARTS OF BODY.

The food that we eat descends into stomach and bowels[1]. There it is converted into juice. This passes into liver and all the veins. There it mingles with the blood that is already there and increases its quantity.

All the blood, that is in the veins, flows (i) through vena cava into the right side of heart (ii) thence through arterial vein it passes into lungs (iii) from lungs it comes to the

1. **Hald., Vol. I, 333.**

left side of heart through venous artery[1] (iv) from there it passes into the great artery, whose branches are all over the body.

The blood that comes to heart is dilated and forces its way from the right cavity into arterial vein and from the left into great artery. As soon as the rarefied blood passes out of heart, fresh blood comes through vena cava into the right and through venous artery into the left part of heart. It is to the motion of blood that pulsation and heart-beat are due.

(ii) HEART.

In the fifth part of the Discourse, among other things, he explains the movement of heart[2] and draws distinction between the soul of man and that of brute.

Influenced by the anatomy of his days and Harvey's theory of circulation of blood, to which he explicitly refers, Descartes puts forth his conception of heart as follows[3]:—

Heart has two chambers or cavities, one on the right side and the other on the left.

(A) There are two large tubes or channels, which correspond with the right cavity.

(a) The vena cava.

It is the principal receptacle of blood. It is like a trunk of tree, of which all the other veins of body are branches.

(b) The arterial vein.

It is an artery, which originates from heart. After it has issued from heart, it divides itself into many branches, which proceed to disperse themselves all through the lungs.

(B) Similarly there are two tubes or channels, which correspond with the cavity on the left side.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 335. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 81. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 110.

(a) Venous artery.

It is nothing but a vein, which comes from the lungs. It is divided into many branches, which are interlaced with (i) those of the arterial vein and (ii) those of the wind-pipe, through which enters the air which we breathe.

(b) The great artery.

It issues from heart and sends its branches throughout the body.

THE MEMBRANCES.

The aforesaid four tubes are so many entrances in the heart. And there are eleven little membrances which, like so many doorleaves, open and shut these passages.

There are three membrances at the entrance of vena cava. They are so arranged that they can, in no way, prevent the blood, that it contains, from flowing into the right cavity of heart. They simply stop it from rushing out.

At the entrance of the arterial vein also there are three membrances. They are so arranged that they allow the blood, which is in the right cavity of heart, to flow into lungs. But they do not let the blood, that is in the lungs, return into this cavity.

At the entrance of the venous artery, there are two membrances, which allow the blood, that is in lungs, to flow into the left cavity of heart, but do not let it return.

At the entrance of the great artery similarly there are three membrances, which allow the blood to flow from heart, but do not let it return.

The great artery and the arterial vein are much harder and firmer than venous artery and vena cava. The latter expand before they enter the heart and so form two pockets, called the auricles of heart.

There is more heat in heart than in any other part of body. This heat is capable of causing any drop of blood, that enters into the cavities of heart, to expand and dilate. When these cavities are not full of blood, the necessary amount of blood flows from vena cava into the right cavity and from venous artery into the left cavity to keep them full.

As soon as two large drops of blood have entered into the two cavities of heart, one in each, through the large openings (constituted by the expanded parts of venous artery and vena cava as they enter heart) they rarefy and dilate because of heat in heart.

These expanded drops cause the whole heart to expand. They force home and close the five little doors, which are at the entrances of the two cavities of heart, through which they enter. Thus they prevent more blood from coming into heart. When they are well rarefied, they push open the six doors, which are at the point where great artery and arterial vein join heart, and they exit through them.

Thus, these two rarefied drops of blood cause all the branches of great artery and arterial vein to expand almost at the same time as they expand the heart. These two tubes, through which rarefied blood passes, and also their branches contract almost immediately, because the blood gets cooled. The six doors then close. Thereupon the five doors of vena cava and venous artery reopen and let two more drops come into heart and so on.

The movement of auricles is contrary to that of heart. They contract when heart expands, because they empty themselves into heart. The heat, that is in heart, is communicated to other members by means of blood[1], which, passing through heart, gets heated and then spreads throughout body.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 114.

The function of respiration is to carry sufficient fresh air into lungs, so that the blood (which comes to lungs from the right cavity of heart where it gets rarefied and evaporated) may thicken and get converted into blood again before falling into the left cavity. Digestion is carried on in the stomach, because heart sends a little heat through the arteries and a little blood, which adds to the dissolution of food, stocked there.

(iii) ANIMAL SPIRITS.

It is in heart that animal spirits are generated. They are like very subtle wind or flame, which is very pure and very vivid. They rise from heart to brain. From brain they proceed to nerves and muscles and give power of motion to different members of physical organism. They (animal spirits) are constituted by the most agitated and the most penetrating particles of blood.

The animated and subtle portions of blood, which heart rarefies, proceed continuously in large quantities towards the brain, because the arteries, which carry them, are such as proceed in the most direct lines towards the brain. But all of them are not able to enter it, because the passages in brain are very narrow. Thus it is that only the most nimble and subtle parts enter the brain. The rest, the weakest and least agitated, are turned aside. These most subtle and nimble particles of blood are the animal spirits.

They never remain at rest[1] ; just at the time when some subtle particles of blood enter into the cavities of brain, others issue forth by pores, which are in the substance of brain. These pores conduct them into nerves and from there into muscles. In this way the animal spirits move the body in all possible ways.

1. **Hald., Vol. I,** 336.

THREE CAUSES OF FLOW OF ANIMAL SPIRITS FROM BRAIN.

There are three causes of the movement of animal spirits.

1. Action of soul, as in the case of free imagination etc.

2. Diversity of movements, excited in the organs of sense by their respective external objects.

3. When fresh animal spirits enter into brain, they cause those which are there to flow.

CAUSES OF DIFFERENCE IN ANIMAL SPIRITS.

1. Difference in food from which blood is formed, the subtlest particles of which constitute animal spirits[1], is one of the causes of their difference from one another.

2. Difference in parts of body, from which blood comes to heart more than from others, is another.

ANIMAL SPIRITS AND VOLUNTARY ACTION.

Soul does not move external physical organs directly. It simply directs the subtle[2] fluid (called animal spirits) and makes this fluid cause definite motions. Animal spirits are, in their own nature, capable of being utilised for different actions.

ANIMAL SPIRITS AND INVOLUNTARY ACTION.

The movements, excited in brain by external stimulus, direct animal spirits towards certain muscles and cause movement of limbs. Thus, involuntary action is the reaction to external stimulus[3], in which the will plays no part: e.g. we involuntarily close our eyes at a friend's thrusting his hand to strike them. This action is involuntary or reflex. Stimulation of different nerves is responsible for difference in the course of movement of animal spirits and accordingly in the physical response. Let us now turn to emotions.

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1. Hald., Vol. I, 338-9. 2. Hald., Vol. II, 103. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 338.

PRIMARY EMOTIONS.

There are only six primary emotions,[1] wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. These are primitive emotions. They are origins of all others. All others are composed of some of these six or are species of them.

I. WONDER.

Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul. It leads to fixing of attention on what seems to be rare and extraordinary. It is caused by an impression in brain, which represents the object as rare and, therefore, worthy of attention. It is fortified and conserved by the movements of animal spirits, which are made to flow towards the part of brain, where the surprising impression is.

It is distinct from other emotions inasmuch as it is not accompanied by any change in heart or blood. Reason for this peculiarity of wonder is that the object, which arouses this emotion, is not associated with the idea of either "good" or "bad" which alone affects heart. It is related to brain only. It forms an element of almost all emotions.

II. LOVE.

Love[2] is an emotion of the soul. It is caused by the movement of animal spirits, which incites us to join ourselves willingly to the object, which appears to us to be agreeable. Both love and hatred, as emotions, are distinct from judgements, which also induce the soul through its free will to unite with what it judges to be good and to separate itself from what it considers to be evil.

Excessive love[3] unites us with the object so thoroughly that the love, that we have for ourselves, loses its distinction from that which we have for the object. Love at its highest pitch leads to identification.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 362. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 366. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 393.

AFFECTION, FRIENDSHIP AND DEVOTION.

Love is different[1], according to the esteem, in which we hold the object of love as compared with ourselves.

1. When we esteem the object less than ourselves, we have simply affection for it. Thus, the emotive bent that we have towards flowers, animals etc. is affection.

2. When we esteem the object as much as ourselves, it is called friendship. It is for men alone.

3. But when we esteem the object more than ourselves, this emotion is called devotion. Its principal object is the Supreme Divinity, to whom we cannot fail to be devoted when we know Him, as we should. But devotion to king, country, town or even to a particular man of outstanding merit is possible.

The difference of these three types of love, called affection, friendship and devotion, from one another, is due to the value that we attach to the object, particularly in the hour of danger. For, in every one of these we consider ourselves joined or united to the thing we love, so that we imagine a whole[2], of which we consider ourselves to be only one part, while the loved thing constitutes another. And we are always ready to abandon the lesser part of the whole, into which we enter, in order to preserve the other. Thus, in affection we prefer ourselves to the object of love. We would not risk ourselves to save a flower, for instance. In devotion, however, the loved thing is preferred to ourselves, so much so that we do not fear death to preserve it. Thus it happens that there are persons who sacrifice themselves for their king, country, leader or religion, to whom they are devoted.

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1. **Hald., Vol. I, 368.** 2. **Hald., Vol. I, 366.**

DELIGHT AND LOVE.

Delight is the enjoyment of that which is pleasant and causes us to desire it very ardently. It is of various types. The desires, therefore, which arise from different types of delight, are not equally powerful. Thus, beauty of flowers arouses the desire simply to look at them. The greatest delight and, therefore, the strongest desire arises from the perfection, which we imagine in a person, who, we think, may become another self. The reason for this may be stated as follows: —

Nature is responsible not only for difference in sex in men and animals but also for certain impressions in the brain because of which, at the time of youth and in favourable situation, they consider themselves as defective, incomplete, only one half of the whole, of which the individual of the other sex should be another half. Thus, the acquisition of the other half is confusedly represented by nature as the greatest of all imaginable goods[1].

Therefore, when we find something in an individual, because of which he or she is more agreeable than others, soul feels for it the greatest inclination, because nature represents it to be the greatest good. This inclination or desire, which springs from delight, is called love in the strict sense of the word. This is what provides material for writers of romances and poets.

MOVEMENTS OF BLOOD AND SPIRITS IN LOVE.

When understanding represents to itself an object of love, certain impression is created in brain. This causes animal spirits to move towards muscles, which surround intestines and stomach in such a manner that the juice of food, which is converted into new blood, passes to heart quickly without stopping in liver.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 371.

This blood, because of its volume, has greater force than that which comes from other parts to heart. It is coarser and, therefore, causes more heat in heart and gives rise to coarser animal spirits, which ascend to brain, fortify the impression of the object of love and make the soul pause over this representation.

III. HATRED.

Hatred is an emotion of the soul. It is caused by the movement of animal spirits, which incites soul to desire[1] to be separated from the object, which presents itself as hurtful to it. In hatred, we look upon ourselves as a whole and consider the object of hatred as separate, but not as a part of the whole, as in love.

MOVEMENT OF BLOOD AND CONDITION OF HEART IN HATRED.

When understanding represents to itself an object of hatred, the impression, that such a representation makes in brain, conducts animal spirits towards the muscles of stomach and intestines. They, in a manner contrary to that involved in love, prevent the juice of food from mingling with blood by closing the openings by which it can proceed to do so. The impression of the unpleasant or ugly conducts animal spirits in such a way towards the little nerves of spleen and lower part of liver, where bile is, that the blood, that issues from these parts and flows with that, which is in the branches of vena cava, goes to heart. The blood, that comes from spleen, gets very little heated and rarefied. But that blood which comes from lower part of liver, where bile is, inflames and dilates very quickly. Thus, there is inequality in the heat of blood in heart, inequality in its movement and so inequality in animal spirits.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 366.

ANGER AS A SPECIES OF HATRED.

Anger[1] is a species of hatred or aversion, which we have towards one, who has actually harmed us or at least has seriously attempted to do so. It is based on action, which affects us and for which we desire to avenge ourselves. It is an emotion, which is as opposed to gratitude as indignation is to favour. It is more violent than indignation, because desire for vengeance is the strongest and most persistent.

In anger, desire is united to self-love. Blood, therefore, under the influence of this emotion, is agitated in the same manner as under the influence of courage and bravery. But anger is mixed with hatred. And it is because of hatred, that blood has good element of bile, because it comes from spleen and small veins of liver. This biled blood is agitated and enters into heart and excites heat there, which is more severe than that which may be excited by love or joy.

IV. DESIRE.

Desire[2], as an emotion, is an agitation of the soul, caused by animal spirits. It makes the soul wish not only to preserve or acquire the things, which it represents to itself as agreeable, but also to avoid the present and future evils. It admits of division into different species, according to different objects, sought after. Thus, there can be desire for glory, in which heroism consists, and desire for vengeance.

CONDITION OF HEART IN DESIRE.

The wish to attain or to acquire some good or to avoid some evil, promptly sends animal spirits from brain to all parts of body, the movements of which may be necessary to bring about the desired effect, and particularly to heart and the parts, which furnish it with most blood. Heart thus gets greater abundance[3] of blood than usual.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 420. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 369. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 378.

V. JOY.

We will deal with joy in its proper context of the æsthetic theory of Descartes.

VI. SORROW OR SADNESS.

Sadness is a disagreeable languor. It is the discomfort, accompanied by unrest, which is due to the present or recollected evil or consciousness of some defect in one's own self.

The group of nerves, excited in sorrow, is the same as that in joy and the process also, involved in its rise, is the same. Difference[1] of joy from sorrow lies in warmth and consequent thinness and swift motion of the blood in the case of the former; and coldness and consequent thickness and slow motion of the blood in the case of the latter.

In sadness,[2] the nerve, that surrounds the openings of heart, contracts them so much and blood, that is in veins, is so little agitated that very little of it goes to heart.

Love, fear, anger and other emotions are generally due to stimulation in different ways of the same group of nerves as is involved in joy and sorrow.

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF EMOTIONS IN GENERAL.

(1) The same impression may be the cause of different emotions in different persons. For, the brains[3] of different persons are differently constituted.

(2) Emotions cannot be directly[4] excited by the will. They can be excited only indirectly through representation of things, which are usually united to them.

(3) Emotions cannot be checked[5] immediately, because

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1. Hald., Vol. I, 291.
2. Hald., Vol. I, 377.
3. Hald., Vol. I, 349.
4. Hald., Vol. I, 351.
5. Hald., Vol. I, 352.

they are accompanied by some commotion of heart. They affect blood and animal spirits. They, therefore, remain present to our thought so long as the commotion lasts.

DIVISION OF EMOTIONS INTO TWO CLASSES.

Wonder constitutes a separate type of emotion from the remaining five. For, its cause is in brain[1] only and not in any other part of body and, therefore, in the movement of blood and condition of heart. The remaining five emotions belong to a distinct class in so far as their causes are not in brain only but also in heart, movements of blood, animal spirits, spleen, liver and other parts of organism.

Although all veins conduct the blood, that they contain, towards heart, yet it happens occasionally that blood from some of them rushes to heart with greater strength than from others, so that the openings, through which it either enters or issues out of heart, are more or less enlarged or contracted. Thus, difference in the strength of blood and the parts from which it comes, as also difference in the enlargement or contraction of various openings of heart, is responsible for difference in five emotions from one another.

DEPENDENT EMOTIONS.

Besides six primitive, original or independent emotions, Descartes admits dependent emotions. The latter are the species ; the former are the genera.[2] They are esteem, disdain, generosity, pride, veneration, hope, fear, jealousy etc.

EXTERNAL SIGNS OF EMOTIONS.

One interesting thing in his treatment of emotions is that he not only describes the condition of heart in each of them but also states external signs[3] of each emotion, exactly as does Bharata in his Nāṭya Śāstra. He also, like the latter, divides

1. Hald., Vol. I, 374. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 400. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 380.

these external signs into two classes, (i) voluntary and (ii) involuntary. According to him, every emotion is an affection of the soul. The movements of heart, blood, brain and animal spirits, which account for difference in pulse-beat, are only conditions or accompaniments of emotions, but are not identical with them. These signs of emotions are rarely experienced or observed in isolation; usually several are found mixed together.

The principal signs of emotions are (i) actions of eyes[1] and face (ii) changes of colour (iii) tremors (iv) languor (v) swooning (vi) laughter (vii) tears (viii) groans and (ix) sighs. Actions of eyes and face, though they are easy to perceive so that even a servant or even a dog can know the emotion in the master, yet they are very difficult to distinguish and to define.

VOLUNTARY CHANGES.

Seams in forehead in anger, movements of nose and lips in indignation and scorn, are not so much natural as voluntary. Generally speaking all actions of face and eyes can be changed by soul, when she desires to hide an emotion. She can do so by vigorously calling up an image of a situation different from or contrary to the one, in which she is. Voluntary changes can as much hide our emotion from spectators as they can reveal it to them.

INVOLUNTARY CHANGES.

I. CHANGES OF COLOUR.

We cannot help blushing or becoming pale under certain emotions. The physical changes, which bring about changes of colour, are more directly connected with heart than actions of eyes and face. Heart is the source of emotions, inasmuch as it prepares blood and spirits for producing them.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 381.

II. TREMORS.

They are due to two causes. (i) Sometimes[1] too little of the animal spirits passes from brain into nerves, as in sadness and fear, as also when we tremble with cold. (ii) Sometimes too much of the animal spirits comes from brain into nerves so that the small passages of the muscles cannot get well closed, as when we ardently desire something or are strongly moved by prayer, as also in drunkenness. Fear etc. so thicken the blood that it does not furnish enough animal spirits to the brain to enable it to send enough of them to the nerves. And ardent desire etc. cause so many animal spirits to proceed to the brain that they cannot be regularly conducted to the muscles. Hence tremors arise.

III. LANGUOR.

It occurs in love, joined to desire for a thing, the acquisition of which is imagined to be impossible under the existing circumstances. For, such a love causes soul so intensely to think of the object of love that it employs all the animal spirits, which are in brain, in representing the image of the object. It checks all movements of glands, which do not contribute to picturing up the object. Desire is the cause of activity, which is related to the object, the attainment of which is imagined to be possible under the existing circumstances. Therefore, when it (desire) is related to one that is imagined to be unattainable, it produces languor. It may occur in hatred, in sadness and even in joy.

IV. SWOON IN JOY.

In extreme joy blood rushes to heart in such a quantity by opening the orifices wide that it almost quenches the fire that is there and causes the person to fall into a faint.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 383.

ÆSTHETIC THEORY OF DESCARTES.

"The Search after Truth", the dialogue, wherein Epistemon asked Descartes as Eudoxus to explain certain particular difficulties, among other things, in what concerns the secret of human arts[1] and where he promised to speak on them, is available in an unfinished form only. It terminates abruptly with an unfinished sentence "I mean a thinking being...........". Here probably Descartes put forth his æsthetic theory or intended to do so. But unfortunately either it could not be written or is irrecoverably lost to us. In dealing with his æsthetic theory we have, therefore, to depend upon his stray remarks in other contexts.

HIS LITERARY BACKGROUND.

According to his own statement in the first part of the Discourse on the Method, Descartes gave sufficient time to study of languages and read the literature of the ancients[2], both their histories and their fables.

HIS VIEW ON FABLES AND POETRY.

He acknowledged that fables have their own charm and stimulate mind and that they make the reader imagine many events possible, which in reality are not so. He also admitted that poetry has most ravishing sweetness and delicacy. He was enamoured of poetry.

He held that poetry is a product of the gift of mind rather than a fruit of study and that those, who have the most delightful and original ideas and know how to present them in most suitable language and in good style, will not fail to be good poets, though the art of poetry be unknown to them.

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1. Hald., Vol. 1, 310-11. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 84.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Æsthetic experience, according to Descartes, is the experience of intellectual joy, accompanied by any passion that may be aroused either by reading a strange adventure, a creation of free imagination, or by presentation of it on the stage. For a clear understanding of his view, therefore, it is necessary to have full grasp of his following conceptions: (i) Intellectual joy (ii) Passions as accompaniments of intellectual joy (iii) Power of language.

JOY AS A PASSION.

Joy[1] is an agreeable passion of the soul. It is the enjoyment by soul of the good, which the impressions of brain represent to it as its own possession. It is the only fruit that soul receives from all the good things that it possesses.

CIRCULATION OF BLOOD AND CONDITION OF HEART IN JOY.

It is particularly the nerve, round the orifices[2] of heart, which is active in joy. It opens and enlarges the orifices and lets the blood, which other nerves drive from veins to heart, enter into heart and issue forth in larger quantity than usual. And because this blood is purer, it dilates easily and produces animal spirits, whose parts are equal and subtle. They form and fortify the impressions on brain, which give to soul thoughts, which are pleasant and peaceful.

JOY AND TITILLATION OF SENSES DIFFERENTIATED.

The joy, which we feel in good health in good surroundings, does not proceed from the understanding, but only from the impressions, which the movements of animal spirits cause in brain. Similarly sadness, which we feel when we

1. Hald., Vol. I. 372. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 377.

are indisposed, proceeds from the impressions which the movements of animal spirits make in brain.

Joy and sorrow are not identical with titillations of senses of two opposite types, but distinct from them. They are affections of the soul, which are consequent on such titillations[1] of senses. Affections of the soul follow titillations of senses so closely that common man can hardly distinguish between the two. The fact, however, is that they are distinct. Their distinction is evident from the fact that often it happens that the type of sensation, which we usually have in sadness, is found in joy. We suffer pain with joy. And pleasurable sensation sometimes causes sadness in us. He divides joy into the following three types: (1) Sensuous (2) Imaginative and (3) Intellectual.

(1) SENSUOUS JOY.

There are five well-recognised external senses[2], because there are five kinds of objects which stimulate the nerves, which are their organs. When these nerves are moved a little more vehemently than usual, but still they do not harm the body in any way, there arises gratification, which is agreeable to mind, because the soul is convinced that one of its possessions, namely the set of senses, is good. This gratification is called sensuous joy.

(2) IMAGINATIVE JOY.

Imaginative joy is of two kinds :—

(i) Caused by animal spirits.

(ii) Caused by poetic or dramatic presentation.

The former may be explained as follows :—

External objects imprint on brain, through senses, various ideas. These are retained in memory. Imagination[3] (fancy),

1. Hald., Vol. I, 373.
2. Hald., Vol. I, 291-2.
3. Hald., Vol. I, 115.

when excited by accidental course of spirits, can change these ideas in diverse ways and out of them constitute new ideas. By means of these ideas it can arouse animal spirits so as to cause actions and passions to rise. This can happen apart from the direction of will. The physiological process, involved in the rise of imaginative joy, may be stated as follows :—

When a pleasant image is constructed out of the remanants of past experiences in memory, because of the accidental movement of animal spirits, it causes animal spirits to pass from brain into muscles, in which the nerves, scattered around the orifices, are inserted. Thus dilation of the orifices is brought about. This gives rise to motion in the small nerves and consequent affection is joy.

But difference in the nature of animal spirits and their accidental course, may cause the imagination to produce a totally different new imaginative construct, which brings about a different nervous movement resulting in pain. Thus, imaginative constructs, due to animal spirits, can be causes of joy and sorrow equally.

But the imaginative joy, which is due to an imaginative construct, built up with the help of what poetry or drama[1] presents, differs from that which is caused by an imaginative construct, brought about by the operation of animal spirits, in this, that while in the case of the former all emotions, which may be aroused by imaginative constructs are sources of joy; in the case of the latter only some can be so. For instance, sadness can never give joy. Descartes distinguishes between the two by calling the former "intellectual".

(3) INTELLECTUAL JOY FROM POETRY ETC.

We feel pleasure in feeling various passions excited in us, according to diversity of objects presented to us, when we

1, Hald., Vol. I, 373.

read of strange adventures in a book or see them presented on stage. This pleasure is intellectual[1] joy.

This pleasure, as he seems to explain in Article XCIV of the Part Second of the Passions of the Soul, is due to the fact that the emotions which are aroused by the works of poetic or dramatic art "not being able to harm us in any way, seem pleasurably to excite our soul in affecting it."[2]

And referring to other causes of intellectual joy, Descartes says : "Thus, when we are given news the mind first judges of it, and if it is good it rejoices with that intellectual joy which is independent of any emotion of the body, and which the Stoics did not deny to their wise man."[3]

PURE INTELLECTUAL JOY.

The pure intellectual joy is due to action of soul itself. It is the enjoyment of things, which understanding represents to soul to be its own good possessions. It is not the enjoyment of what the impressions on brain represent to be good. Therefore, it should not be confounded with sensuous joy. For, the sensuous joy[4] is the enjoyment of things, which the impressions of brain represent to soul as its own good possessions.

SENSUOUS JOY AS AN ACCOMPANIMENT OF THE INTELLECTUAL.

There is no doubt about it that so long as soul is joined to body, the intellectual[5] joy is almost invariably accompanied by the sensuous. For, as soon as understanding represents some possession of the soul to be good, imagination (in spite of the fact that what the understanding has represented to be good is very different from all that pertains to body and, therefore, very

1. Hald., Vol. I, 398.
2. Hald., Vol. I, 373.
3. Hald., Vol. I, 290.
4. Hald., Vol. I, 372.
5. Hald., Vol. I, 372.

difficult to imagine) does not fail to create some impression on brain, which moves animal spirits and excites sensuous joy.

ÆSTHETIC JOY.

We have presented above the three types of intellectual joy as found in the Passions of the Soul, Articles XCI and CXLVII and in the Principles of Philosophy, Part IV, principle CXC. But the conception of the intellectual joy, which is the most important in the context of the intellectualistic æsthetics of Descartes, we get by implication only. He seems to hold that joy in general is due to the fact that the soul realises that one of its possessions is good. For, he admits that sensuous joy is due to excitation of some movement[1] in nerves by an object of sense, which would have harmed them, had they not sufficient strength to resist the movement, or were the body not well disposed. Such a movement in nerves produces in brain an impression, which represents the strength of nerves or the health of body as a good possession for soul to have and excites joy. A similar statement he makes in reference to the emotion that is excited by a work of art, as we have stated in an earlier section. Therefore, Descartes seems to imply that there is another kind of intellectual joy, quite distinct from the three types, discussed above, which is due to the fact that the object of understanding excites some movement, which would have confused it, had it not sufficient strength to respond to it fully. This strength of understanding, when represented to soul as a good which it possesses, arouses intellectual joy in it.

Such an intellectual joy, when felt in relation to an æsthetic object, may be called æsthetic joy in order to distinguish it from pure intellectual joy. For, the theatrical or poetic presentations of strange adventures excite the imagina-

1. Hald., Vol. I, 373.

tion to build up a complete mental picture of the artistically presented. Consequently all sorts of passions or emotions are aroused in us, according to the diversity of objects and we get æsthetic joy, if the understanding is able to grasp the whole imaginative picture with all its implications and, therefore, is realised by the soul as its good possession, if there is harmony between stimulus and response. Thus, the æsthetic experience, according to Descartes, is the experience of intellectual joy, accompanied by an emotion and, therefore, by the other three types of joy, sensuous, imaginative and emotive.

PURE INTELLECTUAL JOY AND ÆSTHETIC JOY DIFFERENTIATED.

According to Descartes, æsthetic experience is the experience of intellectual joy accompanied by a passion. But pure intellectual joy is not so accompanied. For instance, when we are able to grasp clearly the nature of the Soul or Good, there is pure intellectual joy. It possesses general nature of joy, inasmuch as the understanding, which is able to grasp the nature of the Soul or Good, represents itself to the soul as its good possession.

But when understanding is able to grasp through imagination all that is presented to it, by a product of free imagination, a drama or a poem, it represents itself to soul as its good possession and, therefore, there is intellectual joy, which is called æsthetic joy, because it is accompanied by a passion or exterior emotion. For, at the same time when understanding grasps what imagination presents to it, the imagination sets animal spirits in motion, according as poetry or drama has aroused the images of objects which are associated with different emotions. Further, while pure intellectual joy is due to the action of the soul out of itself, the æsthetic joy is due to the action of the soul caused by what

is presented to it by imagination as affected by what poetry or drama has impressed upon it.

PASSION AS ACCOMPANIMENT OF INTELLECTUAL JOY.

Descartes distinguishes interior emotions from passions or exterior emotions. Interior emotions[1] are those which are excited in soul by soul itself. Passions or exterior emotions, on the other hand, depend upon some movements of animal spirits. The former are similar to and very often united to the latter. These interior emotions of soul often take their origin from passions, which are contrary to them. For example, when a husband laments his dead wife, it may be that he is oppressed by sadness, which her absence excites in him. But still he feels a secret joy in his lamentations, which is so strong that sadness, which accompanies it, cannot diminish it in any way.

Similarly when we read of strange adventures or see them presented on the stage, various passions are excited in us, according to diversity of objects, presented to imagination. But along with any passion, that may be aroused by such presentation, we feel pleasure in getting it excited in us. This pleasure is an intellectual joy. It takes its origin from any passion, even from sadness, which may be aroused by reading of a tragic adventure or by seeing its presentation on the stage.

LANGUAGE AS IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF IDEAS AND EMOTIONS.

Although each movement of the "gland" has been associated by nature with a separate thought, yet we may associate them with others by means of custom or habit. Thus, though words[2], which excite movements in "gland", according to the institution of nature, do not present to soul

1. Hald., Vol. I, 398. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 355.

more than their sounds, yet custom usually makes the mind grasp their signification rather than sounds of their syllables.

Accordingly Descartes holds that words[1], spoken or written, are responsible for the rise of various ideas and emotions immediately. While certain words excite in our minds thoughts of battle, tempest, furies and emotions of indignation and sadness, others arouse the opposite ideas such as those of peace and pleasantness and emotions such as love and joy.

He refutes the views of those who hold (i) that words do not immediately arouse any passion in mind or images of things different from forms of letters and sounds and (ii) that they arouse different acts of understanding, with the help of which mind first understands the meaning and then forms for itself images of various things. He asks the opponents "What shall we say of sensations of what is painful or pleasurable ?" He holds that pleasure and pain are immediate. For instance, if a sword is moved towards a body and cuts it, the immediate result is pain. This pain is not identical with local movement of the sword or the body that is cut. It is different from them (the movements) exactly as colour, sound, taste and smell are different from the local movements of the body. Thus, pain is excited in us immediately by the disturbance of certain parts of body because of contact with certain external bodies. His conclusion, therefore, is that linguistic presentation can arouse ideas and emotions immediately as much as can the actual facts. Such a power of language has been recognised by Ānanda Vardhana in his conception of Asaṁlakṣyakrama Dhvani. But he asserts that it is not the conventional but the suggestive power that arouses the ideas and emotions immediately, not in the sense that there is the complete absence of the successive stages in the rise of ideas

1. Hald., Vol. I, 294.

and emotions but that the succession is so quick that it is not noticed.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE EXPLAINED.

In the light of various points discussed above, Descartes' conception of æsthetic experience may be explained as follows :—

If we remember that Descartes holds (i) that language is capable of immediately arousing ideas without the intervention of images of sounds or of forms of letters (ii) that interior emotions are distinct from exterior emotions or passions (iii) that those of the former which are joyous in their nature, may arise from exterior emotions even of the opposite type (iv) that pure intellectual joy is different from æsthetic joy, which also is intellectual (v) that joy in general arises from the fact that brain or understanding represents something as a good possession of soul and (vi) that imagination is capable of arousing passions independently of nervous stimulation by the objects of nature ; there can remain no difficulty in understanding his æsthetic theory.

When we read a poem or see a drama staged, various ideas arise in mind through imagination, impressed upon by a poetic or dramatic presentation. Thus, while the understanding, being able to grasp them clearly in their entirety as a well-connected whole, represents itself to be a good possession of the soul and is responsible for the rise of intellectual joy ; the imagination sets animal spirits in motion, in accordance with its affection by artistic presentation, and arouses a corresponding exterior emotion or passion. Hence it is that intellectual joy is accompanied by exterior emotion.

This joy can rise even if the contents of imagination be such as arouse the passion of sadness. For, intellectual joy

is due not to nature of the ideas, which arise, but to successful grasping of them by understanding as a well-connected harmonious whole.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE FROM TRAGEDY DEFINED.

Æsthetic experience from a tragic presentation on stage, which is due to objective perception of the presented, consists in the interior emotion of satisfaction, that a person of generous disposition feels, in doing his duty in pitying the hero of a tragedy, whom he sees suffering undeservedly. For a clear exposition of the view of Descartes on the experience from tragedy, it is necessary to state his view on the following:—

(i) Emotions, aroused by good or evil happening to others (ii) Generosity (iii) Pity (iv) Power of interior emotion.

(i) EMOTIONS AROUSED BY GOOD OR EVIL HAPPENING TO OTHERS.

When some good is represented to us as happening to other persons and we feel that they deserve it, that does not excite any other emotion than joy, which is serious inasmuch as it gives us the satisfaction that things happen as they should. Similar is the case with evil also. But there is this difference that when we see some evil happening to others, who, we feel, fully deserve it, the joy is accompanied by laughter and mockery. When, however, we see some evil happening to those, who do not deserve it, our pity[1] is excited.

(ii) GENEROSITY.

Generosity[2] consists in the consciousness or feeling that there is nothing, which really belongs to a man, but free disposition of will, and that there is no reason why he should be prais-

1. Hald., Vol. I, 360-1. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 401.

ed or blamed unless it is because he uses it well or ill. It causes the possessor to esteem himself as highly as he legitimately can. It involves conscious, firm and constant determination to use the free disposition of will well i.e. the determination never to fail of his own free will to undertake and to accomplish all that he judges to be the best. This quality can be acquired.

Generous person never despises anybody. He is more inclined to excuse than to blame others, whom he sees committing faults. He believes that the faults, which others commit, are due to ignorance rather than lack of goodwill. He does not consider himself inferior to those who are intellectually or materially better ; nor does he consider himself superior to those who are less gifted.

(iii) PITY.

Consideration of the present good, that belongs to us, excites joy and evil excites sadness. But when the evil is seen to happen to another and we feel that the sufferer does not deserve it, pity is aroused. Thus, pity is a species of sadness, mingled with love and goodwill towards those, whom we see suffering undeservedly.[1]

It is due to two causes, (i) love and (ii) generosity. The subjective conditions of the pity, that is due to love, and that which is due to generosity, differ. Thus, pity in a man, who is conscious of his weakness and is subjected to adverse fortune, is due to love, because he represents the evil of others as possibly occurring to himself and then he is moved to pity more by love for himself than that which he has for the sufferer. Sadness of pity in this case is bitter. But persons of generous disposition and strong mind, who fear no evil for themselves and hold themselves free from adversity, are

1. Hald., Vol. I, 415.

affected by sadness of pity when they see the infirmity of others and hear their plaints. For, generosity consists in wishing well to all. But this sadness of pity, aroused in such persons, is not bitter,[1] has no sting, does no harm, because of the inner feeling of generosity and safety. The tragic spectacle is not to be shunned, because it affords an opportunity for the exercise of generosity and thus gives inner satisfaction of doing one's duty towards a fellow being.

(iv) POWER OF INTERIOR EMOTION.

Interior emotions touch us most and, therefore, have much more power over us than exterior emotions or passions. The former are met with and experienced in conjunction with the latter[2]. The internal[3] satisfaction which arises from consciousness of having done some good, is the sweetest of all emotions.

Therefore, when our soul possesses something that gives it inner satisfaction, no passion, which is aroused by an external object, can have the power of harming it. Passions, under such circumstances, rather increase the emotion of joy, because, soul then realises the powerlessness of passion to harm it and so becomes conscious of its perfection.

This explains why sadness, which arises either from a tragic fact in actual life or from presentation of a tragedy on the stage, not only loses its sting but also increases the inner joy, which is due to some inner possession, which is realised to be good.

EXPERIENCE FROM TRAGEDY EXPLAINED.

Thus, when a person of generous disposition views objectively a tragic event, presented on the stage, and sees the hero suffering undeservedly, his generosity prompts him to do

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1. Hald., Vol. I, 416. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 398. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 360.

his duty in pitying the sufferer. This gives him internal satisfaction. And it is because of this peculiar nature of the interior emotion that pity, which is aroused by presentation of tragedy[1], is not unpleasant : because it is more external and in the senses than in the interior of the soul. The pleasure in pity, aroused by presentation of tragedy, consists in the satisfaction, that the spectator has, in thinking that in pitying the sufferer, he does his duty.

The difference in pity aroused by tragedy from that excited by actual tragic accident, consists in this that in the latter case the spectator thinks that the evil, from which the person is suffering, is more vexatious.

PITY FROM TRAGEDY NOT BITTER.

Bitterness or sweetness of an emotion depends on the consciousness of the capacity of the object, which arouses it, to hurt[2] or to help. In the case of tragic presentation on stage, our subconscious idea of unreality or artistic nature of the presentation accounts for the absence of bitterness from the pity that we experience at its sight. Accordingly it is different from that which we feel at the sight of real tragic event.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE AS CONFUSED THOUGHT.

Clear thought is that which the mind has independently of the body and which is not due to the impressions, created by the body, with which it is united. But confused[3] thought is that which is due to impression of the body on the soul.

Emotions are thus only confused thoughts. Even the intellectual joy, that we have in æsthetic experience, is closely connected with imagination, which is a part of brain.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 416. 2. Hald., Vol. I, 357. 3. Hald., Vol. I, 291.

Æsthetic experience, therefore, according to Descartes, is confused thought.

GOOD AND BEAUTIFUL AND EVIL AND UGLY DIFFERENTIATED.

Beautiful[1] or ugly is that which is so represented to us by our external senses, particularly the sight. But good or evil is that which is so represented to us by reason. Accordingly, the love, that we have for beautiful things, may be called attraction to distinguish it from the love, which we have for what reason represents to us to be good. Ugly and evil also may be similarly differentiated according as the object is represented to be hateful by external senses or reason.

The emotion of love or hatred, which is related to beautiful or ugly, is more violent than that which is related to good or evil : because what comes to soul through external senses, affects it more deeply than that which is represented to it by reason.

INFLUENCE OF DESCARTE'S PHILOSOPHY ON POETIC PRODUCTION.

Philosophy of Descartes brought about a reign of rules in poetry. Genius, the gift of nature, was looked upon as essential for poetic production, but it was thought necessary that it should combine with knowledge of rules to be able to produce a perfect piece. Control of reason over artistic productions was thought to be capable of rendering them divine. Rules were regarded to be the instruments of genius.

Thus, under the influence of rationalism about this time, Boileau (1636–1711.) and others looked upon the following as necessary for the production of good poetry.

1. Hald., Vol. I, 369.

1. Moral purpose : It was to be introduced in poetry with the object of pleasing the largest number. It was to be fixed upon even before the selection of theme, because it regulates the whole work and all its parts. Moral[1] purpose, however, had to be presented in graceful form and grand air in order to secure the acquiescence of the reader or spectator. Pleasing form was looked upon as honey which covered the bitter pill of moral instruction.

2. Suitable theme : Closely related to fixing upon a moral purpose was finding a suitable theme to present the said purpose. Field of selection of the subject-matter was extended so as to include both classical literature and nature.

3. Invention[2] : It did not mean the creation of something entirely new, but simply ordering, arranging and designing the selected material and dressing it so as to make it suited to the mood or occasion i. e. altering, adding to and subtracting from it. Invention, is short, meant, not the presentation of things as they are, but as they ought to be.

When, however, the rationalistic conception of 'truth to nature' was emphasised in handling the subject-matter of a poem, this very invention was called *verisimilitude*. For, if we try to find out the meaning of truth, as conceived by the exponents of the verisimilitude, we, at once, discover how closely the theory of poetry is related to philosophy. Philosophy during the 17th century was primarily concerned with the discovery of "forms" "laws" or "essences" of things. It was not the multiplicity of colours and shapes, which immediately impresses the sense of sight, but the underlying principle, which was acknowledged to give order and unity to the apparent multiplicity, that philosophy was concerned with. Similarly poets were concerned with, not individual man and action or

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1. Gil., 217. 2, Gil., 218.

things as they strike the senses with their mixed content of good and evil, but with the types of character. Poets did not present scenes or events as they were found in fable or in nature, but purified them of all that was irrational and introduced logical order, so that they may win the assent of the mind of beholder, like a syllogism. The aim of Neo-classical poetry was to present, not what strikes the sense but the reason, which mind discovers and which underlies the visible.

The rule, therefore, which a poet was called upon to follow, was that he[1] should not run away from nature; he should not depart from life and nature; he must take care of verisimilitude. His primary task was to dress up and apparel the truth. Verisimilitude[2], thus, was another name for things, not as they are but as they ought to be.

4. Unities[3] : Unities of time and place were prescriptions in the spirit of the age of rational science.

5. Correct words and figures : Employment of correct words and figures in poetic or dramatic presentation to please the æsthetic senses and to transport the soul, was looked upon as necessary, because they open the inner chambers of the soul for hospitable reception of moral truth.

6. Emotion : It was held to be the most essential element of poetic presentation. For, if presented well, it transports the mind of reader, fills it with emotion, throws it into terror and makes it feel all the movements, in spite of the fact that he knows the presentation to be feigned and invented.

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1. Gil., 220. 2. Gil., 221. 3. Gil., 223.

CHAPTER VIII.

BRITISH ÆSTHETIC THINKERS.

IMPORTANCE OF BRITISH ÆSTHETIC THINKERS.

British æsthetic thinkers are interesting from a comparative point of view, because many of them talk of poetry, its contents and means of poetic production in such ways as have striking similarity with those, found in the works of Indian rhetoricians, poeticians and æstheticians. Thus (I) Bacon speaks of distortion of nature by poets very much in the manner in which Indian rhetoricians talk of Vakrokti or Vaicitraya.[1] (II) Hobbes talks of the relation between imagination and poetic figures which has fair similarity with Kuntaka's view of relation between Kavivyāpāra, an act of imagination on the part of a poet, and the twist that he gives to his presentation by means of figures.[2] (III) Addison's conception of imaginative constructs is fairly similar to that of Utpalācārya (Yathābhīṣṭasamullekha) and his 'imagination' seems to be very much like Pratibhā of Ānanda Vardhana. (IV) Burke holds that the affection of the soul of poet at the time of writing and of that of audience at the time of hearing is the same. This view seems to be an echo of that of the Indian æstheticians who say : "Kaveḥ śrotuḥ samānonubhavastataḥ." He differs from Indian Æstheticians, who hold that the basic emotions cannot be aroused by the conventional power of words and that they can be suggested only. For, he asserts that the compound abstract words arouse the affections of soul through sounds only, without the intervening images of the corresponding objects.

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*1. V. J., 22. *2. V. J., 7.

BACON.

HIS CONCEPTION OF IMAGINATION.

Bacon (1561-1626), the founder of Empiricism, divides the mind[1] into three parts and assigns a faculty to each. According to him, imagination produces poetry, memory produces history and reason produces philosophy. Though at first he seems to regard the imagination to be as important as memory and understanding, yet he changes his opinion later on and gives to imagination the position of a messenger between the two.

Creative imagination[2] of the artist, Bacon says, distorts nature. It joins, at pleasure, things, which can never come together in nature. It presents things, which can never happen in nature. He differs from Durer, who attempted to reduce beauty to a mathematical relationship, and holds the strangeness in proportion to be an indispensable attribute of Beauty. Beauty, according to him, is not relation. In opposition to Baconian conception of imagination, Pope said :—

"First follow Nature, and your judgement frame
By her just standard, which is still the same."

HOBBES.

Hobbes (1588-1679) is a thorough-going materialist. In spite of his contemptuous indifference to the products of imagination, he occasionally acknowledges poetic beauty. There are three topics, connected with æsthetics, on which he has incidentally written : (I) Imagination (II) Genius and (III) Identification.

I. IMAGINATION.

The fundamental presupposition of his philosophy is that

1. Gil., 204. 2. Gil., 219.

nothing is real but matter and motion. Thus, sensation,[1] according to him, is nothing but a motion, received from outside, and the formation of an image from sensation, is nothing but counter-pressure or outward motion. Memory is simply a store-house of the residues of motions.

However, he modifies his mechanical view of operations of mind, when he comes to deal with the poetic imagination. He attributes to it the following functions, which his mechanical view cannot support :—

1. Imagination visualises the end and the means, necessary for its achievement.

2. It relates. It discovers similarities between things, which would remain unnoticed but for it. Thus, all similes and metaphors are the discoveries or creations of imagination. Hence it gives poets and orators the power, by means of which they can "make things please or displease" as they like. For, figures of speech are their chief instruments.

3. It finds out not only similarities but differences[2] also. It is thus a judgement also. Hobbes is not very consistent on this point. At times he maintains the distinction between imagination and judgement, but often he abolishes it. Assuming imagination and judgement to be distinct from each other, he holds that in poetic production, though both imagination and judgement are required, the former is more prominent. For, sublimity of poetry rests on extravagant fancy.

4. Imagination functions as reason also. Poetry aims at presenting such a well-ordered and well-arranged system of data of experience as, when well-adorned, pleases the mind of reader. A system may be such as has already been built up

1. Gil., 210. 2. Gil., 211.

by philosophy. In such a case the function of imagination is simply to adorn and to make it pleasing. But in those cases, in which philosophy has not been able to do so, imagination attempts at a system. And the more it succeeds in its attempt, the more pleasing its product is. In such a case, imagination functions as reason, which thinks and classifies.

II. GENIUS.

Artistic genius[1] is both imagination, that detects similarity, and judgement, which finds out differences. It absorbs all the functions of mind.

III. HIS THEORY OF IDENTIFICATION.

The images, which arise within us, admit of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. Thus, when a person identifies himself with another, e.g. an actor[2] or dramatist, when he imagines himself to be the hero of a piece, he compounds the image of his person with the images of actions of the original hero.

LOCKE.

THE RELATION BETWEEN HIS EPISTEMOLOGY AND ÆSTHETICS.

Beauty, according to Locke (1632-1704), is a complex idea, which admits of being brought under a mixed mode. For, it is a combination of colours and figures such as causes delight in beholder. It is not real. And æsthetic experience is a pleasant deception. Let us, therefore, state here the fundamentals of his philosophy such as lead to a clear understanding of his views on art.

Locke was the first philosopher to emphasise the importance of the problem of knowledge[3] and to assert that before

1. Gil., 211. 2. Gil., 210. 3. Thil., 309.

we start an inquiry into any philosophical problem, we must find out what our mental power is capable of handling, what is the utmost reach of our understanding. Thus, he framed the problem for Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The work in which he attempts this problem is An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

He was an empiricist. Therefore, he held that the starting point in any scientific investigation is not a general truth of reason but a particular psychological fact and that to explain means to point[1] out the historical source of any process in a sense-experience. According to him, we have no innate ideas or innate knowledge of the principles; mind is an unfurnished dark room with only two windows. Or it is like a blank sheet of paper with no marks or lines on it.

He also showed the way to the evolution of Kantian thing-in- itself. For, he divided the qualities into two, primary and secondary. The latter, according to him, are not in the objects themselves. The objects have certain powers to produce sensations of colour, taste, touch etc. in us by their primary qualities. Thus, the secondary qualities are not mere subjective ideas. The primary qualities, such as solidity and extention, belong to things in themselves.

SOURCES OF ALL IDEAS.

There are two sources, from which ideas come to mind, two windows through which light comes to dark room, (i) external senses and (ii) internal sense.

External senses present us with simple qualities. These presentations do not disappear immediately. They leave their marks. They are retained. They persist. This persistence enables the mind to contemplate or reflect on them, to find

1. Gil., 233.

out similarity and dissimilarity among them, to combine them in a manner, in which they are not given in sensation, so as to build up new constructs in imagination and to abstract from them the so-called general ideas. Thus, the universals are due to mind's power of abstraction and are not innate.

For a proper understanding of Locke's theory of art, we must note that he holds that senses present us not only with simple ideas but with complex[1] ideas also, for instance, when an object, possessed of various conjoined qualities, is presented to them. To these complexes the mind, through its power of imagination, adds other ideas, which are not given in complexes.

Internal or inner sense[2] observes the operations of mind on the ideas, received through external senses. Though inner sense has nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very much like external senses. Hence it is called inner sense. And just as the ideas, supplied by the former, are called sensations, so those, aroused by the latter, may be called *reflections*, because in forming the latter type of ideas mind turns its attention back upon itself.

There seems to be a very close relationship between taste and genius, as conceived by empiristic æstheticians in general, and the inner-sense[3] of Locke. For, the inner-sense, when it feels beauty, is called taste, but when it creates artistic beauty, it is called genius.

PERSONAL IDENTITY.

Knowledge involves self-consciousness.[4] It is not possible for any one to know without knowing that he knows. The memory of knowing persists and distinguishes a particular

1. Ful., 146.
2. Prichord, 106.
3. Gil., 234-5.
4. Ful., 154.

knower from the rest. In this alone consists personal identity. It can be extended as far as memory of past acts of knowledge can be extended backward. It is not dependent on the constituents of body. For, it persists when body changes.

It is important for our purpose to remember that, according to Locke, personality changes. If a person loses the memory of some aspects of life beyond the possibility of recollection, during a certain period, he ceases to be exactly the same person. One and the same man can be different from himself, if he has distinct and uncommunicable consciousness at different times.

PLACE OF BEAUTY IN HIS SYSTEM.

There are two points in Locke's philosophy which have to be clearly grasped to understand fully the place of beauty in his system; (i) the functions of mind and (ii) the types of idea.

Mind has power to repeat, to compare and to unite in various ways simple ideas which are received through two windows, external senses and internal sense. And the ideas are of two types, (i) simple[1] and (ii) complex.

Simple ideas are those, which mind receives through external senses or inner sense. Colour, taste, space, extension, motion etc. are got through external senses. And perception, retention, comparing etc. we receive through inner sense. But pleasure, pain etc. are simple ideas which we get through both.

Complex ideas, which mind constructs by putting together the ideas it has, are never received so united. These new complexes are due to the unifying power of mind. All such ideas are made up of simple ones. There can be

1. Thil., 310-11.

no content in a complex formation, which is not originally got through senses.

These complex ideas are divisible under three heads: (i) modes (ii) substances and (iii) relations. Modes also are of two types (i) simple and (ii) mixed. The simple modes are combinations of simple ideas of the same kind without the mixture of any other, e.g. a dozen. But mixed modes are made up of simple ideas of various kinds. And Beauty is such a mixed mode. For, it is made up of a certain combination of colours and figures such as causes delight or pleasure in the beholder.

IS BEAUTY A REAL IDEA ?

According to Locke, real ideas are those which conform to the real being and existence of things. Simple ideas are thus real, not because they are copies of things existing outside, but because they are effects of powers of things without. But complex ideas neither conform to external things, nor do they have any reality independently of the mind. They are creations of mind. Some such mental constructs themselves are archetypes and as such are real. Such archetypal[1] constructs, however, are creations of mathematicians only but not of poets, according to Locke. He also holds that beauty has no foundation in our mind.[2] It is a product of mere customs and manners.

Thus, according to Locke, beauty is a complex idea, which can be brought under mixed mode, inasmuch as it is a construct of ideas of different types. Beauty in art neither conforms to an external thing, nor is it archetypal, as the constructs of mathematical mind. Hence beauty is not real.

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1. Thil., 316. 2. Gil., 249-50.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE AS PLEASANT DECEPTION.

Truth or error,[1] according to Locke, comes into being when we begin to make propositions about things. The ideas, put together in a proposition, are not true or false in themselves, because we can have no idea, which does not correspond to an external or internal fact and does not come through either of the two windows. These propositions or combinations of ideas, which are received separately, are true or false, according as they do or do not correspond to the facts of experience. If the constituents of such combinations agree with one another, they are true, but if not, they are false.

But fancy[2] or imagination of the artist, he holds, gives false colours, appearances and resemblances to what it presents and diverts the unwary spectators from truth. It is like a court-dresser, who gives false appearances and deceives the unwary. And the figurative and other artificial applications of words are to poets and dramatists what colours etc. are to court-dresser. Such words indirectly arouse wrong ideas, move passions, divert the mind from truth, mislead judgement and, therefore, are perfect cheats. But human nature is such that it likes to be deceived by such a presentation of creative imagination: for, such a deception is pleasant. The effect of art, according to him, is pleasure rather than information and moral improvement. Æsthetic experience, therefore, according to Locke, is a pleasant deception, caused by artistic presentation of false creations of imagination.

SHAFTESBURY.

HIS RATIONALISTIC TENDENCY.

Though the Empiricists wanted to expel reason from the field of æsthetics by attempting to explain æsthetic experience

1. Ful., 159.

2. Gil., 203.

in terms of the constituents of animal frame of humanity, yet reason forced itself upon them. For, they included the rational elements in their conception of the inner sense. Shaftesbury (1671-1713), for instance, who was perhaps the founder of the empirical school of British æsthetics in the 18th century, so expanded the conception of inner sense that Hume did not see any inconsistency with empiricism in admitting the rational aspects of æsthetic experience. Shaftesbury's conception of sense was different from that of Locke. He applied the term 'sense' to value-experience.[1] According to him, experience of beauty was immediate and sure and the inner sense was the means to it. His inner sense was like rationalist Leibniz's sympathy, which predetermined the well-disposed soul to vibrate in unison with the divine harmony.

His inner sense or sense of beauty was not sense in its literal sense. It was an all-embracing function. It could induce the percipient to pass from effect to cause, from outer to inner and from parts to whole, in an æsthetic context. He held that inner sense could be educated and improved. In fact, he felt it to be his sacred duty to educate his countrymen to better taste.

HUTCHESON.

HIS VIEW ON ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Hutcheson (1694-1747) was a disciple of Shaftesbury. Therefore, we deal with him before taking up Addison, though the latter was elder. He admitted the æsthetic experience to be disinterested and held that the term 'sense' was very appropriate for it. According to him, perception of beauty[2] is rightly called sense of beauty. For, it involves no intellectual element, no reflection on principles and causes no desire : because desire is a joy, which arises from self-love upon a prospect of advantage. But æsthetic

1. Gil., 236-7. 2. Gil., 241.

experience is free from search for any personal advantage. It is disinterested.

HIS CONTRIBUTION.

He had rationalistic tendency. He found an important mathematical law, determining the presence of beauty in geometrical figures, in animals, in theorems etc. This law is the compound ratio between uniformity and variety, "where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety, e.g. triangles, squares, pentagons etc.

TASTE, SENTIMENT AND GENIUS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EMPIRISTIC ÆSTHETICIANS.

The inner sense, so far as it was means of experience of beauty in its visible and audible aspects, was called taste by empiristic æstheticians. But, so far as it was responsible for experience of an artistically presented symmetry etc., it was called sentiment. But, generally the distinction between the two seems to have been ignored. The same inner sense, as the means of artistic production, was spoken of as genius.

ADDISON.

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF HIS ÆSTHETIC THEORY.

We have devoted a separate chapter to Descartes and a fairly long section to Locke. We must keep them in mind to understand the philosophical background of the æsthetic theory of Addison (1672-1719).

He is primarily concerned with the facts involved in the æsthetic experience, but not with their philosophical explanation. He has no adherence to any particular school. But Lockian and Cartesian schools were responsible for shaping his æsthetic theory as presented by him in his papers

on "Pleasures of the Imagination" in the Spectator from No. 411 to 421.

He refers to both the Lockian and the Cartesian schools in the course of his treatment. For instance, he follows the method of Locke in pointing out the historical source of imaginative process in sense-impression. He also refers to the Cartesian theory of association of images.

HIS DISCOVERY.

He noticed a new æsthetic fact "the great" and thus supplied the basis of Burke's conception of the 'sublime' which had a great influence on Kant's treatment of Mathematically sublime and Dynamically sublime

IMAGINATION AND ITS PLEASURE.

Imagination is that aspect of human mind, which receives images of external objects such as are conveyed to it by eyes, when they are in contact with them, or such as are drawn by memory[1] of visual images, aroused by paintings, statues, descriptions etc. It cannot have even a single image, which it does not originally receive through eyes. But human mind is capable of retaining, altering, eliminating and combining these images in innumerable ways. Here he follows Locke, as we can immediately see if we remember what has been stated in an earlier section. He, as an æsthetician, is concerned with imagination not only as a creator of new and original constructs but also as a receiver of images of such constructs. Such mental constructs, reflected on imagination, are the sources of pleasures of imagination. This is the faculty, which enables a man in dungeon to entertain himself with scenes and landscapes, which are more beautiful than any that we can find in the whole of nature.

1. Add., 394.

POWER OF IMAGINATION.

It is a fact of human experience that when an image of a particular aspect of what we have seen before, arises in our mind, it awakens[1] numberless ideas, which lie asleep in imagination (memory). Thus, the sight of a tree is able to fill imagination with the whole picture of fields or gardens, where we met with it for the first time, and brings before the mind's eye the whole view, with variety of images, with which it was experienced before.

Cartesian explanation of this fact of human experience may be stated as follows :—

The set of ideas, which is aroused by a whole natural scene, such as a garden, leaves traces in the brain very close to one another. Therefore, when any one of the ideas of the whole arises in imagination, the trace of the particular idea is animated. But this animation is so violent that it stirs all the traces, which lie about it, and arouses other associated ideas. These in their turn animate still other neighbouring traces and arouse other ideas and so on till the whole view is pictured up in imagination.

One point has, however, to be noted in this connection, namely, that all the ideas, aroused by the sight of a natural scene, do not leave traces of the same kind, but that those which are produced by the pleasant ideas are deeper and wider than those, caused by the unpleasant ones. Hence the latter do not get animated and, therefore, no unpleasant ideas arise in imagination. It is because of this that the scenes, which are pleasant to behold directly, are pleasanter still in reflection.

The power of imagination, according to Addison, irrespective of the materialistic or the spiritualistic explanation, consists

1. Add. 415.

(i) in receiving lively ideas from external objects (ii) in retaining them for long and (iii) in selective organisation of them into pleasanter whole. It is necessary for both the poet and the appreciative reader ; for the one to create figures and representations, such as would hit the imagination of the reader, and for the other to complete the imaginative picture, in all the pleasant details, which is poetically presented in a few vigorous touches.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION.

He holds that imaginative pleasure is possible from both nature and art. The two pleasures, however, are distinct from each other. Accordingly he divides imaginative pleasures into two kinds : (1) Primary and (2) Secondary. Primary pleasures of imagination proceed from immediate presence of objects of nature to eye. Secondary pleasures of imagination are those which are excited by works of art such as painting, sculpture and poetry.

The ideas, which are excited by artistic productions and fill imagination, are not exactly like those once aroused by the objects of nature. For, in a product of art the imagination of the artist enlarges, changes and compounds in various ways the ideas, which are stimulated by the objects of nature. Hence the ideas, excited by a work of art, are different from those stimulated by an object of nature. And the secondary pleasures of imagination proceed from that operation of mind, which compares the ideas, aroused by original objects, with those, received from their imaginative representations in different arts. This comparison is inexplicably delightful.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF PLEASURE OF IMAGINATION.

Pleasure of imagination is distinct from both of sense and

of understanding. Pleasure of sense is gross[1] and vicious and that of understanding is subtle and painful to acquire, though preferable to that of imagination; because it adds to knowledge and improves the mind. But imaginative pleasure is as great and transporting as the intellectual. It is more obvious and easier to acquire, because it needs little attention and employment of thought on the part of the beholder. For, when we are struck with the symmetry of a presentation we immediately assent to its beauty without enquiring into its causes. It requires but gentle exercise of the mental faculties and, therefore, does not involve labour and difficulty, as does that of understanding. It is conducive to health like gentle physical exercise.

DIFFERENCE IN THE PLEASURE EXPLAINED.

It is often observed that persons, who speak and know well the language, in which a poem is written, differ in their judgements about its beauty. One hails it as beautiful but another does not; one is transported with a passage, which another simply passes over in indifference.

This difference in taste, relish, judgement or experience, is due to the following factors :—

1. Difference in the imaginative capacity.
2. Difference in the extent of knowledge.
3. Difference in the power of judgement[2] to discern, to find out, to know, which words are most suited to represent a particular idea or image.

These differences account for the difference not only in the works of art but also in the experience from and judgement about them.

ÆSTHETIC SENSES.

He recognises eye and ear to be the only æsthetic senses.[3]

1. Add., 395. 2. Add., 414. 3. Add., 393-4.

Sight, according to him, is the most perfect and most delightful of all senses. It fills the mind with the largest variety of ideas. It can reach its object at the greatest distance. It can continue its operation for the longest time without feeling tired or satiated with the enjoyment of its object.

SENSES OF SIGHT AND TOUCH COMPARED.

The sense of touch can give the ideas of shape, extension etc., but they are not such as cannot be got through eye. Further, sense of touch is confined in its operation to definite number, bulk and distance of its object. The eye knows no such limitation. It can reach an infinite variety of objects, can comprehend the largest figures and can bring within the reach of seer some of the remotest parts of the universe, such as heavenly bodies. It is the eye that supplies imagination with its ideas.

EAR AS ÆSTHETIC SENSE.

According to Addison, musical sounds of an artificial composition of notes raise confused[1] and imperfect ideas of visible objects in imagination, set the hearers in the heat and hurry of a battle, fill the mind with melancholy scenes and apprehension of death or lull it into pleasing dreams of groves.

Music affords secondary pleasure of imagination, inasmuch as pleasure from music is due to action of mind in comparing the ideas received from music with those arising from the original objects, as in the case of statue, picture or poetic description.

SOURCES OF IMAGINATIVE PLEASURE.

(1) GREATNESS.

Greatness[2], which is one of the sources of pleasure of imagination, does not consist in the bulk of a single object of sight, but in the largeness of the whole, viewed as one entire

1. Add., 412. 2. Add., 397.

piece, such as vast uncultivated desert, high and big mountain, rock, precipices and wide expanse of waters, which strike us with a sort of rude magnificence.

PLEASURE OF IMAGINATION FROM GREAT.

Pleasure of imagination from great consists in the feeling of amazement and freedom. It is explained as follows :—

(a) Imaginative faculty is so constituted by nature that it loves to grasp at anything that is great and to be filled up with it. Therefore, when imagination is filled, there arises the feeling of amazement and mind is perfectly at rest like one, who has attained the objective.

(b) It is natural to human mind to love freedom and to hate restraint. Therefore, when the sight is restrained by anything that confines the view, such as walls or mountain barriers, and consequently the receptive capacity of imagination cannot have full play, the mind chafes at the restraint and feels pain at the loss of its liberty. But if the view be not so enclosed as to put any restraint on the sight, as in the case of spacious horizon, imagination gets free exercise of its receptive power. Pleasure of imagination, therefore, consists in this feeling of freedom of imagination.

(II) NOVELTY.

Curiosity is as natural to human mind as love of freedom. It loves to know the unknown and the unseen. Whenever, therefore, imagination is filled up with something that has novelty or strangeness, there arises pleasure of imagination, consisting in the satisfaction of curiosity. It is curiosity that bestows charm on monsters and imperfect and disorderly products of nature, and makes them sources of pleasure of imagination.

(III) BEAUTY.

Beauty of a product of art or nature, according to

Addison, consists in the gaity or variety of colours, in symmetry and harmony of parts, or in just mixture of all. Symmetry etc., however, are not beautiful in themselves, but only in relation to mind, which is so constituted by nature that it pronounces them to be beautiful immediately.

He admits another kind of beauty and points out that each species of sensible creature has its peculiar notion of beauty and that each is most affected by beauty of its own kind, which works on imagination with greater worth and violence than the beauty of nature or of art. (Sex instinct seems to be at its basis).

EXPLANATION OF ÆSTHETIC DELIGHT.

The explanation that he offers of the pleasure that we get from great, novel and beautiful, is that the whole of creation is so designed by the great Creator that such pleasure arises. Thus, human mind has been so made that it delights in the apprehension of what is great or unlimited, of what is new or uncommon and of what is beautiful in our own species and in art and nature.

PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION NOT PURELY SUBJECTIVE.

Addison follows the Lockian[1] view of distinction between primary and secondary qualities and refers to the eighth chapter of the Second book of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding as his authority. We know that, according to Locke, though light and colour, as figuring in imagination, are only ideas in the mind and not qualities which exist in bodies, yet they are due to a certain power in the external bodies. Pleasures of imagination, therefore, are not purely subjective, because they are stimulated by the power of the external objects, possessing the primary qualities. Even

1. **Add., 403.**

the admission that the ideas of light and colour admit of excitation not only by impressions of external bodies on the organ of sight but also by other occasional causes, does not mean that they are purely subjective.

ART AS IDEALISED IMITATION.

Human mind is so constituted that it never fails to discover some flaw in whatever it sees in the material world. To human mind, there is nothing in the actual world such as does not admit of improvement. It is capable of picturing up to itself things which are greater, stranger and more beautiful than any that can be met with in nature. An artist, therefore, has not simply to produce a duplicate of what is found in nature. His primary task is to mend and to perfect nature[1] in his presentation so as not to allow any room for the idea of improvement of it to rise in the mind of spectator and thus to afford him the highest imaginative pleasure. He has, however, to take care that in endeavouring to excel nature he does not reform her too much and so run into absurdities.

IMITATION IN POETRY.

Thus, though poet imitates nature, yet he does not produce simply a faithful copy of objects of nature. He improves upon what he sees in nature. He gives it touches, which heighten its beauty and enliven it so much that the ideas, aroused by actual objects, seem to be faint and feeble in comparison with those, aroused by words. He gives a free view of nature and brings into prominence those aspects, which escape our sight and attention.

EMOTIVE ELEMENT IN ART.

The more a work of art is capable of stirring our emotions, the pleasanter it is. Further, not only those emotions, which are pleasant in practical life, are pleasanter,

1. Add., 421.

when aroused by art, but also those, which are unpleasant in practical life, become pleasant when stimulated to a high pitch by art.

Addison's explanation of pleasantness of such emotions as pity and terror, aroused by art, may be stated as follows :—

Pleasure from an artistic presentation of the terrible, arises, not from the affection of imagination by what is terrible, but from the reflection that we make upon ourselves at such a presentation. When we see an artistic presentation of the terrible, our pleasure is due to feeling of freedom from danger and sense of safety. It is similar to that which we have at the sight of a dead monster. Similarly when we see an artistic presentation of grief and suffering, our pleasure is due, not to grief and pity, that it arouses in us, but to the secret comparison, which we make between ourselves and the person who suffers.

This pleasure is not possible from a sight of actual suffering and grief. For, such sights hit us hard and give no leisure to reflect on ourselves. When, however, they are artistically presented we think them as past or as fictitious. Reflection, therefore, upon ourselves arises insensibly and puts into shade the sorrow that we feel for the suffering of the afflicted.

SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF POETIC EXPERIENCE.

1. Good and warm imagination to retain the images, received from outside.

2. Knowledge of power of words.

3. Discerning judgement to know what expressions are most proper to clothe and adorn the images.

4. Self-forgetfulness.

Pleasures of imagination involve self-forgetfulness. When imagination is filled with great, new or beautiful, or a harmonious combination of all, there arises a pleasant delusion, in which our souls are lost, and for the time being, we live and have our being in a world of imagination. At such a time, we are like the enchanted hero of a romance, who sees beautiful castles, woods and meadows and hears warbling of birds and purling of streams, though all this time he is actually in a solitary desert.

He agrees with Locke in holding that art deludes, but explicitly states that, at the time of æsthetic experience, we do not care to see through the falsehood ; we lose ourselves in the presentation.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Thus, Addison's conception of æsthetic experience, is an improvement on that of Locke. For, while he agrees with Locke in holding it to be "a pleasant delusion" he adds that it involves self-forgetfulness or change of personality of the spectator and that though it is delusion yet it is without the consciousness of it as such.

BERKELEY.

RELATION BETWEEN HIS METAPHYSICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

According to Berkeley (1685-1753), beauty belongs to feeling, involving reason. He is an idealist. He refutes Locke's view that the material substance exists independently of the mind. Accordingly he denies the independent being of the material world and holds that the ultimate source of beauty is God. It is, therefore, necessary to state here the fundamentals of his philosophy.

HIS REFUTATION OF MATERIAL WORLD.

Locke held (i) that external material bodies produce

sensations, which, being arranged, united, separated and related in various ways, constitute the entire field of our knowledge; our knowledge is confined to sense-experience; we have direct knowledge of our ideas only (ii) that we know that there is an external world, but this knowledge is not so self-evident as the knowledge of our own ideas; it may be said to be a matter of inference only. Berkeley accepts the sensationalistic theory of knowing and makes use of it as a weapon against the materialistic theory of being. He asks, if the bases of our knowledge are sensation and reflection only, if our knowledge is confined to sensation and reflection only, how can we know the material world external to us; how can we compare our ideas with material bodies and talk of representative perception: how can we infer the material world, which is never known directly? Further, if there is a material world existing independently of God, that would be negation of Him. Such a belief leads to atheism and, therefore, has to be discarded.

To exist means to be perceived, according to Berkeley. Objects can exist only in relation to knowing mind. When we say that an object exists even when we are not knowing it in any way, we mean that there is a possibility of its knowledge, if we were to exercise our power of knowing in relation to it; or that it exists in relation to other minds; or that it has its being in the Mind of God. It is inconsistent with the sensationalistic view of knowing to believe that objects exist independently of mind. It is, therefore, absurd to believe in the independent matter.

CRITICISM OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.

In his "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision" Berkeley asserts that extension, figure and motion are perceived by sight and touch and that the ideas of extension etc., got through

touch, are different from those got through eyes. Therefore, those who maintain that objects actually possess in themselves solidity, extension, figure and mobility, may be asked : "Are these qualities tangible or visual ?" For, the qualities, known through touch, considerably differ from those, known through eye, though they are called by the same names. Further, the primary qualities are as much sensible as the secondary. Therefore, there is no reason to suppose that they are really in the objects, while taste, smell etc., are the effects produced by the objects in the perceiving subject. The term matter, therefore, can signify nothing more than something which is entirely unknown to us and of which we can predicate no such qualities as extension, figure etc.

MATTER AS AN ABSTRACT IDEA.

Berkeley's view of matter can be clarified in the light of his conception of nature and origin of abstract ideas, which he discusses in the introduction to his "Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge". It may be stated as follows : –

He holds that things are experienced as groups of qualities. No quality is ever experienced in isolation. But mind is so made that it can isolate any one of them and think it in separation from the rest. Hence it is that though red or blue is never experienced without some figure and extension, yet mind can abstract it and think it in isolation. Further, mind, while comparing the combinations of qualities, the objects, notes common features and abstracts them. Such abstractions acquire general reference and significance. Such an abstracted image may be so vague and ill-defined that it may not fully correspond to any object of the class, for which it stands, but it is nevertheless particular, not the universal. There is never a purely abstract idea. It is always associated with picture of what is being thought

about, howsoever vague and ill-defined this picture may be. It is a particular image, as a representation of all things belonging to a class, which constitutes an abstract idea. Thus, general names, such as 'horse' and 'man', stand for some aspects, which all men and horses possess in common.

If we keep this conception of abstract idea in mind, we immediately discover that the idea of matter in general is nothing but the vague image of object possessing primary and secondary qualities such as represent all objective experiences exhibiting the same material qualities. Matter, thus, is nothing but a general abstraction. It is not the support of qualities. Locke's conception of material substance, therefore, is not sound.

GOD AS CAUSE OF SENSATION.

It is a denial of sensationalism to admit extension, figure and motion, to be the causes of our sensations. For, all our ideas are passive ; they are not active in any way. How can then figure, extension etc., which are nothing more than ideas, be the causes of sensations ? Are then sensations without any cause ? No, says Berkeley, but the cause is not material, as Locke held, but spiritual ; it is not passive but active, it is not corporeal but incorporeal, it is not matter but spirit or God.

We have power over our thought but not over our sensations. Our thoughts depend upon our will for their arousal, but not the sensations. We can think what we please but we do not enjoy such freedom in respect of sensations. The ideas, due to sensations, force themselves upon us ; we have to suffer them passively. They are not creations of our will. They have steadiness, order and coherence. They are not accidental. God is the cause of these ideas. He arouses them in a certain order. He organises them in different relations. They are the real things. But they are ideas so

far as they exist in the mind of God. He is a substance in so far as He is the support or substratum of ideas.

INDIVIDUAL SOUL.

Individual soul is, incorporeal and active substance. It has two aspects, (i) understanding and (ii) will. So far as it 'perceives' ideas it is called understanding. But so far as it creates ideas or operates on them in various ways it is called will. Berkeley recognises two more aspects of the soul, (i) feeling and (ii) reason, with which we are particularly concerned in the context of æsthetics. We can have no idea of it, we can perceive only the effects which it produces. Hence we know it through inference only.

There are innumerable individual souls. They are creations of God. We know of our existence through reflection and that of other spirits through reason. We have only a notion but no idea of ourselves.

EXTERNAL WORLD.

"No idea can exist without the mind" is the firm conviction of Berkeley. But he has not the courage of his conviction. He is not thoroughly skeptical regarding the real existence of anything but his own experience. He admits that suggestions, which accompany perceptions, are valid and that our perceptions refer to and arise from external world. He differs from Locke only in so far as he denies the reality of sensible things as existing independently of the mind. Accordingly he holds that the external world, reference to which is suggested by our perceptions, exists in the infinite omnipotent Mind, which contains and supports it.

HIS ÆSTHETIC THEORY.

It is in his Alciphron Dialogue that he discusses his theory of beauty. He confines himself to the discussion, whether beauty belongs to the sphere of feeling or reason.

And his conclusion is that beauty belongs to feeling, involving reason. His view may be elaborated as follows :—

Beauty is nothing but symmetry and proportion in relation to the use of the object, looked upon as beautiful. It is felt, but not without the co-operation of reason. For, proportion, symmetry and harmony are beautiful, not in themselves, but only in relation to the use of objects. In order to rank as beautiful, they have to be so adjusted that the whole is perfect i.e. fully serves the purpose for which it is created. Further, symmetry and proportion are not ideas of sense, but mental constructs, built out of material, given to senses, with the co-operation of reason. Beauty, therefore, 'ultimately addresses itself to reason through the means of sight'.

GOD AS THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF BEAUTY.

As a true bishop and a firm believer in the ultimate origin of both the subjective and objective aspects of experience from God, the greatest designer, Berkeley holds that the ultimate source of beauty is God. Having established that beauty is nothing but symmetry and proportion in relation to the use of object, he asserts that without thought there can be no end or design; without an end there can be no use; and without use there is no aptitude or fitness of proportion, from whence beauty springs. Hence God has to be admitted to be the first spring of beauty. For, He sustains all reasonableness in the world.

HUME.

HIS GENERAL PHILOSOPHY AND ÆSTHETICS.

Hume (1711-1776), according to his biographers, had little sense of the romantic and the beautiful. He had no appreciation of art. He lacked æsthetic sense. But a careful study of his works enables us to know his views on some of the

important problems of art, if we look at them from the point of view of his philosophy. Thus, beauty, according to Hume, seems to be a complex idea. It is not real. It is individual and not universal idea. He distinguishes taste from sensibility in general and reason. He explains æsthetic experience from the points of view of utilitarian rationalist and emotionalist. He holds that æsthetic pleasure is unselfish and involves identification. A fairly connected idea of his general philosophy is, therefore, necessary to grasp his æsthetic theory clearly. Let us, therefore, refresh our memory of it.

HIS SKEPTICISM.

He is a consistent sensationalist and, therefore, a skeptic through and through. He holds that human knowledge is confined to sensation; we can know only what senses give us; we cannot know what is beyond sensation. Therefore, while Locke believed in the material substance as the substratum of material qualities, which cause sensation, and Berkeley believed in the Spiritual substance as the substratum of the world of ideas, which causes sensations, Hume totally denies such a substratum either material or spiritual. He holds that such a substance is not given in impression; we, therefore, cannot know it, and, therefore, can say nothing about it. The same attitude he maintains towards the subject of experience. He holds it to be beyond the realm of knowledge. For, there is no spiritual element in our experience. Mind is nothing but a bundle of sensations and acts of sensing, remembering and imagining and of combining and abstracting. Thus, substance, qualities and relations and so time, space, causation etc., are nothing but mental constructs.

SENSE OF REALITY.

Hume draws a distinction between impression and idea. He does not use the word "idea" indiscriminately for all kinds

of mental affections, as do Locke and Berkeley. He restricts the word "impression" to sense-impressions and feelings such as love, hate, desire, will etc. The impressions are more vivid and forceful than ideas. But ideas are comparatively pale and cold. They are the products of memory and imagination and are derived from impressions through unification or abstraction.

We believe in impressions or their reproductions. We feel the immediate presence of impressions. And this feeling that impressions are immediately present, is the sense of reality. What we believe[1] in, we consider to be real. And the memories of them are more vivid and living than the imaginative constructs. Hence we belive in their reproductions also.

EXTERNALITY AND CONTINUITY OF OBJECTS.

We believe in externality and continuity of objects. But this belief is distinct from that in reality of impressions. For, the impressions themselves are perceptions, they are immediately present to us. Therefore, we cannot help believing in their reality. But externality and continuity are not immediately present. In fact, they cannot be so given: because in order to sense externality we must know the self. But the self can be as little known as the material substance of Locke. For, the only means of knowledge are the senses, but neither can be known through them. And continuity also has no better claim to belief than externality. For, our impressions vary, we have no continuous impression of any object whatsoever.

IMAGINATION AS BASIS OF BELIEF.

Existence of external world is not to be inferred, as Locke seems to have held. Nor is the consciousness of externality in-

1. Ful., 188.

spired by greater force and vividness and involuntary character of impression, as Descartes and Berkeley held. For, feelings and passions have all these characteristics, but are never looked upon as external. Hume, therefore, maintains that it is the imagination[1] that gives us the ideas of externality and continuous existence of the world of experience, because of (i) constancy and (ii) coherence.

Every impression is momentary. And there are times when we have no impression whatsoever, as when we are in deep sleep or fainting fit. But certain impressions recur after gaps, caused either by impressions of different types or total absence thereof, just, or almost, as they were, and, therefore, have a peculiar constancy. Hence we recognise our homes and friends and relations after long absence from them. But one thing has to be noted in this connection, namely, that recognition takes place in spite of the fact that the objects of recognition have considerably changed. Certain parts of the house may have fallen and been rebuilt differently : friends and relations may have physically changed in many respects, but still we recognise them to be the same. In spite of some inconstancy, the recurring impressions have certain coherency. It is because of these two characteristics (i) constancy and (ii) coherence that imagination makes us believe that the objects possessing them are external. Similarly the idea of continuous existence is aroused, when imagination fills in the gap between two impressions, one past and the other present, which have close similarity.

PERSONAL IDENTITY.

Identity of human mind, according to Hume, is fictitious.[2] The subjective impressions are interrupted and broken up by

1. Ful., 199-204. 2. Ful., 204-5.

deep sleep and fainting as much as are the objective. The idea of its identity is, therefore, due to filling up of gap by imagination, because of constancy and coherence of the subjective impressions.

According to Hume, successive perceptions constitute the mind. There is nothing like simple indivisible immaterial substance, that we know or can know. There is no simple and continuous principle in us. If we try to analyse ourselves, we find that howsoever far we may carry our analysis, we discover nothing but perception or feeling. For, if we are consistent sensationalists, we have to admit that we can know nothing beyond impressions or perceptions. Mind, therefore, is nothing but a bundle of different successive perceptions, which are in perpetual flux.

SUBSTANCE AS A COMPLEX IDEA.

Hume agrees[1] with Locke that all our ideas, howsoever much they may appear to transcend experience, are derived from experience. For, he holds that the mind compounds, adds to and abstracts from the material, given in sense-experience. He accounts for building up of ideas in terms of association as follows : --

Impressions, as they occur, arouse memories or images (i) of similar impressions or (ii) of contiguous impressions that happened near by or at the same time or (iii) of impressions, which are considered as their causes or their effects. Thus, substance, according to him, is nothing more than a collection of particular qualities and we mean nothing more than this collection, when we talk or reason about it. However, it is not a mere aggregate of qualities. It involves a principle of union based upon contiguity and causation.

1. Ful., 185.

ÆSTHETIC THEORY OF HUME.

We have shown in the preceding pages how uncompromising Hume is in holding the sensationalistic view of knowledge and how skeptical he is in regard to both the external world of matter and the immaterial soul. However, when he takes up the æsthetic problem in his Treatise of Human Nature, he has to abandon his extreme sensationalism and has to compromise with rationalism. He is a utilitarian rationalist in his theory of beauty of sense or form. In this respect he is indebted to Berkeley, who was the first to propound such a view. We have shown in the section on Berkeley, how utilitarianism and rationalism go together. Thus, under the influence of the spirit of the time he holds (i) that art is not a product of rules but of the inspiration of genius and (ii) that standard of taste arises from the animal frame. And under the same influence he rebels against (i) the Aristotelian doctrine of importance of plot in drama and (ii) distinction between history and poetry. He seems to maintain that emotion, which, by sympathetic magic, raises an emotion in the spectator, is the most important; and that the distinction between history and poetry is only of degree and not of kind. But he admits that Aristoteli an unities of time, place and action are essential for tragedy, though he explains unity of dramatic action in terms of association, logical association, association of ideas through cause and effect. And he seems to abandon his skepticism when he admits that though the qualities lie in the mind, 'certain qualities in objects are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.' For, this statement apparently means that the feelings of beauty and deformity are aroused by external objects.

BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY.

According to him, Beauty[1] is such an order or construction

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1. *Bos.*, 178.

of parts as (i) by primary constitution of human nature (ii) by custom or (iii) by caprice is fitted to give pleasure and satisfaction. Ugly, on the other hand, is that construction of parts, which gives pain and causes uneasiness. But in "The Platonist", he calls beauty a sentiment or passion in human nature, which makes a man relish the graces of a well-proportioned statue or the symmetry of a noble pile.

BEAUTY OF IMAGINATION AND OF SENSE.

The distinction, which Hume draws between (i) beauty of imagination or relation and (ii) beauty of sense or form, can be understood by comparing the experience of the owner of an object with that of the spectator of it. Suppose we see a piece of land, overgrown with green grass, which is not of much monetary value, on one side, and a fruit-garden, every tree of which is laden with fruits, on the other, and judge both to be beautiful. The former is an instance of imaginative beauty in so far as it would not look beautiful to the possessor, who is concerned with monetary value. The latter is an instance of beauty of sense or form inasmuch as its utility is plainly expressed in the physical form of the object (fruits). Hume, however, holds that utility, the idea of which is the source of pleasure, does not concern the spectator. It concerns only the owner of the beautiful object. Pleasure to spectator, therefore, from such object is due to sympathy with the owner.

BEAUTY AS A COMPLEX IDEA.

Beauty is a complex idea in so far as it is a combination of simple ideas. But it is distinct from other complex ideas, such as that of substance : because beauty as a complex idea does not seem to involve a principle of unity, based upon contiguity and causation, as does the complex idea of substance. For, beauty, according to Hume, as has just been stated, is such

an order or construction of parts as by primary constitution of human nature, by custom or by caprice is fitted to give pleasure and satisfaction. It may, however, be pointed out here that in his explanation of Aristotelian unity of action he declares that association of ideas through cause and effect explains the unity of dramatic action.[1]

BEAUTY NOT REAL.

In the course of our explanation of the sense of reality from the point of view of Hume, we have stated that we believe in sense-impressions, we feel their immediate presence, and that this feeling that impressions are immediately present, is the sense of reality. What we believe in, we consider to be real. Since beauty is neither sense-impression, which we feel to be immediately present nor an exact reproduction thereof, but a complex idea, in building up of which imagination plays such an important part, it is not real.

BEAUTY AS INDIVIDUAL AND NOT UNIVERSAL.

Hume agrees with Berkeley that all abstracted ideas are particular and concrete.[2] They are images, which are made to stand for a host of other images, similar to or associated with the representative image. The image of the so-called abstract idea in mind, is only a particular image of the abstracted common features of similar objects. Hence its application is the same as that of a universal. Beauty, therefore, being a complex idea, is individual and not universal, because there is no purely universal idea, as also because it is not a combination of the abstracted common features of similar objects.

SENSE OF BEAUTY.

In an earlier section we have discussed how Shaftesbury expanded the meaning of inner sense; and how, as a means of

1. Gil., 235. 2. Ful., 185.

appreciation of the beautiful, it was called taste ; and how, as a source of creative artistic activity, it was called genius by empiristic æstheticians. Thus, rational element having been included in the conception of inner sense by the very founder of empirical Æsthetics, Hume does not feel any inconsistency with sensationalism in admitting rational element in the appreciation of beauty as we shall show. When he uses the word "sense" in the context of creative genius, he implies that there is nothing supernatural in the psychological spring of poetry[1] and other arts. He denies divine inspiration in this context and holds that we can discover the psychological cause of arts through a careful study of the structure of human nature. Similarly when he uses this word in the context of appreciating taste, he means that in æsthetic experience no reflection is involved.

Accordingly Hume holds that taste or sensation discerns beauty, which is otherwise indefinable. It is a mere feeling, which is affected with pleasure and pain by structural forms and relations of definite character, which can be analysed by reflection and not by the appreciating sensibility itself.[2]

In the context of discussion on experience from poetry and drama, which does not primarily consist in the experience of sensible qualities, but in that of a pleasant social emotion, he seems to prefer the word sentiment to taste to designate the means of experience.

TASTE AND REASON DIFFERENTIATED.

Reason[3] is concerned with the discovery of truth or falsehood of the presented. It sees objects as they really exist in nature. It is cool and disinterested. Taste, on the other hand, realises the emotional, sentimental or æsthetical value of

1. Gil., 244. 2. Bos., 180. 3. Gil., 245.

the presented. It colours and guilds the presented and transforms it into a new creation.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Hume explains æsthetic experience from the points of view of (i) utilitarian rationalist and (ii) emotionalist. From the former point of view he is concerned with the objects, useful to humanity. This has been discussed in an earlier section. And from the latter he is concerned with good products of fine arts. As an emotionalist, he seems to ignore sense-data in his treatment of æsthetic experience. Æsthetic experience[1] according to him, consists in agreeable passion, which is aroused by a well-composed poem or drama. It involves no operation of reason or understanding. It is the emotional part of the animal frame which is responsible for experience of beauty.

It is, however, surprising that the intellectual element, which the empiricists wanted to eliminate from the process, involved in æsthetic experience, by postulating a separate æsthetic faculty, inner sense or taste, is introduced in some form or another. Thus, Hume himself emphasises the use of reason[2] in the æsthetic experience from works of finer arts in feeling the proper sentiment and correcting false relish. He also maintains that taste is educable.

ÆSTHETIC PLEASURE UNSELFISH.

Pleasure that we get from a beautiful object, does not involve any selfish interest in the object, because the spectator[3] is not concerned with the utility of object to himself. He is pleased, not because it is useful to him, but because it is so to the owner or the person affected by its properties. His pleasure is due to sympathy with the owner. Here we have the

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1. Gil., 245. 2. Gil., 246. 3. Bos., 179.

germs of Kant's view of æsthetic experience, characterised by (i) disinterestedness and (ii) purposiveness without purpose.

IDENTIFICATION IN ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

He holds that in æsthetic experience we somehow feel[1] at one with the persons or objects represented and their apparent sensations become our real sensations. A figure, according to him, which is not justly balanced, is disagreeable, because it conveys the ideas of fall, harm and pain, which are painful, when by sympathy they acquire some force or vivacity. Similarly a figure, with an air of health and vigour and such a construction of parts as conveys the idea of strength, is pleasing, because of sympathetic rise of akin sensations.

BURKE.

HIS IMPORTANCE.

Burke (1729-1797) is very important in the history of Western Æsthetics, because it was he who for the first time distinguished æsthetic judgement from the logical, in his conception of *taste*. It was the Burkian conception of taste, in its aspect of judgement, which probably suggested to Kant the title of his third Critique, the Critique of Judgement, where the implication of the word "judgement" is not logical judgement but æsthetic judgement or judgement of taste and teleological judgement.

Burke's Treatise on Sublime and Beautiful in German translation, was accessible to Kant, who quotes from it with approval and recognises its psychological value, though he denies philosophical value to it. Burke influenced Kant's conception of the Sublime.

1. Gil., 256.

He follows Lockian conception of mind and its powers. But he differs from Locke, when he comes to deal with taste, as we shall show soon. Æsthetic experience, according to him, is neither a pleasant deception, as Locke held ; nor is it a pleasant deception without the consciousness of deception as such, as Addison maintained. A work of art, has the same effect on the mind of spectator, he asserts, as has the real. Æsthetic experience, therefore, according to him, is not deception at all.

He begins as an empiricist and sticks to the traditional Empiricism as long as he deals with the problem of æsthetics from the point of view of æsthete so far as he has emotive experience from a work of art. Accordingly he holds that æsthetic experience is immediate emotive experience, that it does not in any way involve operation of reason or will, that beauty is a quality of object, which produces in the percipient some degree of love or tenderness as effectually as fire produces the idea of heat, and that it is not purely subjective experience but is related to external object. But he compromises with rationalism when he comes to deal with the judgement of a work of art in respect of its decorum, congruity etc.

He approaches the problem of æsthetics from three points of view, (i) epistemic, (ii) emotive and (iii) linguistic. From the epistemic point of view he accounts for æsthetic experience in terms of the powers of knowledge, imagination and judgement, which together constitute taste. From the emotive point of view he declares that the æsthetic experience from poetry and drama is an emotive experience and that they present emotion. Here he agrees with Indian æstheticians. From the linguistic point of view he holds that compound abstract words such as love, fear etc. are capable of arousing passions or

emotions directly, without the intervention of the images of objects. On this point he fundamentally differs from Indian æstheticians, belonging to the Dhvani school, such as Ānanda Vardhana and Abhinavagupta. For, they hold that basic emotions are suggested : they cannot be directly aroused by conventional expressions. Let us, therefore, state at first the powers of knowledge, according to him.

POWERS OF KNOWLEDGE.

He admits three powers[1] of knowledge, (i) sense (ii) imagination and (iii) judgement.

(i) SENSE.

He holds that there are five senses and that the construction of sense-organs is almost the same and that they function also in the same manner in all men; the difference, both in their construction and in the manner of working, is negligible. An orange is yellow to sight, soft to touch and sweet to taste to all persons alike. Thus, there is agreement of all sensible persons, not only in regard to sensible qualities of external objects, but also in regard to their instrumentality to pleasure and pain, because senses present the ideas with their annexed pleasure or pain.

Let us take the sense of taste and see if what has been stated above is true of it. That it is so, is evident from the fact that metaphors, which are taken from the sense of taste, are well understood by all, e.g. sweet temper and sour temper, and sweet expression and bitter expression.

(ii) IMAGINATION.

Imagination is a sort of creative power of mind, which is free to represent the images of things either in the order and manner, in which they are received by senses, or in an altoge-

1. Bur., 69–74.

ther different order and manner. It cannot produce anything absolutely new. It can change the order and manner only of ideas, which are received from senses. Its products are as capable of exciting various feelings, tendencies and emotions as the external objects themselves ; they have the same power pretty equally over all men. For, imagination simply represents what has been received from senses, and, therefore, the principle of imaginative pleasure or pain is the same as that of the sensitive.

ADDITIONAL ELEMENT OF PLEASURE.

In addition to pleasure and pain from the products of imagination, which arise from the properties of natural objects, which imagination represents, there is pleasure arising from the consciousness that the representation is an imitation of the original. Thus, there are two causes of imaginative pleasure ; (i) representation of objects of sense in a new and striking order and manner, different from that in which they are received by senses (ii) resemblance of such representation with the original. The principles, in accordance with which these causes operate, are natural and not derived from any habit. Therefore, they have almost the same effect on all men.

(iii) WIT AND JUDGEMENT.

Burke agrees with Locke in holding that wit is concerned with tracing resemblances and judgement with finding out differences. They differ so materially in many respects that their union is rare in the world. Human mind is so constituted that difference is not so striking to it as resemblance. The latter draws the attention and gives it pleasure, because by attending to similarities we produce new images and enlarge our knowledge. Drawing of distinction, however, does not offer any food to imagination. It is dull, dry and irksome. It affords only negative and indirect pleasure.

TASTE DEFINED.

Burke has no great opinion of definition. However, he defines Taste as follows :—

Taste is "that faculty[1] or those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgement of, the works of imagination and the elegant arts." What he is concerned with in his inquiry into the nature of taste is to find out whether there are any common, well-grounded and certain principles, which control the affection of imagination by, and the formation of judgement of, works of art. And his finding is that there are principles of æsthetic taste which are as common as the sense of taste, on the analogy of which the æsthetic taste is called *taste*.

IMAGINATION AND JUDGEMENT AS ASPECTS OF TASTE.

Taste[2] is not a faculty, distinct from imagination and judgement. It is not a natural instinct, by which we are struck with excellences or defects of a work of art at the first glance without previous reasoning. There is no doubt about it that in the imaginative grasp of a work of art and consequent rise of passion, reason is not involved. But if we are to judge a work of art in respect of its decorum, congruity etc., nothing but understanding (reason) can enable us to do so. This taste, which is concerned with judgements of the works of art, admits of improvement by extension of knowledge, close attention and frequent exercise. Thus, taste is imagination so far as it receives the image of what is beautiful, whether in art or in nature, and it is reason so far as it forms judgement of the presented.

DIFFERENCE IN TASTE EXPLAINED.

Difference in taste depends upon difference in experience

1. Bur., 67. 2. Bur., 81.

and observation but not upon strength or weakness of any natural faculty. The critical taste, as distinct from the ordinary, does not depend upon a superior principle in man, but only upon superior knowledge. Hence it is that while pleasure to a man of uncritical taste would be the same from an ill-done piece of art as he would derive from a highly finished one, because it proceeds from bare similarity ; a man of critical taste will find no pleasure in the former, because of his superior knowledge.

The taste, so far as it belongs to imagination, is the same in all men. And there is no difference in the manner in which they are affected. Therefore, if there is difference in taste, it is only a matter of degree. It is due either to greater sensibility or to longer and closer attention.

So long as we are concerned with the sensible qualities of a work of art, i.e. so far as a work of art strikes our senses, nothing more is needed for artistic pleasure than imagination. The same is the case when our passions, such as love and fear, are aroused. For, passions are felt by force of natural sympathy and their justness is recognised by all without any recourse to reasoning.

But many works of art represent not only the objects of senses, such as are capable of arousing passions, but also customs and manners, characters, actions and designs of men and their relations and virtues and vices. Such works of art appeal not only to the imaginative aspect of taste but also to the rational.

FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS.

Æsthetic experience, according to Burke, is an immediate emotive experience. It is, therefore, necessary to deal with his conception of emotion. The following points may be noted

in this connection :—

1. He draws a distinction between feeling and emotion. Pleasure, pain and indifference are simple ideas or feelings and as such are not passions or emotions as earlier thinkers classified them.

2. He confines himself to the treatment of those passions[1] only, which are involved in the experience of beautiful and sublime. He does not deny either existence or value to other passions, not connected with his subject.

3. He holds that the Providence[2] has established certain laws of connection between certain motions and configurations of bodies and certain consequent feelings or emotions in mind. The objects affect us in accordance with these laws.

4. An object, that is intended to arouse passions[3] to any height, should, according to him, not only be a source of pleasure or pain because of its novelty, but should cause them for some other reason also.

5. The passions are of two types[4], according as they are related to the instinct of self-preservation or are social. The two types of passion are opposed to each other. For, while passions, which are due to the instinct of self-preservation, arise from danger and pain, social passions originate from pleasure and satisfaction.

PLEASURE, PAIN AND DELIGHT.

Pleasure and pain[5] are simple ideas. They cannot be defined. They are not mere negative ideas involving the removal of each other. They are of positive nature. There are three states, of pleasure, of pain and of indifference. We pass from the state of indifference to that of pleasure without the intervention of pain and to that of pain without going

1. Bur., 104. 2. Bur., 206. 3. Bur., 84. 4. Bur., 90-1.
5. Bur., 84.

through pleasure. The sensation, which accompanies removal of pain or danger, is delight.[1]

SOCIAL PASSIONS.

1. CURIOSITY.

Curiosity[2] is the first and simplest emotion of humanity. It is a desire for novelty, which yields pleasure when it is satisfied. It is most superficial. It changes its object perpetually. It is an active principle, which runs over its object in no time and seeks a new one. It blends itself more or less with every passion.

2. SYMPATHY.

Sympathy[3] puts us in the place of another man and makes us feel very much as the person, with whom we sympathise, does under the circumstances, in which he finds himself. It makes the circumstances affect the spectator very much as they do the circumstanced. Therefore, it can arouse the feeling of either pleasure or pain.

It is a passion, which consists in entering into another person by placing ourselves in his place and being affected by the happening and situation as he is. It can be a source of sublime, if it be related to a person in a dangerous and terrible situation, in whom the passions, which arise from the instinct of self-preservation, predominate and who is afflicted with pain.

It is solely by means of sympathy that the products of arts are able to transfuse passions from one breast to another and to graft delight even on wretchedness, misery and death.

3. IMITATION.

Imitation is a social passion. Just as sympathy makes

1. Bur., 89. 2. Bur., 83. 3. Bur., 104,

us take concern in what others feel, so imitation makes us copy what others do. We take delight in imitative presentations independently of reason. Burke seems to agree with Aristotle in his conception of imitation.

4. AMBITION.

Imitation is one of the great instruments, which God has created to move human nature to perfection. But it is common to animals. Therefore, if human beings were possessed of imitative power only, they could not progress much beyond the stage of mere animality. Another instrument of progress towards perfection, that He has implanted in men, therefore, is ambition, a satisfaction, that arises from the consciousness of possession of something, which is held to be valuable by humanity and of excelling others in it. It prompts men to distinguish themselves in various ways. It makes that, which arouses the idea of distinction, very pleasant. It is this which makes the otherwise painful toil of scholars pleasant to them, because it arouses the idea of distinction in them. This satisfaction is experienced most, when we can look at a terrible object without feeling the danger associated with it. It is this sense of glory and inward satisfaction, which we experience when we read the poetic representations, which are really sublime.

5. GRIEF.

Cessation of pleasure affects the mind in three ways. (i) If it ceases after proper continuity, the effect is indifference. (ii) If it abruptly ceases, it causes disappointment. (iii) If the object of pleasure is irrecoverably lost so that there is no possibility of its enjoyment again, the passion, which arises, is grief.

GRIEF AND PAIN DIFFERENTIATED.

Grief has no similarity with pain. For, the person who

grieves, allows the passion to grow upon him. He indulges in it. He loves it. But such is not the case with pain. Though grief is not a pleasing sensation, yet, unlike pain, it is willingly endured. For, it keeps the object perpetually before the mind's eye and represents it in its most agreeable aspects.

6. LOVE.

Love is a social passion.[1] It is of two types : (i) that which is due to society of a person, belonging to the opposite sex, and serves the purpose of propagation and (ii) that which is due to society of men, animals or even inanimate objects. Love of both the types originates from pleasure. But the pleasure, which is caused by the society of a person, belonging to fair sex, is the highest of sensuous pleasures. It has violent effects so as to drive the person, affected by it, mad, when he is separated from the object without any hope of reunion. It is capable of mixing with a mode of uneasiness, e.g. when we remember the object of love which is irrecoverably lost. The experience from memory of the lost object of love is not pure pain, because we like to remember the lost objects of love. The other type of love simply arouses the feeling of tenderness towards its object. Its effect is not so violent as that of the former.

PASSIONS ARISING FROM INSTINCT OF SELF-PRESERVATION.

1. TERROR.

Terror[2] completely robs the mind of its powers of acting and reasoning. It arises from the consciousness of possibility of pain and death and, therefore, operates in a manner so as to convert the possible pain into almost actual. The object of

1. Bur., 103-4. . Bur., 108-9.

terror, whether it possesses greatness of dimension or not, is sublime. For, it is impossible to think of anything, that is dangerous, as trifling, e.g. poisonous snake. Surging ocean with its destructive possibilities is a good illustration of the sublime.

Obscurity of the object of terror, inability to grasp the full extent of the danger, adds to the terribility of the terrible. Night, for instance, makes a possible object of terror more terrible. It is because of the obscurity that ghosts etc. are terrible to those who believe in them.

2. ASTONISHMENT.

Astonishment is a passion that is caused by what is great and sublime, when it affects the spectator most powerfully. In it all motions are suspended with some degree of horror. It entirely fills the mind with the object that arouses it, so that there remains no room for any other idea to come in. It debars the mind from reasoning about the object. It is the highest effect of the sublime. The lower effects are admiration, reverence and respect.

LOVE AND BEAUTIFUL.

Love in man is a mixed passion[1]. It is due to instinct of self-propagation, mixed with the idea of some social sensible qualities, which direct and heighten the 'appetite', which he has in common with animal. There is always an element of lust in it. The object of this mixed passion is the beauty of sex. But not only men and woman, possessed of certain sensible qualities, but animals and plants also inspire us with tenderness and affection towards them. Beauty is, therefore, a social quality in general. And beautiful is the object of love of either kind.

1. Bur., 94.

PROPORTION AND FITNESS TO END DO NOT CONSTITUTE BEAUTY.

Burke does not agree with the earlier thinkers, who held that beauty[1] consists in proportion. For, proportion is a creature of understanding and cannot act immediately on sense and imagination. Nor does beauty consist in fitness of the parts to a particular end. For, though the claws of lion are well fitted for destruction, yet, are they beautiful[2] ? Proportion and fitness, however, have not to be excluded from works of art. Architectural beauty, even Burke admits, is dependent on proportion[3] and, therefore, is rational.

SUBLIME.

The passions[4], which belong to the instinct of self-preservation, depend upon the consciousness of possibility of pain and danger. And pain and danger are simply painful when their causes affect us immediately. But they are delightful, when we have an idea of pain and danger coupled with the consciousness that the causes of pain and danger do not affect us immediately. Thus, there is a difference between the experience that we have, when we see a person with a naked sword rushing towards ourselves, from that which we have, when we see such a person moving towards another and are conscious of the fact that he does not mean to injure us. When we have an idea of pain and danger coupled with the consciousness of freedom from dangerous circumstances, we feel delighted. This experience is distinct from positive pleasure, because it rests upon the idea of pain and danger. The object that arouses this delight is sublime.

According to Burke, in addition to what has been stated above, the following are sublime :—

1. Bur., 139. 2. Bur., 152. 3. Bur., 155. 4. Bur., 103.

Power[1] is sublime. For, generally speaking, everything that is sublime, is some modification of power. Greatness of dimension is sublime. Depth and height tend to arouse the idea of sublime more than length. Succession and uniformity of parts constitute artificial infinite. Infinite is sublime. Magnitude in building is sublime. Magnificence[2], a great profusion of splendid things, starry heaven for instance, is sublime. Strong light, such as that of the sun, and loud sound, such as that of thunder, and roar of lion, are sublime.

Thus, he holds that sublime[3] is that which arouses the strongest emotion, that the mind is capable of feeling, and that such emotion is excited by objects, which arouse the ideas of pain and danger and therefore, delightful terror, or anything, that 'operates in a manner analogous to terror'. It is the strongest, because the idea of pain which is associated with it, is more powerful than that of pleasure. But pains are preferred to death. The latter, therefore, affects much more than the former. But even danger and death, when they do not touch us most closely, are at a certain distance and are modified in a certain manner, are delightful. Hence sublime is the cause of delightful terror, mixed with the idea of pain and danger, or even death, realised as not affecting oneself immediately.

POETRY AND EMOTIONS.

Burke is recognised more as a literary critic than as a philosopher. His theories of poetry and drama are important to us, because he holds, like Indian poeticians and dramaturgists, that poetry and drama present emotions. In fact, we have dealt with his conception of emotion only to clarify his poetic and dramatic theories and to explain æsthetic experience.

1, Bur., 115. 2. Bur., 128 3. Bur., 91.

But poetry and drama present emotions in words, we have, therefore, to state his conception of power of words, before we deal with his poetic and dramatic theories. It may be interesting to note in this connection, that in his conception of power of compound abstract words Burke goes very much farther than Descartes, and that his view that compound abstract words, such as love and fear, arouse the emotions directly, is fundamentally different from that of Indian æstheticians, belonging to the Dhvani School.

POWER OF WORDS.

The words affect us in a manner very different from that in which the objects of nature and even the products of arts such as painting and sculpture do so. They have, however, as much power of 'exciting the ideas of beauty and of the sublime' as any other medium of artistic presentation or perhaps even more.

WORDS AND EMOTIONS.

Words are of three kinds :—

1. *Aggregate words* : They stand for many simple ideas, which are united by nature : e.g. man, horse, tree etc. stand for a determinate composition of ideas of hands, feet etc.

2. *Simple abstract words* : They represent, according to convention, one simple idea of a composite whole, for which an aggregate word stands, e.g. red, blue, round etc.

3. *Compound abstract words* : They stand for arbitrary union of the above two types of ideas and various more or less complex relations among them, e.g. virtue, honesty, magistrate, love, fear etc. These words give rise to ideas, without any representation being raised in mind, of things for which they stand. They stand for *confused ideas*. They are mere sounds, which are used on particular occasions[1], when we

1. Bur., 208.

receive some good or suffer some evil or see others suffering or enjoying. When we hear these words we know by habit what they mean. Hence it is that subsequently, whenever these words are used, even without adequate reference to any occasion, they arouse mental affections similar to those, which they gave rise to, on those various occasions, which were responsible for formation of habit of mind to get affected in a certain way on being stimulated by a certain combination of sounds.

Words of the first two types produce three successive effects[1] on hearer : (i) consciousness of sets of sounds (ii) of things represented by them and (iii) affection of the soul (pleasure, pain etc.). But of the last type (compound abstract words) arouse the affections of soul through sets of sounds only, without the intervening images of the corresponding objects : for, there are no definite simple things or combinations of them, for which they stand. Words, standing for passions, are of this type. Hence passions are aroused by sets of sounds immediately, without the intervention of objective images.

POETRY NOT STRICTLY IMITATIVE.

Poetry is concerned with the presentation of passions and manners of men. It is not strictly imitative[2] : for, there is no definite element in passion, as in the case of an external object, to copy. But if poet takes a definite person in definite circumstances to copy, as in the case of dramatic poetry, it is strictly imitative. But descriptive poetry operates by substitution.

POETIC IMPRESSION DEEPER.

Poetry is capable of making deeper impression[3] than products of any other art. It is due to three causes :—

1. We extraordinarily share in passions of others. We are easily affected and made to sympathise by any tokens of

1. Bur., 209-10. 2. Bur., 215. 3. Bur., 216.

passions of others. As there are no other tokens, which express all circumstances of most of the passions so fully as do words, and as poetry is composed of the choicest and most suitable words, it affects more deeply than products of any other art. Further, the influence of most of the things on our passions is due not so much to things themselves as to the opinions of others about them, and the opinions of others are conveyed by words only.

2. There are many affecting things, which can seldom occur in reality. But words, which represent them, occur oftener. Thus, words have the occasion of making deep impressions and taking deep root in the mind. Further, some of the objects, represented by words, are never actually seen by many, e.g. war and famine ; and others are never sensed, e.g. God, Heaven etc. Still the words, representing them, have the power of affecting the mind.

3. By means of words we can make such combinations as can never be met with in reality. Words, thus, enable us to represent well the chosen circumstances and give a new life and force to simple objects.

CLARITY UNNECESSARY FOR AFFECTING IMAGINATION.

Linguistic presentation affects imagination more than painting. For, by means of lively and spirited verbal description we can raise in mind very obscure and imperfect ideas of objects, which arouse stronger emotions than any painting is capable of. That clearness of imagery is unnecessary for producing emotive effect, is fully testified by the emotive effect of the instrumental music.

EXPERIENCE FROM TRAGEDY.

There is no controversy on the view that the objects,[1]

1. Bur., 97.

which, if met with in reality, would shock, are sources of high pleasure, when presented in drama or poetry. Before Burke, delight from tragedy was explained in two different ways. It was thought to be due (i) to consciousness that the tragic happening is not a fact but fiction or (ii) to 'contemplation of our own freedom from the evil, which we see represented'.

These, according to Burke, are rationalistic explanations. He holds that passions are due to mechanism of body or peculiar construction of brain and that reason does not play so great a part in arousing passions, as it is commonly believed.

If we desire to understand fully how tragedy affects when it is poetically or dramatically presented, it is necessary to know how tragedies in real world affect us. That real suffering, to which we see another person subjected, is a source of delight is proved by the following considerations :—

It is a fact that crowds are drawn to sights of real distress and suffering and that men do not shun such sights. This would have been impossible if such sights had been a source of unmixed pain, if there were no elements of pleasure in the experience, which such sights arouse. Further, it is also a fact that the greater is the person who suffers and the less deserving he is of the suffering, the greater is the delight that we have from the sight.

Hence it is evident that 'terror' is a passion that delights us, when it does not touch us very closely and that pity is a passion, which is always accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection.

Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, the passion, which animates us to it, is attended with delight or pleasure of some kind, independently of the subject-matter that excites it. According to the design of the Creator, we are united by the bond of sympathy. This bond of sympathy

is strengthened by proportionate delight in sympathy. If this passion had been painful, we would have shunned all places and persons which would excite it.

Delight, that we experience from a sight of distress, is mixed up with uneasiness. But the same delight hinders us from shunning it and the pain, that we feel, prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving the suffering. All this happens instinctively, without the intervention of reason.

TRAGIC EXPERIENCE FROM REALITY AND ART DIFFERENTIATED.

The experience from the sight of a tragic event, presented on the stage, differs from that which we get from the sight of a real tragedy only in this that in the former case, we have an additional element of delight, arising from the consciousness that the presented is an imitation. This delight is not due to deception, nor is it due to consideration that tragic representations are no realities. For, the more a representation approaches reality the more delightful it is. But tragic representation cannot move so much as does the real.

Affections[1] of soul of the poet at the time of writing and of that of the audience at the time of hearing are identical.

1. Bur., 212.

CHAPTER IX.

ÆSTHETIC CURRENTS IN GERMANY

LEIBNIZ.

HIS IMPORTANCE.

Leibniz (1646–1716) is interesting from a comparative point of view because (i) he recognises different levels of æsthetic experience ; sensory, emotive, intellectual and transcendental, most of which are in common with those admitted by Abhinavagupta[1] : (ii) he holds that at final level of æsthetic experience the individual is universalised ; this view corresponds to Sādhāraṇībhāva in Indian æsthetics : (iii) he admits it to be disinterested.

Leibniz considered beauty[2] to be nothing more than harmony, though capable of including apparent contradiction. He was influenced in his conception of æsthetic experience by his famous doctrine of pre-established harmony. He held æsthetic experience in its final stage to be the experience of universal harmony[3] through its symbolic presentation in art. We shall, therefore, briefly deal with it before taking up his æsthetic theory.

HIS PHILOSOPHY.

He raised two main objections against the Spinozistic and the Cartesian systems. He levelled his criticism (i) against the theory of mechanical causation, which was common to both and (ii) against the relation of mind and body as propounded by Descartes. Both Descartes and Spinoza held matter to be nothing more than extension and similarly mind to be nothing more than thought. Analysis of Leibniz, however, revealed

1. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 154. 2. Bos., 177. 3. Gil., 227.

the former to be more than mere extension. He discovered it to be extension and force. Similarly he found mind to be thought and force on closer examination.

If force is the common factor in both, it is then naturally the substance, of which mind and matter or thought and extension are the attributes. It is the reality inasmuch as the conception of it can be formed independently of any other conception. It is unextended, invisible, simple, fundamental and eternal.

The force, however, is not one. On the contrary, there are many forces. And every one possesses all the attributes stated above. To this conclusion Leibniz is forced by careful examination of both matter and mind. According to Descartes, the essence of matter is extension. But Leibniz asks : how can extension be possible unless each point of the extended be such as does not allow itself to be ingulfed by others, does not let itself merge into others ? Each point, therefore, has to be regarded as a centre of force. Similarly each mind has its uniqueness For, thought-current of every mind is its own. There is no interpenetration of minds. Each is completely shut off from the rest. Hence there are as many mental forces as there are individuals. These forces Leibniz calls monads.

Each monad, whether material or mental, is capable of self-representation. Howsoever vague or indefinite it may be, but it is there. Thus, the only difference between the inanimate and the animate is this that life in the former is in stupor.

HIS CONCEPTION OF MATTER.

The prime characteristic of matter is impenetrability of one part by another, i.e. two bodies cannot occupy the same space ; each monad must represent to itself exclusion and impenetrability by representing bodies as side by side,

occupying different spatial points. Thus, extension is the secondary characteristic of matter. It is the expression of essential impenetrability of matter.

SPACE AS FORM OF INNER EXPERIENCE.

Each of the higher monads represents its uniqueness and independence to itself both subjectively and objectively. The subjective representation of independence is in the form of feeling of individuality and separate personality. The objective representation of independence consists in representing separateness of its body from other bodies. Space is the condition of representation of such separateness. It is, therefore, not an external thing, but simply a form of inner experience of each monad. It is a mode of representing separateness confusedly at the level of purely physical existence. Self-consciousness and personality are the modes of representing separateness confusedly at the mental level.

GOD, THE MONAD OF MONADS.

Reality is constituted by infinite number of monads, which represent to themselves the same universe in various degrees from infinity to zero. The zero degree, however, is not total negation of power of representation but something bordering on it. God, therefore, is a monad, in which infinite degree of representation of the universe is reached and realised. He is the monad of monads, the highest monad. He is perfect intelligence. His representation of nature of all things, whether actual or possible, is clear, complete and wholly intelligible. He is pure spirit. He is perfect. He is pure activity.

CLASSIFICATION OF MONADS.

Though the series of monads, with almost unrecognisable gradation of capacity of representation, is continuous and without break, yet Leibniz roughly divides them under three heads.

(I) Swooning monads: They constitute the physical world by representing to themselves their uniqueness and individuality as spatial apartness. They constitute inorganic bodies, which are made up of a central dominant monad and some lesser monads, which cluster round it. It is the central monad, which gives the aggregate form and cohesion. It is, however, at the level of swooning.

(II) Animal soul monads: They are above the swooning monads. They possess (i) simple feeling and (ii) memory. Their activity is expressed in the animal consciousness.

(III) Human soul monads: They are higher than animal soul monads. They possess powers not only of feeling and memory but also of (i) reflection (ii) self-consciousness and (iii) reasoning.

SOUL AS CENTRAL MONAD.

Just as in the case of the inorganic bodies there is a central monad, round which lesser monads cluster and which gives the aggregate its form; so in the case of organic bodies also, as those of men and animals, there is a central monad, soul monad, round which others cluster. Men and animals have bodies. They are physical as well as conscious entities. They represent their uniqueness and individuality both physically and mentally. They represent to themselves not only their bodies but their consciousness also as distinct from those of others.

THE PRINCIPLE OF PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.

Leibniz begins with the criticism of dualism of Descartes and Spinoza. His main objection against them is: how can there be any interaction between mind and matter, if they are so opposed to each other as Descartes supposed them to be, or even if they be two aspects or attributes of one and the same, as Spinoza thought them to be? But the same objection may be raised against the doctrine of monads, as

propounded by Leibniz. If mind and matter cannot interact, how can monads do so? For, they resist one another on physical level, maintain absolute privacy at psychological level and communicate nothing of their inner life. Monads of Leibniz are not like individual minds of Locke, with windows. They have no windows, therefore, nothing can come in or go out of them. How can then arise the objective consciousness of both the external physical world and other selves? How can we think that there is a world outside us and that we are parts of it?

To answer these objections, Leibniz propounds the doctrine of pre-established harmony. It may be stated as follows:—

God is the creator of monads. He has not only so created them that they form an unbroken series with graded power of self-representation, but also has so arranged that whatever changes or developments take place in one monad, they mean a corresponding change in the inner experience of other monads. Changes in one are represented in all others. The corresponding representations refer to the original and give rise to feeling in monads that they are seeing something taking place in a world that is external to them. Monads are like so many clocks, which have been so made by their creator that changes in them synchronise with one another without any interaction.

Regarding the manner of creation of monads by God, Leibniz maintains that they proceed from Him as do the sparks from fire. His theory of origin of monads from God is technically called "fulguration". It seems to be distinct from the theory of emanation, propounded by Plotinus, inasmuch as, according to the analogy of spark, monads have more or less independent existence, once they are created. They are as little related to God after their creation as spark is to fire.

But Plotinus seems to have held that the created is related to the creator as the rays are to the sun. Leibniz seems to have been influenced by Aristotle's conception of intellectual soul, which was regarded as a spark of Divine light. God created this world because He is good and this world is the best of all possible worlds.

GRADES OF KNOWLEDGE.

Leibniz distinguishes four grades[1] of knowledge :—

1. Obscure and dark knowledge.

It is made up of little perceptions, such as the mass of vague images in dream.

2. Clear but confused knowledge.

It is that in which phenomena, such as colours, are recognised but are not intellectually defined.

3. Distinct knowledge.

It is that in which definition or scientific explanation is possible.

4. Intuitive knowledge.

It is that in which all the marks of objects are exhaustively known and gathered into a single complete survey.

MONAD AS MICROCOSM.

Every monad has the power of representation. It represents the entire universe. It is a world in miniature. It is microcosm. But each monad represents the world from its own point of view, with different degrees of clearness. The higher a monad, the more clearly it is able to represent the part of the world, the monads nearest to it.

The implication of the conception of monad as microcosm, is that every monad is capable of feeling everything that

1. Gil., 228.

occurs anywhere at any time in the whole universe. But monads form a graduated progressive series from the lowest to the highest. Every one, therefore, is not able to represent all clearly.

HIS ÆSTHETIC THEORY.

It is against this background of his general philosophy that he puts his æsthetic theory. It is a synthesis of theories of art, which were propounded before him, whether they referred to the means of æsthetic experience or the nature thereof or the end of art. Leibniz holds that there are various levels of æsthetic experience, the lower of which leads to the higher : that we have sensory, emotive, intellectual and spiritual experiences in succession from a good piece of art : and that there is an artistic faculty, taste, which is a means to these experiences at different levels. He also holds that art improves us morally. Thus, he synthetizes, pedagogic, empiristic, rationalistic and mystic theories of art.

ÆSTHETIC TASTE.

He distinguishes taste from understanding. He holds that taste consists in confused perception, of which no adequate account is possible. It is something approaching instinct. It is, however, not an instinct[1]. It is to be formed on the basis of what reason and tradition have declared to be beautiful. It begins with vague perceptions but proceeds to drawing moral lesson from and complete rational grasp of the presented which leads to intuitive vision. From his conception of taste it is evident that he recognises four levels in the æsthetic experience.

I. Æsthetic experience begins with vague perceptions. At this level æsthetic experience consists in feeling something that is not definable and yet arouses sympathy in us. Accord-

1. Gil., 229.

ing to Leibniz, there are four grades of knowledge, as we have already stated. Æsthetic experience at the first and lowest level, therefore, belongs to the second grade of knowledge, clear but confused perception in which phenomena, such as colour etc., are recognised but not intellectually defined.

Both the subjective and the objective aspects of æsthetic experience are, according to him, indefinable at this level. It is not possible, he holds, to point out definitely in what the agreeableness of a thing consists ; nor is it easy to state what constituent of our mental frame it appeals to.

Poetry, according to him, has unbelievable power to move. It can dull, excite, move to tears or laughter. And emotions, according to the empiricists, belong to the empirical level. Leibniz, who accepts the empiristic view of æsthetic experience at the lowest level, therefore, naturally maintains that the culminating point at this level is emotive experience.

II. After vague perceptions, Taste, as defined by him, proceeds to draw moral lesson from and to have complete rational grasp of the presented. Æsthetic experience at the second level, therefore, is intellectual experience. It consists in complete rational grasp of the presented as an affair of ratio. For, Leibniz is a rationalist in so far as he holds that beauty is an affair of ratio. He follows Aristotle in holding that art improves its lover morally. He also maintains that contemplation of the beautiful is agreeable in itself and, therefore, disinterested.

III. Complete rational grasp of the presented leads to intuitive vision. We know that intuitive knowledge, according to Leibniz, is that, in which all the marks of the presented are exhaustively known and gathered into a single complete survey. Therefore, when Leibniz talks of intuitive

vision, to which the intellectual grasp of the presented leads, he means that at the third level of æsthetic experience all the marks of presented work of art are exhaustively known and are gathered into a single complete survey.

IV. The fourth and final level of æsthetic experience, according to him, is characterised by the experience of universal harmony,[1] got through its symbolic presentation in art. If we keep in mind the following points, his conception of æsthetic experience at the fourth level will become clear :—

I. Art symbolically presents universal harmony.

II. Symbol is that which is related to the symbolised as an architect's projection in perspective is to his finished edifice.

III. Leibniz draws a distinction between individual and universal harmony. We know (a) that he propounds the doctrine of pre-established harmony to account for phenomenon of knowledge in individual monads in a manner different from that of Descartes and Spinoza (b) that, if we ignore the adjective "pre-established", harmony in the case of individual means that each monad, being a microcosm, is capable of representing to itself the entire universe, but, being only a link in the chain of graded series, is actually able to represent clearly only some parts, such as those which are in spatial proximity. Individual harmony, therefore, means limited representation of some parts or aspects only of the whole universe in an individual monad.

We also know that God, as monad of monads, is perfect and that in his perfect intelligence nature of all things, actual and possible, is represented with absolute clarity. Representation of the whole universe in a perfect intelligence, therefore, is universal harmony. In the presentation of the fourth, the

1. Gil., 227.

final level of æsthetic experience, Leibniz allies himself with the mystic school of æsthetics such as that of Plotinus. At this level of æsthetic experience microcosm becomes macrocosm, the individual is transformed into universal; monad attains Godhead.

However, Leibniz, as a representative of philosophical rationalism, maintains that art has lower value than science. His theory of Æsthetics contains germs which enabled Baumgarten[1] to found 'Æsthetic'.

BAUMGARTEN.
HIS IMPORTANCE.

Baumgarten's (1714-1762) importance for comparative study of the problems of æsthetics lies in the fact that he for the first time in the history of Western Æsthetics recognizes that art has an independent value and declares that the problems of art form the subject-matter of a separate science which he calls "Æsthetic", a name which is in use even today, though with slightly different implication. He asserts that the content of poetic art does not admit of adequate presentation in language much as does Ānanda Vardhana, the first exponent of the theory of Dhvani, the suggested meaning, that the basic or persistent emotion, the Sthāyin, the central and the most important content of poetic art, cannot be presented by conventional, secondary and contextual powers of language.

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF BAUMGARTEN.

Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff described passions and sense-perceptions in terms of attributes only, in which they differ from an abstract idea. Each of them in his own way looked upon passions and sense-perceptions as confused acts of knowledge and, therefore, different from abstract ideas, which

1. Gil. 229.

are characterised by clarity. And Wolff divided the sciences[1] into practical and theoretical on the basis of two faculties of soul (i) cognition and (ii) appetite. Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology and Theology were, according to him, theoretical sciences and Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics and Economics were practical sciences. But Logic formed an introduction to all sciences.

HIS CONTRIBUTION.

He is a rationalist. He accepts the classification of knowledge, as propounded by Leibniz, and recognises æsthetic experience as confused knowledge in terms of Leibniz. His chief contribution lies in adding to the Wolffian division of theoretical sciences another science, which he calls "Æsthetic"[2] and which, according to him, is concerned with 'obscure' knowledge as 'obscure'; the knowledge in the form of feeling. Obscurity of knowledge, according to him, as interpreted by Bosanquet, consists in the impossibility of adequately representing this form of knowledge in words. He seems to distinguish it from clear knowledge, which admits of fairly adequate presentation in conventional terms. He holds that confused idea, such as presented in the harmony of colours, has an order of its own and is related to feeling as distinct from reason.

Giving a summary-view we may say that Baumgarten's contribution to æsthetics lies (i) in extending the intellectualistic[3] theory, which was primarily concerned with knowledge, to phenomena of feeling; (ii) in recognising the philosophy of the beautiful as a separate branch of philosophy and (iii) in giving it the name, which has been accepted by all subsequent writers. (iv) His predecessors and contemporaries, such as Addison, Burke, Hutcheson etc., recognised certain independent elements

1. Thil., 380. 2. Bos., 183. 3. Bos., 182.

in poetry, but Baumgarten organises them into a carefully elaborated system.

MATTER AND VALUE OR PERFECTION OF POETRY.

He maintains that matter and value of poetry are distinct from purely intellectual matter and value. In distinguishing the matter and value or perfection of poetry from those of logic and science, he accepts Leibnizian distinction between clear but confused knowledge and distinct knowledge. He identifies æsthetic experience with the former. And matter of poetry, according to him, may be stated as follows :—

(i) The individual or what is nearest to the single example is the matter of poetry; but the matter of science is the universal. Particular sensations and emotions are the right stuff of poetry. But reason has nothing to do with them.

(ii) Fiction, (which is nothing but a harmonious recombination of elements, discovered by analysing given experiences), is an excellent material for poetry. But reason deals with facts only.

His conception of perfection of poetry may be presented as follows :—

Dark images do not contain as many parts as are necessary for distinguishing them from others. Therefore, they do not contribute to perfection of poem. But clear images are so full of parts that they can be easily distinguished. Hence the clearer the images of a poem the more perfect it is, according to Baumgarten. Thus, he seems to bring out the implication of "clear" in his conception of æsthetic experience as "clear but confused knowledge" a term which he borrows from Leibnizian thought. He seems to maintain that in æsthetic experience from a poetic presentation there are two aspects, one is clear but the other is confused. Clarity

belongs to the images of the objects, which are presented in such details of parts as arouse corresponding distinct images in the mind of reader or hearer. But these images are by no means exhaustive presentation of the poetic vision. They suggest and, therefore, make the connoisseur feel something more than is actually presented in words. And because this element does not come to the level of clear thought but remains simply a matter of feeling, therefore, it is "obscure" or "confused". Hence obscurity belongs to the suggested or felt. We shall soon take up this topic for more detailed treatment under a separate heading.

ART AS AN IMITATION.

Leibniz held that our world has the greatest degree of perfection. Baumgarten accepts this view and maintains that nature, the world, which is accessible to sense-perception, is the standard of art, because nature contains the greatest variety of forms, which admit of harmonious combination. Imitation of nature, the world of sense, therefore, according to him, is rivalling, equalling and emulating the ideal. It is not mere copying of what is given to senses, but elimination of what is out of harmony with certain contents of a given phenomenon as a whole and introducing in the given the fullness of details, extensive clarity and quantitative richness of sensuous contents. Such an imitation of nature, according to him, is the law of art.

His theory of imitation is distinct from that of Plato, inasmuch as the latter looked upon the world of sense to be simply a reflection, an imperfect copy, of the real ideal world, while Baumgarten, following Leibniz, holds it to be perfect.

HIS CONCEPTION OF POETRY.

According to him, "A poem is a perfect sensuous utterance." He claims the right of an independent science for

matters pertaining to poetry. He admits poetry to be a means to distinct thought. He looks upon the confused but vivid imagery of sense-impressions, fancies, fables and stirrings of passions as affording a beautiful passage from the darkness of unknowingness to distinct thought. He recognises a specific order and perfection in poetry and holds that it requires an interpretation by an independent discipline.

PERFECTION IN POETRY.

Perfection or intrinsic value of poetry lies, not in logical definition of things, but in fulness of detail, which arouses a flood of ideas, which mind can, without conscious effort, form into a harmonious whole. The more perfect a poem is, the richer variety of elements of an individual whole it presents, so that they can be grasped by mind in a single act of apprehension.

Perfection of poetry lies also in certain types of order, which are not logical relations but parallel to them, such as those (i) of premises to conclusion, (ii) of similarity and (iii) of historical connection. Distinction between the logical order and the poetic lies in freedom of the latter from the clutches of reason. When chain of reasoning, similarity between two and historical connection, presented by a poem, are felt rather than understood, we have a perfect poem. If a poem presents similarity, not by analysing the contents of the two, to which it refers, but through a metapher, so that it is grasped immediately without the intervention of reason, it is perfect. If a poem presents historical connections in such a way that they are grasped as a whole immediately, without the synthetic activity of reason, it is perfect. Perfection of a poem consists also in presentation, in right succession, of the physical and psychological aspects of *emotion*.

The domain of poetry is the domain of feeling, as distinct

from the domain of science, which is the domain of reason. Poetry arises from and appeals to feeling, but science owes its being to reason and appeals to the same.

BEAUTY AND TRUTH.

Beauty, according to him, is felt perfection. Distinction between beauty and truth is purely subjective. The same attribute (perfection) of reality is called truth or beauty according as it is grasped by reason or feeling. In his conception of perfection here, he follows Wolff, according to whom it was nothing but logical relation of the whole to parts, or unity in multiplicity. Beauty, therefore, according to him is nothing but felt harmony of parts with one another and with the whole. Accordingly ugly is the absence of this feeling of harmony.

He speaks of *beauty* as felt perfection and not as sensitive appreciation of perfection. For, according to the philosophical tradition, which he follows, æsthetics was concerned with the content of feeling and distinction between subject and object was the concern of metaphysics and not of æsthetics.

CHAPTER X.

TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICS OF KANT

IMPORTANCE OF KANT.

Kant (1724-1804) is interesting from a comparative point of view; because he admits: (i) that æsthetic experience is disinterested and free from individuality in its subjective aspect and from the relation to matter in its objective aspect: (ii) that there is freedom of imagination and understanding from the restraint of *a priori* and empirical concepts: (iii) that it is subjectively purposive, that is, the purpose that we assume as the cause of the artistic activity has reference to the feeling that is subjective but to nothing that is objective: and (iv) that it is universally valid. In the context of the dynamically sublime he definitely admits that an object of nature, which is looked upon as a source of fear, is simply a medium of sublime. For, it is admitted by Indian æstheticians from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka onward that the æsthetic experience involves the deindividualisation of both the subject and the object. The purpose of the artist from Bharata downward has been recognised to be nothing but to give rise to æsthetic experience, which is essentially subjective. And Abhinavagupta has shown that a work of art is only a medium to it. Kant attempts the problem of æsthetics from two points of view and ignores the third i.e. that of the actor, because he is not concerned with the dramatic art in particular. Bharata and his commentators attempt it from all the three points of view viz. of dramatist, of actor and of spectator.

He admits the identity of experience of the artist, who produces a work of art, and of the æsthete who judges it. He looks upon the genius as sufficient in itself for producing

works of fine art but recognises the importance of the knowledge of rules to give appropriate form to the ideas. On both of these points he seems to agree with Bharata. He also talks of the soul of work of art and holds that it is the æsthetic idea, which genius alone can supply; it is that representation of free imagination which gives rise to more thought, though not definite, than can be grasped in any definite concept. Here he seems to be talking of something which has close similarity with 'Dhvani' of Ānanda Vardhana. Compare the following :—

"Yattat prasiddhāvayavātiriktam
Vibhāti lāvaṇyamivāṅganāsu"

and

"A poem may be very neat and elegant, but without spirit: even of a woman we say that she is pretty, an agreeable talker and courteous, but without spirit. What then do we mean by spirit?"

HIS TRANSCENDENTALISM AND ÆSTHETICS.

Kant is a transcendentalist in his philosophy. He has dealt with three types of experience, (i) theoretical (ii) practical and (iii) æsthetic, in his three Critiques, (i) Critique of Pure Reason (ii) Critique of Practical Reason and (iii) Critique of Judgement, respectively. His advance on the thoughts of his predecessors lies in his demonstration of the *a priori* principles of the various aspects or faculties of the mind involved in three distinct experiences. Just as time and space are the *a priori* principles of sensibility; the categories, quality etc., are those of the understanding to which theoretical knowledge is due; and freedom is the *a priori* principle of the will, to which the practical or ethical experience is due; so the principle of *purposiveness without purpose* is the fundamental *a priori* principle of the judgement of taste, which judges an object in reference to imagination's free

conformity to law and is mainly responsible for the æsthetic experience. According to Kant, philosophy that is concerned with the principles *a priori* is transcendental (A12) and in his treatment of the theory of beauty he is concerned with such principles: his theory of art and artistic experience has, therefore, in these pages been called "Transcendental Æsthetics." Of course, Kant calls 'the science of all the principles of sensibility *a priori* Transcendental Æsthetic'.

The fact that Kant is concerned with the principles *a priori* in his Critique of Judgement becomes clear if we remember that according to his own statement in the Preface to the Critique of Judgement, the questions with which the work is concerned are (i) whether the judgement has principles *a priori* for itself (ii) whether these are constitutive or merely regulative (iii) whether they give a rule *a priori* to the feeling of pleasure and pain[1].

HIS THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ÆSTHETICS.

Æsthetic experience, according to Kant, is the experience of harmony between free imagination[2] and free understanding, 'bound up with the mere apprehension of the form of an object of intuition[3]'. It is purely subjective. It is distinct from the experience of the pleasant and the good. It is disinterested. It is universally valid.

For a clear understanding of the nature of æsthetic experience as distinct from ordinary determinate empirical experience, it is necessary to picture to ourselves Kant's theory of knowledge as contained in his Critique of Pure Reason. For, the technique, which Kant employs in giving an account of æsthetic experience, is a modified form of that which he uses in explaining determinate empirical experience.

1. Ber., 2. 2. Cas., 140. 3. Ber., 30-1.

PROBLEM OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

The principal problem of the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason is "What and how much may understanding and reason know without all experience?" (M.M.XXIII) To solve this central problem, Kant analyses human knowledge into its elements and shows (i) what are the fundamental presuppositions of the very possibility of knowledge (ii) what are the elements which are given (iii) how much is contributed to it by the nature of human mind and (iv) what are the different processes involved in its rise?

HIS ASSUMPTIONS.

He assumes (i) that human knowledge[1] depends on something that is given, it is never productive of its objects (ii) that objects of human knowledge are phenomena, but things-in-themselves are entirely unknown to us i.e. phenomena and things-in-themselves are distinct from each other and (iii) that there are different individual knowing minds[2].

ÆSTHETIC AND SENSIBLE KNOWLEDGE.

His analysis of human knowledge into its elements reveals two sources[3] from which it springs (i) sensibility and (ii) understanding. The former receives what is given from outside. It is affected in a certain way by the given. The given is represented in it. The given appears in it, not as a correct representation of that which is given, but as transformed by the conditions in which everything, given to sensibility, must appear.

The sensibility is passive. It does not react on what comes to it from outside. But it is like a mirror, which does not give faithful reflection, in which everything that is reflected appears distorted. It is like the rays of the sun which make the drops of water in the sky appear to us as rainbow.

1, Cas., 3. 2. Pat., Vol. I, 71. 3. M. M., 40-1.

Æsthetic is the science of rules of sensibility in general. Just as Logic is the science of rules of understanding. Kant thus partly seems to accept Baumgarten's view of æsthetic in so far as he holds that æsthetic is the science of sensible knowledge, i.e. knowledge that sensibility yields. But he refutes the view of Baumgarten and consequently that of Leibniz and Wolff from whom the former inherited it, that sensible knowledge is confused knowledge[1].

FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF SENSUOUS KNOWLEDGE.

Sensuous knowledge is intuitive knowledge. It is in immediate relation to the object. It gives material to all thought. It is an affection of human mind by what is given. It takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. It necessarily conforms to the *a priori*[2] forms of sensibility, space and time. It does not represent the thing as it is. It gives us the appearance only. It contains a manifold of sense, arranged in spatial and temporal order. It is a form of knowledge prior to reaction of understanding on it. It is a form of knowledge, the contents of which have not been organised according to any category of understanding. It is a singular idea as opposed to concept which is a general idea[3]. It has no elements, which may be apprehended as common to other ideas.

INTUITION AND PHENOMENON.

The undefined object of an intuitive or sensuous knowledge, as presented above, is phenomenon[4]. Phenomenon has two aspects (i) matter and (ii) form. That which corresponds to sensation is called the matter and that which causes the manifold matter to be perceived as arranged in a certain order

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1. M. M., 35-6.
2. Cas., 4.
3. Pat., Vol. I. 94.
4. M. M., 16.

is called its form. Intuition, therefore, is nothing but representation of appearance. The things, which we see in intuition, are not by themselves what we see, nor are their relations by themselves such as they appear to us. If[1] we eliminate the subject from our intuition, not only all qualities, relations of objects in space and time, but also space and time would disappear. For, they do not exist by themselves, but in the subject only.

PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA.

Kant holds that just as a person, before whose eyes blue glasses are permanently and irremovably fixed, can never know the real and true colours of the objects of sight : for, to him everything must look blue, irrespective of the true colour of each thing ; so human beings cannot know the things-in-themselves as they really are : for, time and space are the two universal and necessary conditions of all knowledge and, therefore, human mind can never know the objects of its knowledge as they are independently of the aforesaid conditions of all knowledge. That there is something beyond the immediate object of knowledge, the phenomenon or the appearance, Kant has not the least doubt about. The very fact that there is appearance means that there is reality which appears. The very fact that the person with blue glasses permanently on his eyes sees something, means that there is something, whatever may be its colour. Though there may be a mistake about the colour of the thing, yet there can be no mistake about the very being of it.

Kant's argument may be fallacious, there may be an element of inconsistency in the doctrine, but he holds fast to this doctrine. Kant is in no doubt that the world, that is given to us through senses, is not the real world, the world of

1. M. M., 34.

things as they are in themselves. It is only the appearance. He is equally free from doubt about the reality that lies beyond the appearance, the world of things-in-themselves, the noumena.

KANT IS NOT A SUBJECTIVIST.

The view of the object of intuition, as phenomenon, as has been presented above, does not mean that Kant is a subjectivist, that the individual mind is self-confined, that each individual can know only what is within himself and that there is no common objective world. For, such a view would make impossible the co-operation of many individuals in respect of one and the same object. There being no object outside the individual mind and consequently no common world, according to subjectivism, how could there be anything, towards which the activities of many could be directed ?

Kant, therefore, admits that the world, which we know, fills space, lasts through time, is made up of permanent substances acting upon one another in accordance with causal law, is common to all human beings and is the object of scientific investigation. He distinguishes between the time-order of individual sensations and that of the objective events. Accordingly he maintains that though only a part of the objective whole stimulates our senses at a time, yet that does not mean that whole does not exist. Though we may be able to see only the front of the page, which we are reading, yet that does not mean that its back does not exist.

He accepts the conclusions of the contemporary scientists, who distinguished the qualities into (i) primary and (ii) secondary, as Locke had done before him; but he also accepts the soundness of criticism levelled against the Lockian position. His view is that the secondary qualities no less than the primary belong only to the appearance and not to things-in-themselves. He, however, does not accept idealism of

Berkeley, nor skepticism of Hume, nor does he accept the common sense view of the objective world as composed of things-in-themselves, i. e. things as they are independently of the constitution of human mind.

His[1] final position may be summed up as follows :—

1. The secondary qualities: They depend upon our individual sense-organs and upon our position in space. They are subjective.

2. The primary qualities: They are objective and common to all men. But they also depend upon general constitution of human mind, though not upon the peculiar constitution of the individual mind. They are not the apparent size, shape and motion, which differ with our different sense-organs and our different positions in space. They are determinable by scientific measurement and are the same for all men.

3. The thing-in-itself: It is thoroughly independent of human mind. Human mind cannot know it as it is in itself. For, all human knowledge is conditioned. The unconditioned as such can never enter human knowledge. The reason, however, for Kant's believing in the thing-in-itself is that he draws distinction between knowing and thinking and holds that though we cannot know the thing-in-itself, yet we can think it. It is not what is given in experience. It is only a logical postulate.

TWO TYPES OF INTUITION.

Intuition, according to Kant, is of two types, (i) empirical and (ii) pure. The empirical intuition requires the following conditions for its rise :—

1. The objective world of permanent substances, acting on one another, according to causal law, which in itself is only an appearance of the reality, the thing-in-itself.

1. Pat., Vol. I, 60.

2. Sensibility, including both the senses, the outer and the inner, with their respective *a priori* forms of space and time.

3. The unity of apperception. We shall deal with it in a subsequent section.

What happens, not psychologically, but logically, may be stated as follows :—

The external objects affect outer sense. The representations, so caused, are arranged according to *a priori* form of the outer sense. They are taken over by the inner sense, are subjected to its *a priori* form and so are arranged in temporal order. Thus, when the matter, given to sensibility, is arranged in spatial and temporal order and is referred to the unity of apperception there is empirical intuition.

Pure intuition[1] has no other content than a mere form of sensibility. We have shown that empirical intuition has two aspects (i) matter and (ii) form. When, therefore, we eliminate matter from an intuition and are left with the form only, we have pure intuition. When form is abstracted from matter, there remains nothing but a system of relations, i.e. time or space, in which the appearances stand. A pure intuition is nothing but consciousness of system of relations in isolation from any given matter.

NATURE OF ABSTRACTION IN PURE INTUITION.

Kant, when speaking of pure intuition as due to abstraction, maintains that this abstraction is distinct from the one, involved in abstracting empirical concepts from experience. For instance, when we find red colour in a number of objects and abstract it from them, we simply ignore the differences in the given objects and consider redness in separation from them as their common mark. Such a concept is not independent of experience. If space and time were abstractions of this type,

1. Pat., Vol. I. 104.

it would have been ridiculous for Kant to assert their *a priori* nature.

Kant, therefore, holds that the ideas of space and time are not the concepts of the features or relations, common to different sensible objects. In intuiting space and time, we do not abstract common relational qualities of things, but simply leave out or eliminate spatial and temporal objects and are thus left with space and time as individual wholes.

SYNTHESIS OF APPREHENSION IN INTUITION.

It has been stated above that intuition contains a manifold and that sensibility is a passive faculty of mind, according to Kant. If we analyse the meaning of "Manifold" or "Manifoldness" we discover that it involves the idea of unity in multiplicity. Therefore, if[1] we are to be aware of a manifold we must be aware both of its unity and of its multiplicity; (i) we must be aware of the parts of the manifold in different successive moments, we must "run[2] through" the parts of the manifold and (ii) hold together these parts, produce some kind of unity in the multiplicity.

This is the farthest point, this is the extreme limit, to which Kant has been able to carry his analysis of human knowledge into its elements. The element so revealed is an isolated and unrelated sense-impression, free from temporal and spatial relations; for, both involve succession and, therefore, multiplicity.

This stage in the logical process of the rise of knowledge is totally indefinable. It is not even intuition. It is not even awareness of externality. It is a mere idea, which Locke called notion, a mere isolated affection of the mind, as indicated by the full description of the synthesis[3] of apprehension as

1. Pat., Vol. 1. 357. 2. M. M., 82. 3. Pat., Vol. I. 360.

"the synthesis of apprehension of ideas, as modifications of the mind in intuition." These ideas are merely subjective, in so far as for mere apprehension, considered in abstraction from thought, they are not the ideas of an object. In fact it is not quite accurate to describe them as subjective, because for mere apprehension, they are not modifications of the subject as distinct from the object. The ideas are recognised to belong to an object when they are subjected to the process of thinking ; and so long as there is no objective consciousness there can be no subjective consciousness either. For, subject and object are correlative terms and always imply each other.

Thus, when Kant talks of "running through" as a part of the synthetic process, he means that logically the parts of the manifold are referred to the empirical consciousness one after another in quick succession.

But Kant believes in the momentariness of the affection of sensibility. When, therefore, the mind passes on from one part of the manifold to another, the former disappears. He, therefore, holds that the synthesis of apprehension in intuition involves another synthesis i.e. the synthesis of reproduction.

SYNTHESIS OF REPRODUCTION IN IMAGINATION.

The isolated points in the affection of sensibility (the different units, which, taken together, constitute the manifold of an intuition) are, no doubt, momentary. They come and go. But this does not mean that they are completely and forever lost to the mind. The affections, which are once produced on the sensibility, can be reproduced even after they are lost. The isolated parts of the sensuous manifold can be reproduced and are reproduced after they are no longer being given.

The synthesis of reproduction in imagination, therefore, consists in producing again, in imagination, the elements of the sensuous manifold, which have come and gone, and holding

them together before the mind. Kant admits a separate faculty of mind, which makes synthesis of reproduction possible. It is called imagination.

INTUITION IS BLIND.

In the introduction to the second part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled "Elements of Transcendentalism" Kant states his view about the relation between sensibility and understanding and so between intuition and concept as follows[1] :—

"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of our soul; the first receives representations (receptivity of impressions) ; the second is the power of knowing an object by these representations (spontaneity of concepts). By the first an object is given to us, by the second the object is thought ....Intuition, therefore, and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so neither concepts without an intuition corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts can yield any real knowledge."

By receptivity he means sensibility and by spontaneity he means understanding, as he makes it clear in the very next page. The former is the power of receiving representations when it is affected in any way by external objects. And the latter is the power of producing representations. The former yields sensuous intuition, when the sensuous manifold is arranged in temporal and spatial order through synthesis of apprehension involving synthesis of reproduction. It is due to co-operation of sensibility and imagination. The latter enables us to think the objects of our sensuous intuition. It enables us to bring the object of sensuous intuition under a concept, that it produces *a priori*. Both of these faculties are equally important. For, if there be no sensibility, the objects would not be

1. M. M., 40.

given to us. And if there be no understanding the objects would not be thought. It is intuition that supplies contents to thought. '*Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.*' Knowledge is the joint product of sensibility and understanding. They have their exclusive and unchangeable functions. Sensibility cannot think, nor can understanding see.

We have so far been concerned with the presentation of the process and the faculties involved in the rise of intuition. We have shown that intuition is due to co-operation of two faculties of mind (i) sensibility and (ii) imagination and that it is a product of synthesis of apprehension involving that of reproduction in imagination. But all this can produce, not knowledge, but only blind intuition. Kant's position, reached so far, may be stated as follows :—

The first, that must be given to us *a priori* for the sake of knowledge of all objects, is the manifold of intuition. The second is the synthesis of this manifold by means of imagination. The concepts add the third contribution towards the knowledge of an object and rest on understanding.

INTUITION AS COMMON ELEMENT IN BOTH EMPIRICAL AND ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCES.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is free from the doctrines, which he propounds in his third Critique, the Critique of Judgement. In fact, the Æsthetic theory has not yet taken a definite shape in his mind. The view, therefore, which he maintains here, is that knowledge is possible only through co-operation of sensibility, imagination and understanding. Sensibility passively receives the given manifold. Imagination reproduces the manifold in temporal and spatial order and holds it together and thus produces intuition, which is blind. So far and no farther is the sphere

of Æsthetic, as distinct from that of Logic. It is this blind intuition (which is the joint product of sensibility and reproductive imagination, independently of any influence of the understanding or its *a priori* rules, which it produces) to which he refers in the context of æsthetic experience, when he holds the æsthetic experience to be the experience of harmony between free imagination and free understanding, bound up with the mere apprehension of the form of an object of *intuition.*

The treatment of sensibility in isolation from understanding, therefore, in "the Transcendental Æsthetic" seems to have a meaning in relation to the Critique of Judgement. It definitely marks out the elements, which are common to both the experiences, the empirical and the æsthetic. It states the process that is common to all experiences which are related to sensibility. The process, that distinguishes the æsthetic experience from the empirical, begins after the completion of the intuitive process. The process, which is distinctive of the determinate empirical experience, is the synthesis of recognition in concept.

SYNTHESIS OF RECOGNITION IN CONCEPT.

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant speaks of the categories of thought as the products of understanding. They are the rules, in accordance with which synthetic unity is produced in the manifold of sensuous intuition. They are *a priori* i.e. necessary and universal. There can be no determinate cognition of an object unless the manifold of sensuous intuition has been united in accordance with the said rules of understanding and the unification is recognised to be in such accord.

It has to be clearly remembered in this connection that Kant is here speaking of the determinate empirical experience only and that the necessity and universality, which he attributes to the categories of understanding, is only of limited nature,

inasmuch as it holds good of the determinate empirical experience only and not of the æsthetic experience. In fact, Kant's main effort in the Critique of Judgement is to distinguish æsthetic experience from the empirical and to show that the distinction primarily consists in the freedom of æsthetic experience from the *a priori* rules of the understanding, i.e. categories of thought.

Knowledge of an object at the empirical level is not mere consciousness of undefined sense-data in temporal and spatial order. We know an object when a definite picture,—made up of the given manifold, each element of which is related to others in a definite manner and possesses a general character, by which it is distinguished from the rest,—has been constructed. Kant, therefore, maintains that in human consciousness at the empirical level productive synthesis of imagination is chained down to certain definite conditions by the understanding. He holds that it is in the nature of human mind, the human mind is so constituted, that, for empirical knowledge, it combines the elements of the manifold in accordance with certain rules of synthesis, which lie *a priori* in the understanding. The distinctive process involved in empirical knowledge consists in the activity of 'productive' imagination. Imagination reproduces elements of intuition and puts each in definite relations to other elements in accordance with the *a priori* rule of understanding. It does not represent such elements as merely a state of the subject. Rather it represents the various elements as parts of an image which is made according to rule.

Recognition, involved in synthesis of recognition in concept, consists in cognising again, this time in the image that has been constructed by imagination, the rule of synthesis which lies *a priori* in the understanding. We know an object when the particular image, that is

constructed by imagination out of the given sense-data, according to a general rule, is recognised as an instance of the operation of the general rule i.e. when we subsume a particular under a universal. Mind is aware of the categories of understanding in isolation, prior to their application in subsumption of the given manifold, arranged in temporal and spatial order, under them. When the given manifold is apprehended as subsumed under a category, it is cognised again, not in isolation, but in the image that is constructed by imagination in accordance with a Scheme.

The categories of understanding are the most general rules of such synthesis. Every synthesis of recognition is necessarily and universally in accordance with them. They are *a priori*. Human knowledge at the empirical level is impossible without their operation. Synthesis of recognition, is, therefore, the most important and culminating point in the process of determinate knowledge at the empirical level.

TRANSCENDENTAL APPERCEPTION AS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRESUPPOSITION OF ALL EXPERIENCES.

In the Critique[1] of Pure Reason, Kant emphatically asserts :—

"No knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or unity of one kind of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuition, and without reference to which no representation of objects is possible. This pure, original and unchangeable consciousness I shall call transcendental apperception. That it deserves such a name may be seen from the fact that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the concepts *a priori* (space and time), is possible only by a reference of all intuitions to it............

1. M. M., 88.

The same transcendental unity of apperception constitutes, in all possible phenomena which may come together in our experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws."

It is a fundamental assumption of Kant that the representation of combination can never be given through sense. He holds that the conception of combination involves (i) manifold (ii) synthesis of manifold and (iii) representation of synthetic unity, which is necessary for all knowledge. The representation of unity, involved in combination, is a distinctive and additional factor in both manifold and synthesis. For, it conditions the consciousness of synthesis and, therefore, cannot be its outcome.[1] This representation of unity, which is a constituent element of the conception of combination, is not that which is expressed through the category of unity, but that of unity of apperception or transcendental self-consciousness. It is the highest and most universal form of unity. For, it is the presupposition of unity of all concepts.

If we study the above quotation in the light of this fundamental assumption, we find that Kant maintains that our consciousness (i) of pure intuition (ii) of individual objects and (iii) of nature, which is nothing but a combination of all determinate cognitions according to laws, presupposes the unity of apperception.

UNITY OF APPERCEPTION AND PURE INTUITION.

The experience, on the basis of which Kant attempts to prove that the unity of apperception is the fundamental condition of all experiences, is the experience of time. For, time-experience is a fact, the actuality of which cannot be challenged[2]. It is an unquestionable possession of human

1. K. S., 284.
2. K. S., 243.

mind. It is a factual experience. This factual experience is a serial experience. In order, therefore, to intuit the series, we have to apprehend each content separately and then to reproduce and hold together all the contents and to recognise that what is being held together is just what was given in succession. There are two things to be noted in this connection, (i) that the intuition of time, in order that it may become my intuition, has got to be referred to my self-consciousness; "I intuit" must accompany it; and (ii) that there must be persistent consciousness of "I intuit", lasting through serial apprehension, subsequent reproduction and holding together.

For, if the "I intuit" were not to accompany the affections of inner sense, which constitute different members of the series, which, held together, make the intuition of time, these affections would be nothing to me. They would exist as little for me as do those which are related to the "I intuit" of an individual different from me. Kant, therefore, holds that unity of apperception or self-consciousness is that element in intuitive experience, which, when accompanying the intuitive process, makes the intuition "my intuition", as distinct from that of another individual i.e. makes the intuitive experience possible for me. He also holds that this self-consciousness is permanent and not changing. For, if it were not so, consciousness of the series as a whole would be out of the question. The idea would become clearer if we discuss the unity of apperception in the context of an empirical concept.

Let us, for instance, take the number "six" and find out how is this unitary experience possible. In order that such an experience may be possible, the successive members of the series, for example, a, b, c, d, e, f, must be held together simultaneously before the mind. If, therefore, the earlier members of the series from 'a' to 'e' were gone from consciousness, before mind could reach the last member of the series 'f',

it could not have been apprehended as having followed upon them. The synthesis of apprehension of the successive members of the series is, therefore, absolutely necessary.

But every impression being momentary, the earlier contents of the series have come and gone, where is then the material which the mind can synthetize ? Synthesis of apprehension has, therefore, to be supposed to be conditioned by synthesis of reproduction in imagination.

But without the consciousness that the images, now present before mind, are the same as those which came before it a little while ago, or at least, that they represent or stand for the contents, which mind has just experienced, the reproductive activity of imagination would be useless. For, each representation would, in that case, be a new experience and as such perfectly unrelated to what has gone before, and, therefore, not a reproduction of the contents of the former experience, but an original production. Recognition is, therefore, absolutely necessary for the consciousness of number six and so of time.

But recognition is recognition of a succession as forming a unity or whole. This unity is based on a concept, which unites into a single representation a manifold that has been successively intuited and then subsequently reproduced. Synthesis of recognition, thus, takes place in and through empirical concepts. In the present case the unifying empirical concept is the number six.

Kant's deduction of the subject is chiefly based upon the third synthesis. Just as apprehension depends upon reproduction and both rest on recognition, so recognition presupposes a still further condition, and that is self-consciousness. For, recognition of the reproduced images, as standing for past experiences, can be possible only in so far as there is an abiding self, which is conscious of its identity throughout the succession.

Thus, an analysis of our serial consciousness of time, number or line leads to the conclusion that it is conditioned by complex synthetic processes and that these syntheses presuppose a unity, which finds twofold expression for itself, objectively through a concept and subjectively in self-consciousness.

UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS TRANSCENDENTAL.

Self-consciousness, which has been shown to be the ground of possibility[1] of all empirical experiences, because it is the presupposition of the synthesis of recognition, is itself empirical. Kant, therefore, maintains that the ultimate ground of possibility of all consciousness and, therefore, also of empirical self-consciousness is the transcendental unity of apperception. It precedes experience as its *a priori* condition.

The transcendental self has no content of its own, through which it can know itself. It is a mere identity "I am I". It is a mere form, through which the contents, which never constitute the self, are yet apprehended as objects to the self. Thus, though the self in being conscious of time or duration must be conscious of itself as identical throughout the succession of its experiences, yet that identity can never be discovered in those experiences. It can only be thought as a condition of them. It conditions memory and, therefore, cannot be substituted by it. It can never be found among appearances.

Thus we get two important conclusions :—

1. All consciousness involves self-consciousness.

2. Self-consciousness is a mere form in terms of which the contents, which do not constitute the self, are apprehended as existing for the self.

1. K. S., 250.

From the second conclusion it is clear that there can be no such thing as pure self-consciousness i.e. a consciousness, in which the self is aware of itself and of nothing else. Self-consciousness to be aware of itself must at the same time be a consciousness of something that is not-self. In itself it is a mere form.

The points discussed so far may be summarised as follows :—

1. Consciousness of time, as a form of change, involves empirical self-consciousness.

2. Empirical self-consciousness is conditioned by transcendental self-consciousness.

3. Transcendental self-consciousness is itself conditioned by consciousness of object.

Thus, it is evident that, according to Kant, self-consciousness and consciousness of object mutually condition each other; only through the consciousness of both simultaneously can the consciousness of either be possible.

EMPIRICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL SELF.

Empirical[1] self is nothing but the consciousness of self according to determinations of our state in inner perception. It is always in the process of change. It cannot be represented to be numerically identical. It is an element in the experience as a whole. The Transcendental self is a condition, which precedes all experiences and renders them possible. This is original unchangeable consciousness.

Kant holds that consciousness of the self consists in the awareness of its own unceasing activities. As consciousness of activity, it is entirely distinct in nature and origin from all apprehensions of sense-impressions. This consciousness of unity

1. K. S., 207-8.

and identity of the self is obtained by attending to actions of mind on the occasion of experience.

It precedes all data of intuitions. It is only in relation to this self that all representations of objects are possible. It combines all appearances, which are capable of co-existing in one experience, according to laws.

The unity of apperception is the sole source of all unity. The unity of a concept, which serves as rule in the organisation of the manifold of outer sense, depends upon this unity of apperception. For, unity of consciousness, involved in a concept, would be impossible if the mind could not become conscious of identity of its function whereby it combines the manifold synthetically in one knowledge. But how could there be the consciousness of identity of synthetical activity, involved in the combination of manifold into one concept, unless the mind, (the self, the apperception) were conscious of identity of itself.

Thus, mind's original and necessary consciousness of identity of itself, according to Kant, is a consciousness[1] of equally necessary unity of synthesis of all appearances according to concept. For, mind could not think of identity of itself in the manifold of representations, if it were not conscious of identity of its action, whereby it unites the manifold of sensation into one concept.

Even the purest objective unity of the *a priori* concepts, space and time, is possible only through relation of intuitions to the transcendental apperception. The numerical unity of apperception is the *a priori* condition of all concepts. Even the notion of the transcendental object[2], Kant maintains, is formed on the analogy of the unity of apperception. It is simply opposite counterpart of the unity of the self. It is nothing but the subjective representation of the subject itself.

1. K. S., 208. 2. K. S., 209.

He argues "I would not represent anything as outside me and so make the subjective appearances into objective experience, if the representations were not related to something which is parallel to my ego."

Thus, it has been shown how the process involved in the rise of the æsthetic experience is the same as that of the determinate empirical experience up to the intuition of the given. And it will be demonstrated subsequently how the technique, employed by Kant to explain the distinction of æsthetic experience from others, is just a modified form of that adopted to explain the rise of the empirical knowledge, e.g. imagination, understanding and judgement. But before dealing with these aspects of mind in the context of æsthetics, let us refresh our memory of the æsthetic ideas of his predecessors and his criticism of them, which led to the formulation of the æsthetic problem, dealt with in the Critique of Judgement.

ÆSTHETIC IDEAS OF KANT'S PREDECESSORS.

The effort of the immediate predecessors of Kant was (i) to mark off the sphere of æsthetics from those of logic, ethics and other branches of philosophy : (ii) to show that æsthetic experience belongs to a human faculty distinct from reason on the one hand and sensibility on the other : (iii) to prove that æsthetic experience is distinct from determinate empirical experience in so far as it is free from interest in the material aspect of the presented : and (iv) to distinguish between pure and relative beauty no less than between beautiful and sublime.

Thus, Baumgarten declared that the problems of art form the subject-matter of a separate science. Addison[1] asserted the pleasures of imagination to be less refined than those of reason and less gross than those of sense. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson

1. Gil., 322

and Kaimes pointed out disinterestedness of æsthetic experience. Burke wrote on beautiful and sublime drawing attention to their mutual distinction.

KANT'S CRITICISM OF BAUMGARTEN.

Before Kant, the problem of æsthetics was attempted from the point of view of Leibnizian philosophy, as did Baumgarten, or from psychological point of view, as did Addison and Burke. He criticises the view of Baumgarten, who asserted the æsthetic experience to be confused knowledge of perfection, as follows :—

1. It is difficult to find how confusion[1] in our knowledge is related to pleasing form.

2. Few people have a clear conception of what is right. Is the confused conception of right, therefore, to be looked upon as identical with æsthetic experience ?

3. Clearness[2] of knowledge differs from confusion only in quantity. The more concentration on an object one is able to achieve, the clearer is the conception that one is able to get. Quantitative difference, therefore, cannot constitute the distinctive feature of æsthetic experience.

4. Perfection has nothing to do with æsthetic experience. For, perfection may mean the unity of manifold and completeness of a given object in all details. But the fact that an object is complete, does not make it beautiful. Perfection may also mean that the object, which possesses it, fulfils a purpose. But æsthetic experience is free from the idea of purpose that an object serves.

KANT'S CRITICISM OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

The psychological school attempts the problem of æsthe-

1. Ber., 77. 2. Gil., 324.

tics from the point of view of empirical psychology. It offers an explanation of æsthetic experience in terms of generalisations based on observed facts. Such an explanation cannot justify the claim of æsthetic experience to universal validity. For, universal validity comes from *a priori* conditions only.

EVOLUTION OF ÆSTHETICS IN KANT'S MIND.

Kant's philosophy is the philosophy of the *a priori*. His chief contribution to æsthetics, therefore, is naturally his establishing the fundamental *a priori* principle of judgement of taste to which æsthetic experience is due. This principle, according to him, is nothing else than the principle of purposiveness without purpose or subjective purposiveness. In his earlier writings, however, he held the taste to be simply empirical.[1] For instance, in the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, he held that Baumgarten's attempt to base taste on reason was hopeless. For, it is empirical.

In the second edition of the said Critique, however, he modified his position in regard to Baumgarten's view and said: "Taste in its main sources is empirical." It was only when his philosophical ideas had attained full maturity that he was able to discover that *Taste* has an *a priori* principle.

KANT'S ADVANCE ON HIS PREDECESSORS.

Before Kant there were two contending schools of thought, one led by empiricist Locke and the other propounded by rationalist Leibniz. The former emphasised the importance of sense-perception and experience of the real objective world. He held that mind is a blank sheet of paper and the impressions coming through various senses are printed on it. The latter, however, minimised the importance of sensation and emphasised that of reason. He maintained that knowledge, howsoever it may start, in order to be know-

1. Gil., 326.

ledge, must be certain and demonstrable. Kant reconciled them by giving equal importance to both. He held that sensations without form are blind and form without sensations is empty. He maintained that sense-experience supplies the matter of knowledge and reason gives the forms. But his real contribution is not so much the demonstration of interdependence of sensibility and reason in bringing about knowledge as the discovery of the *a priori*. The problem that he tackles is "What is the general constitution of mind, which is presupposed by such systems of knowledge as geometry and physics and what is it in human mind which makes ethics and æsthetics possible ?" And his answer is (i) that it is the *a priori* character of space and time, of causality, of moral law and freedom and of the principle of purposiveness without purpose, that makes geometry, physics, ethics and æsthetics respectively possible and (ii) that unity of apperception, and not a soul-substance, is necessary presupposition of all experiences. He differs from Hume in so far as he holds the synthetic activities to be *a priori* and not merely customary, as Hume held them to be.

Kant builds up a system out of topics, dealt with in isolation by his predecessors. He shows in a systematic manner the philosophical presuppositions of æsthetic experience. He determines the exact place of æsthetic experience in the total body of experience and relates it to a human faculty (taste), distinct from sensibility and reason.

THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT.

In his Critique of Practical Reason also Kant followed the same transcendental method as he had done in the Critique of Pure Reason. Just as he had explained the necessity and universality of knowledge, embodied in geometry and physics, in terms of *a priori* forms of space, time and causality, so he explained Man's sense of duty in terms

of *a priori* condition of freedom of will, freedom to carry out the dictates of the sense of duty, which is expressed in categorical imperatives. Freedom of will is not a link in the causal chain. It is independent in the initiation of action. The idea of causality, which had been the most important scientific principle in the field of physical sciences, was found to be inoperative and was substituted by freedom of will in the field of morality. Hence causality and freedom turned out to be two opposing principles and needed reconciliation. For, if they were such opposing forces in separate worlds, morality would have no influence on the real world and would remain an empty ideal. The problem, therefore, that Kant faces in his Critique of Judgement, is, what is the link that binds together the two : how can the opposition between causality and freedom be reconciled ? And he holds that reflective judgement constitutes the required link.

Kant states the problem of the Critique of Judgement in his preface to it as follows :—

"(i) Whether now the judgement, which in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason, has also principles *a priori* for itself ; (ii) whether these are constitutive or merely regulative (thus pointing out no special realm) ; and (iii) whether they give a rule *a priori* to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as the mediating link between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire[1]."

SOLUTION.

Kant spent his whole life in trying to establish better than any of his predecessors the exact place (in our total body of knowledge) (i) of mathematics and physics and (ii) of ethics and religion. It was only towards the close of his life that he attempted to do so for æsthetics. He himself says

1. Ber., 2.

in the closing paragraph of his preface :—

"Here then I end my whole critical undertaking. I shall proceed without delay to the doctrinal part in order to profit, as far as is possible, by the more favourable moments of my increasing years[1]."

But before he had proceeded very far with the Critique of Practical Reason, he realised that he had not given any satisfactory account of the phenomena of feeling[2]. He, therefore, adopted a threefold classification of the higher mental faculties (i) Understanding (ii) Reason and (iii) Judgement, corresponding to three ultimate modes of consciousness. Thus, according to Kant, understanding is the faculty of knowledge : reason is the faculty of desire as will : and judgement is the faculty of feeling of pleasure and pain. And he maintains that the third Critique, which is concerned with the faculty of judgement, bridges the gulf between the two earlier Critiques. For, judgement corresponds to the feeling of pleasure and pain ; and therefore, just as the feeling of pleasure is intermediate between our perception of an object and our desire to possess it, so the judgement occupies a place between understanding and reason.

Kant states his view on this topic in the third section of his introduction to the Critique of Judgement as follows[3] :—

"And as pleasure or pain is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire,.........we may also suppose that the judgement will bring about a transition from the pure faculty of knowledge, the realm of natural concepts, to the realm of concept of freedom."

Hence the Critique of Judgement completes the undertaking of criticism. In it, the problems, stated in the

1. Ber., 5. 2. Ber., XVI. 3. Ber., 16.

preface, are answered as follows :—

1. Just as understanding and reason, with which the earlier Critiques are concerned, have their *a priori* principles, so does the judgement also.

2. The principles of judgement are not constitutive like those of reason. They are only regulative of experience. They do not tell us anything positive about the characteristics of objects. They simply indicate the conditions, under which we find it necessary to view the objects.

3. Æsthetics is transcendental philosophy based on principles *a priori.*

THE NATURE OF ÆSTHETIC JUDGEMENT ABOUT BEAUTIFUL.

Kant, in his Transcendental Logic, demonstrates that there are four categories of understanding (1) quality (2) quantity (3) relation and (4) modality. And presenting the nature of æsthetic experience, he holds that (i) according to quality[1], it is disinterested (ii) according to quantity, it is universal (iii) according to relation, it involves purposiveness without definite purpose and (iv) according to modality, it is necessary. He draws a distinction between free and dependent beauty and holds that æsthetic experience is free from concepts and that it is due to an *a priori* condition and, therefore, it is necessary.

EXPLANATION OF THE TECHNIQUE.

We have stated in the earlier sections that the process and technique, involved in intuition, are common to both the determinate empirical experience and the æsthetic and that the distinctive process of the former is represented by synthesis of recognition. The distinctive process involved in the rise of æsthetic ex-

1. **Ber., XIX.**

perience, he explains in terms of judgement, understanding and imagination to which he attributes functions different from those which they perform in giving rise to determinate empirical experience. We shall, therefore, present the distinctive functions, which he attributes to these faculties in the context of æsthetics.

JUDGEMENT AS A FACULTY OF MIND.

Judgement, according to Kant, performs its function of binding together the particular and the universal[1], the real and the ideal, in two ways. It may proceed from general laws of reason and come to particulars. Or it may begin with the particular and rise to the universal. The former he calls determinant and the latter reflective judgement. The taste, as conceived by Kant, is concerned with reflective judgement.

JUDGEMENT AS A FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

In Kantian philosophy the word "judgement" is used not only for a faculty of mind but also for a form of consciousness, in which subject is related to predicate in a definite way. Thus, Kant uses the word "judgement" in the statement of the problem of the first Critique : "How are synthetic *a priori* judgements possible ?" As such, it is *a priori* or a posteriori from one point of view and synthetic or analytic from another : e.g. "Body is extended." "This body is heavy[2]." It is a product of the faculty which also is called judgement.

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF JUDGEMENT AS FACULTY OF MIND.

Judgement, as a faculty of mind, is conceived differently in different Critiques. In the Critique of Pure Reason, it is that faculty of mind which enables us to decide whether a particular case is an instance of a universal rule or not[3]. The

1. Ber., 16-17. 2. Pri., 3. 3. M.M., 108-9.

function of subsuming the particular under the universal cannot be ascribed to understanding. For, the characteristic function of understanding is to produce the *a priori* or empirical concepts, which are nothing but universal rules ; it is not concerned with the sphere of particulars. Kant proves by means of various examples that understanding and judgement are two distinct faculties. A politician, for instance, may carry many beautiful political rules in his head and yet, in a particular case, he may not be able to decide whether or not it is an instance of a universal rule which he knows. Such a person lacks, not understanding but judgement. He can comprehend the universal in abstraction, but he cannot decide whether a particular case, which is before him, comes under it or not. Thus, judgement in the first Critique is a faculty that relates category and intuition and, therefore, sensibility and understanding. It is a connecting link between them. It mediates between them.

It is purely human faculty. It belongs to humanity, which is not purely rational,[1] but rational no less than sensible, and which cannot know objects by means of mere thought, but by thought related to intuition. Neither purely rational beings (if for the sake of clarifying the conception of judgement, as a faculty, we assume the existence of such beings) have this faculty nor do the animals have it. This is theoretical judgement.

The function of judgement in the practical field, which is discussed in the Critique of Practical Reason, is quite different from that which it exercises in the theoretical field. For, the practical concepts are valid, not only for every rational being but also for the absolute being, i.e. God Himself. They are absolute laws. But human beings are partly rational and partly sensible. Therefore, they have

1. Cas., 184.

to make use of the faculty of judgement in order to be able to make a practical judgement. To look upon an action, occurring in the sensible world, as determined by absolute moral law, they have to subsume it under the absolute universal law of Reason. It is the practical judgement which makes such a subsumption possible.

The judgement, however, with which Kant is concerned in the third Critique, is neither theoretical nor practical. It is reflective judgement.[1] Kant distinguishes the reflective judgement from the determinant in section IV of his introduction to the Critique of Judgement as follows :—

"Judgement[2] in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal be given, the judgement, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinant. But if only the particular be given, for which the universal has to be found, the judgement is merely reflective."

This seems to mean that in the case of determinant judgement, as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, the form, in accordance with which sense-impressions are to be arranged, lies ready in understanding : therefore, as soon as an impression occurs, we can predict what other impressions there should be and how different impressions are to be related so as to correspond to the whole scheme.

In the case of the reflective judgement, however, the form does not lie ready *a priori* in understanding. As each impression arises, mind feels an impulse to reach out to another. Thus, there is freedom in the course of æsthetic judgement; a given impression reaches out to the next, by a play of imagination, unhampered by any rule of understanding, which, by its capacity to wide variation, suggests what impressions would best fit in with the one that has already arisen.

1. s., 185. 2. Ber., 16-17.

The idea, contained in the quotation given above, will be clearer, if we fully grasp the distinction of the æsthetic or free imagination from the productive imagination.

IMAGINATION.

According to Kant, imagination is of three kinds:[1] (i) Reproductive (ii) Productive and (iii) Free or Æsthetic. We have already had an occasion to refer to reproductive imagination in the context of synthesis of reproduction in imagination. He talks of productive imagination in the context of Schematism.

PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION.

To understand the importance of the productive imagination it is necessary to remember (i) that Kant is not a faculty-psychologist: he does not believe in the actual existence of different faculties of mind, which perform their functions successively, though the word 'faculty' has been used in the translations of his works: he is simply concerned with the analysis of what is involved in human knowledge: and (ii) that he assumes productive imagination to solve an outstanding philosophical problem of relation between the universals and particulars, between thought and reality.

According to his philosophy, the categories are the products of pure thought and, therefore, by themselves, they have no reference to sensuous appearances. The problem, therefore, arises: how can we say of appearances that they have a reference to categories: how can we subsume an intuition under a category: how can theoretic judgement arise? And his solution is that it is made possible by the productive imagination, which produces transcendental schemata, which contain both, a sensible and an intellectual element, and therefore, are homogeneous with both, categories and appearances. The

1. Cas., 216.

following illustration will clarify the point in hand :—

The pure category of ground and concequent is in itself a mere form of thought. It has no reference to time. A mere analysis of the category cannot tell us whether it will apply to objects in time or not. We can, however, introduce reference to time. This is exactly what the productive imagination does in producing the schema of "necessary succession in time". This schema gives a more precise meaning to the pure category of ground and consequent. The pure category thus gets schematised. The schema of "necessary succession in time" provides a sensuous correlate of the pure category and makes possible an application of the pure category to appearances.

Productive imagination[1] is called productive, because it is independent of experience and is at the same time *a priori* condition of experience. The point to be noted here is that imagination is not absolutely independent in its activity. It is determined by the laws of the understanding. If there were no such laws, it could achieve nothing.

ÆSTHETIC OR FREE IMAGINATION.

Reproductive imagination is not free, because it is controlled by the empirical laws. Productive imagination also is not free, because it depends on *a priori* laws of understanding. Æsthetic imagination alone is free because it is independent of the laws of understanding. It cannot be regarded as reproductive : for, that would mean its dependence on the law of association. It is productive and spontaneous. It is the author of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions. It is not chained down to definite laws of understanding. For, in that case also it would not be able to claim freedom. Beautiful object furnishes the imagination simply with such a form, containing a combination of manifold, as imagination in its

1. Cas., 217.

freedom, would have produced in accordance with, not any particular law of the understanding, but only the general law of conformity to rule.

FREE IMAGINATION AND TASTE AND GENIUS.

Kant assumes two faculties in the Critique of Judgement: (i) Taste,[1] the faculty of judging an object in reference to imagination's free conformity to law: and (ii) Genius, the faculty of presenting æsthetical ideas[2], i.e. such representation of free imagination as occasions much thought. No definite thought or concept, however, can adequately represent a creation of free imagination. Hence æsthetic ideas, which Genius presents, cannot be made completely intelligible by language. Kant discusses imagination in the context of both taste and genius. Imagination as an aspect of genius, he presents as follows :—

Imagination, as a free productive faculty, is an aspect of creative genius. As such it is so powerful[3] that it can create, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature supplies to it. It is free from the law of association, which controls empirical imagination and, therefore, it can work up the material, supplied to it by nature, into something, which is very different from the given and which surpasses nature. Imagination, in its creations, strives after something that lies beyond the bounds of empirical experience and rivals the ideas of reason. Just as the ideas of reason cannot be brought under a definite concept of understanding, so cannot those of the æsthetic imagination.

Thus, artistic genius with free imagination attempts to realise to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell etc. Even when it presents the objects of experience such as death, envy and vice, it

1. Ber., 96. 2. Ber., 197. 3 Ber., 198.

tries to go beyond the limit of experience[1] and to present them to sense with a completeness, of which there is no example in nature. Its creations contain more thought than can ever be comprehended in a definite concept, whether empirical or *a priori*.

CONTENTS OF THE PRODUCT OF ARTISTIC GENIUS.

A creation of artistic genius contains two elements (i) concept and (ii) its attributes. Kant asserts that artistic genius presupposes a 'definite concept'[2] of the product as its purpose. However, this 'concept, as a rational idea, cannot be adequately presented'. It is strictly indefinable: i.e. it does not admit of adequate presentation in words. When, therefore, creative imagination takes up this concept for conscious elaboration, it builds up an image. This image has some elements, which inadequately represent the concept. But there are other elements also, which are not constituent elements of the concept that is presented. These elements are the contribution of the creative imagination. They express the consequences, bound up with the concept, and its relationship to other concepts. They are called "attributes[3] of an object, whose concept, as a rational idea, cannot be adequately presented."

Suppose creative genius tries to produce in imagination an image of Jupitor, as mighty king of heaven. It will contain (i) the forms, which 'constitute the presentation of' some elements of the definite but strictly indefinable concept of Jupitor, and (ii) the forms, which constitute his eagle with the lightning in its claws. The latter is the characteristic contribution of creative imagination. It is an æsthetical attribute of the mighty king of heaven. Such creations of imagination are not logical attributes. They do not represent

1. Ber., 198-99. 2. Cas., 283. 3. Ber., 199.

the constituents of a logical concept. They represent something, which gives occasion to the imagination to spread itself over a number of kindred representations, which arouse more thought than can be expressed in a concept, determined by words. They enliven the mind by opening out to it the prospect into an illimitable field of kindred representations. They are the very life, the spirit or the soul of the product of artistic genius.

FREE UNDERSTANDING.

We have already discussed at some length, in an earlier section, the part that understanding plays in the rise of empirical knowledge. We have shown (i) that intuitions, which are due to co-operation of sensibility and imagination, are blind, if they be not related to concepts, and concepts without intuitions are empty, and (ii) that the understanding is the faculty of concepts and, therefore, understanding and imagination are always related in the rise of determinate empirical experience. This relation between them in the said experience, however, is definite. Imagination in its productive activity is controlled by definite and well-defined concepts, which understanding supplies. Imagination submits to the constraint of understanding and is subject to the limitation of being conformable to concepts of understanding. Thus, understanding is an independent law-giver to imagination in empirical experience.

In the production of æsthetic object, however, understanding does not so completely control imagination. It gives, not any definite rigid law, but simply indefinite and flexible law, which the imagination can modify and enlarge at pleasure. Analysis of a product of creative[1] genius reveals two aspects (i) definite but strictly indefinable concept and (ii) its attributes. As all concepts belong to understanding, this definite but strictly indefinable and loose concept is the contribution of

1. Ber., 199.

understanding to the æsthetic configuration. Just as loose and flexible laws of the central body of a federation do not interfere with the autonomy of autonomous federal units, as Kant seems to think, so do not the concepts of understanding with the autonomy of imagination.[1] Imagination is free to enlarge and to modify concepts, without being in conflict with understanding. Thus, in æsthetical context, understanding is spoken of as free, because in giving law to imagination it is not confined to rigid laws, with which it controls the productive activity of imagination for empirical experience.

So far our exposition of freedom of understanding in the context of æsthetics has been in relation to creation of work of art. But it is also free in relation to the experience, which such a product arouses in spectator. For, whatever creative imagination represents in its product, the understanding is able to discover an indefinite law for it, which is very different from the fixed ones, with which it controls empirical experience. Thus in both, production of work of art and its appreciation, there is a happy relation, absence of conflict, harmony, between free imagination and free understanding.

JUDGEMENT OF TASTE.

Taste[2], as has already been stated, is the faculty of judging an object in reference to imagination's free conformity to law. If the imagination is fully controlled by definite law, the judgement is theoretical. Hence[3] in judgement of taste imagination's conformity to law is without law. It is purely subjective agreement of imagination and understanding. The mental satisfaction that we find in a regular figure, such as a circle as opposed to an irregular scrawled outline, is due to understanding. Taste has nothing to do with it. Judgement of taste has nothing to do with utility or purpose of the object. It is not concerned with the

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1. **Ber., 96.** 2. **Ber., 96.** 3. **Ber., 97.**

consideration of the object in its material aspect. It relates to the formal aspect only.

JUDGEMENT OF TASTE IS SUBJECTIVE.

When we call a thing beautiful or ugly, we are not concerned with the object as such. We are concerned with the feeling of pleasure or pain, which we feel when we represent the object to ourselves. Judgement of taste is distinct from logical judgement[1] in so far as in the latter case we ascribe to object certain properties: e. g. when we say "table is round" we ascribe roundness to table. But when we say "Table is beautiful" we do not ascribe any property to table. What we mean is that we take pleasure in the representation of table. It is purely subjective judgement. In it we refer the representation of object to the subject and its feeling of pleasure.

It has to be noted in this connection that Kant admits no other sensation to be purely subjective than pleasure or pain. Colour and all other similar sensations are to some extent objective, because they are attributed to object. And because in judgement of taste we refer the representation of object to the feeling of pleasure or pain, both of which are purely subjective, it is subjective judgement.

JUDGEMENT ABOUT PLEASANT DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT ABOUT BEAUTIFUL.

The judgement about an object which is spoken of as pleasant expresses an interest in the object. But the judgement about the beautiful is disinterested.

Interest has been defined in two ways. (i) It is the relation between pleasure and appetitive faculty, which is judged by understanding to hold good by a general rule. (ii)

1. Cas., 178.

It is the satisfaction that we connect with the existence of an object. Thus, interest involves three things, (i) subjective state (Pleasure) (ii) appetitive faculty, which is necessarily connected with the existence of the object, towards which it is directed, and so (iii) the existence of the object. The judgement about beautiful is concerned with mere reflective form of intuition. It clings to the idea only and is not concerned with existence of the object[1]. The appetitive faculty, therefore, which is necessarily connected with the existence of an object, cannot come into play and hence there is neither relation between satisfaction and appetitive faculty, nor is the former connected with existence of an object. Hence the judgement about beautiful is disinterested.

JUDGEMENT ABOUT GOOD DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT ABOUT BEAUTIFUL.

The point of distinction between judgement about the good and that about the beautiful is the same as between those about the pleasant and the beautiful. That is, the judgement about the former is interested, but the judgement about the latter is disinterested. Let us show how in the judgement about the good interest is involved.

Things necessary for the judgement about the good are :—

1. Reason which refers to after-result.
2. Concept of the thing to be judged to be good.
3. Concept of purpose.
4. Faculty of desire.

The judgement about the pleasant as such, simply represents the object in relation to sense. This object must be brought by the concept of purpose under the principles of Reason in order to be judged to be good, as an object of will[2]. A thing is judged to be good if it is good for something and

1. Ber., 50. 2. Ber., 51.

consequently affords satisfaction as a means, as also if it is an end in itself, that is, good in itself.

Concept of purpose is involved in both the cases. There is, therefore, the relation of Reason to desire and hence there is satisfaction in the presence of an object in both cases. Thus, the relation between satisfaction and the faculty of desire related to the existence of an object being involved in it, the satisfaction in the good is interested satisfaction. The difference between the satisfaction in pleasant and that in good is that the former is merely a ***sensuous satisfaction***, but the latter is ***rational***.

UNIVERSAL VALIDITY OF JUDGEMENT OF TASTE.

While distinguishing the judgement about beautiful from those about pleasant and good, we have shown that judgement about beautiful is disinterested, but judgement about pleasant or good is interested. The second characteristic of the æsthetic judgement, universal validity, follows from the first, disinterestedness. For, when a person forms judgement about the beautiful, he is free from all individual inclinations[1], he is in no way influenced by any personal predilection, like or dislike, for the object. He is free from elements of individuality in making such judgement. He, therefore, does not relate the judgement and the delight that is expressed in it to his person. He forms his judgement as if it were logically. Hence it is universally valid.

It is, however, distinct from logical judgement. For, the universality in this case does not arise from concept. The universality, therefore, of the judgement of taste is not objective but merely subjective. It is free from objective reference. It is a mere presupposition on the part of judging subject. He presupposes that since his æsthetic delight rests on the form of the object and he is not interested in the existence of the object, every one will feel the same delight.

1. Ber., 56.

There is no difficulty in understanding how theoretical judgements claim universal validity. For, Kant has established the objective validity of the concepts of understanding ; he has shown in his first Critique that human knowledge is impossible without the application of categories to sense-data. The theoretical judgement, which employs the concepts, the objective validity of which has been established, can rightly claim universal validity, because it is based on universal concepts. The universal validity of judgements of taste is really difficult to understand, because they are not conceptual. We can understand this if we fully realise the meaning of disinterestedness, which is the qualitative characteristic of æsthetic judgement. It involves freedom of the judging person from those elements of personality, which constitute his individuality i.e. from the elements, which relate him to the material aspect of the objective world, and which compel him to take pleasure in the material existence of thing. The judging subject, therefore, being free from elements of individuality, gets universalised in æsthetic experience. And because in the judgement of taste the representation is referred to such universalised subject, therefore, the universality is implied in it and not asserted by it. The judgement of taste implies universal validity, because in it the representation is referred to free and universalised subject and his feeling of pleasure or pain. The universality, which the æsthetic judgement[1] possesses is not logical but æsthetic quantity. It refers to the harmony between free imagination and free understanding in relation to representation of object, which we judge to be beautiful. Universality[2] of æsthetic judgement implies identity of all judging subjects in respect of freedom from elements of individuality and indefinite harmony between free imagination and free understanding.

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1. Cas., 194. 2. Cas., 196-97.

SUBJECTIVE PURPOSIVENESS OF JUDGEMENT OF TASTE.

The third characteristic of judgement of taste is that it is purposive without purpose or subjectively purposive. We have already shown that the judgement of taste is disinterested i.e. it is not concerned with the existence of object; it is independent of any idea of the end that the object serves; it is concerned with mere contemplation of the form and has nothing to do with the material aspect of the object. Thus, the first characteristic, disinterestedness, of the judgement of taste implies or rather presupposes that it is independent of purpose that the object is intended to serve. For, as we have already shown, the judgement, which depends on the representation of purpose of the object of judgement, is not æsthetic judgement, judgement of beauty, but practical judgement.

The idea will become clear if we explain what is meant by purpose or purposiveness in other than æsthetical context.

Suppose a person desires to build a house. Before building operations can start, a plan, which is nothing but a representation of a scheme in his mind, must be there to determine and to guide the action. Now the question is "Does the mental scheme have a controlling principle?" If the scheme is not to be haphazard, if it is not to be promiscuous, it should have such a regulative principle. That principle is nothing but concept of purpose; the idea of the end that the building is to serve, the idea, which is the final cause of the building, and in the absence of which the building cannot come into being. Purpose, therefore, in such a context, is the effect that the building, when completed, is intended to produce. This intended effect controls the formation of scheme in mind. It is a cause, of which the actual building is simply an effect.

Thus, when we judge a thing to be purposive, we mean that the object before us is an effect of the idea of an end which it is intended to serve; that it is a representation of a mental scheme that arose under the control of the idea of an end. Accordingly purposiveness is the causality[1] of the idea of an end to an effect in the form of a material object, which is nothing but a representation, in matter, of the mental scheme that guides the productive activity.

The æsthetic judgement is not purposive in the sense of the word, which has been pointed out above. Such purposiveness is objective purposiveness. Æsthetic judgement is not objectively purposive. It is purposive, but subjectively only. The principle of purposiveness that is operative in the æsthetic judgement is not constitutive but regulative or reflective principle. In asserting that the principle, which is operative in the case of æsthetic judgement, is not constitutive, Kant seems to maintain that the idea of purpose is not a constituent in the representation of object: it is not a part of the thought of an object as a whole; as it is in the case of an empirical object, a house, for instance, referred to above. The principle of purposiveness is operative in the case of the judgement of taste only in so far as it is assumed for the sake of reflexion only. For, we cannot explain the possibility[2] of the object, that is before us, without assuming as its ground (final cause) the idea of an end, the purpose, which controlled the imaginative scheme, which we find represented in a material medium. In assuming it in the case of æsthetic judgement, we are free from interest in the material aspect of the object. We are concerned with the form only and the relation of this form to our faculty of representing it to ourselves. When we judge an object to be purposive in relation to its effect in stimulating mental faculties (imagination and understanding) to work in indefinite harmony,

1. Ber., 276. 2. Cas., 203.

our idea of purposiveness is free from objective reference; it does not relate to the effect that the object is to produce in the material world; it has mere subjective reference; it refers to the harmony of mental faculties. Hence the principle of purposiveness, which is employed in forming æsthetic judgement, is purely subjective; it is principle of purposiveness without objective purpose, it is accordingly called "subjective purposiveness" as opposed to "objective purposiveness." It is purposiveness without purpose.

The principle of purposiveness without purpose, which a judge of beauty assumes, is something that may be said to determine his attitude towards the presented, to make the judging person free from interest in the material aspect of the presented, to bring about disinterestedness, to free the judging person from such elements of his personality as constitute its individuality. This universalisation of personality, however, is a mere consequence of its freedom from interest in the material existence of the object. It expresses itself in the harmony of free imagination and free understanding, because the feeling of harmony is not the effect of consciousness of the principle of purposiveness without purpose, but merely expression of it. Hence the judgement of taste, according to relation, is purposive without purpose.

ÆSTHETIC JUDGEMENT IS NECESSARY.

Æsthetic judgement,[1] according to modality is necessary. "The beautiful we think as having a necessary reference to satisfaction." This necessity is of a peculiar kind. It is distinct from the theoretical no less than the practical necessity. It is not the former inasmuch as in that case it would be cognised *a priori* that every one will feel this satisfaction in the object, judged to be beautiful. It is not the latter also; for, in that case the satisfaction would be necessary result of an

1. Ber., 91.

objective law. The necessity, therefore, which is thought in an æsthetic judgement, is exemplary. It is the necessity of the assent of all to a judgement, which is regarded as an example of a universal rule, which cannot be stated definitely. Æsthetic judgement is distinct from objective theoretical judgement, whose necessity is derived from a definite concept; because the relation between imagination and understanding in the æsthetic experience is indeterminate. The necessity, therefore, in this case is different from that which is thought in theoretical judgement. It is only a subjective necessity. It requires the agreement of every one. He, who judges an object æsthetically, claims that every one ought to judge it in the same manner. Agreement of all is claimed, because the ground of judgement is common to all.

The necessity, however, which is so claimed, is conditioned. The condition of necessity is the *common sense.* It is a subjective principle[1], which determines what pleases or displeases by feeling only, and not by concepts, and yet with universal validity. It is distinct from understanding, because it judges by feeling and not by concept. The judgement of taste is possible only on the presupposition of such a common sense.

NATURE OF THE ÆSTHETIC JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE SUBLIME.

According to Kant, æsthetic judgement is of two kinds: (i) about the beautiful and (ii) about the sublime. We have discussed in the preceding sections the nature of the æsthetic judgement about the beautiful at some length. Before stating the distinctive features of the judgement about the sublime, we may draw attention to those features, in which it agrees with that about the beautiful. In fact, Kant himself begins the treatment of the sublime with the statement of the points,

1. Ber., 92-3.

in which the judgement about the sublime agrees with that about the beautiful. The points of agreement may be summarised as follows :—

1. Both please in themselves.

2. They are not logical but simply reflective.

3. The satisfaction belonging to them is neither that which depends upon sensation, as in the case of the pleasant, nor that which is related to a definite concept as in the case of the good.

4. They are related to indeterminate concepts.

5. They refer to indeterminate harmony between free cognitive powers.

6. They are singular.

7. They are universal and necessary.

The points of difference between judgement about the beautiful and that about the sublime may be stated as follows :—

1. The beautiful[1] in nature is connected with the form of the object, which is definitely limited. But the sublime is connected with such form as is limitless, though its totality is present to thought.

2. Accordingly the beautiful is looked upon as a presentation of an indefinite concept of understanding. But the sublime is regarded as a presentation of an indefinite idea of reason.

3. The satisfaction, in the case of the beautiful, is bound up with the representation of quality ; but in the case of the sublime, with quantity.

4. The satisfaction in the beautiful is quite different from that in the sublime. In the former case pleasure arises

1. Ber., 102-3.

directly. "For the beautiful directly brings with it a feeling of furtherance of life." But, in the latter case, pleasure arises only indirectly. It is produced by momentary checking of vital powers and consequent stronger outflow.

5. The satisfaction in the case of the sublime does not so much involve positive pleasure as admiration and respect. It is accordingly negative pleasure.

6. The beautiful in nature exhibits purposiveness in its form and thus seems to be preadapted to our judgement and is, therefore, in itself the object of satisfaction. But the sublime in nature seems to violate the principle of purposiveness in its form, and therefore, it is ill-adapted to our faculty of judgement; it is ill-suited to our representative faculty; it does violence to imagination.

Of all distinctions between the beautiful and the sublime, as have been stated above, Kant holds the last to be the most important. Let us, therefore, see what does this distinction imply.

We have already stated that beautiful in nature exhibits purposiveness. The form in nature, which we judge to be purposive, we cannot explain in accordance with mechanical laws, which are sufficient to explain such products of nature as crystal. In the case of the beautiful object, nature seems to proceed not mechanically but technically. She seems to proceed according to some scheme, just like an artist.

This procedure, which we attribute to nature, for the simple reason that we can in no other way explain to ourselves the beauty in nature, has a subjective reference only, inasmuch as its purpose is to bring about harmony between imagination and understanding. We judge an object beautiful[1] on the ground that imagination in apprehending the object does not

1. Cas., 220.

feel that it is a mere manifold of disconnected parts but that there is some principle of order and limitation, though indefinite, which connects the apprehended manifold. We feel that the object, which we represent to ourselves, is not altogether formless and that the understanding gives some indefinite law to imagination, to which it conforms.

Thus, it is clear that the principle of purposiveness without purpose can be assumed as the principle of reflexion only in the case of that object, which we do not feel to be formless. The problem, therefore, which faces us in the context of the sublime, is "How can we regard an object, which we judge to be sublime, as representing a principle of order, as exhibiting purposiveness ?" For, we call an object sublime for the very reason that it is formless. Sublimity of an object consists in containing a greater manifold of parts than our imagination can comprehend.

Kant's solution of the problem may be stated as follows :—

Our judgement[1] about the sublime is based, not upon the indeterminate and indeterminable relation between imagination and understanding, as in the case of the beautiful, but upon such a relation between imagination and Reason. The fact, that deserves to be specially noted in the case of judgement about the sublime, is that simply because imagination cannot comprehend the given sensible object, the knowing subject feels itself raised above the sensuous level. The mind, while representing the object, finds itself incapable of grasping it in its entirety. It is, therefore, made to think of Reason and its ideas, which are the principles of supersensible world. Accordingly the mind thinks of an object, which it cannot fully comprehend in imagination, as a presentation of an indeterminate concept or idea of Reason ; because the concepts of reason are concepts of infinite world of the supersensible.

1. Cas., 221.

Hence in the case of judgement about the sublime, the principle of purposiveness refers to the relation between imagination and Reason.

The nature of relation between imagination and reason may be stated as follows[1] :—

In a judgement about the sublime the faculty of judgement judges an object to be absolutely great on the ground that it becomes aware of the fact that imagination is incapable of finding in the world of sense a measure great enough to serve as a standard for measuring the object that is present. This makes the judging subject think of a different standard, the idea of the supersensible, compared with which everything in the world of sense is infinitely small. In doing so it refers imagination to reason. The judgement in question, however, being æsthetic judgement, the imagination is referred, not to any definite concept or idea of reason, but merely to the principle of Reason in general.

Just as æsthetic judgement about the beautiful refers imagination in its free play to understanding in order that imagination may conform to the concepts of understanding in general; so in the case of judgement about the sublime, it refers imagination to Reason in order that it may conform to reason's ideas in general.

Thus, the object, that is judged to be sublime[2], is purposive only in relation to the mind of the judging subject. It is purposive only in so far as it brings about an indefinite relation between imagination and reason. The judging subject, in relation to the sublime, is made conscious of the fact that he is a rational being and that he is not confined to the world of sense. He is made conscious of the fact that he can rise above the world of sense; and the consciousness of this capacity fills him with purely subjective pleasure.

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1. Cas., 236. 2. Cas., 237.

Kant holds that it is incorrect to call any object of nature sublime. For, how can that be regarded as a source of satisfaction which is apprehended in itself as a violation of purpose. All that we can say is that the object is an inadequate presentation of sublimity, which is to be found in the mind only. No sensible object can contain the sublime proper. Sublimity concerns only the ideas of reason, which, when inadequately represented in a sensible object, are aroused and summoned into mind.

In the experience of the beautiful, the mind is in restful contemplation. But in the experience of the sublime it is in motion.

DIVISION OF SUBLIME.

Kant divides sublime into[1] (i) Mathematically sublime and (ii) Dynamically sublime : because he holds that we judge nature to be sublime on the following two grounds :—

1. Nature presents us with objects, which we judge to be infinitely great and to which we attribute absolute magnitude.

2. In some of its products, nature makes us feel its absolute power over us. We judge nature to be mathematically sublime because of the former and to be dynamically sublime because of the latter.

SUBLIME IN GENERAL.

Before we discuss the distinctive features of the two types of sublime, let us see what sublime in general means. Sublime in general is that which we judge to be absolutely great. "Absolutely great" is (i) not a concept of understanding (ii) nor an intuition of sense (iii) nor even a concept of Reason. That it is not a concept of understanding may be shown as follows :—

1. Ber., 105.

We assert *a priori* that every empirical object will possess magnitude, without comparison with other things being required. This we are able to do because "quantity" is an *a priori* category of understanding and accordingly no cognition is possible unless the sense-data have been subsumed under it. But we cannot assert *a priori* any definite magnitude. In order to be able to determine the magnitude of a given object, to say definitely how great the object is, we have to compare it with some standard of measure or comparison. The object is great only in relation to the unit which is taken as a standard of measure. Thus, a city is judged to be great if it extends over a respectable number of miles. The concept of "absolutely great", which is involved in a judgement about sublime, is, therefore, different from a concept of understanding, because it implies greatness beyond comparison.

It cannot also be regarded as a concept of reason. For, concepts of reason are concerned with the supersensible. Therefore, if "absolutely great" were a concept of reason it could not be employed in a judgement about a sensible object. The concept of "absolutely great" therefore, belongs to the faculty of æsthetic judgement, which refers to no cognitive principle when it judges an object to be absolutely great. The judgement about an object, that it is absolutely great, refers only to the feeling that we cannot imagine that any object could be greater than the present.

MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME.

Mathematically great is distinct from mathematically sublime. The former is a theoretical judgement. It relates to a concept of understanding. It refers to a standard of measure. It involves the thought of a unit, which is taken as a standard of measure and in terms of largeness of number of which greatness of the object of cognition is accounted for. The latter, however, is an æsthetic reflective judgement. It

is not related to any definite concept of understanding. It does not touch theoretical level. It is a judgement of feeling. It involves no comparison. It is based on feeling that it is impossible to imagine any other object greater than the present. It is called mathematically sublime, because it is a judgement, which is concerned with greatness, and all such judgements are mathematical.

FEELING OF RESPECT IN MATHEMATICALLY SUBLIME.

The judgement about Mathematically sublime manifests itself in the 'feeling of respect for the object', 'of our powerlessness to reach an idea that is law for us'. But properly speaking, the respect is not for the object but for the principle of reason. It is akin to our feeling of respect for absolute moral law.[1] At the ethical level an individual realises that all his actions ought to be in perfect accord with the moral law that commands unconditionally. But at the same time he is aware of his incapacity to direct his activities so that they may be in perfect accord with the categorical imperative. This realisation of helplessness arouses respect for the law. The feeling of respect that accompanies æsthetical judgement about the sublime is very similar to feeling of respect for moral law. For, judgement about the sublime is also consequent on the failure of imagination to comprehend in one intuition the entire object that is given to it.

This makes the judging subject think of Reason's idea of absolute totality. The feeling of respect for the object, that accompanies judgement about the sublime, however, arises because its representation makes us refer to Reason and its idea of absolute totality ; therefore, strictly speaking it is not for the object, but for the principle of reason, of which the judging subject is reminded, because of the

1. Cas., 238.

failure of imagination to comprehend in one intuition all the constituents of the given.

EXPERIENCE OF SUBLIME AS A MIXED EXPERIENCE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

We have stated above that the judgement about the sublime is accompanied by feeling of respect for the idea of reason, "absolute totality", which cannot be grasped by sensuous imagination. There is an element of pain[1] in the feeling of the sublime, because there is the realisation of incapacity of a faculty of mind, imagination, to grasp in a single intuition all the elements of the given. But there is pleasure also in it, inasmuch as there is the recollection of the idea of reason and, therefore, elevation from the level of sense to that of reason.

This mixed feeling[2] of pain and pleasure, in which the feeling of respect consists, is very much like that which we feel in ethical experience. For, respect for moral law involves a kind of pleasure inasmuch as it makes us conscious of being determined by moral law and, therefore, implies elevation from sensuous level to that of Reason. But there is an element of pain also in it, because there is the consciousness of our lack of capacity, as limited individuals, to realise fully the demand made upon us by moral law.

PECULIARITY OF PURPOSIVENESS IN JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE SUBLIME.

In a judgement about the sublime, reason takes the place of understanding. The two faculties of mind, which are requisite for it, are not imagination and understanding, as in the case of judgement about the beautiful, but imagination and reason[3]. They are felt to harmonise in virtue of their contrast. But in the case of judgement about the beautiful,

1. Ber., 119. 2. Cas., 239. 3. Cas., 241.

the faculties involved, are not in contrast with each other. They are in perfect accord. We ascribe subjective purposiveness to the beautiful, because the faculties, necessary for judging it, perfectly harmonise with each other. The idea of subjective purposiveness in the case of judgement about the sublime, however, arises from our consciousness of lack of harmony between imagination and reason. But consciousness of this discard gives pleasure, because we, as rational beings, enjoy the contrast between our sensuous and rational faculties. Kant puts this idea as follows :—

"For[1] just as Imagination and Understanding, in judging of the Beautiful, generate a subjective purposiveness of mental powers by means of their harmony, so (in this case) Imagination and Reason do so by means of their conflict. That is, they bring about a feeling that we possess pure self-subsistent Reason, or a faculty for the estimation of magnitude, whose superiority can be made intuitively evident only by the inadequacy of that faculty (Imagination)........."

DYNAMICALLY SUBLIME.

Kant begins his treatment of the Dynamically Sublime with drawing a distinction between 'might' and 'dominion.' Might[2], according to him, is that which is superior to great hindrances. This very might is called dominion 'if it is superior to the resistance of that which itself possesses might'. An æsthetical judgement is Dynamically Sublime, if the judging subject looks upon an object in nature as mighty, but having no dominion over him as a moral being i.e. not superior to the resistance of him, who is conscious of freedom of his will, who is aware of the fact that all the might of nature cannot affect him as a moral being.

Another condition of judgement about an object of nature as dynamically sublime is that it should be looked upon not

1. Ber., 121. 2. Ber., 123.

only as mighty but also as a source of fear. In representing the object to ourselves we must feel that we cannot successfully offer physical resistance to it, we must look upon the object as infinitely superior to us in respect of physical power. We must think that it can wipe us out of physical existence. The point, however, to be emphasised in this connection, is that in spite of the fact that we regard the object as a source of fear, we should not be in a state of actual fear. For, actual fear puts a stop to the operation of the faculty of judgement. The feeling of imaginary physical helplessness against the physically superior power of the object of nature is, therefore, another condition of the judgement about dynamically sublime.

The third condition of such a judgement is the consciousness of our moral personality. Just as the helplessness, which we feel, as imaginative beings, in grasping in one intuition all that is given by what we judge to be mathematically sublime, arouses the consciousness of rational idea of 'absolute totality' and raises us from sensuous level to the rational; so the helplessness, which we, as physical beings, feel at the sight of the physical power of nature, as expressed in an object, that is regarded as source of fear, arouses in us the consciousness of our moral personality, raises us from physical to moral level and excites a feeling of our moral superiority.

An object of nature, therefore, is judged to be dynamically sublime, because an imaginary representation of it makes us conscious of our moral personality through feeling of helplessness against its might and makes us feel that nature may completely annihilate the physical aspect of our being, but it can have no power over our moral aspect.

We have stated above (i) that mathematical sublimity is not a property of a natural object, but belongs to human mind only and (ii) that feeling, involved in judgement about

mathematically sublime, is mixed feeling of pain and pleasure. The same holds good of dynamical sublimity also. It is interesting to note that Kant mentions the natural phenomena, similar to those which were cited as instances of sublime in nature by Burke, e. g. (i) Bold[1], overhanging and as it were threatening rocks, (ii) clouds piled up in the sky, moving with lightning flashes and thunder peals. But he differs from Burke in holding that sublimity properly speaking belongs to the judging subject, who is raised from sensuous level to rational, as in mathematically sublime, or to moral level as in dynamically sublime. According to Kant, an object of nature that is looked upon as a source of fear is simply a medium of the sublime. But very often he talks of the objects[2] of nature also as dynamically sublime. He seems to admit both beauty and sublimity in nature also. His view on beautiful is summed up in the following words :—

"Nature is beautiful because it looks like Art ; and Art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art while yet it looks like Nature."

TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF ÆSTHETICS.

Kant attempts the problem of æsthetics from two points of view (i) of a judge of a product of art and (ii) of a producer of a work of art (artist).

We have so far been concerned with nature of the judgement of taste and, therefore, with the point of view of the connoisseur. In this connection we have made a passing reference to the *taste*, the faculty of judging an object in reference to imagination's free conformity to an indefinite law, in the context of free imagination. But taste is the most important factor in forming judgement about beautiful. Let us, therefore, discuss it in detail.

1. Ber., 125. 2. Ber., 137.

TASTE.

Taste is a special faculty[1] of human mind which judges the beautiful. It feels[2] the harmony between imagination and understanding. It is distinct from the faculties which operate in the practical and the theoretical spheres. It is called taste[3], because in coming to judgement about a product either of nature or of art, it can in no way be influenced by reason, argument or proof. It is called taste on the analogy of a sense, called by that name. On this point Kant simply echoes what had already been said about this faculty by Burke. In stating the reason why he calls this faculty "taste" he says :—

"For though a man may enumerate to me all the ingredients of a dish, and remark that each is separately pleasant to me and further extol with justice the wholesomeness of this particular food—yet (am I ?) I am deaf to all these reasons ; I try the dish with my tongue and my palate, and thereafter (and not according to universal principles) do I pass my judgement."

Just as the proofs, advanced in support of wholesomeness of food, cannot make it agreeable to our palate, so cannot those, put forward to prove that the object before us is beautiful, make our faculty of æsthetic judgement (taste) judge it beautiful. If a person reads us a poem, which does not suit our taste, no argument, however great may be the authority, on which it is based, can affect our faculty of æsthetic judgement (taste). It has its own *a priori* principle. This principle, however, is not constitutive but only reflective ; it is purposiveness without purpose or subjective purposiveness as opposed to objective purposiveness. The judgements, therefore, which it forms, are universally valid and necessary.

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1. Ber., 173. 2. Cas., 263. 3. Ber., 158.

Kant's conception of taste is fundamentally opposed to that of the empiricists: for, while the latter hold it to be cultivable and educable, the former maintains it to be *a priori.* Kant's view is that although culture[1] is necessary for forming a judgement of taste, yet this does not mean that it is an original product of culture. Just as feeling for moral ideas is not introduced into society conventionally, but it has its roots in human nature, so taste, sensitiveness to beauty, is not conventional, but is inborn and natural. When we find that a person is insensitive to beauty, we say that he lacks taste. When we find him indifferent to what we judge to be sublime, we say that he has no feeling. We demand taste and feeling of every body. The only difference between taste and feeling is that in the case of æsthetic judgement about the beautiful, we demand agreement of every judge as a matter of course. But we demand every body's agreement on the judgement about the sublime on the assumption of existence of moral feeling in every body.

The judgements, which are formed by this faculty of mind (taste), are not concerned with the material aspect of the presented. They are related only to the form. They are not conceptual. They do not involve any category of understanding.

ARTIST'S POINT OF VIEW.

While attempting the problem of art from the point of view of artist, Kant raises the following questions :—

1. What are the faculties of mind, which are necessary for the production of such works of art as are judged to be universally and necessarily beautiful ?

2. Does artist need any special faculty of mind ?

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1. Cas., 246.

3. Is art imitation ?

4. What is the importance of rules in producing a work of art ?

5. What is the spirit or soul of products of art ?

When Kant raises these questions, he has a particular type of art in his mind. These questions refer to some kind of art to the exclusion of others. The fact is that he divides arts into two kinds : (i) Mechanical and (ii) Æsthetical. He defines them as follows :—

"If art (product of art ?) which is adequate to the cognition of a possible object performs the actions requisite therefor merely in order to make it actual, it is mechanical art ; but if it has for its immediate design the feeling of pleasure, it is called æsthetical art."

For instance, a motor mechanic has a definite purpose in his mind which he wants a product of his art to serve. His productive activity is controlled by a fixed end. He wants the car, that he attempts to produce, to run at a speed of seventy miles per hour. In order that he may be able to produce such a car, he should have a very clear consciousness of the necessary mechanical laws and should act according to them.

In order that we may be able to take pleasure in such a product of mechanical art, we must have the same purpose in our minds as that which controlled the productive activity of the mechanic. Our pleasure at the presentation of such an object is due, not to mere sight of its look or appearance, but to its serving the purpose for which it is produced, namely, running at a speed of seventy miles per hour. Thus, an artist in producing a work of mechanical art is controlled in his production by an objective purpose and definite laws, in accordance with which such an object can be produced as serves

the required purpose. And appreciation depends on the awareness of realisation of such a purpose.

The product of æsthetical art, however, is quite different, not only in respect of psycho-physical activities responsible for its production, but also the psychological presuppositions, involved in its appreciation, and the nature of experience that it arouses.

Before we proceed further with the discussion of this point it is necessary to point out that Kant holds that æsthetical art and, therefore, its products are of two kinds (i) pleasant art and (ii) fine art. The products of the former are meant simply to please their lovers; cookery[1], for instance, may be called a pleasant art, because it is concerned with producing what is agreeable to palate. Fine art, on the other hand, is concerned with the production of something, which does not yield mere sensuous satisfaction. A product of fine art makes us conscious of the harmony between our cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding. Its production is not controlled by an objective purpose or a definite concept.

It is evident[2] from what has been stated above about the division of art that Kant's conception of fine art entirely depends on his theory of judgement of taste. The only thing that can enable us to decide whether a particular work of art is a product of pleasant or fine art, is to refer it to judgement. If it is judged to be beautiful it is a product of fine art. But if it is judged to be pleasant to senses or intellect it is a work of pleasant art. The judgement about the beautiful depends on those very conditions, which are necessary for the production of a work of fine art. For, a work of art is nothing but a representation, in a material medium, of the æsthetic experience. The same experience, therefore, is the basis of

1. Cas., 269. 2. Cas., 270.

both (i) judgement about a work of fine art and (ii) production of it in a material medium.

If, therefore, we attempt the problem of æsthetics from the point of view of the artist and raise the question: "What are the faculties of mind necessary for the production of a work of art, which is judged to be beautiful?" the reply is that imagination and understanding, such as are capable of harmonising with each other independently of any concept, are the two faculties of mind necessary for the production of beautiful work of art. Just as we can enjoy beauty only when our imagination and understanding are in an indefinite relation, when they are not determined by any definite rules, and therefore, are in harmony with each other, so the artist also can produce a beautiful work when his cognitive faculties are in perfect harmony. He must be capable of producing his work in accordance with rules without being conscious of what they are.

GENIUS.

To the question, "Does artist need a special faculty of mind?" Kant replies that the special faculty that the artist must possess is Genius. It is the capacity of producing things which are judged to be beautiful. It does not depend on any definite rule in its productive activity, though it presupposes some rule. For, otherwise, its product will not be a product of art, but of mere chance. This rule, however, is not based on any definite concept, nor is the artist determinately conscious of it. It borders on instinct. Just as judgement about the beautiful is not dependent on rule, based on definite concept, so production also of beautiful work is not determined by any rule. The unconscious and indefinite rule, which is presupposed in creation of a piece of fine art, is supplied by genius.

It is the talent,[1] the natural gift, which gives the rule to Art. It is the innate productive faculty of the artist. Through genius nature herself gives rule to fine art, because genius (talent, innate capacity of producing works of fine art) is itself the gift of nature and, therefore, belongs to nature. Beautiful work of art is possible only as a product of genius.

GENIUS AND ORIGINALITY.

1. Originality is the first property of genius. Genius is not a mere aptitude for what can be learnt by a rule. It is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given.

2. It is not a mere faculty of imitation. For, the products of genius are not faithful reproductions, in a certain medium, of what already exists in nature. They are original and stand as models, to be followed and not to be imitated by others.

3. The rule, in accordance with which the productive activity proceeds, does not descend to clear conscious level. There is, therefore, no possibility of telling how products of fine art are brought about. The ideas, which are judged to be beautiful, come to it unsought.

4. It is the medium, through which Nature prescribes indefinable rules to fine art.

IS ART IMITATION ?

This leads us to the third question : "Is art imitation ?" And answer to it has already been hinted at, namely, that art is not imitation. Kant attempts to refute the theory of imitation, from the point of view of artist. Genius is the special faculty, necessary for the production of what is judged to be beautiful. It is independent of the rules based on definite concepts and, therefore, is fundamentally opposed to

1. Ber., 188.

the spirit of imitation. For, imitation can proceed only according to definite conceptual rules. Hence work of art is not imitation. It is neither an exact copy of what exists in nature, nor of what has been produced by an earlier genius. Work of art is not an imitation but a model, embodying the inspired ideas of a genius,[1] which excite like ideas in a successor if nature has endowed him with a like proportion of mental powers.

ORIGINALITY AND INTELLECTUAL EQUIPMENT.

What has been stated above about the products of fine art seems to suggest the reign of lawlessness in the field of fine art. Kant's conception of genius seems to suggest that he believes that artist is entirely free from the constraint of all rules. However, this is not true. He condemns those who hold such a view as follows :—

"Now since the originality of the talent constitutes an essential element in the character of genius, shallow heads believe that they cannot better show themselves to be full-blown geniuses than by throwing off the constraint of all rules ;......" (Ber. 192).

Kant distinguishes mechanical art from fine art, but recognises mechanical aspect in fine art also. He holds that art has two aspects (i) Material and (ii) Formal. Genius, which is free from constraint of rules, can do no more than supply the material, the ideas. But to give appropriate form to the ideas, is something which has got to be learnt. There are certain rules, which can under no circumstances be ignored or violated.

THE SOUL (GEIST) OF ART.

The only question, that remains to be discussed in connection with a product of art, is "What is the soul or spirit of a product of art ?" This question seems to have been

1. Ber., 192.

a common question with the contemporaries of Kant. In the introduction to section 49 of the Critique of Judgement he says:—

"We say of certain products, of which we expect that they should at least in part appear as beautiful art, they are without spirit; although we find nothing to blame in them on the score of taste. A poem may be very neat and elegant, but without spirit.......even of a woman we say that she is pretty, an agreeable talker and courteous, but without spirit. What then do we mean by spirit ?"

It is a well-acknowledged fact that in a work of art, though we find no defect on the score of observance of rules, concerning its formal aspect, yet we may miss something in it, in consequence of which we do not judge it to be beautiful. This element, the absence of which prevents us from judging an otherwise perfect work of art to be beautiful, is the spirit, soul or Geist of art. This element is nothing but the material, the æsthetical idea, which genius alone can present. And æsthetical idea is that 'representation' of free imagination, which gives rise to more thought, though not definite, than can be grasped in any concept. Such a creation of free imagination,which constitutes the soul of art, cannot, therefore, be adequately presented in language. For, linguistic expressions stand for definite concepts. It is this suggestive element in art, which puts the mental powers of the connoisseur purposively into swing,[1] into such harmonious play as maintains itself and strengthens them (mental powers) in their exercise. It strives to present, howsoever inadequately, what lies beyond the bounds of ordinary experience. It strives 'to approximate to a presentation of concepts of Reason.' This is what Indian æstheticians call Dhvani. It puts the cognitive faculties of the connoisseur in a condition identical with that of the artist at the time of inspiration.

1. **Ber., 197.**

CHAPTER XI.

ABSOLUTIST ÆSTHETICS OF HEGEL

HEGEL'S IMPORTANCE FOR COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS.

Hegel (1770-1831) is of special importance to us, because on many aspects of the problem of æsthetics his views seem to have marked similarity with those of Indian æstheticians like Abhinavagupta. They may be stated as follows :—

(1) Both Hegel and Abhinavagupta admit that a work of the highest art is simply a medium to the æsthetic experience. They admit the triadic relation in art-experience[1].

(2) They talk of the soul of a work of art (Kāvyasātmā) and hold that the external of a work of art is only a medium of revelation of the purely subjective, which is the significance or soul.

(3) The emotion, its physiognomical expression and the situation or environment are the important aspects of a work of dramatic art, according to Hegel. The world of nature enters into the content of drama in so far as it is regarded as the environment of man. And drama requires complete man to present (i) the progress of action to its end in corporial existence, (ii) the physiognomical expression of emotion and passion and (iii) this too in a specific situation. This seems to be simply an echo of what Indian æstheticians say about the various aspects of Rasa in the words of Bharata "Vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicārisaṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ".

(4) Poetry, according to Hegel, presents the universal or rational principle, the spirit in its freedom and independence,

1. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 141.

not in its abstract universality, but as concretised by its self-expression or self-manifestation in its actions and emotions in the midst of external natural environment. This is in consonance with the Upaniṣadic idea, expressed in the oft-quoted sentence "Raso vai saḥ".

(5) The actor is admitted to identify himself with the hero of poet's imagination by both Hegel and Abhinavagupta.

(6) Hegel admits the æsthetic experience to be recognitive experience; because in it, the mind that knows itself in its universality subjectively, cognises itself again in the works of art, under the garb of external form. And in India recognitive nature of æsthetic experience was admitted by Śrīśaṅkuka[1]. But recognition, according to him does not refer to the Absolute, as according to Hegel, but to the original of which the artistic presentation is an imitation. Thus, æsthetic experience from a dramatic presentation is said to be recognitive, because the spectator recognises the original historical character in the imitating actor. But it may be pointed out here that "Recognition of the Absolute" (Īśvarapratyabhijñā) is the basic doctrine of the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir. In fact this system is called "Pratyabhijñā" because of this doctrine, as presented by Utpalācarya in his Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā. This can be upheld with justification in relation to æsthetic experience, as presented by Abhinavagupta.

(7) Hegel holds that a work of art points to something beyond itself. The exponents of the theory of Dhvani seem to maintain the same view.

(8) There seems to be complete agreement between Hegel and Mammaṭa[2] on the causes of poetic or artistic production. Both assert that genius and knowledge and practice of rules

1. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 150-51. *2. K. P., 2-3.

are equally necessary for the production of beautiful work of art.

(9) Self-forgetfulness and merging in the subject,- the specific content, the Absolute, concretised in one of those forces in humanity which carry in themselves their own justification such as love, which the artistic imagination takes up to give it artistic expression,- are essentials of artistic inspiration, according to both Hegel and Abhinavagupta.

(10) Both Hegel and Abhinavagupta agree that the highest function of art is to present the Divine, through its modes or forms.

(11) Both admit the artistic relation to be different from both the theoretical and the practical relations.

(12) Both admit that in æsthetic experience the subject and the object are universalised. The view that the subjective and the objective aspects, involved in æsthetic experience, are universalised (Sādhāraṇīkṛta), was first propounded by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. But he explained it by assuming the two powers of the poetic language. It was the genius of Abhinavagupta that explained it (universalisation) psychologically.[1] Hegel seems to maintain this view when he says that the subjective aspect involved in the contemplation of art, may be called pure intelligence, as contrasted with that, involved in scientific contemplation, which is rational intelligence and that the sensuous material in a work of art is entitled to be delivered from the frame-work of purely material substance.

(13) Hegel holds that a work of art occupies a midway ground with the directly perceived objective world on the one hand and the ideality of pure thought on the other. This idea of a work of art seems to be asserted by Indian æstheticians when they talk of it as unwordly (Alaukika)[2].

1. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 139. 2. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 149.

(14) According to Hegel, only universal emotions of our common humanity can be the permanent subject of art, because they are universal and, therefore, manifestations of the Absolute. This seems to be in complete accord with the view of Indian æstheticians, who unanimously emphasise the importance of the basic or persisting emotion (Sthāyin) in a work of art. Abhinavagupta has discussed the universality of the eight emotions at a great length in his Abhinava Bhāratī.

(15) Hegel seems to recognise Śānta Rasa. For, he holds that the most important task of poetry is to bring before the vision of the reader the energies of the life of spirit, all that surges in heart in passion or emotion or appears before the mind in tranquility.

There is also fair similarity between the metaphysical theories of Hegel and Abhinavagupta, on which their solutions to various problems, connected with æsthetics, are based. Both are encyclopaedic thinkers. Both give definite places to different important schools of thought in the conceptions of categories in their comprehensive systems. Hegel, for instance, in his Logic (p. 159-61) explicitly says: "In the history of philosophy the different stages in the logical idea assume the shape of successive systems, each based on a particular definition of the Absolute............Logic begins where the proper history of philosophy begins. Philosophy began with the Eleatic School, especially with Parmenides, who conceived the Absolute as Being". Similarly in regard to the second category "not being" or "nothing" he says: "The Nothing, which the Buddhists make the universal principle". Abhinavagupta also holds that the highest spiritual principle, reached by the Vedāntins, called Brahman, is nothing but Sadāśiva, the third category of his system. Similarly the Śūnya of the Nihilistic Bauddhas, according to him, is nothing but the Śūnya Pramātā of his system.

In their metaphysics, both are concerned with the explanation of the entire range of experience, from the highest to the lowest, as was known to their contemporaries and predecessors. They explain everything in terms of a single principle. They hold the entire field of experience,—including the subject, the object, the means of knowledge and knowledge itself, or in Hegelian terminology, the ideas, the objective natural things and the individual minds,—to be explicable in terms of a single ultimate principle. Hegel calls this principle Absolute. And Abhinavagupta gives it the name "Anuttara."

According to Abhinavagupta, all that is, all that is thought to have being in any way and even the not-being, all that is within the reach of the limited individual mind and even beyond it, and all that, in regard to which any language in any form can be used and even that in regard to which the use of language is not possible, is manifestation of the ultimate principle, much as all that figures in the dream of an individual subject is his manifestation. But Hegel, as a rationalist, maintains that the universe flows from the first reason much as conclusion flows from reason in logic.

Further, Hegel is the first Western æsthetic thinker, whose works contain references to Indian art[1], who expresses definite opinion on it and assigns a definite position to it in the world of art, constituted by the products of art of different nations on the globe.

METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF HEGEL'S THEORY OF ART.

Personality, of which Hegel talks in the context of tragedy, first emerges at the stage of 'actual soul' which is a synthesis of 'natural soul' and 'feeling soul'. But full-grown personality of the hero of tragedy is not only actual soul but also

1. Ph. A., Vol. 1.26.

comprises all the stages of the subjective spirit from 'con sciousness' to 'free mind'. This personality acts, not in the pure world of 'nature' but in the world, the essential contents of which are the various legal, moral, and social institutions, which are the manifestations of the objective spirit. And art, according to Hegel, is the sensuous presentation of the Absolute[1]. It is the first of the highest triad, manifested by the Absolute : (i) art (ii) religion and (iii) philosophy. It is the thesis, which is synthetized with religion, the antithesis, in philosophy. Thus, art belongs to the sphere of the Absolute mind. Further, imagination, which is so very important in artistic production, is a phase of 'representation', the second of the triad manifested by theoretical mind, (i) intuition (ii) representation and (iii) thinking. And Hegel explains the dramatic action in terms of the practical mind and his theory of emotion is connected with the second of the triad, manifested by it, (i) practical feeling (ii) impulses and choice, and (iii) happiness. Let us, therefore, give a brief account of Hegel's Absolutist metaphysics before taking up the various aspects of the problem of art tackled by him.

HEGEL'S CONTRIBUTION TO METAPHYSICS.

The fundamental problem of philosophy is to explain the universe.[2] Before Hegel the explanations were offered in terms of causality. Thus, Plato maintained the ultimate cause of the universe to be the world of ideas. The general conception of causality, implied in a system like this, is that of mere sequence, "This being there that comes into being". The effect is not in the cause. It is dependent on an independent entity. It is somehow effected by what is spoken of as its cause. Thus, in Plato the sense-world owes its being to the world of ideas, casting its reflection on matter. And in Aristotle it is due to moulding of matter by form. In

1. Knox., 82. 2. St., 52.

both the cases the problem is how the two, idea or form and matter, which are fundamentally opposite in nature, get related ; how and why one affects or moulds the other, remains unexplained.

Hegel, therefore, holds that causality explains nothing. The causal explanation is pure dogmatism. For, the first cause is itself an inexplicable mystery. He rejects causal explanation and substitutes for it the dialectical. He is concerned, not with finding out the cause but the Reason of the universe. According to him, the first principle is not the cause, of which the universe is an effect; but the Reason of which the world is the consequent. The universe needs nothing like matter, apart from or in addition to Reason, for its being. It is wholly contained in the first Reason, just as conclusion is in the premises. It flows from Reason, just as conclusion flows from reason in Logic.

This Reason, from which the world flows as consequent, is universal. It is free from temporal and spatial relations. It is not the reason of individual mind. It has no separate existence from that of which it is the reason. It is a mere abstraction. It is separable from its consequent only in thought. It is a process of universals. It is not a mere collection of motionless universals. It is not static but dynamic.

The flow of the world from the first Reason is governed by necessity, a necessity, with which we are familiar in the field of Logic. It is a self-explanatory and self-determined principle. We cannot, therefore, raise the question "What is the reason of Reason ?" as we do in the case of causation. This first principle, which he calls Reason in logical term, is called Absolute in metaphysical term.

HEGELIAN CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE.

The primordial being, which is the source of all things in the world, is the Absolute. The Absolute is of the nature of thought, i. e. universal. And since thought is the essence of mind, the Absolute is mind.

The ultimate fact for Hegel is always mind or spirit, which reaches complete consciousness of its own self by passing through and taking up into itself all the previous grades of its development. This primordial mind, from which the universe flows, is no psychic entity, i. e. it is not the mind of any particular subject. It is real. It is the universal mind. The mind as real is a logical being and does not exist, i.e. it is free from temporal and spatial relations. It is a logical category or concept. It has a logical and not a factual being.

This real, the universal mind, is the first principle or ultimate being, the Absolute, which is the source of all things and in terms of which the universe must be explained. This first principle is first only in the sense that it holds logical priority over all things. It is not first in the order of time.

HIS CONCRETE MONISM.

Hegelian Absolute is not pure unity. It does not totally exclude multiplicity. For, such a conception of the Absolute would make the deduction of multiplicity from it impossible. If there is no multiplicity in the Absolute, how can it proceed from it and so be deduced from it ? He rejects Spinoza's abstract monism. For, how can the substance, which is admitted by Spinoza to be such a pure unity as excludes all multiplicity, give rise to its multiplicity of attributes, such as thought and extension, if they are not already there.

Hegel, therefore, holds that the Absolute is unity in multiplicity. It is one in many. It contains many within itself. In the graded series of ideas, contained in it, each

separate idea logically involves every other and all together form a systematic whole. It is, thus, self-contained, self-explained and self-determined unity and the actual objective world flows from it as conclusion flows from premises. Thus, Hegel is a concrete monist, because his first principle is not pure unity but unity in multiplicity.

IDENTITY OF OPPOSITES.

Monism implies the identity of opposites. For, if Reality is unity and multiplicity proceeds out of it, multiplicity must be admitted to be contained in unity; unity cannot be maintained to be pure or abstract unity, but it must be unity in multiplicity. This means that unity must be identical with multiplicity, that there is identity of opposites. This principle is the basis of Hegelian dialectical process.

CATEGORIES AS DEFINITIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE.

According to Hegel, categories are the logical modes of being. They are the logical condition of the world. They are the logically connected principles, without which the world could have no existence at all. As logical, they are not things, which have logical priority to the world. They are neither material nor psychic things. They are pure abstractions. Nevertheless they are real, i. e. their being is independent.

The categories are definitions of Absolute. "Being itself", says Hegel, "and the special sub-categories of it, as well as those of Logic in general, may be looked upon as definitions of the Absolute". This means that the categories are definitions, concepts, or thoughts, of the Absolute. But the definition and that which it defines, the categories and the Absolute itself, are one and the same. Looked at from the subjective point of view the categories are our mental forms,

and looked at objectively they are objective universals and as such are the Absolute.

These categories constitute no mere aggregate or miscellaneous heap of universals, but they logically involve each other and are connected as a systematic whole. They constitute such a self-explained and self-determined whole as is capable of being the absolutely first principle of the world.

DEDUCTION OF CATEGORIES.

If we are to deduce the categories from one another, then two questions at once present themselves: (i) what is the first category and (ii) by what method are we to deduce the others? Hegel answers these questions as follows:—

Since the categories are the logical conditions of the world, the first category will naturally be the category, which comes first in reason, first in the order of thought, that which is logically the first, logically prior to all others. Such a category is the category of 'Being', the quality of mere 'isness', devoid of all particular determinations. The other categories are deduced from 'Being' through the dialectical method; and the whole world follows logically step by step from the category of 'Being'.

The accepted logical principle with regard to concepts is that the more universal is prior to the less universal; the genus is prior to species; the more abstract and general a concept, the earlier is its place in Logic. The category of "Being" is the most abstract and is reached by carrying the process of abstraction to the farthest limit. Thus, the highest abstraction, according to Hegel, which is presupposed by all that can possibly be conceived, is "*being*". Being, therefore, is the first category. It is the highest genus.

Now if we want to proceed from genus to species, we can do so only by adding the *differentia* to the genus. But

wherefrom can we get the differentia to add to genus in order to make it into species? If the progress from being is to be logical progress, that to which we proceed from *being* must be contained in the "being". For, it is an essential of all logical deductions that the consequent should be contained in the reason or antecedent; we cannot get out of a thing what is not in it. In order, therefore, to proceed from genus to species, we have to admit the differentia to be contained in the genus. Hegel, therefore, holds that it is wrong to think that the universal completely excludes the differentia, as his predecessors thought. He holds that a concept may contain its own opposite hidden in it and that this opposite admits of deduction from it and can be made to do the work of differentia, which, when added to genus, converts it into species. Accordingly he maintains that the first category, "being" contains its own opposite, the "not-being", and is identical with it. For, according to Hegel, the required differentia is always the negative, because his accepted principle is that negation is determination.

Therefore, Hegel maintains (i) that if we are to proceed from genus to species, from "being" to "becoming", the determination, which converts "being" into "becoming" must be contained in "being" (ii) that this can be no other than its opposite, its negation, the "not–being". Hence there is identity of opposites. The doctrine of identity of opposites is the basis of Hegel's triadic system.

HIS TRIADIC SYSTEM.

Hegelian system, thus, becomes a system of triads, thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Thus, in Logic, the first category, "being", is thesis, the second, "not-being" is antithesis and the third "becoming" is the synthesis of the two, in which the opposition is reconciled. The last term of the first triad is thus

the first term of the next triad and so on till we reach the final category of Logic, the Absolute Idea. The smaller triads fall within the larger and these again within the larger still. Thus, his logic deals with a single triad of (i) being (ii) essence and (iii) notion or idea. From the broader point of view of the system as whole, however, this Idea forms the first term, the thesis, from which proceeds the antithesis, Nature, which also is reconciled with its thesis in the Spirit. The whole Hegelian system, therefore, deals with a single triad (i) idea (ii) nature, and (iii) spirit.

(i) ABSOLUTE IDEA.

The absolute idea or the primal mind,–the mind as it is before the manifestation of the world, the first Reason of the world, which is a mere system of the categories; the mind, which is purely abstract,–is the subject-matter of the Logic.

(ii) NATURE.

Nature,—which includes space and time, inorganic matter, plants and animals, and which is the expression or manifestation of the abstract mind into its opposite, the mindless, the irrational, the crude external world,—is the subject of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature.

Nature is the antithesis of the Logical Idea. It is, therefore, the opposite of the Idea. It is not-idea and yet it is idea in its otherness : because the relation of idea and nature is that of thesis and antithesis; of being and not-being. Just as "nothing" is different from "being", it is not-being, the opposite of being, so the nature is the opposite of idea, it is not-idea. But just as not-being is identical with being, so the nature is identical with the idea ; it is identity in opposition; it is idea in its element of otherness.

The Philosophy of Nature is concerned, not with mere abstractions, such as being, cause and substance, but with 'actually existing things', such as plant and animal. Transition from Logic to Philosophy of Nature is, in a sense, transition from thoughts to things. The dialectical method is involved in the Philosophy of Nature as much as in the Logic; and Nature is deduced from the Absolute Idea as much as "not-being" is deduced from "being."

It is, however, wrong to suppose that Hegel, in his Philosophy of Nature, is attempting to deduce solid things from abstract thought. When he deduces nature from idea, what he does is not that he deduces nature, in the popular sense of the word, from Idea, but simply the idea of Nature from the Absolute Idea. Similarly when he deduces animal from plant, he attempts the deduction of the idea of animal from that of plant. Both his Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit are concerned with universals alone and not the particulars.

This, however, does not mean that Hegelian system is concerned with abstractions only and, therefore, has no application to actual things. For, Hegel is an idealist; he totally denies the existence of anything that is not thought; he repudiates Platonic matter no less than the Kantian thing-in-itself; the things, therefore, are, according to him, nothing but thoughts.

But the universals, with which the Philosophy of Nature is concerned, are different from those, dealt with in the Logic. Hegel accepts the distinction, drawn by Kant, between the pure and the sensuous universals. The former he deals with in his Logic and the latter in the Philosophy of Nature. The former are universals in the strict sense of the word, in so far as they apply to everything. They are technically called categories. There is nothing to which categories do not

apply. Everything from some point of view or other can be looked upon as being, quality, quantity, cause, effect etc. Accordingly they are separately treated in the Logic. The latter, the sensuous universals, are universals in a restricted sense of the word. They apply only to some things and not to others. Thus, plant and animal are universals but only sensuous. They do not apply to everything. The sensuousness of the universals consists in this that they have not only universality but particularity also. Hence when Hegel deduces Nature from Idea, transition is not strictly speaking, from thoughts to things, but from one type of universal to another.

The following questions, however, arise in this context : –

(1) If the first principle is purely rational, how can we account for "Nature", which is acknowledged to be irrational, in terms of the said principle ?

(2) If Hegelian system claims completeness, what is the place of contingent or particular in it ?

The first problem did arise in his mind. But he found that the solution of it is not possible from a strict rationalistic point of view. For, to acknowledge nature as irrational and yet to account for it in terms of the first Reason, is an untenable position. He was, therefore, forced to give up the strict rationalism. He was inclined to give up the dialectical method. He says : "This is not a becoming or a transition as above, when we took the step from the totality of subjective notion to objectivity......the Idea exists itself with *freedom* in the form of Nature......The pure Idea resolves to determine itself as external "idea". "In its own absolute truth it (Idea) resolves to let the moment of its particularity......as a reflected image, go forth freely as nature". In these statements the rationalistic doctrine is apparently substituted by the doctrine of freedom.

The fact is that if monistic rationalism is true to its professions, it must account for the entire field of experience in terms of its rationalistic principle. The only course, therefore, which is open to it, is to deny the irrational. For, to admit the irrational is to abandon both monism and rationalism. Hegel seems to be groping for a higher principle than the Reason and hits upon the principle of Freedom. But he is not able to assert it with requisite emphasis, because it is contrary to the one which he has propounded in the whole of his Logic.

The second question was actually raised by Herr Krug, who, supposing that Hegel was attempting to deduce particular existing objects from the Idea, asked whether he (Hegel) could deduce the pen, with which Herr Krug was writing. And Hegelian position with regard to the contingent or particular is clearly indicated by the reply that philosophy of nature cannot and should not attempt to deduce particular facts and things, but only universals; and that the details of nature are governed by contingency and caprice, not by reason. This means that the details of Nature, according to Hegel, are irrational and as such cannot be deduced and that philosophy is concerned with the universals only and not the particulars.

This is a weak point in Hegelian system. The Absolute ceases to be the Absolute, if there be anything that cannot be explained in terms of it. According to Hegel's reply to Krug's question, the entire field of the particulars is inexplicable in terms of the First Principle of Hegelian philosophy. The principle, therefore, is not what is claimed for it. There are only two alternatives, which could enable Hegel to get out of the embarrassing situation: (i) to deny that there is anything irrational and, therefore, to admit the whole nature to be rational or (ii) to abandon the strict rationalistic position in regard to the first principle: to modify his position in

regard either to the Absolute or to Nature : to admit either the Absolute to be both rational and irrational or Nature to be purely rational. If he had maintained "Freedom" and not "Reason" to be the first principle, at which he hinted in the course of his exposition of Nature, his system would have been above criticism. This is just the point, which shows the advance that Realistic Idealism of Abhinavagupta presents on Hegelian philosophy.

THE SCOPE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.

Hegel follows his famous dialectical method in his Philosophy of Nature also. As in the Logic he begins with the emptiest of thoughts, i.e. "being", so here also he begins with the emptiest of things, space. The subsequent stages of Nature constitute the return of the Idea into itself. Space is most empty of mind[1], thought or reason. In the successive stages in the dialectical evolution of nature, this reason, which is so perfectly asleep in space that it is said to be non-existent, gradually reawakens. In the sphere of nature the gradually awakening reason manifests itself as blind force, working in accordance with certain laws, which are studied in three sciences, (i) mechanics (ii) physics and (iii) organics, a triad, which nature exhibits. This force is perfectly blind in the sphere of mechanics. In the organic world, however, it becomes an organising and controlling power, has a certain coherence and purposiveness and appears as a tendency to be and to live ; it becomes a unifying factor, one that holds the multiplicity of parts together and breathes life through all of them. If, for instance, we look at the vegetable organism, we find that there is a force in the seed, which is responsible for its affection by the environment, assimilation of what is outside it, making what is foreign to it, its own, developing

1, St., 312.

along a fixed line in accordance with certain laws and holding together all the parts, into which it develops through environmental affection. The force, however, which we discover in a vegetable organism, is capable of reducing multiplicity to unity only partially. The parts are not firmly united. Functions of different parts are not firmly fixed ; they retain some sort of independence of and indifference to one another, inasmuch as one part may perform the function of another.

But when we turn our scrutinising attention to animal organism, we find that it presents a more advanced stage of the principle of unity ; here the parts are firmly held together so that the functions of different parts are well fixed. There is recipiency of affection not only of what is in tangible touch with it, as in the case of plants, but also of all that which is spatially removed from it ; in other words, there is the emergence of *animal sensibility*.

(iii) SPIRIT.

We are attempting to sketch Hegelian philosophy with a view to expounding his theory of art. As art is a product of human mind for appreciation by the mind of connoisseur, it is necessary to have a clear idea of Hegelian conception of human mind as presented in the Philosophy of Spirit.

Hegel presents the mind or spirit in three stages (i) subjective (ii) objective and (iii) absolute. Out of these the first and the last are of special importance from our point of view. For, in the course of presentation of the subjective spirit, Hegel deals with most of the topics, with which modern psychology is concerned, such as instinct, feeling, sensation, imagination, intellect and practical will, the universal characteristics or essential features of mind : and his treatment of the Absolute Spirit includes discussion on the problem of art.

NATURE AND SPIRIT OR MIND.

Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit continues the work of tracing the gradual and successive stages, through which the mind—that had manifested itself into its opposite, the mindless and lifeless space, time and matter, which are studied in mechanics —returns to itself, becomes once more mind, self-conscious principle of unity. The culminating point in the return journey of mind, traced in the Philosophy of Nature, was animal sensibility. The Philosophy of Spirit traces the steps, by which mind, in the strict sense of the term, as will and intelligence, emerges from general animal sensibility, which is the crowning phase of organic life and final problem of biology.

Thus, Hegel takes up a problem in his Philosophy of Spirit, which he has already partly attempted in the Philosophy of Nature. His problem is "Through what stages the rational principle, that appears as blind force in the sphere of mechanics and as organising principle and animal sensibility in organic bodies of plants and animals, returns to its original rationality in the philosophic mind ?" "What are the different stages, through which the Reason, which appears as animal sensibility in animal organism, passes in human organism, before it attains the culminating point of its manifestation in philosophic mind ?" He, therefore, takes up the work of showing the various steps, through which mind returns to itself, just at the point where he left it in the Philosophy of Nature. According to Hegel, therefore, mind, though rational at bottom, yet appears as irrational in the sphere of mechanics and acquires certain coherence and purposiveness in animal organism. But in human organism it is endowed with new character and as such is called *soul*. Soul is the raw material of consciousness, the basis of higher mental life. It is the border land where the ground is still debatable between *nature* and *mind.*

THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF SOUL.

Soul is the principle of unity. This unity is found not only in organic life, but in inorganic world also. It is more perfect and clearer in the former than in the latter. But in both of these spheres the unity is only implicit ; it is only for the outsider, the observer, the percipient of the fact ; it is only intelligible to us ; it is only a hypothetical idea ; mechanical and organic worlds have unity, but not in and for themselves ; their unity is only for the beholder. The unity, however, which we realise in the functions of human sensibility and sentiency, the unity of which we talk in the context of soul, is one that is in and for itself. Soul, as a principle of unity, is not so for the observer but for itself. It not only is, but is also aware that it is such a principle of unity. The unity, which is implicit in the sphere of Nature, becomes explicit in the sphere of Spirit or Mind.

Soul, as sentient principle of unity, is mere possibility of intelligence. It is mere faint self-awareness and a general and indeterminate susceptibility to influence, a sympathy vaguely responsive to stimuli of physical environment.

Hegel seems to maintain that soul is no separate immaterial entity ; wherever there is nature, soul is its universal immaterial aspect. It is the simple ideal life of nature. It is the basis of all particularising and individualising of mind. It is the 'material', on which the character of mind is impressed. It is immaterial inasmuch as it not only lacks gravity but also every other aspect of existence, which might lead us to treat it as material.

The community or interdependence of body and soul is not an incomprehensible mystery. For, they are not absolutely independent of and, therefore, impenetrable to each other. Hegel holds that finitude of soul and matter are unreal dis-

tinctions and that the Absolute is the true identity of finite soul and matter.

Soul, shrouded in body, is in sympathy with nature. It is governed by nature. Accordingly with concrete differences in climatic and other natural conditions, different types of mind, with racial characteristics, come into being. Thus, due to influences of natural surroundings deuniversalisation of the soul goes on till we have individual subjects.

SOUL AS THE FIRST STAGE OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT.

The subjective spirit exhibits three stages (i) soul (ii) consciousness and (iii) mind. Soul is, therefore, the thesis of the triad, into which the subjective spirit manifests itself, and as such it is characterised by immediacy. Soul is the first stage of the subjective spirit, the human mind, viewed subjectively as the mind of an individual subject. It is a stage that precedes both consciousness and 'mind'. It is a stage, which manifests itself into three stages (i) natural soul (ii) feeling soul and (iii) actual soul. It is so rudimentary a stage that it has not yet reached sense-perception. It is hardly recognisable as human. It is hardly above the level of mere animality.

Hegel seems to start the analysis of human mind at the point where life for the first time becomes manifest in human body in mother's womb. His soul represents a stage just above that of mere animality and just below that wherein perception develops. The soul-level in itself involves three levels, as has just been stated. Its position in the Philosophy of Mind is just like that of "Being" in the Logic and of "Space" in the Philosophy of Nature.

(I) NATURAL SOUL.

The first starting point of the spirit is natural soul. It

is immediate and, therefore, can be characterised as mere "being", free from all determinations. Nothing can be said of it excepting that it "is". If we remember the instance that Hegel gives of the second stage of soul, the feeling soul, namely, that of a child in mother's womb, when its feelings are not its own but those of the mother, we may justly say that Hegel had in his mind a child in womb before the development of feeling, as his illustration of the first stage. At the first stage, soul is entirely empty and homogeneous. It has no distinction of any kind. It is mere homogeneous blank. It has no distintion within itself. It has no conscious relation to anything. It is undifferentiated unity. No category is applicable to it excepting that of being. There is no consciousness of anything external to it. It is for itself the totality of all existence. Natural soul manifests itself in a triad of (i) physical qualities (ii) physical alterations and (iii) sensibility. These are the three stages in which natural soul appears.

(II) FEELING SOUL.

Hegel draws a distinction between sensation and feeling. Natural soul is characterised by immediacy. As sensibility is a stage in its development, sensation is characterised by immediacy. Sensations are within the soul and, therefore, are parts of it. They are merely found in it. The distinction between immediate being, the undifferentiated homogeneous universality, and content, is the distinction within the soul itself. Sensation, therefore, emphasises passivity of the soul. However, when sensations are distinguished from the soul itself and are found existing by it and, therefore, affecting it, they are active. But because they are within the soul and parts of it, they are the soul itself. Hence attribution to them of activity of affecting means attribution of it to the soul itself. Feeling, therefore, emphasises activity of the soul. Feeling soul is the subjective side of feeling. It takes possession of the content and realises it as

its own. It is now an individuality, which feels itself as independent of the content. It is no longer merely a formal element in the totality of sensations but an independent entity.

FEELING SOUL AS REFLEXIVE UNIVERSAL.

The form and the content of the soul cannot exist apart. The empty form of universality of the soul must embody itself in particulars. It must stamp its universality on the content. Its universality must appear in particulars. This universality, however, which gets embodied in particulars is not ideal universality, but real, the universality in manifestation. It is what Hegel calls reflexive universality. It is mere numerical universality, which consists in the repetition of the same sensation or feeling etc. in time series, e.g. this man, this man, this man. Soul, as reflexive universal, is simply the realisation of its ideal universality in the world. That the ideal should get realised is a necessary stage in the dialectical process. Two points have to be noted here (i) that this conception of soul, as reflexive universal, is very much like the Buddhistic conception of Ālayavijñāna and (ii) that time for the first appears here as necessary element in the conception of the soul.

(III) ACTUAL SOUL.

In 'feeling soul' the subjective and the objective sides of total experience are distinct. The individual is not simply a formal element of totality, but an independent being, who takes possession of what it finds within itself. The objectivity, however, has not yet fully emerged, because as yet there is no consciousness of externality. What is felt is within the subject itself. It is an aspect of the subject. *Coalescence of the two is the Actual Soul.* Soul envelops body and body expresses soul. The actual soul, as unity of body and soul, is the percipient individual. Communion of body and soul is the dominant fact in the constitution of individuality. Soul is

aware of changes in peripheral organs and body expresses emotions.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

The next step from actual soul in Mind's journey to full self-realisation, is consciousness. Consciousness is the second term of the triad, in which the subjective spirit manifests itself. It represents a more advanced stage in the development of the subjective spirit than 'actual soul'. In the stage of soul all experience was confined to physical organism, in which it was shrouded ; all sensations, impressions and feelings were subjective ; there was no consciousness of any external objective world. At the stage of consciousness there is awareness of the object, the not-self. There is clear realisation of the object as opposed to the subject, as definitely external object, which confronts the subject. The changes or alterations, which at the stage of soul appeared to take place within the subject itself, are now experienced definitely in the object and the experiencing subject is aware of itself as persisting unchanged in the midst of various objective experiences.

Hegel holds that consciousness[1] comprises only the categories, belonging to abstract ego or formal thinking. It treats them as features of the object. It manifests itself through consciousness proper, in the triad of (i) sensuous consciousness (ii) sense-perception and (iii) intellect. It represents the transition of immediacy through mediation to the intellectual point of view, which regards the universal as reality and single individuals of sense as appearance. Here sensuous consciousness seems to stand for immediacy and sense-perception for mediacy as conceived in the context of theory of knowledge.

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1. Wal., 198.

IMMEDIACY OR NIRVIKALPA.

According to Hegel, the starting point of knowledge is immediacy. If we try to understand clearly the Hegelian conception of immediacy, as presented in the very first chapter of his Phenomenology of Mind, we find that essentially it is the same as that which Abhinava speaks of as indeterminate knowledge (Nirvikalpa). It marks the beginning of the cognitive process. It admits of presentation mostly in negative terms. It is characterised by absence of all activities, which are the distinctive features of determinacy or mediacy. The negative feature is indicated by the prefix "Im" in immediacy and "Nir" in Nirvikalpa.

Determinacy, mediacy or Vikalpa is characterised by the activity of mind, (i) which brings a plurality of elements, which are distinct from one another, to unity and gives this unity a name, (ii) which splits the unity into multiplicity and (iii) which gives a definite meaning to the presented by first superimposing a number of things, similar in nature, on the presented and then, negating all the superimposed, determines the presented as distinct from all that is first superimposed.

Nirvikalpa, therefore, is that knowledge which is marked by absence of the three elements of the activity of mind. This negative distinction of immediacy from mediacy is referred to by Hegel when he talks of it as a knowledge, which is free from all conceptual activity, as a mere apprehension and involving no comprehension; as a knowledge, in dealing with which we proceed in an immediate way, merely accept what is given and do not change in any way what is presented before us. (Ph. M., 149.)

TWO TYPES OF IMMEDIACY.

Immediacy, according to Abhinava, is of two types (i) higher and (ii) lower. The higher is absolutely contentless.

It has no sensuous content. It is absolutely free from objective reference. It is pure consciousness in its ultimacy. It is free from all limitations. The lower immediacy, however, is to be found only in relation to sense-material. It is the experience of limited consciousness. It is the first moment in the process leading to perceptual knowledge. The former is "Śuddhāham pratyavamarśa" and the latter is "Aindriyaka Nirvikalpa".

The immediacy, of which Hegel talks in the present context, is the immediacy of the latter type. It is lower immediacy. It is due to the given. It is apprehension of the sensuous as it is presented before us. It is sense-certainty. It seems to be the truest, the most authentic knowledge, not because all its contents have been discovered, distinguished from one another as well as from all that may have any similarity with them, but because it has not yet dropped anything from the object.

It may be noted that Hegel is using the word "certainty" in conjunction with "sense", in a special sense. For, certainty (Niścaya) according to Abhinava, involves the knowledge of two; the one, that is distinguished as certain, and the other, from which it is distinguished; the one, that is first superimposed on the presented and then established as "not-this" from which the "this", which has certainty, is distinguished.

(Dvayāpekṣī viniścayaḥ).

RELATION BETWEEN IMMEDIACY AND MEDIACY.

There is a logical connection between immediacy and mediacy. There is a necessary sequence between them. Though these two moments or factors present themselves as distinct from each other, yet neither of them can be absent when the other is; neither can exist apart from the other.

To mediate is to take something as a beginning and to go onward to a second thing, so that the existence of this second thing depends on our having reached it from something else, contradistinguished from it.

This Hegelian view of relation between immediacy and mediacy as presented in his Logic p. 20, seems to be very similar to that pointed out by Abhinava between Nirvikalpa and Savikalpa. For, Abhinava also holds that all determinacy directly or indirectly has its root in indeterminacy. "Sarvasya vikalpasya sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā vikalpamūlatvāt." (I.P.V., Vol. I., 55.)

According to him, determinacy is of two types (i) subtle and (ii) gross. The former is involved even in the indeterminate apprehension of isolated sense-data, combination of which forms an object of determinate knowledge, as, for instance, in the case of quick reading or fast running. For, if there be no subtle determinacy in the above two cases, the runner cannot reach the destination, nor can the reader read intelligibly what is before him.

(Bh., Vol. I, 284.)

THE "I" AND THE "THIS" IN IMMEDIACY.

In the case of immediacy, 'consciousness' is pure ego; the "I" has not yet developed itself in conjunction with the "This", the object. It has not yet set thought to work about it in multiplicity of ways. It is free from all relations and qualities. It does not think. It is merely pure "This".

The object also is pure "This". It lacks all qualities and relations. It has not yet split itself into multiplicity of its elements. No category is applicable to it, excepting the highest, the "being". It merely "is" and nothing more.

At this stage not only the elements of both the "I" and the "This" are undistinguished, but they themselves also are

not distinct from each other. The "I" in such a case is as pure "This" and the object also is merely as pure "This".

MEDIACY.

When we do not simply receive what is given, but look at it more closely, a form of knowledge, which is next to immediacy in the order of evolution and constitutes the second stage in the dialectical process, is revealed to us. It is not pure immediacy. It is not mere sense-certainty. It is not pure being. It is a good deal more than that. It is concrete actual certainty of sense. It is no longer immediacy but mediacy.

Fundamental difference of this stage from the earliest lies in the fact that at this stage pure being breaks up into two 'thises'; one this as "I" and the other as "object". On reflecting over this distinction we discover that neither the one nor the other is immediate; neither merely "is". Both are mediated. The "I" has certainty through the actual fact. And the actual fact has certainty through the "I".

In immediacy there is no distinction between the "I" and the "this". Both the "I" and the "object" are mere "this". When, however, distinction arises, one of them is put forward as the essential reality and the other as non-essential. The "ego", a state of knowledge, is put forward as existing not in itself, but through another, the object, which it knows. The object is the real truth, the essential reality. It is quite indifferent to whether it is known or not. It remains even though it be not known. The knowledge, however, does not exist if the object be not there.

INTELLECT.

Determinacy consists in the use of some linguistic expression for the presented, in subsuming the object of sensuous

consciousness under a universal, which is introduced by the spontaneous activity[1] of mind, and in recognition of the universal in the particular. Thus, the object of determinate cognition is both universal and particular ; it is an individual and not an individual at the same time. Hence determinacy involves contradiction, because it is consciousness of universality and particularity in the same object. To get out of this contradiction, consciousness rises to a higher stage, i.e. the intellect. Intellect differentiates between the particular and the universal. It separates and puts them in two different worlds, (i) the supersensible world of universals and (ii) the sensible world of appearance. It regards the universals as true objects and the sensible objects as mere appearance. It regards the sensible world as a veil, which covers the true world of pure universals.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Self-consciousness is the second term in the triad of (i) consciousness proper (ii) self-consciousness and (iii) reason. It is the antithesis of consciousness proper. In the case of consciousness proper the object was independent of the subject, the opposite of 'self', not-self ; but in the stage of self-consciousness, the object, the world of universals, is not something alien to the subject, but identical with it. Self-consciousness, thus, consists in the realisation of identity of the subject with the world of universals. It manifests itself in the triad of (i) desire (ii) self-consciousness recognitive and (iii) universal self-consciousness.

MIND.

Mind is the last term of the triad, in which the subjective spirit manifests itself. Soul was characterised by immediacy, included all existence, had nothing outside it, had not even so

1. St., 343.

much as the feeling of anything external to it and was a state of undifferentiated simplicity. And consciousness was a state, which involved putting forth by the subjective spirit of a part of itself as something external and opposite to itself and, therefore, was characterised by mediacy. But the mind is merging of mediacy into immediacy ; it is a stage in the development of the subjective spirit, in which the object ceases to be an independent entity and is known as the spirit itself. This is the highest phase of the subjective spirit: for, here the spirit knows itself to be all reality, the object becomes the subject and all independent externality disappears. Mind has no relation with an external world. It is organic totality of its free activities in its own world. It finds its world within itself and all its activities refer to this world within itself. It splits itself into a triad of (i) theoretical mind (ii) practical mind and (iii) free mind.

(i) THEORETICAL MIND.

Intelligence or theoretical mind, finds itself determined. This is its apparent aspect from which it starts. It treats what is found determining[1] it as its own. It is concerned with empty forms. Its aim is to realise its concept, to be actual reason and to realise its content as rational.

Hegel definitely asserts that the view, that intelligence receives and accepts the impressions from outside and that ideas are caused by the operation of external things upon it, is utterly alien to the mental level of philosophic study.

Theoretical mind is the first term of the triad in which the mind manifests itself. It is, therefore, as is the case with the first term of every triad, characterised by immediacy. The content of the theoretical mind has apparent external existence, though in reality it is identical with mind itself. It is simply found existing as an external fact, to which the

1. Wal., 209-210.

activity of theoretical mind is directed. It is something which serves as an object of knowledge. Theoretical mind, therefore, is knowledge or cognition. It manifests itself in the triad of (i) intuition (ii) representation and (iii) thinking. Each of these represents graded rise of theoretical mind to realisation of identity of its content with itself.

INTUITION.

Intuition is characterised by immediacy. It is marked by the absence of all mediacy. The object of intuitive knowledge appears to be external to knowing subject. It is the most rudimentary stage of judgement, a stage, in which judgement can hardly be recognised as such. It is an immediate feeling of certainty that an external fact is as it appears to intuiting subject. At this stage no reply can be given to the question 'why is it so ?'. It is the lowest of free acts of mind. It is purely subjective. It is merely a subjective impression of the individual mind. It has no universality.

Intuition is the product of two free activities of theoretical mind (i) attention and (ii) self-externalisation. Attention is nothing but the act of directing mind along a definite and fixed line and concentrating it there. It is a free act of mind, in which mind is not influenced by any external consideration in the choice of direction of its cognitive activity. But mind at the stage of intuition is cognitive and, therefore, has objective reference. The object of intuition, however, is not such as exists in the objective world. The object, referred to, is a feeling that a certain religious, moral, or political fact is so, true or false. Possibility of attention, therefore, presupposes externalisation of the subjective feeling of the cognising subject so as to make it an object of attention. Self-externalisation of mind, as involved in intuition, consists in objectifying a subjective feeling and viewing it as existent and, therefore, in external temporal and spatial relations.

REPRESENTATION.

Representation is the second phase of theoretical mind. It is distinct from intuition in so far as it does not involve self-externalisation. It has no reference to an object in objective time and space. The content of mind at this stage is realised to be purely subjective, as it really is, and not as objective as in the case of intuition. It has three phases (i) recollection (ii) imagination and (iii) memory.

RECOLLECTION.

In dealing with the recollection, Hegel is concerned with accounting for the appearance of a general image, a universal, at the conscious level, which is necessary for the subsumption of the given under a universal for the rise of the determinate knowledge.

Looking at recollection from common sense point of view, Hegel admits that theoretical mind inwardises the content of 'intuition', frees it from its relation to objective time and space, from all relations with other things, and thus makes it into a generalised image and treasures it up in the subconscious. This generalised image, so treasured[1] up, is a presupposition of a determinate cognition, because it is the subsumption of immediate single impression under a universal that gives determinacy to knowledge. Thus, recollection is the appearance at the conscious level of that generalised image, which was stored in the subconscious, at the call of mind.

This image, however, in strict accordance with Hegelian doctrine, is not something entirely alien to knowing subject. It is not foreign material that enters into ego and persists there in some form. Hegel is an idealist. Accordingly he maintains that the theoretical mind, which is so rich in its subconscious possession, is the potentiality of its own specialisation[2].

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1. Wal., 216.   2. Wal., 215.

Thus, when Hegel says that the transient image of sense-perception retires into subconscious, what he means is that the potential, that became actual at the time of sense-perception, sinks back into potentiality. This image is free from all relations with other particular things and, therefore, is not particular but universal. It is an unspecified image in the subconscious. New impressions are subsumed under it. No knowledge is complete unless this subsumption has taken place. All knowledge, therefore, is recognitive. Hence recollection in Hegelian philosophy is inner objectification of the potential, which became actual.

IMAGINATION.

Imagination is another form of representation. It differs from recollection inasmuch as in it the rise of the subconscious to conscious level is not confined to an isolated image for the sake of subsumption of a given particular under a universal, but there is a continuous flow of images from the subconscious, which are not directly related to any given external object. The images are linked together by association. This link of association may be constituted by something pictorial, such as likeness and contrast, or by an intellectual category, such as reason and consequent. The emergence of train of images is free from control of reason and has no external purpose.

Imagination is of two kinds (i) creative or productive and (ii) reproductive. The reproductive is so called because it can bring to consciousness only those images, which are generalised forms of determinate cognitions, which the imagining subject has actually had; and because it can reproduce only such images as have already been found associated in actual experience. But creative or productive imagination is not thoroughly dependent on generalised images in the subconscious. It is the source of new ideas, which

admit of material presentation. Creations of productive imagination are harmonious combinations of what springs independently in mind with what is given from outside and stored in the subconscious in a generalised form. The images so produced are bare subjective intuitions.

Imagination, as a unifier of self-produced idea with matter, got from outside, is reason, but only nominal reason, inasmuch as it is indifferent to truth or falsity of the combination. For, true reason insists upon the truth of matter so combined. This is the Hegelian view of the poetic or æsthetic imagination. But the productive imagination, which is responsible for the rise of a system of signs, may be presented as follows :—

Product of imagination is fusion of an independent creation of imagination with an intuition. The matter of intuition is something that is given. But in this fusion intuition does not stand for itself, but for something else. It is a sign of an independent creation of imagination, which has entered into intuitive image as its soul.

Imagination is thus responsible for the rise of a system of signs which, when fully developed, becomes language. Language may, therefore, be looked upon as a product of imagination for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.

MEMORY.

The Linguistic expression, is a thing which exists in external world. When it is received in consciousness, it is subjected to the same process of generalisation as any other thing, got from outside, and becomes a general image in the subconscious. It is fused with the universal, for which it stands. When, therefore, generalised image of a word is brought from subconscious to conscious level, it does the work of sensuous image, for which it stands and which is fused

with it. Memory is nothing but representation in verbal image.

(ii) PRACTICAL MIND.

When mind regards the world, not as something perfectly alien to itself, but as something that is to be moulded and determined by it, and accordingly proceeds to mould the world by its activity, it is called practical mind. It manifests itself in a triad of (i) practical feeling (ii) impulses and choice and (iii) happiness.

PRACTICAL FEELING.

It is the first phase of practical mind and, therefore, is characterised by immediacy. It finds its content as something already given to it. The given may be in harmony or out of harmony with it. Neither is a product of practical mind. Both are simply found. Harmony of the given with mind is feeling of pleasure and lack of harmony is pain.

Mind, as affected by the given, whether it be in harmony with it or otherwise, is only an instinct to action, a mere feeling towards a certain given object. Such a feeling is not governed by any universal principle ; it is not a decision to act upon a principle. For, it is characterised by immediacy, but being influenced by a universal principle means mediation. Such a feeling is called practical feeling.

IMPULSES, PASSIONS AND CHOICE.

The practical mind or will is characterised by freedom. It is, therefore, against the very nature of will to be simply a passive recipient of whatever is given to it, whether it is in or out of harmony with it. It is in the nature of will not to leave things as it finds them, but to mould them so as to make them conform to it. Therefore, it develops the propensities to act so as to alter the shape of what it finds. These propensities are called impulses, inclinations or interests.

But 'will' is a concrete universal. The multiplicity of impulses is its content. Therefore, it distinguishes itself from its impulses. Hence there arises the element of choice in the life of will. It chooses one particular impulse to react to the given.

If 'will' chooses one particular impulse, is restricted to one special mode of volition[1], in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged and so is thoroughly identified with one of its modes, it is called passion or emotion. Emotion involves throwing of the whole soul, all interests of intellect, talent, character and enjoyment on one aim and object. Nothing good and great can ever be achieved without it. Impulse and passion are the very life-blood of action. They are needed if the subject is ever to realise any great aim.

(iii) FREE MIND.

Will is universal. It is pure identity or universality, I—I. Impulses are the contents of will. And satisfaction of will consists in conformity of its object to itself. It is, therefore, not possible for it to attain satisfaction in impulsive or emotive life. For, each impulse is only a particular and is related to an object which also is a particular. How can there be true satisfaction so long as the object of will is a particular? For, there can be no harmony between the universal and the particular. The true satisfaction can be got only if the object of will be a universal. For, then alone there can be harmony. But will itself is a universal. Therefore, when it has itself for its object, it attains perfect satisfaction. The will, that has itself for its object, is self-determined and self-centred and, therefore, free. Such a will Hegel calls *free mind.*

OBJECTIVE SPIRIT.

The will, the acting ego, can find no satisfaction in any particular impulse. Not being satisfied by gratification of one

1. Wal., 234.

impulse, it seeks satisfaction through another, but to no better effect. It is, therefore, led to will the universal. One point, however, has to be remembered in this connection, namely, that the will is universal ; it is ego in the phase of acting, it is the I—I, a simple unity with itself and as such simple universality. But in spite of this simple universality it is itself an individual. For, it is subjective and, therefore, it is simply this "I". In willing the universal it wills what transcends its subjectivity ; it wills the objective. It exerts itself in material world and moulds it into a new world of its own. Thus, various human institutions, such as law, morality, state etc. come into being. They are not merely objective but spiritual. For, they are the expressions of spirit itself in the material world. The spirit, therefore, which manifests itself in human institutions is the objective spirit.

ABSOLUTE SPIRIT.

Both the subjective spirit and the objective spirit are defective. The former is simply inward, personal, individual and, therefore, onesided. The latter also is no less onesided. For, it is impersonal and merely objective and it has lost the true characteristic of spirit, consciousness. The subjective and the objective spirits are thus two opposite extremes; each limits the other. Both are, therefore, finite. But spirit by its nature is infinite. It is, therefore, necessary that it should transcend both the finite subjectivity and the finite objectivity. Thus, when the spirit transcends the subjective finiteness no less than the objective, when the self-created division between its subjectivity and objectivity is annihilated, when both are embraced in a concrete unity, Absolute Spirit arises. It is both subject and object at the same time.

ABSOLUTE SPIRIT AS MODE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS.

Absolute Spirit, as unity of both subjective and

objective spirits, cannot be purely impersonal existence like state. Because of the element of subjectivity in it, it has necessarily to be a mode of human consciousness in human mind, which has reference to an object. But the object, to which the subjective aspect of Absolute Spirit refers, cannot be any other than Spirit itself. For, Absolute Spirit is the stage of identity of subject and object ; in Absolute Spirit distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is completely annihilated ; it is concrete unity of both. Absolute Spirit, therefore, is the Spirit in contemplation of itself and as such it is infinite. When human mind realizes that whatever presents itself as an object is nothing but itself, when it realizes that it is all being and all reality, when it is self-centred in self-contemplation, it attains the stage of Absolute Spirit.

ART AS A PHASE OF ABSOLUTE SPIRIT.

Apprehension of the Absolute takes place under three modes of human mind, which constitute three phases of Absolute Spirit. They are (i) art (ii) religion and (iii) philosophy. They are the progressive stages of liberation of human mind from finitude. In art and religion some traces of finitude still cling to Spirit. For, in art the Absolute is realised through sensuous medium and in religion it is realised through feeling. It is, therefore, in philosophy only, which rises above the level of both sense and feeling and which is concerned with thought, that the Absolute is realised in perfect freedom.

ART AND BEAUTY.

Hegel distinguishes between art and beauty. Art is simply a stage of the Absolute Spirit in its onward march to the realisation of its true infinity in philosophic spirit. It is a mode of human mind, in which there is identity between the subject and the object, in which the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is annihilated and in

which mind contemplates itself in its freedom and as such is infinite and attains the stage of the Absolute Spirit. It is characterised by immediacy. It apprehends the Absolute in the guise of external sense-objects.

But Beauty is the Absolute as it shines through the veil of the sense-world. It is the Absolute, as apprehended in and through an actual thing, present to senses, such as a statue, a building or a musical note, or at least a mental image of sensuous object, as in poetry. The sensuous object, through which the Absolute shines, is *Beautiful*. Beautiful object addresses itself to the senses as well as the mind. For, a mere sensuous object is not beautiful. It is beautiful only when mind sees the Absolute shining through it. Beauty is Ideal, because it is nothing but the Idea (Absolute) sensuously apprehended. However, it is not the Idea, as it is in itself ; it is not pure thought, as it is apprehended by pure thought, philosophy ; but a special form of the Idea as sensuously apprehended.

PROBLEM OF ÆSTHETICS IN HEGEL.

In the course of a bird's-eye view of Hegelian metaphysics we have shown how the Absolute Spirit manifests itself into a triad of (i) art, (ii) religion and (iii) philosophy and how art is characterised by immediacy. In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel devotes just one section to art. The detailed treatment of the problem of art is to be found in his Philosophy of Fine Art.

The immediacy[1] of art produces the factor of finitude in art. It is concrete contemplation and mental picture of the Absolute Spirit as embodied in sensuous form. It breaks up, manifests itself, into (i) a world of realised beauty, in arts and their works (ii) the subject that produces works of art and (iii) the subject that contemplates products of arts. Thus, Hegel

1. Wal., 293.

in the course of his treatment of the problem of Æsthetics shows (i) the essential nature of æsthetic experience (ii) the essential subjective conditions for the production of work of art (iii) the mental outfit necessary for apprehension of beauty through the medium of work of art and (iv) the essential constituents of products of art and how they are related.

Before taking up these definite points of view, from which Hegel approaches the problem of art, let us consider a few allied topics, an elucidation of which is absolutely necessary for understanding his theory of art: e.g. (i) meaning of "Æsthetic" in Hegel (ii) comparative position of beauty of nature and art (iii) place of art in Hegelian system (iv) formal character of art as appearance (v) place of form of art in the world of appearance and (vi) highest function of art.

MEANING OF "ÆSTHETIC" IN HEGEL.

The word "Æsthetic", adopted by Baumgarten, meant "the science of the senses or emotion", according to Hegel. For, during the period of Wolffian philosophy, works of art in Germany were studied with reference to feelings of pleasure, admiration, fear, pity etc. which they aroused in the connoisseur. In ordinary life, however, we are accustomed to speak of a beautiful colour, a beautiful heaven, a beautiful flower, a beautiful animal and above all a beautiful human being; and æsthetics is regarded as the science of the beautiful. The subject-matter, therefore, of this science is taken to be co-extensive with the entire realm of the beautiful.

But Hegel uses the word "Æsthetic" in a restricted sense. He means by it the science or rather philosophy of art, more particularly of fine art. Accordingly he entitled his work, in which he deals with different problems of æsthetics, "Philosophy of Fine Art".

BEAUTY OF NATURE AND ART.

According to Kant, products of both, fine art and Nature, could be judged as beautiful. Kantian theory of æsthetics, therefore, covered both. He held that Nature could be judged as beautiful, if it looks like[1] art ; and art could similarly be viewed if it looks like Nature. But Hegel excludes the beauty of Nature from his exposition of the beautiful. He confines himself to the treatment of the beautiful, which is the product of mind and which, therefore, is higher than that which is the creation of Nature. His view that beauty of art is higher than that of nature, is based on his triadic system. We remember that the whole Hegelian system deals with a single triad of idea, nature and spirit; that the first is characterised by immediacy, the second by mediacy and the third by merging of mediacy into immediacy; and that every succeeding term of a triad represents a higher stage in the manifestation of the Absolute than the preceding. Nature, therefore, and her phenomena stand lower than the Spirit and its creations. Hence he holds that the spiritual beauty is higher than the natural beauty. And because he concerns himself with the highest beauty, he excludes beauty of Nature from the field of his investigation.

Ordinary people, however, think that a work of art is inferior to products of nature inasmuch as the former possesses no feeling of its own. It is not through and through living. Regarded as an external object it is a dead thing. And it is usual to regard what is living to be higher than that which is dead.

Hegel admits that work of art is not alive in as far as it is not capable of movement and that it attains merely to a show of animation on its surface ; below it there is nothing more than wood, canvas or stone or, in the case of poetry, idea in the medium of speech or letters. But he holds that it is

1. Ber., 187.

not the external existence which makes a work a creation of fine art. The external aspect is the least important. A work of art is only truly such in so far as it originates in human spirit and continues to belong to the same. And everything, which partakes of spirit is better than anything begotten of mere nature. What art does is that it brings into special prominence an interest vital to man, the spiritual values, which a single event, one individual character, one action possesses in its final issue, with such purity and clarity as is not possible in the sphere of the pure creation of nature. Hence work of art is higher than product of nature.

Superiority of the products of nature to those of art is tried to be established in another way. It is said that the objects of nature are the creations of God, while those of art are simply of man. Hegel[1] criticises this view by pointing out that it is based on the false assumption that God is not working in and through man and that His sphere of activity is limited to nature alone. The fact, on the contrary, is (according to the Hegelian as well as the Śaiva philosophy) that Divinity is operative in the creation of art in a mode that is nearer to its essential nature than in anything, brought into being or fashioned in natural process. For, not only there is Divinity in man but it is also operative in a form, which partakes more of the true nature of God than that which works in nature. God is spirit, and it is only in man that He manifests Himself in a spiritual form, which is fully conscious of the activity, in which He manifests His ideal presence. Art is the ideal; and God manifests the ideal in a more direct way than the real. For, art is manifested through the medium of finite mind, which is self-conscious and so possesses the Divine nature in a higher degree than the unconscious sensuous medium in nature.

1. Ph. A., Vol. I. 39-40.

PLACE OF ART IN HEGELIAN SCHEME.

Hegel recognises three levels in human experience (i) sensuous (ii) supersensuous and (iii) rational. The experience at the sensuous level is due to contact with external objects of Nature. It is the level, at which we live in the course of our daily routine. The experience at the supersensuous level is independent of sense-contact. It is due, not to sensation, but to the rise of the reflecting consciousness above the sensuous level. It implies freedom of reflecting consciousness from sensuous reality and finitude. At the supersensuous level, the mind, in its freedom from sensuous reality and finitude, brings into being the works of fine art from the wealth of its own resources.[1] This is the level of artistic intuition. The content of experience at this level comes from the inner resources of mind and not from nature. This level is midway between the sensuous and the rational. It bridges the gulf between the two. Thus, the place of art in Hegelian scheme is higher than that of sensuous reality, but lower than that of Reason.

FORMAL CHARACTER OF ART AS APPEARANCE.

Art has two aspects (i) content and (ii) form. The formal aspect of art is appearance. But such an admission, according to Hegel, does not imply condemnation of art. For, appearance also has a right to be ; it has its own locus standi ; it has its recognised position. It is essential to actuality ; because truth is no truth, reality is no reality, unless it appears. Art, therefore, is not condemnable simply because it has formal aspect. The formal aspect is essential to art, because through it art makes actual what is essentially real and true. It is in the medium of appearance that art gives determinate existence[2] to its creations.

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1. Ph. A., Vol. I. 9.
2. Ph. A., Vol. I. 10.

PLACE OF FORM OF ART IN THE WORLD OF APPEARANCE.

Hegel admits that form of art belongs to the sphere of appearance. But he distinguishes appearances from one another. He compares and contrasts the appearance or form of art with external objective world and inward sensuous life or the world of emotions, both of which are appearances. He holds that reality or truth is concealed more by the forms of empirical world—the objective world and the world of emotions—than by the forms of the world of art. In the forms of art truth dominates. Truth is better manifested by the forms of art than by the forms of empirical world. For, our experience, which is related to forms of empirical world, is conditioned by so many subjective and objective facts that truth or reality, that underlies them, remains unrealised. But the experience, which is stimulated by a form of art, is unconditioned. In art-experience, reality is not obscured by any condition and, therefore, it is clearly manifest.

In comparison with the appearance of immediate sensuous existence, the form of art possesses this advantage that, in its own virtue, it points beyond itself, directing us to what is spiritual, which it seeks to envisage to the conceptive mind. The immediate appearance does not point beyond itself; on the contrary, it gives itself out to be the true and real, though truth is contaminated and obstructed by the immediate sensuous appearance.

FORM OF ART AND PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT.

The form of art is contrasted with the philosophic thought and religious and ethical principles: because the mode[1] of revelation, attained by a content in the realm of thought, is the truest reality. Hence Hegel admits that art, in respect of both,

1. Ph. A., Vol. I. 11.

its content and form, though higher than the immediate appearance, yet is neither the highest nor most absolute mode of bringing the true interests of our spiritual life to consciousness. The form of art limits its expressive power to a definite content only to the exclusion of the rest. Such content "must have the power in its determinate character to go out freely into sensuous shape and remain adequate to itself therein". There is, however, a profounder grasp of truth which art is incapable of expressing in the sensuous medium. Thus, while the conception of the gods of Greece admits of artistic expression, "the Christian conception of truth" does not.

END OF ARTISTIC PRODUCTION.

In attempting the problem of the end, that artist has in creating a work of art, Hegel follows his usual historical method. He states the various ends, which were admitted to be the guiding principles of artistic creations by his predecessors, and criticises them, before stating his own view on the subject. He states and criticises the views that aim of artistic production is (I) imitation of nature (II) presentation of emotion of every kind (III) mitigation of the savagery of desires (IV) purification of passions or (V) moral improvement of the spectator.

I. THEORY OF IMITATION.

Exponents of imitation of nature as the end of artistic production hold (i) that artist aims at copying the objects of nature in such a manner that his products most fully correspond to actual facts ; (ii) that he brings about a bare repetition a second time, so far as his means permit, of all that exists in the external world precisely in the manner, in which it exists externally ; and (iii) that such an imitation, if successful in exact presentation of nature, affords complete satisfaction.

CRITICISM.

(1) Acceptance of the theory of imitation, as presented above, means denial of an independent value to art. According to this, the aim of art comes to be a bare repetition of what is already there in the external world.

(2) The exact correspondence of a product of art with the external reality is impossible; because art is limited in its means of representation. It can produce at the most only one of the sensuous aspects and thus can erect an illusion, addressed to one sense only. The external objects are objects of various senses in their different sensuous aspects, touch, taste, smell etc. But creations of art are imitations of one sensuous aspect only, namely, that which is addressed to the eye or the ear. Hence on the sensuous side they are very much inferior to objects of nature.

(3) A work of art[1], produced in accordance with the principle of imitation, would be lifeless or soulless, inasmuch as imitation is possible only of what is sensed i e. objectively known. The soul-life does not admit of objective apprehension. No imitation of it is, therefore, possible.

(4) Imitation can at the most produce illusion such as for a little while may arouse the same flood of feelings and emotions as does the real. But as soon as disillusionment comes, one feels tired and sick of such presentation.

(5) If imitation be accepted as the end of art, it would mean that content of the beautiful is a matter of indifference. It will abolish the distinction between beauty and ugliness. It will deprive art of all standards to distinguish between beauty and ugliness.

(6) The principle of imitation, in the sense of exact copy, does not apply to all arts. It may apply to painting and

1. Ph. A., Vol. I. 58.

sculpture, but surely it will have to exclude architecture and poetry. For, they are not mere copies of what already exists in the same form in nature.

II. PRESENTATION OF EVERY KIND OF EMOTION NOT THE TRUE AIM OF ARTIST.

Hegel rejects the view that the content of works of art is all that human spirit can conceive or perceive and that its object is to arouse and give life to slumbering emotions, passions and inclinations of every description, to fill the heart to the brim, to compel mankind to pass through all that human soul carries in its most intimate and mysterious chambers, to interpret for us misfortune and misery and wickedness and crime, to make the heart of man thoroughly realise all that is atrocious and dreadful no less than every kind of pleasure and blessedness, and last of all, to start the imagination in the world of fancy 'to revel in the seductive mirage of vision and emotion, which so captivate the senses'. According to this view, work of art presents the stimulus, that is responsible for such experience, not on the plane of actual world, but only through the semblance of it i.e. through illusion, which art creates and substitutes for the actual world. And possibility of such experience by means of semblances of art, depends on the fact that all reality, in order that it may enter into the emotional life and the will, must pass through the medium of vision and imaginative idea. For, in a passage through imaginative idea, it is immaterial whether it is the immediate external reality that claims the attention of man or the result is effected by means of symbols, images and ideas, which display the content of such actuality.

The awakening of every kind of emotion, making the soul pass through every content of life by means of a presentation, which is external as an illusion, is rejected by Hegel, as the end of artistic production. No less does he discard the view

that art is to imprint on mind the good and the evil in order to strengthen it in the pursuit of what is good and to dissuade it from following the evil. For, the task, proposed above, is purely of formal character. According to this view, all that art can offer is only an empty form for all possible ideal and formative contents. But art does not possess the formal aspect of bringing before our senses every kind of material to awaken every kind of emotion. The reason for this may be stated as follows :—

Such diverse emotions and ideas, as the aforesaid view maintains to be the aim of artistic production to arouse, intersect and mutually contradict and cancel each other. If the aim, that the artist has in his productive activity, be simply the arousal of conflicting passions in the spectator, it will enlarge the cleavage in passions and feelings and thus will produce more disorder in the emotional life than harmony.

III. MITIGATION OF SAVAGERY OF DESIRES AND PASSIONS.

The higher and more universal purpose of art is supposed by some to be the mitigation of savagery of mere desires. The savagery or coarseness of desire arises from unmitigated self-seeking of the sensuous impulses, which are intent upon the satisfaction of their concupiscence (sexual desire or desire for worldly things). The sensuous desires are all the more brutal inasmuch as they are able to appropriate the entire man. The result is that a man, under the influence of sensuous desire, entirely loses his capacity to separate himself in his universal capacity from this determining condition and to maintain the conscious presence of such universality. The savageness of passion, from which the savagery of desire arises, therefore, consists in identification of the ego, as such a universal principle, with the limited content of desire, so that man loses his volitional power outside this single passion.

Art mitigates such savageness of passion in the following ways :—

Art, by means of its presentation, brings home to the mind and the imagination of the spectator what he actually feels and carries into effect in such a condition. It places before the vision of mind *pictures of passions* and so brings before man's intelligence what apart from such presentments he merely is. By means of artistic presentation of passions, inclinations and impulses, man contemplates them. In such contemplation he sees them outside himself ; and because they come before him rather objectively than as a part of himself, he begins to be free from them as aliens.

Consequently the mitigation[1] of violence of passions admits of this general explanation, that man by means of contemplation, is released from the unmediated confinement in a passion or emotion, becomes aware of it as a thing external to himself and so places himself in an ideal relation with it.

IV. PURIFICATION OF PASSIONS.

We have dealt with Aristotle's theory of Katharsis in a preceding chapter. It is just that which Hegel refers to and criticises. Theory of purification of passions as the end of artistic production has the same defect as the mitigation of savagery of desires and passions has, namely, it gives art a formal and not a constituent principle ; it denies an independent value to art and reduces it to a mere means to an end that is external to it. According to this, a work of art ceases to exist for its own sake and comes to exist for the sake of an external end.

V. INSTRUCTION.

Instruction consists in the presentation of the ideal of duty. It aims at producing moral perfection in the lover of art.

1. Ph. A., Vol. I, 68.

ITS CRITICISM.

If we accept instruction as the end of art, the question arises whether it should be direct or indirect, explicit or implicit, in a work of art. Answer to this can be no other than that instruction has to be explicit in a work of art. For, if this end is to be universal rather than contingent, it must be true in virtue of its own nature and on its own account. And instruction can be spoken of as such a purpose or such an end of art, only in so far as a genuine and essentially explicit content is brought before mind by means of a work of art. This would mean that it is the function of art to accept such content within its compass in proportion to the nobility of its rank. That is, the higher the rank of a work of art, the more it ought to have the instructive content. Goodness or otherwise of a work of art will, accordingly, have to be judged on the basis of this genuine and essentially explicit content. In short, if instruction be taken to be the universal purpose of art, a work of art should have as its essential content the maxims or universal propositions. But we find that only one of so many fine arts can have this explicit content, namely, poetry or drama. Hence, on this principle, painting, sculpture and all other fine arts will cease to be so.

Further, if instruction be the universal end of art and, therefore, the content of art be constituted by maxims or universal propositions, in an explicit, rather than implicit manner; the sensuous, the plastic configuration, which makes an artistic product a work of art, will be reduced to a mere ineffective accessory. The sensuous in that case will be merely a husk, a semblance, which is expressly posited as nothing but shell. Such a position means complete misunderstanding of work of art. For, a work of art is nothing but universal concretised and ought not to bring before the imaginative vision a content in its universality. The

universality has rather to be presented under the mode of individual concreteness and distinctive particular sensuality.

Thus, if we accept instruction as the universal end of art and present it as the essential content of art, the unity of work of art will be completely destroyed; the particular object of sense and the ideal content apprehended by mind will become external to each other.

The acceptance of instruction as the end of art means abandonment of the other aspect of art, namely, delight, entertainment and diversion. For, it means regarding the aspect of delight as unessential. This amounts to saying that art does not carry the purpose in itself but that it subserves as a means to something external to it.

CONCEPTION OF MORALITY AND MORAL IMPROVEMENT AS THE END OF ART.

In order to appreciate the full value of the moral end of art, let us find out the precise standpoint of morality, which is recommended for our acceptance by this view. If we examine the enlightened conception of morality, we find that it does not coincide with that which we describe in a general way as virtue, respectability, uprightness and so on. For, according to the enlightened conception of morality, to be respectable and honest is not sufficient to make a man moral. For, morality implies reflection and definite consciousness of what is consonant with duty, and the acts, which issue from such consciousness. And duty is the law of will, which man freely establishes for himself. A man is moral in so far as he does the duty for duty's sake, and acts under the conviction that what he does is good. This law is abstract universal of the will, which is absolute antithesis to nature. It is antithesis to what is collectively described as emotional life and heart, including impulses of sense, selfish interests and passions.

There is opposition between the law and the emotive life. In this opposition one side is regarded as negating the other. Both of them are present in the individual. In their opposition, he is compelled to choose one and to reject the other. Such a choice and the act, done in accordance with it, are moral in virtue of free conviction of duty, of the victory secured over the emotive life and of noble feelings and higher impulses.

Thus, the ethical theory, on which the view of moral end of art is based, starts from the fixed opposition between the will in its spiritual universality and its sensuous natural particularity. Morality, therefore, according to it, does not consist in perfected mediation of these opposite aspects, but in their mutual conflict which demands that impulses in their antagonism to duty ought to yield to it. This opposition appears in mind as a conflict between the sensuous and the spiritual in man; as a conflict of spirit with flesh.

The problem, therefore, is whether such a fundamental antagonism can be the essential and wholly expressed truth and the final and supreme consummation? Natural answer of philosophy to this would be "No". Neither the one side nor the other in its onesided abstractness should be held to possess truth. They contain within themselves the principle of their dissolution. Truth comes only in the mediation and reconciliation of both. Hence Hegel rejects the view that moral improvement is the final goal of art as propounded in the light of the enlightened conception of morality, presented above. To this may be added the common reason for rejection of all external ends, that admission of such an end will mean that every work of art has to be regarded as existing for something else, i. e. it has an external end, and as such it is merely a useful instrument in the realisa-

tion of an end, which possesses real and independent importance outside the realm of art.

According to Hegel, the function of art is to *reveal the truth* under the mode of sensuous or material configuration, to display the reconciled antithesis between spirit and flesh, or soul and nature, and finally to prove that art possesses its final aim in itself. He holds that art ought not to make the immoral and its advance its end. But it is one thing to make immorality the aim of its presentation, and another not expressly to do so in the case of morality. It is possible to deduce excellent moral from any piece of art, but such a deduction depends on the particular interpretation and so upon the individual, who draws the moral.

He rejects the moral improvement as the end of art, because it does not simply mean that a moral should be conceivably deducible from work of art through interpretation; but it means that the moral instruction should be clearly made to emerge as substantive aim of art and that all subjects, characters, actions and events, which fail to be moral, should be excluded from the products of art.

HIGHEST FUNCTION OF ART.

There is no doubt about it that art can be utilised as a mere pastime. It can be used as a means of pleasure and amusement. It can be used in decoration of surroundings. As such, art is not independent and free[1]; it is subservient to an external end. But art, or rather fine art, is not art in the true sense of the term, unless it is free from such subserviency, until it is free. The highest function of art is to bring to consciousness of the connoisseur, the Divine, the profoundest interests of mankind, the spiritual

1. Ph. A., Vol. I, 8.

truths of widest range and the richest intuitions and ideas, through its modes or forms. The highest function of art is the same as that of religion or philosophy.[1] Art is distinct from religion or philosophy only in so far as it presents the Divine, the most exalted subject-matter, in sensuous form. It is closer to our sensitive and emotional life than religion and philosophy.

Having thus thrown a little light on the topics, allied to art, let us take up the various essential problems which arise, because of the manifestation of Art-Spirit into arts and their works, artist and connoisseur.

WORK OF ART FOR SENSE-APPREHENSION.

Work of Art is produced for sense-apprehension and, therefore, it has necessarily to be presented in sensuous medium. It is presented to sensuous apprehension exactly as the objective world. It is, however, not exclusively addressed to sensuous apprehension. It is fundamentally addressed to mind. It is intended to affect and in some way to satisfy mind. It is not intended to be a natural product i. e. to possess the living principle of nature. The sensuous aspect of a work of art has a right to determinate existence only in so far as it exists for human mind and not as a material object, which exists for itself independently.

ARTISTIC RELATION DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER OBJECTIVE RELATIONS.

The following are the relations, in which the sensuous material is presented to man :—

(a) SENSUOUS RELATION.

It is a common experience that when mind has been overstrained so as to lose the capacity for active interest in

1. **Ph. A., Vol. I, 9.**

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what affects the senses, we simply look round and see and hear whatever comes to eyes or ears, without exercising our mental faculty on what so comes to consciousness. In such a case there is sensuous relation.

(b) RELATION TO DESIRE.

Mind, however, is so made that, unless it is too much overstrained as in the above case, it is not satisfied with merely sensuous apprehension of external objects. It makes them objects to its own inward nature. It relates itself to them as *Desire*. In this relation of *Desire*, the appetitive relation, to the external world, man in his physical form, stands in relation of opposition to things in general and particulars. He does not approach them with open mind and universal ideas of thought. He, with his personal impulses and interests, retains an isolated position, relates himself to objects, in their isolation, and uses or rather sacrifices them for his own satisfaction.

In this relation of desire, merely superficial show of the external objects is not sufficient. It needs actual things themselves in their material concrete existence. Mere pictures are of no use in this relation.

The individual also, in this relation of desire, is not free, (i) because he is under the restraint of transitory interest of his desire, inasmuch as his definite acts do not proceed from essential rationality and universality of his will and (ii) because he is not free in relation to the external world, inasmuch as his desire is determined by things and is related to them.

(c) THEORETICAL RELATION.

Another way, in which the externally present is related to conscious subject, is purely theoretical. Theoretical relation seeks to attain to the knowledge of the related in their universality and not in their particularity, to find out their

ideal nature and universal principle and to comprehend them according to their notional idea. It leaves the particular things as they are and stands aloof from them in their objective singularity.

The intelligence is not the property of a particular individual, as is the desire. It appertains to his singularity as itself essentially universal. In the theoretical relation (the relation of universality) to objects, intelligence is the reason in its universal potency. In this relation, the rational intelligence attempts to discover itself in nature and thereby the inward and essential being of natural objects. Intelligence proceeds towards the universal, the law, the thought and the notion of the object, and so forsakes the immediate singularity of the object and transforms it within the world of mind, converting a concrete object of sense into an abstract subject-matter of thought.

(d) ARTISTIC RELATION.

A work of art is related to conscious subject in a manner different from those, involved in all the cases, which have been discussed so far. The distinction may be stated as follows :—

The artistic relation is contrasted with the relation of desire. For, in the former case, connoisseur allows the object to exist in its free independence as an object. He looks at it without any craving. In this relation the object is reflective of himself ; in it he finds himself. It exists solely for the contemplative faculty of mind. It is because of this that although a work of art possesses sensuous existence, yet it does not require sensuous concrete existence, nor the animated life. It is rather necessary that it should not remain on the level of nature ; because its purpose is to satisfy higher spiritual need by shutting doors on all approaches to mere desire.

It is also contrasted with theoretical relation. For, contemplation of art restricts its interest to the manner in which a work of art is manifested as a single isolated vision of the whole. It does not go far beyond the immediately received objective character. It does not think of the object in terms of the rational and universal notion, that underlies it, nor does it enter into conceptive thinking, as does the scientific contemplation.

Thus, while the scientific contemplation is concerned to transform the object in terms of universal thought and notion, the artistic contemplation cherishes the interest for the object in its isolated existence. The subjective aspect, involved in the contemplation of art, may be spoken of as 'pure intelligence', as contrasted with that, involved in the scientific contemplation, which, according to Hegel, is rational[1] intelligence.

SENSUOUS ASPECT OF WORK OF ART.

The discussion, carried on in the preceding pages, shows that though the sensuous matter is present in a work of art, it is neither the concrete material stuff, which is the object of desire, nor is it the universal thought, which the mind seeks for in theoretical relation.

The sensuous material in a work of art aims at giving sensuous presence which, though it persists in its sensuousness, is entitled to be delivered from the framework of purely material substance. Hence, as compared to the immediacy of nature, the sensuous presence in a work of art is transmuted to mere semblance or show. A work of art[2] thus occupies a midway ground, with the directly perceived objective world on the one hand and the ideality of pure thought on the other.

1. Ph. A., Vol. I, 50
2. Ph. A., Vol. I, 52.

This is what Abhinava means when he talks of the æsthetic object as Alaukika (unworldly).

THE SOUL OF ARTISTIC PRESENTATION.

A work of art has two aspects :

(a) content or subject-matter and

(b) the mode of its presentation.

From the point of view of the artist, it is an expression of a subjective aspect in the medium of his art ; and from that of the art-critic or contemplator, it is a means of recognition of this subjective aspect, so expressed. The latter, therefore, begins with the observation of what is presented and then proceeds to ascertain its content or significance. The perceptible is of no real importance to him. It is simply a means to the realisation or recognition of the inward ideality or significance, which is behind it, to which it points or attests and which enlivens it.

The external of a work of art is of the nature of written or spoken symbol, which has no value apart from its pointing to the meaning, for which it stands. It has the same value for the contemplator as a medium has for a mystic. Similarly expression of eyes, colour of face, freshness of skin, manner of breathing etc. in an artistic presentation are the means of revelation of the purely subjective, which is the significance or soul. And the contemplation is no contemplation unless and until it involves recognition of this soul of the presentation.

WORK OF ART AS NECESSARY PRODUCT OF THINKING CONSCIOUSNESS.

The essential form of art arises from the fact that man is thinking consciousness and renders explicit to himself in the medium of his conscious life what he is and all that exists. The difference between man and objects of nature

is mainly this, that while the latter do not know themselves and others, man does. This, however, does not mean that he is not an object of nature, but only this that his being an object of nature is only one and the least important aspect of him. In this conscious aspect i. e. as mind, he reduplicates himself; he observes himself and presents himself to the eyes of imagination and thought.

Man knows himself[1] through self-reproduction in two ways (i) theoretically and (ii) practically :-

(i) He knows himself theoretically by bringing to his consciousness the whole of his spiritual life, that is, all that moves, surges up and strives in human heart, because there is natural impulse in him (a) to make himself an object of perception or conception, (b) to regard himself as that which thought discovers as essential and (c) to recognise himself in all that he summons out of himself as also in that which is received from without.

(ii) The other way, in which self-recognition is effected, is through practical activity. For, man has also the impulse to assert himself in all that which is presented to him in immediacy, in that which is external to himself. He asserts himself by altering the external so as to imprint the seal of his inner life upon it and thus to rediscover in it the features of his own determinate nature. All this he does simply to free the external from the extremely alien element, so that in the configuration he may enjoy an external reality simply of himself.

The self-reproductive tendency is perceptible even in children in their play. This is what accounts for various methods of ornamentation of person by changing the body in different ways, cutting hair, slitting ears for putting on orna-

1. Ph. A., Vol. I. 41.

ments etc. The highest effect of this tendency is the human art.

BASIS OF DIVISION OF ART INTO DIFFERENT TYPES.

Hegel attempts the division of art from three points of view. We have already stated that art presents the Absolute in a material medium. Every work of art, therefore, has two aspects, (i) unity and (ii) plurality of differences. Unity means the spiritual meaning, the inner significance, the soul of work of art. Plurality[1] of differences means the sensuous material side of work of art, which may be called the material embodiment or form.

The soul or spiritual content of a work of art is everywhere the Absolute; that is to say, thought or the universal. What is absolutely particular, contingent, or capricious, will find no place in it. Consequently where it is human life that is depicted, it will be the essential, universal and rational interests of human life which will form its substance. These universal and rational interests, however, will not appear in art in the form of abstract universals. For, art has no dealings with abstractions, but with concrete and individual. Only the universal emotions of our common humanity can be the permanent subject of art. For, just because they are universal, they are, for that reason, manifestations of the Absolute; for, the Absolute is rationality, thought, universality. Thus, we find that there are three aspects of a work of art (i) content (ii) form or material and (iii) relation of the two. These aspects supply Hegel with three points of view, from which he divides art.

DIVISION OF ART FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CONTENT.

For a proper understanding of division of art from the

1. St., 443.

point of view of its content, it is necessary to remember that, according to Hegel, the mind,[1] before it can grasp the true notion of its absolute essence, has to pass through a series of stages. For, his division of art in the present case depends upon these stages, which the mind unfolds to itself. On this basis, he divides art into (i) subjective (ii) objective and (iii) absolute, corresponding to three stages of mind in its dialectical development.

(i) Subjective art produces all forms of the Beautiful, exhibited in useful[2] or industrial products. Here the content is entirely limited, subsidiary and finite. It appears merely in external design and beautiful form of a common object, which serves as a means of satisfying human needs. To such products of art, the mind of an individual stands in practical utilitarian relation. It is because of this utilitarian relation of mind to such products that the industrial art is distinguished from the fine art and as such is excluded by Hegel from the field of his investigation.

(ii) The objective art is distinguished from the subjective, inasmuch as the idea, that it represents in a sensible medium, is infinite and mind stands to the sensible presentation of it, not in any utilitarian but only in essentially æsthetical and contemplative relation. It is represented by music. For, music embodies an infinite idea in the medium of sound or tone and mind is not in utilitarian, but only in essentially æsthetical and contemplative relation to it. The mind of artist in representing infinite idea in the medium of tone, is simply a form of activity, by which the ideal is unfolded. Similarly the mind of beholder is another form of æsthetic activity, in which the ideal is reproduced.

(iii) Absolute art is the highest art. It is represented by poetry. In æsthetic contemplation of a product of the

1. Ph. A., Vol. I, 98. 2. Mich., 50.

absolute art, mind rises from finitude to infinity. The whole ideal content of the Beautiful, as presented in the linguistic medium of poetry, is not only received into mind through æsthetic contemplation, but is also reproduced by mind out of itself. Thus, there is identity of mind with the idea of the Beautiful and the highest stage of mind, attainable through æsthetic contemplation, is reached. At this stage there is perfect union of practical design with æsthetic contemplation. It furnishes the highest satisfaction. For, it involves a perfect activity, realising its own end, and brings with it the repose of the spirit in æsthetical contemplation.

DIVISION OF ART FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ITS MATERIAL MEDIUM.

From the point of view of material medium of art, it is divided into (i) architecture (ii) sculpture (iii) painting (iv) music and (v) poetry.

(i) ARCHITECTURE.

Architecture is an external art. It aims at working external inorganic nature into such form that it may get related to mind as artistic objective world. Its material is inorganic matter as mechanical inert mass. Its form is the form of inorganic nature, but arranged in accordance with the intellectual relation of symmetry[1]. It is called external art, because its products stand only in an external relation to the spiritual idea. They do not embody it. It struggles with the external nature, in order to work it out of deformity of accident and thus to prepare the place for the Divinity. It builds temples for inner aspiration and concentration upon the Divinity and thus manifests the tendency to self-concentration in worship. It organises the inorganic matter, arranges it symmetrically and brings it into relation

1. Mich., 36.

with spirit. And just because the products of architecture stand in external relation to the Divine it is symbolical.

(ii) SCULPTURE.

Sculpture is distinct from architecture in so far as it embodies in its products the inner spirituality, to which the latter simply points. Though the medium, in which it sensibly represents the spiritual idea, is the same inert mass as in the case of architecture, yet it harmonises the content and form with each other in such a manner that neither predominates over the other. It is, therefore, classical type of art. It is capable of representing every spiritual subject in a sensible form. It shapes its medium, not merely in accordance with its mechanical quality, nor in the form of inorganic matter, nor in utter indifference to colour, but, transfigures it into ideal forms of human body. It represents the spirit as settled and composed and not as distracted in passion. It can present only one moment of inner spirituality.

(iii) PAINTING.

Painting stands next to sculpture. It is the first art of the romantic form. It uses, as the material of its subject and form, the visible as such. It particularises the visible by differentiation into the visibility of colour. It employs light[1] in its simplicity and specialises it in darkness as its opposite. It is distinct from architecture in so far as it does not require outward mechanical distinction of matter as inert mass. It is also distinct from sculpture inasmuch as it does not require the whole dimensions of sensible extension in space. It is free from sensuous materiality of solid extension. It is limited by the dimension of surface only. Its subject admits of widest particularisation in detail. Whatever surges in human heart, may it be feeling, repre-

1. Mich., 41.

sentation or purpose and whatever man is capable of shaping into action, may be taken as the subject of painting. The whole range of individual things, from the highest idea of mind down to the most individual object of nature, admits of pictorial presentation. And natural scenery can find place in painting if it alludes to some such spiritual element or interest as may ally it to human feeling and thought.

(iv) MUSIC.

Music is the second art of the romantic form. It is higher than painting, because it presents an advance on painting in respect of idealisation of the sensible. Though both proceed upon the recognition of external outwardness of extended objects, as separate from each other in space, yet, while painting retains the whole appearance of extended objects in its representation, music idealises it into 'the individual unity of the point'. It does not represent material extension. It represents the movement and quivering of the inner parts of material body in tone, and so the whole scale of feelings and emotions. It constitutes the point of transition between the extended sensuousness of painting[1] and higher spirituality of poetry.

(v) POETRY.

Poetry is the highest of the romantic arts. We are primarily interested in Hegelian view of poetry, because it is Abhinava's poetic theory, in general and the dramatic in particular which we propose to compare with that of Hegel. We shall, therefore, deal with it in detail after we shall have given Hegel's division of art from another point of view.

DIVISION OF ART FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF RELATION BETWEEN CONTENT AND FORM.

In an ideal work of art the two aspects of art i. e. the

1. Mich., 43.

content and embodiment, are in perfect accord and union, so that the embodiment constitutes the full and complete expression of the content ; whereas the content, on its part, could find no other than this very embodiment as adequate expression for it. But perfect accord and union are not always attained. And different possible relations, which content and embodiment bear to each other, give us the division of art into its fundamental types. Thus, according to Hegel, there are three[1] types of art (i) Symbolic (ii) Classical and (iii) Romantic.

SYMBOLIC ART.

It marks the beginning of the artistic production. The idea, which it attempts to represent, is ill-defined and obscure. Being indeterminate, it does not possess the individuality, which is necessary for sensuous presentation. The idea has not yet found the formative principle within itself and, therefore, its presentation in sensuous form is a mere effort and strain to find it.

In symbolic type of art, the abstract idea is presented in purely material substance of nature, which is outside itself. Thus, the material objects are left as they are and the substantive idea is imposed on them as their significance, so that their function hence forward is to express the same. And they claim to be interpreted as though the idea itself was present in them.

Thus, in the symbolic type of art, adequate coalescence of the idea and the sensuous configuration is not possible. It is called symbolic art, inasmuch as the sensuous configuration in it is merely a symbol of the idea, as when a lion is understood to symbolise strength. In short, the form in symbolic art is alien to the idea. The indeterminate idea seeks for

1. Ph. A., Vol. I, 103-6

expression among the objects of nature, but finds them inadequate to meet its need and, therefore, exaggerates them. Hence, because of the incompatibility of idea and form, the relation is negative one.

DEFECTS OF SYMBOLIC ART.

Symbolic configuration is imperfect, (i) because the idea, that it represents, lacks determinateness and (ii) because the coalescence of idea with form is defective. The idea, as presented in symbolic art, represents the first stage in the self-evolution of mind, in the objectification of art-impression.

CLASSICAL ART.

The idea, presented in the classical art, represents the second stage. In this stage the idea attains definiteness. This definiteness, however, is determined by the mediation of archetypes, which the mind brings to bear upon the impression. And these archetypes are such as admit of complete realisation in the sensuous form. Thus, two defects of the symbolic art, stated above, are prominent in the classical art by their absence. It is adequate embodiment of the idea in a shape which, according to its notional concept, is appropriate to the idea itself. There is, therefore, concord between idea and form. The classical type of art is, therefore, first to present us with creation and vision of complete ideal.

The concordance of idea and form in classical art, is not purely formal. For, in that case every copy of nature, which forms the aim of presentation, would at once become classical in virtue of agreement between such content and form. In classical art, the characteristic feature of the content is the concreteness of idea, the concrete spirituality, the inward truth of conscious life. And configuration, which the idea, as individually determinate spirituality, possesses,

when it must appear as temporal phenomenon, is the human form. The personification and anthropomorphism have very often been misused. But art, in so far as its function is to present the spiritual in the sensuous guise, must advance to such anthropomorphism. For, the spirit is adequately presented to perception only in bodily presence, because it is the only visible phenomenon adequate to the expression of intelligence.

The human bodily form is employed in classical art, not as purely sensuous existence, but as the natural shape appropriate to mind. It has, therefore, to be freed from all the defective abnormal and morbid outgrowth, which adheres to it in purely physical aspect. The external shape, therefore, must be purified in order to express in itself the content adequately. Furthermore, in order that the coalescence of idea and form may be complete, the spirituality, which forms the content, must be such as is able to express itself completely in the natural form of man. Under such a condition, the spirit is simply the spirit or mind of man and not absolute or eternal.

ROMANTIC TYPE OF ART.

Romantic type of art annuls the completed union of idea and its reality (form). The classical type of art attained the highest excellence, of which the sensuous embodiment is capable. The defect, such as we find in it, is due to the limitation of entire province of art. The limitation consists in this that art in general accepts for its object the spirit under the guise of sensuously concrete form. The classical type of art presents the perfected coalescence of the spiritual and the sensuous existence as adequate conformation of both.

But in the coalescence of the idea and its reality, as presented in the classical type of art, the mind is not re-

presented in conformity to its true notional concept. For, the mind is the infinite subjectivity of the idea, which, as absolute inwardness, i. e. pure ideality, is not capable of freely expanding in its entire independence, so long as it remains within the mode of bodily shape, fused therein as in existence, wholly congenial to it.

To escape from such a condition, the Romantic type of art strikes out, abolishes, the completed union between idea and its reality. It does so by securing a content, which passes beyond the classical stage and its mode of expression. The content agrees with what Christianity affirms to be true of God as spirit. It is in contrast with the Greek faith in gods, which form the essential and befitting content of the Greek art. In the Greek art the concrete ideal content is potentially, but not fully realized unity of the human and the divine nature. This unity, because it is only potential and not fully realised, i.e. purely immediate and not fully explicit, is manifested without defect under the immediate and sensuous mode.

The Greek god[1] is the object of unaffected and amusingly simple intuition and sensuous imagination. His shape is, therefore, bodily form of man. The sphere of his power is individual and his being is individually limited. In his opposition to individual person i.e. the individual ego of self-consciousness, he is 'an essence and a power, with whom the inward life of soul, the inner subjective state, is merely potentially in union, but does not itself possess this unity as inward subjective knowledge'.

The higher stage is the knowledge of this potential unity, which in its latency the classical type of art accepts as its content and is able to represent perfectly in bodily form. This elevation of mere potentiality to self-conscious knowledge

1. Ph. A., Vol. I, 107,

constitutes enormous difference. This difference in its magnitude is in no way less than that which exists between man and animal. Man is animal, but in his animal functions he is not restricted within the potential sphere, like animal. He knows and understands the animal functions.

If then the unity of the human and the Divine is raised from potentiality to self-conscious unity, it follows that the genuine medium for the reality of this content is not the sensuous and immediate existence of what is spiritual, but the self-aware inner life of the soul itself.

It is Christianity, (because it presents to mind, God as spirit, not as particular individual spirit, but as absolute in spirit and truth) which steps back from the sensuousness of imagination into the inward life of reason and makes the latter, (the life of reason) and not the bodily form, the medium and determinate existence of its content. The unity of the human and the Divine nature is thus conscious unity and can be realized only by means of spiritual knowledge and in spirit. The new content, secured by means of spiritual knowledge, is not bound up with the sensuous presentation in such a manner that the latter cannot be done away with. It is rather delivered from this immediate existence.

To state the position summarily, in the Romantic stage the object of art consists in the free and concrete presentation of the spiritual activity, which appears as such presence or activity for the inner world of conscious intelligence. In consonance with such an object, art cannot merely work for sensuous perception. Art must deliver itself to inner life, which coalesces (gets thoroughly united) with its object, as though it were none other than itself i.e. the distinction between a percipient and an external object falls away. The content, displayed, is part of the soul-life itself. It

delivers itself, in other words, to the intimacy of soul, to the heart, the emotional life[1], which is the medium of the spirit itself.

Architecture is symbolic art. Sculpture is classical art, and painting, music and poetry belong to the type of romantic art. Art cannot fulfil its mission to reveal the Absolute, in the lowest form of art. It has a gradual development. In the course of this development, it passes through different forms of the spirit. In drama the development comes to a close. Poetry is the highest form of art; and drama is the highest form of poetry. But, for this very reason, poetry is at the same time the dissolution of all art and the transition to a higher form of spirit, religion.

POETRY.

Poetry is the third and the most spiritual of the romantic arts. Its characteristic peculiarity lies in the fact that it is capable of representing its spiritual content in such a sensible form as arouses the imaginative power of mind to free play. The material element that it employs in its representation is the spoken sound. But this sound does not represent mere shades and gradations of indefinite feeling, as in the case of music, but definite mental ideas. It reduces the articulate sound of human organ of speech to mere symbol.

SOUND AS THE MEDIUM OF MUSIC AND POETRY.

The spoken sound, which represents a spiritual content in poetry[2], is mere sign of ideas and is in itself devoid of significance. It does not form an essential content of poetic experience. It does not constitute its objective aspect. For, it is thought, feeling, emotion or any similar phase of soul, of which the contemplating subject is aware and which he

1. Ph. A., Vol. I, 109. 2. Ph. A-, Vol. III, 352.

confronts as an object, that constitutes the true objective aspect. In poetic experience, the imagination is affected, not by sound, but by that which is symbolised by it, a thought, a feeling or a noble emotion; and the whole process of elaboration of the given content into its particular features and of relating them into an organic whole, needs no actual sound. In music, however, the sound is not a mere sign of idea, feeling or emotion, but an independent medium, so that the modes of tone, as artistically developed, become its fundamental aim and object.

But all that poetry loses in external objectivity[1], because of its dispensing with sound as an independent sensuous medium, it is able to secure for itself in the ideal objectivity of its vision which the poetical speech presents to the contemplative mind. For, it is the function of imagination to clothe the ideas, feelings or emotions with events, actions, moods and exhibitions of passion and thus to create an object, which is complete in its external aspect as phenomenon, no less than in the ideal significance of its content and so constitutes the vision.

Further, the art of music does not make the separation of its external material medium[2] from its content in the same way as does poetry. For, in poetry the idea is elaborated with more definite freedom from the sound of speech: it is cut off from the sound and issues in a unique progression of mental ideas, constructed by imagination. But in music, though the tone has for its content the inward life, yet, it is not completely cut off from the content, as in the case of poetry, and, therefore, penetrates to consciousness and together with feeling or emotion, that is its content, constitutes the objective aspect of musical experience.

1. Ph. A., Vol. III, 354. 2. Ph. A., Vol. III, 362.

Both poetry and music[1] have sound as their material medium. In both the cases the wholly external objective material is substituted by the subjective medium of sound, which is divested of all visibility and which 'suffers' an ideal content to be apprehended by a contemplative mind independently of sight. The distinction, however, between poetry and music, in spite of their use of sound as common medium, lies in this, that for music the configuration of musical tone as such is the essential end. For, although the course and movement of melody and its harmonious relations present to the consciousness of the contemplative mind what is ideal, yet the ideality, thus presented, is not pure ideality but interwoven in the closest way with the musical tone as its expression. In fact it is the configuration of such musical expression, which confers on music its true character. It is because of the fusion of the ideal with the tone, both in the presentation and in the experience, which it arouses, that music cannot present the entire extension of the ideal wealth of conscious life. Hence it is that it can present a spiritual content, which is comparatively more abstract than that of poetry and an emotion, which lacks definiteness in manifestation.

Music cannot represent fully the imaginative picture of the poet. For, the content of such a picture is an idea more accurately defined than can be presented in tone; and its form is not that of external appearance as such, but that of external appearance as impressed upon 'the inner sense of perceptive reason'. Such ideas and forms, therefore, need a different medium from the musical tone. They are expressed through words, which are purely external signs of communication and do not, as sounds, form an element of either poetic imagination or of poetic experience. This constitutes the

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 7.

essential difference between music and poetry.

THE OBJECTIVE ASPECT OF POETIC EXPERIENCE.

We have shown above that poetic experience is marked by the absence of all that is the object of external senses and that even the sound is eliminated from it. The question, therefore, naturally arises: "What is it that constitutes the objective aspect of poetic experience?" Hegel's answer to this question is that it is "the ideal envisagement and imaginative content itself."[1] The forms of poetry are not sensuous but spiritual. Idea, imagery, emotion, and such other spiritual forms are specific modes, under which every content of poetry is manifested. Hence the objective aspect of poetic experience is not constituted by what is externally real, but by what is ideal i.e. something that receives an existence exclusively in the conscious life itself; something that is conceived or imaged by the mind. Here the mind is the object to itself.

PLACE OF NATURE IN POETIC PRESENTATION.

The external world of nature[2] does not form the content of poetic presentation. The sun, the moon, the high mountains and the pleasing landscape are not the contents of poetry. The spiritual interests of humanity are the proper subject-matter of poetry. The world of nature, therefore, enters into the content of poetry in so far as it is regarded as the environment of man, is related to the ideality of conscious life and is a material, upon which mind exercises its own energy. An important task of poetry, therefore, is to bring before the vision of the reader or hearer, the energies of the life of spirit, all that surges in heart in passion or emotion or appears before the mind in tranquility; in short, the all-embracing

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 9.
2. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 20.

realm of human idea, action, exploit, fatality, the affairs of this world and the Divine providence.

UNITY IN POETIC PRESENTATION.

We have stated in a preceding paragraph that the spiritual interests of humanity are the proper subject-matter of poetry. Poetry, therefore, aims at presenting spirit in its universality, freedom and independence of all that environs it. It is concerned with the world of natural facts in so far only as it is regarded as the environment of man and as the material, which stimulates the expression of freedom of spirit. Individuals, actions, emotions and ideas are presented in it, not for their own sake and in their isolation, but as expressions of freedom and independence of spirit and as motived by the same. Consequently, the universal or rational principle, the spirit in its freedom and independence, is presented in poetry not in its abstract universality, but as concretised by its self-expression or self-manifestation in its actions and emotions in the midst of external natural environment. Poetic presentation is thus an organic whole every constituent of which is related to the spiritual content exactly in the manner, in which all that constitutes human body is related to soul, the principle of life. The spiritual content, therefore, is the principle of unity, the unifying factor, in poetic presentation: not as abstract universal, but as concretised in its manifestation in action and emotion in the midst of natural environment.

The universal[1], therefore, which is the true content of poetry and the individuals in whose character, events, actions and emotions it is manifested, must not fall apart. The string of unity, constituted by the former, must run through the latter and form them into a well-integrated whole. In the Iliad, for instance, the contest of the Greeks and the

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 30.

Trojans and the victory of the former, are inseparably bound up with the wrath of Achilles. Thus, in the Iliad, the wrath, which in itself is a manifestation of freedom of spirit, is the unifying factor.

THE FORMAL ASPECT OF POETRY.

Poetry has two aspects, content and form. The ideal element of conscious life constitutes its content[1]. In its artistic presentation of such a content, however, it cannot confine itself to the objective forms of direct perception as do the arts of sculpture and painting, nor to the ideal emotion as it passes through soul-life, nor even to the forms of reflective thought. It has to maintain a mediate position between the immediate objectivity of perceptual life and the inner life of feeling and thought. It borrows from thought the aspect of ideal universality, which binds together the immediate particularity of the senses. It also borrows particulars from the sphere of sense-impression. It presents its ideal or essential content, under the external guise of human actions[2], events and similar other manifestations of soul-life. It is in language that it gives its ideal content an external form. It represents the content of conscious life in an ideal image, but only as determined in the activities of human or divine beings. And the action, that it represents, issues from self-subsistent ethical forces, which are the mainsprings of both human and divine actions. This action arouses reaction and thus there is a series of events, which forms a whole and as such is represented by poetry.

TYPES OF POETRY.

Hegel divides poetry into three distinct types (i) Epic (ii) Lyric and (iii) Dramatic. From our point of view it is necessary to give more space to his views on dramatic

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 99, 2. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 100.

poetry in general and his theory of tragedy in particular; because the æsthetic theory of Abhinavagupta, with which we propose to compare the Hegelian theory, is based primarily on drama. We, therefore, in order to give a connected idea of the whole, shall come to his theory of drama and tragedy after summarily stating his views on Epic and Lyric.

EPIC POETRY.

Epic represents the events, which form a causally well-connected whole. For, it aims at presenting poetically and in the form of actual facts, either an essentially complete action or the personalities, from which such an action proceeds in the midst of variety of external accidents. It represents objective fact in an objective manner. It is not an expression of personal phantasy[1] or heart's passion of either the poet or the reciter. The presented in it appears and must appear as a part of real life.

LYRIC POETRY.

The content of Lyric poetry is the ideal world, the contemplative or emotional life of soul. It presents this soul-life, not as it manifests itself in action, but as confined to self-expression. In fact, self-expression is the final end of Lyric poetry. It does not present external facts or events, but emotion and individual's self-introspective life. In the case of recitation of Lyric poetry, the reciter is not totally detached from the subject-matter, as in the case of Epic. On the contrary, he gives utterance to the ideas and views as though they were the expression of his own emotive life.

DRAMATIC ART THE HIGHEST.

Among arts in general that type of art, which uses human

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1. Ph. A,, Vol. IV, 103.

speech[1] as its medium, is the highest. For, no other medium of artistic presentation is fully adequate to the presentation of spiritual life. Poetry, therefore, is the highest type of art. And dramatic poetry is the highest phase of the art of poetry: (i) because it is elaborated, both in form and substance, into a whole, which is most complete and (ii) because it combines in itself the objectivity of Epic and the subjectivity of Lyric and thus is the synthesis of thesis and antithesis. It presents to the imaginative vision of the spectator an essentially independent action as a definite fact. And the action, that it presents, does not spring merely from personal life of the character in the process of self-realisation, but is such as receives determinate form in consequence of interaction, in concrete life, of ideal intentions, individuals and collisions. It does not describe the external aspects of local condition and environment as such, nor does it present action and event in the way, in which they are presented in the Epic. Hence, in order that the product of the dramatic art may receive full animation of life, there is the necessity of complete scenic representation.

GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF DRAMATIC POETRY.

Drama presents human actions[2] and relations in their actually visible form to the imaginative consciousness. The actions, which drama presents, spring from opposing human passions and characters and, therefore, involve collision. For, action gives rise to reaction. It presents definite ends individualised in living personalities in definite situations.

WHEN DOES DRAMATIC ART ARISE ?

Drama is the product of essentially cultured condition of national life. It presupposes the existence of both Epic and Lyric: for, it combines in itself the characteristic features of both. The rise of dramatic art presupposes

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 248. 2. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 249.

free self-consciousness and a clear and distinct concept or idea of human aims, developments and destinies. Therefore, it arises, only when a nation has risen to a cultural level, which is possible only in the intermediate and later epochs of national development.

DRAMA AS SYNTHESIS OF EPIC AND LYRIC.

Epic narrates the greatest exploits and events in nation's primitive history. It presents the action, which reflects the national spirit in its entirety in the form of definite events and exploits of external life. It maintains a balance among the personal volition, individual aim and vital external condition.

But Lyric presents individual person in the independence of his subjective life. It is concerned with the presentation of feeling or emotion of a particular individual in a definite situation.

Drama combines the points of view of both Epic and Lyric. It adopts the point of view of Epic in so far as it brings action and event before our imaginative sense. But it combines this point of view with that of Lyric in so far as it does not present them as reflecting the spirit of a nation, but that of an individual. The event and action, therefore, do not appear in it as proceeding from external condition, but from personal volition and character. The individual, however, is not left rooted in his self-exclusive independence. He realises his end through the peculiar nature of conditions[1] in which he is placed. It is under the given conditions that his character and purpose become the content of his volitional faculty. Drama presents action in the process of development and collision with other forces, which attempt to change the course of event in a direction contrary to that

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 251.

willed and intended by the hero. The objective aspect is as necessary in drama as the subjective, the intimate soul-life of particular man or woman.

Hence, in spite of the attraction of soul-life of particular individual, drama cannot rest contented with the purely lyrical conditions of emotional life; nor can it be confined to the presentation of national exploits in the manner, followed in Epic. It presents individual character, with a definite aim, which forms an effective part of practical content of his volitional self-identity, in a situation, in which he succeeds or fails in the achievement of his aim, through opposition and conflict. The presentation of soul-life in it, therefore, takes the form of effective action. It passes out of the sphere of pure ideality and makes itself the object of outer world. The action, in which the soul-life is presented in drama, is not a bare external fact; on the contrary, it is the executed will of the focus of the situation and is recognised as such. All that issues from action, is recognised by the acting personality as issuing from himself and reacts on his personal character and its circumstances. The soul-life[1] of self-realising individual is in constant relation with the entire complex external condition.

Thus, dramatic action, in the true sense of the word, is the execution of ideal intention and aim, with the realisation of which the individual agent perfectly identifies himself and consequently regards all that proceeds from it as constituent of the objective world. Dramatic character plucks for himself the fruit of his own deeds.

DRAMA MORE ABSTRACT THAN EPIC.

Drama is concerned with the presentation of personal aim of the hero. It chooses only as much from the external

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 252.

world as is essentially bound up with such purpose. It is, therefore, of more abstract nature than Epic. Dramatic action originates from the self-determination of character: it does not presuppose the epic background of the entire world in its varied aspects: it is concerned with the presentation of situation, in which the individual character forms and realises his purpose. Further, the type of personality, the hero of drama, is presented, not in the entire complexity of national qualities, but in terms of such qualities only as are directly related to action. He possesses a definite end, which is inspired by the spiritual life in its universality. And drama places this end in a more exalted position than is possible to purely individual life. Presentation of those traits of character of the hero, which are not directly related to action, is, therefore, superfluous in drama. Hence in respect of active personality also drama is more abstract than Epic.

THE DIVINE AS CONTENT OF DRAMA.

Dramatic action is not presented on the background of national existence, but as closely related to one fundamental purpose and its achievement by an individual character. And an end, which is tried to be realised through action, is dramatic, because it possesses such qualities as make its realisation possible only by particular personality under definite conditions, as also because it inspires other individuals with aims and passions quite opposed to it. Such an end is the motive force and excitant of emotion and, therefore, in active agent assumes the form of spiritual, ethical and divine force[1], such as love of mother country, parents, wife, relations etc. However, if this end, the essential content of human feeling and action, is to strike us as dramatic, it must specialize itself as a distinct end, so that in every case the action may

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 254.

meet with opposition in its relation to other individuals and may be subjected to changing conditions. The genuine content, the essential operative energy in drama, therefore, can be nothing but spiritual forces, the divine and true. But the divine in drama is presented, not in its tranquility, but as content of human personality, as concrete existence in its realisation and as charged with movement.

PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY IN DRAMA.

The divine constitutes the most essential content of human action, presented in drama. The deciding factor in its course of action, original departure and conflict, therefore, cannot reside in particular individuals, which are placed in relation of opposition to one another. It must be the divine presence itself, regarded as essential totality. Hence, drama has to propound to us the vital energy of a principle of necessity, which is essentially self-supporting and capable of resolving every conflict and contradiction. It must present that ideal and universal substance, which is at the root of human ends, conflicts and destinies.[1] It must present all the contradictions and developments, which the particular action, as springing from the root of ideal universal substance, involves and displays. It should not present action as springing from mere personal passions and specific characteristics of particular individuals. It has, no doubt, to present rightful claim no less than wrongful misuse of passions, which arise in human heart and excite to action, but only as revealing the self-realisation of the divine and true. It must present spiritual powers in consonance with their simple substantive content. It must present the resolution of the one-sided aspect of these powers.

DRAMATIC UNITY.

The synthetic unity of dramatic composition is of a more

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 255.

stringent character than that of Epic. For, while unity of Epic is based on an event, which has national importance, the dramatic unity rests on an event that has only personal importance. In dramatic poetry the individual characters assert their mutual relations to one another by means of opposed features of their character in such a way that it is just this personal relation, which constitutes the ground of their dramatic realisation. The dramatic unity is both objective and subjective. It is objective in so far as it relates to the features of practical content of the aim, which the hero attempts to realise. It is subjective in so far as this essentially substantive content, the aim, appears, in dramatic composition, as passion of particular character, so that the results of the action are primarily referred to his own act of volition.

HEGEL'S INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN UNITIES.

Hegel recognises the laws of dramatic composition, summarised in time-honoured prescription of the so called unities[1] of place, time and action. But he asserts at the same time that Aristotle merely says that the duration of tragic action should not exceed, at the most, the length of a day and that Aristotle does not mention the unity of place at all. We have already stated in the course of our chapter, dealing with Aristotle's dramatic technique, that unity of place was necessary in Greek drama, because of its peculiar constitution. Chorus was an important part of drama. It remained in the archestra even during the interval between two scenes. The whole tragedy, therefore, from prologue to exode was naturally one continuous scene, without any break, such as could permit the change of place. Hegel, however, points out that the ancient tragedians have not

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 257.

followed the principle of unity of place in the strict sense that change of scene is not permissible. For instance, we have change of scene in both the Eumenides of Æschylus and the Ajax of Sophocles. He, therefore, condemns the French interpretation of this rule that it implies unalterability of scene.

In any case, he maintains that modern dramatic writing, which presents a more extensive field of collision, a greater variety of dramatis personæ and action, the ideal explication of which requires an external environment of greater extent than did the ancient, cannot subject itself to the rule of identity of scene and consequently has freed itself from such demand. He, however, admits that this rule is healthy in so far as it implies that constant change of scene, without sufficient reason, is inadmissible.

HEGEL'S POSITION IN REGARD TO UNITY OF PLACE.

The action of drama is more concentrated than that of Epic. This concentrated action, therefore, ought to assert itself in spatial condition and changes. Thus, because drama presents a contrast to Epic in respect of action and its environment, the change of scene, therefore, has to be restricted in drama. Further, drama is not exclusively addressed to imaginative sense like Epic. It is addressed to both the æsthetic senses, eye and ear. Thus, while in the case of Epic frequent change of scene is permissible, because in the sphere of pure imagination we can readily pass from one scene to another ; in the case of drama, only so much change of scene is permissible as does not contradict ordinary experience of life. In short, according to Hegel, the best way of observing the unity of place, is the happy mean, avoiding of both the extremes.

UNITY OF TIME.

Hegel's attitude towards the unity of time is the same as he maintains towards that of place. For, he holds that in the pure realm of imagination we can, without difficulty, combine vast periods of time; but in direct vision we cannot readily pass over a few years. Therefore, if the action, that drama presents in its conflict from its origin to its resolution, be of simple character, it is best to concentrate time in a restricted period. But if the action be such as requires richly diversified character, whose development necessitates many situations, which, in respect of time, lie widely apart from one another, the formal unity of purely conventional duration is inadmissible. He dismisses as absurd, the view that, in order not to shock the sense of reality of the audience, who are to witness the drama in the course of a few hours directly through their senses, the action ought to be limited to short duration of time. For, such a view leads to perpetration of most glaring improbabilities.

UNITY OF ACTION.

Hegel holds that the law of unity of action is inviolable. His view about the true nature of this unity may be stated as follows :—

Every action, without exception, must have a distinct end, which it seeks to achieve. It is through action that man enters actively into the concrete actual world. Unity of action, therefore, is to be looked for in the realisation of an end, which is essentially definite and is carried, under the particular conditions and relations of concrete life, to consummation. But dramatic action has such an end as can never be realised smoothly : the active agent, in his efforts at realisation of his end, invariably meets with obstructions at the hands of other agents, who have opposite ends, which they,

with all their resources, try to realise. Dramatic action, therefore, necessarily involves conflict. The unity of dramatic action, therefore, consists in the entire movement, beginning with fixing upon an aim and terminating in its achievement through conflict and opposition, or in the resolution of conflict.

DRAMA AND GENERAL PUBLIC.

The most distinctive feature of the dramatic poetry is that the opinions, characters and actions, presented in it, have to appear before the general public in all the reality of life itself. It is on account of this that certain aspects of the content are far more important in drama than mere dramatic form; because they are brought into direct relation to the public, before whom they are reproduced. Drama has a distinct public, which it is under an obligation to satisfy and which has a right to applaud or condemn it. It is meant for the enjoyment with sympathy by this distinct public, when it is staged. It has, therefore, to present such a content as will equally appeal to the general public, irrespective of difference in education, interests and hobbies. A drama, written in utter disregard of the public, is no drama, because it fails to serve the distinct purpose, for which dramatic writing exists.

CONDITIONS OF FAVOURABLE PUBLIC RECEPTION OF DRAMA.

1. The ends, conflict and final resolution[1] of which drama presents, should either possess general human interest or should have at bottom a pathos, which is of valid and substantive character for the public, before which it is to be staged. Drama presents universal ends or universal emotions, from which definite ends spring. But all art is universal concretised. Drama also, therefore, cannot present the uni-

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 272.

versal as such, but it has to give it a concrete form. And it is in the concretisation of the universal that the individual gets into dramatic presentation. But individualisation can be primarily in terms of national characteristics and those of a particular time in the national history. Thus, drama presents a content, which has two aspects, (i) universal and (ii) national. The more the universal aspect predominates in a drama the more universally appreciated it is. And conversely the more the national aspect is emphasised in a drama the more limited favourable popular reception it has. It is because of the predominance of universal human interest in Shakespearian dramas that they find universal appreciation wherever English language is well known and understood.

2. Individualisation of the universal is another condition of favourable public reception of drama. We have already stated in the preceding pages that art is universal concretised. The universal, therefore, in drama has to be presented in the guise of individual. Individualisation can be effected in terms of situations, conditions, traits of character and actions, no less than in terms of local environment, customs and usages and other matters, which effect the visual presentation of action.

3. Vitality of the dramatis personæ is the third condition. It is more important than individualisation in terms of situation etc. The characters of drama ought not to be mere personifications of specific interests. For, the abstract impersonations of particular aims and passions are wholly devoid of dramatic effect. A superficial individualisation is insufficient, because it keeps the content and form apart. The dramatic personality ought to be vital and self-identical throughout. Its opinions and characterisation ought to be consonant with its aim and action. It should be the per-

meating individuality, which synthetically binds all in a central unity. Its speech and action should be such as may strike the spectator as issuing from the same living source. For such vitality of characterisation Shakespeare is well known.

4. The collision of the ultimate ends is the fourth condition. The display and expression of personal experience in definite situation in itself is not sufficient for dramatic effect. The collision of the ultimate ends, including the forward and conflicting movement that it implies, is of great importance in dramatic presentation.

THE RELATION OF DRAMATIST'S PERSONALITY TO HIS WORK.

In Epic poetry, the poet presents the events in the national history in an objective manner. He does not allow his personality to colour the presentation in any way. In Lyric poetry, on the contrary, he expresses his own emotional life and his personal views of the world. In drama, action is presented in sensuous form and characters speak and act in their own names to a greater extent than in Epic. This, however, does not mean that drama is a presentation of facts in an objective manner more than Epic. For, as has already been stated, drama is the product of that period in the history of a nation, in which the personal self-consciousness, both in respect of general outlook on life and artistic culture, has attained a fairly high degree of development. The dramatic poet, therefore, has not to present what appears to originate from popular consciousness simply. He should not be a mere instrument of the expression of national consciousness. His work should rather be such as clearly reflects self-aware creative force and makes the poetic personality clearly recognisable. In fact, it is the reflection of the poet's personality in his work that distinguishes it from actions and

events of natural life. The dramatic poet has not to present in his creation mere accidental moods and opinions, peculiar tendencies or one-sided outlook. On the contrary, in the course and final issue of dramatic action, he has to vindicate what is fundamentally reasonable and true.

EXTERNAL TECHNIQUE OF DRAMA.

Of all arts poetry alone completely dispenses with the sensuous medium of the phenomenal world. But drama is on a different footing from Epic or Lyrical poetry in so far as it is concerned with the presentation of action in all the reality of its actual presence. It cannot, therefore, be confined to the common means of poetic presentation, namely, the language. Inasmuch as it requires complete man to present (i) the progress of action to its end in corporeal existence (ii) physiognomical expression[1] of emotions and passions, as affecting other men and arousing their reaction and (iii) this too in a specific situation, it is compelled to avail itself of the assistance of pretty well all the other arts. A genuine product of dramatic art is that which admits of the employment of scenery, music and dance.

ART OF ACTING.

The most important of all arts, which are utilised for dramatic presentation, is that of acting. The material, that it employs for its artistic presentation, is man himself in his various aspects. One aspect, with which it is primarily occupied, is the human speech and its poetical expression. It gives such an artistic form to human speech that the hearer recognises in it the characterisation of soul-life in its finest shades and transitions, as also in its oppositions and contrasts. Another aspect of man, which serves as means of representation of soul-life, is the pose and movement of body, including

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 278.

facial expression. Thus, the art of acting, by means of declamation, play of facial expression, bodily movements and postures, represents to vision the poetical work.

The relation of the dramatist[1] to the external medium, in its contrast to other arts, is quite unique. In painting and sculpture, it is the artist himself, who executes his conception in colours or marble. The dramatist, however, does not work directly on the medium, in which his conception is represented. For, it is the actor, who executes the conception of the dramatist; and it is the function of the actor to coalesce absolutely and to identify himself completely with the character he portrays. He has to enter, with all his faculties, into the part that he receives, without adding anything to it, which is peculiar to himself. He has to act in complete accord with the creative conception and the means of its display, supplied by the dramatist. In the West this art has attained complete development only in very recent times.[2]

TYPES OF DRAMATIC POETRY.

The basis of division of dramatic poetry into distinct types, is the distinction, which refers not only to the end but also to the characters, conflict and entire result of action. The most important aspects, emphasised by such distinction, are those which are peculiar to tragedy and comedy. But because drama is primarily concerned with the presentation of collision of aims and characters, as also their necessary resolution; therefore, its division into separate types primarily rests on the relation, in which the hero is placed to his end and its content. The difference in the relation of hero to his end is the decisive factor in determining the form of dramatic conflict and the issue therefrom. Thus, dramatic poetry is divided into (i) tragedy (ii) comedy and (iii) social play.

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 287. 2. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 284.

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TAGEDY.

1. The first essential characteristic of tragedy is that it has as the content of action, which it presents and which springs from a definite substantive aim, one of those forces[1], which carry in themselves their own justification and which are realised substantively in the volitional activity of mankind. Such forces are the love of husband and wife and of parents and children etc. And the more the hero of a tragedy is swayed by any one of these powers, the more tragic he is. This power, therefore, constitutes the distinctive characteristic of the hero. In fact, he is essentially that which such a power enables and compels him to be. Thus, in spite of his vital individuality, he is an impersonation of this characteristic power. He completely identifies himself with it. It is in consequence of such identification that he stands forth as a work of sculpture and, therefore, as an interpretation of the power, in which he completely merges his personality. Thus, the true content of tragedy may be the godlike.

Two things, however, are to be noted in this connection, (i) that this holds good of the ancient tragedies only and (ii) that the godlike in this context does not mean the Divine, as it figures in purely religious consciousness. On the contrary, it means the Divine, as it enters into the world, into individual action, without losing its substantive character. In other words, the godlike here means the spiritual substance of volition, the ethical power. For, what is ethical is the Divine in its secular realisation and as such forms the content of truly human action.

2. The second characteristic of tragedy is that the action, that it presents, necessarily involves conflict. The action of hero, which springs from a definite substantive aim and in which the character of hero is realised, inevitably

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV. 295.

stimulates the emotion and action, opposed to itself, in another character and so brings in its train unavoidable conflict. Such a conflict, as presented in ancient tragedies, consists in this, that both the sides, involved in it, if taken by themselves, are perfectly justifiable; but each tends to realise its respective object in such a way as involves negation and violation of the other side. Hence, in respect of their ethical purport, both of them fall under condemnation.

3. The third characteristic of tragedy is that it presents resolution of the said conflict. It is in the resolution of conflict that eternal justice operates in such a way that it restores the ethical substance and unity by bringing about the downfall of the individuality, which disturbs its repose. For, though individual characters have aims, which are justifiable in themselves, yet, under the tragic demand, they are able to realise them in a manner that implies negation of each other and with one-sidedness which is injurious. The substantive truth, the function of which is to secure realisation, is harmony and not conflict, howsoever much such a conflict may be involved in the notion of a real world and human action. And art presents the true. Tragedy, therefore, as a work of fine art, cannot present conflict only. Hence what tragedy aims at presenting, is the harmony. Consequently what is negated in the tragic issue, is one-sided particularity, which is unable to accommodate itself to this harmony. This one-sided particularity, in the course of tragic action, is either committed to destruction or is compelled to fall back upon a state of resignation.

4. The fourth characteristic of tragedy is that it excites and purifies fear and pity. This is the doctrine of tragic Katharsis, which was originally propounded by Aristotle and which we have already discussed in an earlier chapter. Hegel, however, interprets it in the light of his

philosophical system in general and his Philosophy of Right in particular. He deals with excitation and purification separately.

He holds that the emotions, which a tragedy excites and purifies, are not merely the concordant or discordant feelings with anybody's private experience. For, a work of art does not primarily present an individual and his experiences, but that which is consistent with the reason and truth of the spirit. The excitation and purification of the tragic emotions, therefore, have to be explained with reference to the content of tragedy. Hegel holds that the tragic emotions are distinct from the ordinary in respect of their objective reference. Let us, therefore, deal with his conception of them.

FEAR AND PITY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRAGEDY.

Fear is possible in two ways : (i) It may be aroused when we are confronted with an object, which is terrible, but finite. (ii) It may also be excited by the visualisation of that ethical power, which is at the basis of the social phenomena; the power, which manifests itself as social institutions, like family, civil society and state. Human beings, who are distinguished from animals chiefly by their rationality, have to fear, not a terrible external power and its expression, which arouses fear in animals and is related to their instinct of physical self-preservation, but the ethical power, which is self-defined in its own free rationality, which is eternal and inviolable and which a man summons against himself when he turns his back upon it. The fear that a tragedy excites is of the latter type and refers to the might of the ethical power.

Just as fear is of two kinds, according as it differs in its objective reference, so compassion, pity or sympathy

also is of two kinds : (i) It is ordinary sensibility, a sympathy with misfortunes and sufferings of another, which is experienced as something finite and negative. As such it is a painful feeling. (ii) True sympathy is not such painful feeling. It does not smother the sympathiser. It is not a deprecation of misfortune. On the contrary, it is an accordant feeling with the claim of ethical power, exercising itself on one who opposes it and, therefore, antagonises it. It is an accordant feeling with, not what is negative in the condition of suffering, but what is affirmative and substantive and, therefore, necessarily implied in it. The pity or sympathy that a tragedy excites is of the latter type in so far as it refers to the claim of the ethical power.

Thus, according to Hegel, sympathy in the context of tragedy is not 'the feeling of lament' at the sight of suffering or misfortune, that is overwhelming an individual; but the accordant feeling with the claim of ethical power, which shows itself when something is done in utter disregard of and, therefore, in opposition to it. This accordant feeling arises when we contemplate the claim of the violated morality.[1] Hegel, therefore, seems to regard the suffering hero of tragedy to be simply a medium, through which the spectator contemplates the ethical power.

Such a sympathy, however, does not arise at the sight of rogues and ruffians, suffering the consequences of their roguish exploits. For, they do not draw the attention of noble minds. Tragic hero, the sight of whose suffering and misfortune leads to the contemplation of ethical power and consequent accordant feeling with its claim, therefore, should be a strong and powerful man of noble character, whose suffering or misfortune is of the nature of consequence to his own deeds, who draws our attention but becomes subject to blame in so

1. Ph. A., Vol. IV, 300.

far as his deeds, with which he completely identifies himself, are a negation of and in opposition to the ethical power. For, tragic sympathy is not sympathy, in the ordinary sense of the word, with a man in misfortune, which is accidental and due merely to external circumstances, to which the individual does not contribute anything and, therefore, for which he is in no way responsible, such as accidental loss of property or death etc.

Tragedy arouses not only the feelings of fear and sympathy, but also the feeling of reconciliation. It does so, because it presents the vision of the eternal justice, which shows its might against the aims and passions, which are inspired by personal and individual motives, which lead to conflict. For, this eternal justice cannot tolerate any conflict with and opposition to those ethical forces, which are essentially concordant and of which it is itself an embodiment.

We have so far shown that, according to Hegel, tragic fear and pity have objective reference. But the object of fear is not a terrible external object, presented on the stage, which represents such an object in external life; on the contrary, it is the absolute, eternal and inviolable ethical might itself. Similarly the object of compassion or sympathy, the accordant feeling, is not an accidental suffering, such as loss of property, illness or death, which overwhelms an individual, but that which is affirmative, substantive and, therefore, necessarily implied in the suffering, which a great and noble character invites, as if it were, to himself by identifying the whole of his personality with one particular end or passion.

But all this refers to Hegel's interpretation of the first part only. It explains the peculiar nature of tragic fear and pity as distinct from the ordinary fear and pity. It does not give Hegel's interpretation of Katharsis. For, Katharsis

means purification. According to medical analogy, it means removal of the excess, the unwanted, the undesirable, the injurious. On the analogy of religious Katharsis also, with which we have dealt in our chapter on Aristotle, it means the removal of excessive element in passion or emotion. It remains, therefore, yet to be explained, what is it that is removed from fear and pity or sympathy, what is it, of which they are purged ?

In order to understand fully Hegel's interpretation of the doctrine of Katharsis, we have to call to our minds Hegel's conception of personality, of the world in which it acts, of wrong and of punishment.

PERSONALITY.

Hegelian system is a system of triads. The fundamental triad is constituted by (i) idea (ii) nature and (iii) spirit. The last term of this triad, the spirit, manifests itself as (i) subjective (ii) objective and (iii) absolute spirit. And the subjective spirit manifests itself as (i) soul (ii) consciousness and (iii) mind. Soul also manifests itself as (i) natural soul (ii) feeling soul and (iii) actual soul. Now personality first emerges in Hegelian system at the stage of 'actual soul' in the dialectical process. When body and soul, the sentient principle of unity, coalesce; when soul envelops body and body expresses soul; when soul is aware of changes in the peripheral organs and body expresses emotions and feelings; when there is unity of body and soul, the actual soul emerges. It is the percipient individual. The communion of body and soul is the dominant fact in the constitution of individuality. This individuality, in which the sentient principle of unity is identified with full-grown human organism, possessed of definite sense-organs and racial characteristics, which are due to the influence of environment, is *Personality*.

But personality is not mere actual soul. Its experience is not confined to the body, in which the sentient principle is shrouded. Its sensations, impressions and feelings are not merely subjective. On the contrary, it involves a more advanced stage in the development of subjective spirit. It is not only actual soul but consciousness also. As such, it is aware of the object, the not-self. It realises the object as opposed to itself, as definitely external, as confronting it. As consciousness, it is aware of itself as persisting unchanged in the midst of various objective experiences; it has both indeterminate and determinate perceptions. It comprises categories and treats them as features of the object. It involves intellect also and, therefore, differentiates between the particular and the universal.

Personality, as mind, is both theoretical and practical. As theoretical mind, it intuits, represents, recollects, imagines and memorises. As practical mind, it is will, which is characterised by freedom. As such, it regards the external world of nature, not as something alien to it, but as something that admits of being moulded and determined by it. It is against the very nature of will to be simply passive to its surroundings. It is in its nature not to leave things as they are, but to mould them so as to make them conform to it. It has propensities to act; it has impulses, inclinations and interests. These impulses are the contents of personality as will. It distinguishes itself from impulses. It chooses a particular impulse to react to the given. That impulse is called emotion with which personality thoroughly identifies itself.

Personality has two aspects (i) universal and (ii) individual. It is essentially spirit and as such it is universal. But this spirit is shrouded in fully developed physical organism and is completely identified with it. It is, therefore, indivi-

dual in so far as and so long as this identification lasts. It is both thought and will. But they, thought and will, are not two distinct faculties. The same sentient principle is spoken of as thought, when it is in theoretical relation with the external objective world, but as will, when it is in practical relation.

Personality[1], according to Hegel, does not rise till the subject has not only general consciousness of himself as limited in the inner life of caprice, impulse and appetite as well as in the outer environmental life, but also is conscious of himself as completely abstract ego, in which all limits are negated. Personality is essentially the free being in pure self-conscious isolation. It is conscious of its freedom. It can abstract itself from everything. But in spite of all this, in so far as the abstract ego is shrouded in and completely identified with body, it is completely limited. It is, therefore, unity of infinite[2] and finite.

One of the essential constituents of personality is 'will'. And freedom[3] is the fundamental phase of will, as weight is of bodies. Just as heaviness constitutes the body and is body, so freedom constitutes the will and is will. Will without freedom is meaningless. But this freedom becomes actual only as will or personality.

THE WORLD IN WHICH PERSONALITY ACTS.

The world, in which the personality acts, uses its will to mould its surroundings, is not constituted simply by the objects of nature. It is not purely physical world, but a world, which is partly physical and partly spiritual. Its essential constituents are the various institutions, such as those of law, society, morality and state, as also of customs,

1. Ph. R., 44.
2. Ph. R., 45.
3. Ph. R., 11.

manners, rights and duties. These institutions are spiritual in so far as, according to Hegel, they are not the products of nature, but expressions of free universal will, the objective spirit.

PERSONALITY AND RIGHT.

Personality is the basis of right. Right is the manifestation, expression or objectification of will. It is the authority to use force. But the use of force is right, right is right, only so far as it does not negate its own principle, if it does not contradict the universal right, the first expression of freedom, the original right, whose mandate is "Be a person and respect others as persons". Right is right only so far as its exercise, its expression in action, does not proceed according to private, particular and selfish interests of personality, but according to universal interests; only so far as the action of personality does not go against the mandate of the original right.

PERSONALITY AND WRONG.

Personality is essentially universal[1]. It is simple self-reference of the ego in its essential universality. It is the "I"—"I". But in addition to this it is a being of impulses, private interests and particular appetites. It is because of the fact that personality is a unity of universal and particular that there is the possibility of wrong. Expression of freedom of will in an action, which is dictated by private end and which, as such, implies total disregard of the ends of other personalities and, therefore, disrespect to them, is wrong. Wrong is negation or violation of Right, the original Right, whose mandate is "Be a person and respect others as persons". Wrong is merely an empty appearance, a mere

1. St., 388.

nullity, untrue, because right by negating wrong, the negation of itself, restores itself.

According to Hegel, there are three forms of wrong (i) unpremeditated wrong (ii) fraud and (iii) violence or crime. If a man, while exercising his right in action, recognises the universal right, does not mean to disrespect other personalities, does not intend to go against their interests ; and yet his act does involve negation of or opposition to universal right and injury to others' interests, he does wrong. But a wrong so committed is unpremeditated wrong. But if a person does mean to injure another, does intentionally go against the universal right, and yet acts in such a manner as to make the person, whom he really means to injure, believe that what is being done to him is just the right thing, he commits fraud.

VIOLENCE OR CRIME.

Property is the embodiment of personal will. It is the reflection of individual's will[1]. It is the individual will objectified. In so far, therefore, as a person's property is the embodiment of his will, a wrong done to property, an injury inflicted on what a person calls "Mine", is violence, done to will itself, Crime is wrong in its proper sense. It is the highest degree of wrong. It is a negation not only of the general right but also of the personal right. It violates both the subjective and the objective aspects of right. When a person, in the pursuit of the object of his desire, acts in a manner so as to injure the interests of others, and not only he does so intentionally but also makes no attempt to conceal his intention from the person or persons, whom he injures thereby, he commits crime. He violates not only general right but personal right also.

1. Ph. R., 90.

PUNISHMENT.

Freedom is the property of will[1]. Will is free. It admits of no compulsion. A man may be compelled to do a certain thing against his will; his physical and other powers may be suppressed or brought under control; his property, which is an embodiment of his will, may be confiscated; but his free will, his subjective will, the will, of which his body, his property and all that he calls "Mine" is only an external expression, cannot be suppressed or controlled. Will is essentially universal and, therefore, eternal; nothing, therefore, can kill it. It admits of violence and compulsion in so far only as it does not withdraw from its external expression or embodiment, so far as it completely identifies itself with body and clings fast to whatever it calls "Mine."

Force, violence or crime, is devoid of right. For, though it is incapable of injuring the will in its potentiality, yet it does injure its realisation, its actualisation, its external manifestation, its objectification, or what it calls "Mine". And in so far as violence, being an act and an expression of freedom of will, is directed against, cancels or supersedes a manifestation or visible expression of will, it is negation of will itself and, therefore, devoid of right. Violence destroys itself in its very conception. Its principle is that it must be cancelled by violence. It is not only right but also necessary that a second act of violence should annul and supersede the first.

Crime[2] is the first violence, exercised by a free man. It injures a concrete embodiment of personal or national freedom. It violates right as right. It is negative. It negates not only a particular object of personal will, but also the universal and infinite will. For, the universal is implied in the complement "mine" when a person says "It is mine".

1. Ph. R., 91. 2. Ph. R., 93.

Thus, murder is the greatest crime, because it injures, nay, annihilates the whole concrete character of will.

Injury[1] or violence, done to right as right, is a positive external fact, but it is a negative being; it is nullity. That it is so becomes evident from the fact that right negates this negation, right realises itself by negating the wrong, which is negation of right. Right cancels wrong and asserts itself.

Crime sets aside right. It usurps the place of right. It alters the shape of things, which have a right to be such as they are. But as it is itself an expression of freedom of will, so, when it injures what in itself also is an expression of freedom of will, it opposes itself and, therefore, is negation. But Right, as absolute, refuses to be set aside, does not brook opposition. It is the nature of Right to negate its negation. Punishment, which necessarily follows wrong or crime, is, therefore, negation of negation. Actual right destroys and replaces injury and thus shows itself as a necessary factor in reality. Crime exists positively only as the particular will of the criminal. And to injure this will in its concrete existence is to supersede the crime and to restore right.

The punishment, which a perpetrator of crime gets, is inherently just, because it expresses his own inherent will. Punishment is the right of criminal himself and is implied in his act. For, in his criminal act he asserts the freedom of will in its universality and sets it up as law. He recognises freedom of will in his crimes and, therefore, punishment, which in itself is a higher expression of freedom of will, is his own right.

In this context Hegel raises a question, which is very important from the point of view of comparative æsthetics

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1. Ph. R., 94.

and which clearly brings out his conception of Katharsis. That question is "What[1] is that in crime, whose existence has to be removed ?" If punishment is negation of negation ; if punishment, as a manifestation of free will, sets aside only what is evil, the most essential thing is to determine wherein that evil lies. And Hegel's answer to this question is[2] "The origin of evil in general lies......in the necessity of freedom to rise out of natural state and to find itself within itself." The origin of evil lies in the opposition of the natural will, the individual will, to freedom, the universal will. In this opposition the natural will is contradictory of and incompatible with its own essential nature as will. Hence it is the particularity of will, which is evil, and as such has got to be negated and removed by Right in the form of punishment. There are two phases of evil, (i) that evil of necessity is and (ii) that evil of necessity shall not be.

HEGEL'S INTERPRETATION OF KATHARSIS.

Now we can understand Hegel's interpretation of Katharsis (purification). Fear is a feeling with objective reference. Ordinary fear is related to some terrible external object, which is finite. But tragic fear is not related to any limited finite existence. Its object is the might of absolute Right, which tragedy presents.

This absolute Right is presented in a tragedy "to rise out of natural state and to find itself within itself" through negation of negation, through negation of wrong or crime, which is its own negation in so far as it is the negation of right as such. This negation of wrong is the negation of the element of individuality from that which opposes right. Tragedy, therefore, in presenting the punishment of wrong, purifies what it presents from the element of individuality

1. Ph. R., 96. 2. Ph. R., 134.

and, therefore, presents the absolute might of right, the divine justice. And tragic fear is purified in so far as its object, the might of absolute Right, is purified inasmuch as it is purged of the element of individuality, the element which is opposed to it and in which the origin of evil lies. The same holds good of sympathy, because it is an accordant feeling with the claim of the ethical power. Thus, Katharsis, according to Hegel, means 'deindividualisation'.

While discussing Hegel's approach to the problem of æsthetics, we stated that he handles the problem from three distinct points of view, (i) arts and their works, (ii) the subject that produces work of art i.e. artist and (iii) the subject that contemplates products of arts i.e. connoisseur. We have so far discussed the problem mainly from the first point of view and have shown what are the essential constituents of a work of art and how they are related. We, therefore, now proceed to take up the second point of view to show what are the essential subjective conditions for the production of work of art.

THE ARTIST.

A work of art has its origin in human spirit. It is a product of spiritual activity. It is not mere natural growth of the external nature. It receives its due form through the creative impulse of the artist. The obvious aspects of this creative activity are (i) imagination (ii) genius and (iii) inspiration.

Besides the creative impulse, the artist must have seen much, heard much and stored away a great deal. He should have accurate knowledge of truth and should adhere to it steadfast. He should fully understand the soul of man, the passions which arise in human heart and everything that it yearns and strives for. He should know the various ways in which human soul expresses itself in external world.

(i) IMAGINATION.

While dealing with Hegel's conception of theoretical mind, we have given the features of poetic imagination, which distinguish it from ordinary image-making faculty. We have, therefore, to add only a few remarks here. Poetic imagination is wholly distinct from the passive visionary fancy[1]. It is creative. It has a peculiar power of grasping reality and the forms, that it presents, through alert eyes and ears. It implies exceptionally retentive memory to store up all that is so grasped. It lays hold of all that interests mankind. It furnishes the material for artistic production.

Poetic imagination, as an aspect of creative activity of the artist, involves reflection. It is through reflection alone that the artist can grasp the wealth that is in him. For, what the artistic imagination undertakes to do, is to bring to consciousness the Absolute as clothed in a concrete form of actual existence and individuality. And in this interfusion of an intelligible material with form, which the artist receives from outside, he has to avail himself of the reflective faculty in order that his work may have vitality. According to Hegel, only fools[2] are of the opinion that genuine artist does not in the least know what his hands and senses are about.

(ii) TALENT AND GENIUS.

The productive activity, by means of which the artist is able to give the essentially rational content a real embodiment, which is more his creation than product of nature, is called genius. It is essentially the property of human soul. But talent is slightly different from genius : though the two are always found united in a genuine artist. It is merely executive skill, the capacity to present artistic vision in a material medium. Talent, therefore, by itself cannot pro-

1. Ph. A., Vol. I., 381.
2. Ph. A., Vol. I., 383.

duce any genuine work of art. To be able to do so, it needs the vital spark of genius.

WORK OF ART AND GENIUS.

There are two necessary conditions of artistic production. (i) Perfect familiarity with the rules of artistic production and practice to use them according to the need of the subject-matter. (ii) Possession of the artistic capacity of production, which is called genius.

However, while some literary critics hold the former, others consider the latter, to be in itself sufficient for the production of works of art. Thus, while some maintain that familiarity with the rules and practice in their use by itself is sufficient ; others hold that knowledge of such rules is unnecessary and even injurious : genius by itself is sufficient.

According to Hegel, both combined are necessary for artistic production of value. Neither by itself is sufficient. This is just what Mammaṭa holds[1].

IMPORTANCE OF STUDY TO THE ARTIST.

The more exalted the rank of an artist, the more profoundly ought he to portray the depth of the soul and the mind. These are not to be known by flash-light. They are to be sounded exclusively by directing one's intelligence to the world of souls and the objective world. Here again the study is the only means, wherewith the artist can bring to consciousness such contents and get the material and supporting frame-work of his conceptions.

Poetry aims at presentation of humanity, rich in subject-matter and reflective power, and its profounder interests and the forces which move it. The mind and heart, therefore,

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*1. K. P., 2—3.

must themselves be richly and profoundly disciplined by life, experience and thought, before genius itself can bring into being the fruit that is ripe and the content that has substance.

(iii) INSPIRATION.

Intimate co-operation between imagination and technical skill is inspiration. It is the capacity of being entirely absorbed in a given subject; capacity not only to have a complete vision of it, but also to present it adequately in an external medium. It involves self-forgetfulness, the rise above individual idiosyncrasies and all that accidentally attaches to them. It involves, in short, complete merging in the subject. It is not beautiful natural scenery, nor wine, nor strong will, that causes inspiration. On the contrary, it is the specific content, which imagination takes up to give it artistic expression, that is responsible for inspiration.

ARTISTIC SATISFACTION.

A work of art is not primarily addressed to senses. It is not intended to be the object of desire. It is not for sensuous satisfaction. It is primarily addressed to the mind. Hence the connoisseur associates himself with it without any craving such as one has for the sensuous object of desire. He relates himself with it as with an object that is reflective of himself, that which, like a mirror, gives reflection of a certain moment of the life of the self. Thus, a work of art is only for the contemplative faculty of mind[1] and the satisfaction from the artistic relation with it is purely spiritual satisfaction, due to self-recognition in the reflection of the self in a work of art, through contemplation.

1. Ph. A., Vol. I. 49.

RECOGNITIVE NATURE OF ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Hegel holds that the experience, that a work of art is capable of arousing in us, is recognitive. It is nothing but recognition by the mind of itself in a work of art, which is its own product. This view is based upon his conception of mind, of art and of work of art.

(i) Mind, according to him, is capable of knowing itself and all that originates from it. Thought is the most essential feature of mind. It is in the awareness of itself and its products that the most essential nature of mind is manifested. The power of mind shows itself not only in grasping itself in its purity as pure thought but also in recognising itself in its self-divestment in the medium of emotion and the sensuous.

(ii) Art, as we have already pointed out, is the first of the triad, manifested by the Absolute Spirit. It is a necessary mode of human consciousness. It is the actual consciousness in human mind, which has objective reference, though the object is nothing but the Spirit itself. When human mind, in its freedom from finitude, realizes that what is presented to the senses is nothing but itself; when in its universality the mind contemplates itself in the sensuous medium, it attains to the level of Art. It is a mode of human mind, in which there is the identification of the subject with the object, in which distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is overcome and in which mind contemplates itself in its freedom and as such is infinite and attains to the stage of Absolute Spirit. It apprehends the Absolute in the guise of external sense-objects.

(iii) Works of art are the products of mind in its freedom. They have two aspects (i) content and (ii) form. Content of a work of art is always mind in its freedom and universality. The essence, therefore, of a work of art is mind itself. It is nearer to spirit, thought or mind than

the external nature. It is not thought or notion as such, but an evolution of notion out of itself. It is a self-alienation, self-divestment, self-estrangement or self-objectification of mind in the medium of emotion and the sensuous. And form of a work of art is nothing but this medium of emotion and the sensuous, in which the spiritual content is embodied. The relation of this form with the content is similar to that of thought and expression. In a work of art the sensuous material is transmuted into thought-expression. Sensuous form is only a medium, through which mind apprehends itself. It has as little value and meaning independently of its content as speech has independently of thought.

Now, for a clear understanding of Hegel's view that æsthetic experience is recognitive experience, it is necessary to remember that will in his philosophy is characterised by freedom : that it expresses itself in certain propensities, called impulses, inclinations or interests : that passion or emotion is nothing but an impulse in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged : and that, according to him, soul and body are in communion, the soul is aware of the changes in peripheral organs and body expresses the emotions.

Thus, emotion, according to Hegal, is an expression of freedom of will; and body, the sensuous thing, expresses emotion. A work of art, therefore, in presenting the mind in its freedom in a sensuous medium, has to present primarily such physical aspects of human body as clearly express emotion and through that the mind in its freedom. It concretises the universality of mind by embodying it in the physical expressions of its emotion, in which its freedom is expressed. Work of art is universal concretised. But in æsthetic experience concrete is universalised. For, in contemplating a work of art, mind penetrates through the outer guise, that it puts on in its self-alienation in the form of

art, and grasps the soul, the true meaning, the real, the mind itself, which this guise conceals. As recognition consists in cognising again something, that was known before in circumstances and form different from those in which it is at present, so art-experience is recognitive experience because, in it, the mind that knows itself subjectively, cognises itself again in the works of art, under the garb of external form.

CHAPTER XII

VOLUNTARISTIC ÆSTHETICS OF SCHOPENHAUER

IMPORTANCE OF SCHOPENHAUER.

Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is important from a comparative point of view. For, æsthetic experience, according to him, is a transcendental experience. It is an apprehension of an idea, which transcends the forms of empirical knowledge, the forms of sensibility and understanding, time, space, causality etc., in Kantian terminology, or four forms of the principle of sufficient reason in terms of the voluntaristic philosophy of Schopenhauer. It is attained when the individual subject ceases to be individual, when he becomes pure willless subject of knowledge. This conception of æsthetic experience agrees with that of those Indian æstheticians who talk of the universalisation (Sādhāraṇībhāva) of the subjective and the objective aspects of æsthetic experience. It is disinterested and in it the knowledge is free from the service of the will.

And art, according to him, is concerned with what is outside and independent of all empirical relations ; it reproduces eternal *ideas*, grasped through pure contemplation: it is the way of viewing things independently of the principle of suffiicient reason : it extends the artist's horizon far beyond the limit of personal existence and thus enables him to construct the whole out of the little that comes to his actual apprehension. Genius alone can comprehend the *idea* and imagination is an essential element of genius. This conception of

imagination has fair similarity with the conception of Pratibhā[1] in Indian Æsthetics.

The summary and comparative view of Schopenhauer's theory of æsthetics, as given above, clearly show that for a proper understanding of it a clear grasp of the fundamentals of his voluntaristic philosophy is necessary. Let us, therefore, state them briefly.

HIS PHILOSOPHY.

The Voluntarism of Schopenhauer has close similarity with the voluntaristic trend in the monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir. Both admit that what is known at the empirical level is merely a phenomenon, an idea: that the world, apart from being idea, is, in its inner nature, Will : that the philosophical wisdom is nothing but bringing the truth "The world is my idea." into reflective and abstract consciousness. But there is the fundamental difference between the two. For, while Schopenhauer holds that the unconscious will constitutes the reality of thing ; Kashmir Śaivaism admits the will to be an aspect of the Universal Mind or Consciousness. This view is in consonance with the experience of the will, as even Schopenhauer himself admits[2].

Thus, according to Schopenhauer, the world as known to limited individual is merely idea and the inner nature of it is the Will. This he establishes in his two books (i) The World As Idea and (ii) The World As Will.

(i) THE WORLD AS IDEA.

It was under Kantian influence that Schopenhauer came to the conclusion that the world as known to individual subject is merely idea, phenomenon.

1. Com. Æ., Vol I, 151.
2. Proceedings Vol. II, XVI All-India Oriental Conference, 330-36.

He accepts the Kantian view that the laws, according to which phenomena are combined, namely, time, space, causality etc., are merely subjective, that they are mere forms of knowledge and that howsoever far the investigation may be carried on under their guidance, no progress will be made towards the true nature of the world in itself.

But he is not a phenomenalist. He is an idealist and has much in common with the objective idealists. He seems to hold the relation to be the highest category[1]. Under this he puts two dependent categories, (1) antithesis of subject and object, which is the common form of all types of idea : and (2) principle of sufficient reason, which has various aspects (i) causality, (ii) ground of knowledge, (iii) Law of sufficient reason of being and (iv) motivation. The principle of sufficient reason generally expresses necessary relation and is valid for a particular class of ideas only. Accordingly he asserts that no truth is more certain than that all that exists for knowledge is object only in relation to subject, is perception of a perceiver, *idea*. According to Kantian philosophy, phenomenon necessarily has temporal and spatial relations. But, according to Schopenhauer, *Idea* is what is related to subject. The object may not have temporal and spatial limitations, still it remains an idea. It cannot be spoken of as the thing-in-itself. Thus, he holds that the æsthetic object, though it is free from temporal and spatial relations, yet it is an idea, because it is related to subject, though he also is free from all limitations. This conception of Idea, Schopenhauer borrowed from Berkeley. For, the principle 'No object without a subject' was the foundation-stone of the philosophy of Berkeley.

Thus, Schopenhauer uses the word "idea" not only for what is formed according to four forms of principle of

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1. W.W.I., Vol. I, 7.

sufficient reason but also for Platonic idea, but not in the strict Platonic sense as something that is beyond the world of stars. He adopts[1] the Aristotelian improvement on the Platonic ideas as forms, as directing forces of things, as forces which make things what they are. But he recognises them to be different grades of the objectification of the Will in things.

The distinction between the idea, formed according to the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, and the idea that is beyond the principle of sufficient reason, that is transcendent, is very important from the point of view of the voluntaristic æsthetics. For, the former is the object of empirical knowledge and the latter is the object of transcendental knowledge; it constitutes the objective aspect of æsthetic experience.

SUBJECT.

The conception of the subject is another point, on which the Kantian Phenomenalism influenced Schopenhauer. For, in accordance with the general trend of his transcendental philosophy, Kant holds the subject to be both transcendental and empirical. The former is only a transcendental condition of the latter. Schopenhauer accepts the Kantian distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical, but differs from Kant in regard to their essential nature.

(i) Schopenhauer improves upon the Kantian view of the transcendental apperception. He holds that Kant's proposition "The 'I think' must accompany all our ideas." is insufficient. For, it leaves the 'I' unexplained[2]. Further,

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1. W. W. I., Vol. I, 186.
2. W. W, I., Vol. II, 51.

according to Kant, self-consciousness, which is spoken of as the condition of the consciousness of object, is itself consciousness. How can one consciousness be represented to be the condition of another? That which gives unity and connection to consciousness of the objective world in so far as it runs through all its ideas, is its substratum, its permanent supporter, cannot itself be conditioned by consciousness and, therefore, cannot be idea. It must be the prius of consciousness, the root of the tree, of which consciousness is the fruit. Schopenhauer, therefore, holds that that which is the condition of the empirical knowing subject, is the Will. For, the will alone is unchangeable and absolutely identical. Without it the intellect would not have the unity of consciousness, as a mirror in which now this and now that successively presents itself. The Will alone is permanent and unchanging in consciousness. It does not belong to the intellect, but is only its root, source or controller.

(ii) And the subject of knowing, the empirical subject, according to Schopenhauer, is nothing but extensionless[1] centre of the sphere of all our ideas, whose radii converge to it, or the focus in which the rays of the activity of the brain converge.

The view may be elaborated as follows :—

Schopenhauer holds that that which lies at the foundation of the whole phenomenon, that which alone has being in itself and is original, is exclusively the Will. This Will objectifies itself in various grades of ideas, which constitute the phenomenal world. The highest grade of objectification of Will is the highly perfected brain. The intellect is an organic function, the function of the brain. Thus, intellect springs from organism and thereby from the will. Hence intellect owes its being to Will.

1. W. W. I., Vol. II, 51.

Not only the perception of the external world but self-consciousness also is conditioned by the brain or its functions. The Will in itself is without self-consciousness. It becomes conscious of itself only through the secondary world of ideas, which reflects it. Thus, when the Will produces a brain, the consciousness of its own self arises by means of the subject of knowledge, the focus of the activity of the brain, which comprehends things as existing and ego as willing. For, this focus or the knowing subject apprehends itself as identical with its own basis, from which it springs, that which wills.

This knowing and conscious ego, the focus of the whole of activity of brain, is indeed like an indivisible point. It springs from the Will. That from which it springs, can be known only indirectly, as it were through reflection. Annihilation of this focus does not mean the annihilation of that from which it springs.[1] It is related to the Will, which is the basis of its phenomenal appearance, exactly as a picture in the focus of a concave mirror is related to the mirror itself and has only a conditioned, nay, merely apparent reality.

FOUR CLASSES OF IDEAS ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.

Schopenhauer admits four classes of ideas according to the principle of sufficient reason. He holds that all our ideas are objects of the knowing subject and all objects of the subject are our ideas. All our ideas stand to one another in an orderly connection, which is always determinable *a priori* in point of form. On account of this connection, nothing, that is in itself separate and wholly independent of other things, can be the object of our consciousness. It is this connection, which the principle of sufficient reason, in its generality, expresses.

1. W. W. I., Vol. III, 12-3

(I) The first class of objects[1] for the subject consists of those complete ideas of perception, which form a part of our experience and are referable to some sensation of our bodies. They are perceptible only under the forms of space and time. In this class of objects the principle of sufficient reason appears, as the law of causality. It is through this law that all objects, which present themselves in perception, are bound together through the changes of their states.

(II) The second class of objects is constituted by abstract ideas, which are the products of reason, the distinctive characteristic of man. They are distinct from the ideas of perception, from which they are derived. They are incapable of being the objects of perception. They would be outside consciousness and the operations of thought would be impossible, were it not for the fact that they are fixed for sense by arbitrary signs, called words which, therefore, always indicate general conceptions. But thought does not consist in the mere presence of abstract ideas in consciousness, but in the union and separation of two or more of them in accordance with logical rules. It is in a judgement that the relation of concepts is clearly expressed. In relation to judgement the principle of sufficient reason is valid in a new form, the *ground af knowledge.* And it is just because it has a ground, that the predicate 'true' is ascribed to it.

(III) The third class of objects for the subject is constituted by the formal elements of perception, the forms of outer and inner sense, space and time. This class of ideas, in which time and space appear as pure intuitions, is distinguished from that in which they appear as objects of perception on account of the presence of matter, i.e. ideas of perception. They are known through pure intuition. And

1. W. W. I., Vol. III,480.

the law, according to which the parts of space and time determine one another, is called *the law of sufficient reason of being.*

(IV) The fourth class of objects comprehends only one object, the immediate object of inner sense or internal sense, the subject in volition, which becomes the object of inner sense. Here the principle of sufficient reason appears as "Motivation".

(ii) THE WORLD AS WILL.

The problem that arises after the conclusion that the world is merely an idea, an object related to a subject, is: "What is the significance of the ideas of perception ?" Does the phenomenal world have any reality that underlies its appearances : or is it absolutely meaningless ? Schopenhauer was influenced by Kant in his conception of 'the world as Will'. For, though Kant did not directly recognise the thing-in-itself in the Will, yet he made a great initial step towards this recognition. We can get a clear idea of the importance of this step if we take into consideration the doctrine of *freedom*, as presented in his Critique of Practical Reason.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, the existence of moral law is treated, not as a problem but as a fact. According to Kant, it is a fact that moral law exists. It is impossible to deny this fact. The moral law is given to us. Every moral action and every moral judgement is based upon the presupposition of the moral law. The question of the second Critique, therefore, is not whether moral law exists, but how can it affect human action ? And the answer to the question is that it is the very nature of the moral law to determine the Will of beings, who recognise this law as binding on themselves. Hence it follows that the Will, which recognises this law, is free. Here we find that Kant

admitted free Will to be independent of the laws of phenomenon and to be inexplicable in accordance with them. Hence he acknowledged it to have the characteristics of what he called the thing-in-itself. However, he did not identify the thing-in-itself with the Will. This is just what Schopenhauer has done.

According to Schopenhauer, the answer to the question "What is the significance, the inner nature of the ideas ?" is given to the knowing subject ; and that answer is the Will. The Will reveals to him the significance of his actions and movements. Therefore, on the basis of the analogy of the inner nature of voluntary action, that is known to us immediately, the Will has to be accepted as the inner being of everything. He asserts that it is wrong to think that it is all the same whether we denote the inner nature of all phenomena by the word 'Will' or by some such other word as 'force'. For, such a thought would be right if the thing-in-itself were something, the existence of which were a matter of inference only. The word 'Will', however, is not merely a symbol of an unknown quantity, something arrived at by means of inference only : but it is that which we fully and immediately comprehend and is so familiar to us that we understand far better what Will is than anything else.

The concept of Will is not subordinate to that of force. The position is the reverse. For, at the foundation of the concept of force, lies the knowledge in sense-perception of the objective world, and the concept is constructed out of this. It is an abstraction from the province, in which the law of causation reigns supreme. It is an abstraction from the ideas of perception. It means just the causal nature of causes at the point, at which the causal nature is no longer etiologically explicable. It is a necessary presupposition of all etiological explanations.

The concept of Will, however, does not have its source in the mere ideas of perception, in the phenomena. On the contrary, it springs from within. It proceeds from the most immediate consciousness of every human being, in which each one of us knows his individuality immediately, in which there is freedom from all forms of knowledge, not excluding even that of antithesis of subject and object.

Therefore, if we subsume the concept of Will under that of force, we subsume what is better known under what is less known. We have, therefore, to reverse the position and to subsume force under Will, that is fully and immediately known to us. If we do not do so, we renounce the only immediate knowledge, which we have of the inner nature of the world. For, we allow it to disappear in a concept which is abstracted from phenomena and with which we can never go beyond the phenomenal.

THE WILL AS THE INNER BEING OF EVERYTHING.

Schopenhauer's view that the world, apart from being idea, is, in its inner nature, Will, is based on the analysis of voluntary action as follows :—

The body is given in two different ways to the subject of knowledge, who becomes individual only through identification with the body.

(i) It is given as an idea in intelligent perception, as an object among objects and subject to the laws of object.

(ii) It is also known in a quite different way as that which is immediately known to every one and is signified by the word *Will*.

For, every act of Will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body. The act of Will and the

movement of the body are not two different things objectively known, which the bond of causality unites, but they are only given in two entirely different ways: (i) immediately and (ii) in perception for the understanding. Thus, the action of body is nothing but the act of Will, objectified i. e. passed into perception.

Here there is agreement between Schopenhauer and Kashmir Voluntarism. For, the latter also holds that action is nothing but the Will[1] externalised. (Cikīrṣā bahiṣparyantatām prāptā kriyā ityabhidhīyate).

He enters into lengthy arguments to establish that not only our action but also the whole body itself is nothing but objectification of Will. Accordingly he suggests that the double knowledge, which the individual subject has of the nature and activity of his own body and which is given in two different ways, be used *as a key* to the nature of every phenomenon in nature; and that if we follow the analogy of our own bodies in judging what the objects are apart from being mere ideas, we have to admit that just as in one aspect they are ideas, just like our own bodies, so, in another aspect, they, in their inner nature, must be the same as that which we call *Will*. For, besides Will and idea nothing is known to us. Therefore, if we wish to attribute the greatest known reality to the material world, which is known to us as mere idea, we have to give it the reality, which our own bodies have for each of us. For, we can nowhere find another kind of reality which we can attribute to the material world.

Therefore, if we hold that the material world is something more than our own idea, we must say that it is, in itself, in its inmost nature, that which we find immediately in ourselves as *Will*.

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1. Bh., Vol. II., 207.

On the basis of analogy of what goes on in a human being, when the body performs an action, Schopenhauer recognises the inscrutable forces, which manifest themselves in all natural bodies, as identical in kind with that which in human being is *the Will* and as differing from it only in degree.

He holds that the fourth class of ideas, in which there is no antithesis of subject and object, which comprehends only one object, the immediate object of inner sense, *the Will*, and which is experienced as identical with the knowing subject, *is the key* to the knowledge of the inner nature of the first, comprising those complete ideas of perception, which form a part of our experience, which are referable to some sensation of our bodies and which are capable of being perceived under the forms of space and time.

In the case of man this *inner being* is called character. But in the case of stone it is called quality. In both the cases, however, the inner being is the same. When it is immediately known *it is called Will*. But when it is a mere presupposition *it is called natural forces*.

This *inner being* is the strongest in the case of man. For, in man the subject in volition becomes the object of knowledge only to inner sense. In stone the objectivity of Will is the weakest, because there is no awareness of Will, because the Will is blind. Thus, the Will in Schopenhauer's system denotes that which is the inner nature of everything in the world and the one kernal of every phenomenon.

He asserts that the thing-in-itself is not altogether directly unknown and is not simply inferred, but it is immediately known, and that it is the *Will*. The Will, as thing-in-itself, lies outside the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms and consequently it is groundless in itself, though all its manifestations are entirely subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason.

It is free from all multiplicity, though its manifestations in time and space are innumerable. It is one, not in the sense, in which an object is one; because the unity of an object can be known only in opposition to a possible multiplicity: nor is it one in the sense in which a concept is one; because the unity of a concept originates in abstraction from multiplicity. It is one as that which lies outside time and space and is the possibility of multiplicity.

GRADES OF OBJECTIFICATION OF WILL.

The objectification of will has many grades, in which the nature of will appears as ideas i.e presents itself as objects. They are similar to Platonic Ideas. They are just the determined species or the original unchanging forms or qualities of all natural bodies. They are also the general forms, which reveal themselves according to laws. They, as a whole, express themselves in innumerable individuals and particulars. To these individuals and particulars, the Ideas are related as archetypes are to their copies. While the individuals, in which the ideas express themselves, are innumerable and unceasingly come into being and pass away, the Ideas remain unchanged and the same. The principle of sufficient reason does not apply to them, has no meaning for them. But all knowledge of the individual subject comes under the forms of the principle of sufficient reason. The ideas, therefore, lie quite outside the sphere of knowledge of the individual subject. The Ideas become objects of knowledge only when the individuality of the subject is transcended.

KNOWLEDGE AND WILL.

Knowledge, whether it be rational or sensuous, generally proceeds from the will itself. It belongs to the inner being

of the higher grades of objectification of will. It is a mere means of supporting the individual and the species. It is originally destined for the service of the will, for the accomplishment of its aims. It remains almost throughout entirely for the service of the will. It is so in all brutes and in almost all men.

In some men, however, the knowledge can free itself from the service of the will, can throw off the yoke of will, can free itself from all the aims of will, can exist purely for itself, as a clear mirror of the world. *Such a knowledge is the source of art.* For, art is nothing but representation of apprehension of the object, free from all relations to will and its aims. Further, if the knowledge, which is free from the service of the will for the accomplishment of all its aims, reacts on the will, it can bring about self-surrender i.e. resignation, which is the final goal and the inmost nature of all virtue and holiness and is deliverance from the world.

TRANSCENDENTAL NATURE OF ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Æsthetic experience, according to Schopenhauer, is the experience of 'Idea', the immediate manifestation of will, free from all relations. It is attained when knowledge is free from the service of will and the subject also is free from all elements of individuality. It is, therefore, transcendental experience. For, according to Schopenhauer, time, space and causality are the forms of human intellect, by virtue of which, the one being of each kind (the idea), which alone really is, manifests itself as multiplicity of similar beings, constantly appearing and disappearing in endless succession. The apprehension of objects by means of and in accordance with the forms of intellect is immanent knowledge. But that apprehension of objects, which transcends these forms, is tra-

nscendental knowledge. Schopenhauer holds that this transcendental knowledge is got intuitively by a connoisseur, contemplating on a beautiful work of art.

The transition from the immanent knowledge to the transcendental takes place suddenly. The knowledge is always in the service of will. But in connoisseur it breaks free from the service of the will. This happens when the individual subject ceases to be individual ; when he becomes the pure willless subject of knowledge ; when he no longer traces the relations in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason but rests in fixed contemplation of the object, free from all relations to other objects ; when he ***rises into the object.***

Thus, if a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things, gives up tracing the relations of things in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason ; if he does not relate the object of knowledge to his own will ; if he ceases to consider the when, the where, the why and the whither of things and looks at simply and solely the what ; if he does not allow abstract thought to take possession of his consciousness ; but, on the contrary, if he sinks himself entirely in the presented and lets his whole consciousness be filled up with quiet contemplation of it; if he forgets even his individuality and exists only as a pure mirror of the object so that the perceiver and perception become one ; if the object is free from all relations to what is not itself, to what is outside itself, and if the subject is free from all relations to will, then that which is so known is no longer the particular thing as such, but it is the Idea, the eternal form, the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade, and, therefore, he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual, but he is pure willless, timeless and spaceless subject of knowledge. The æsthetic experience is, therefore, nothing else than the

disinterested apprehension of the relationless object, the 'Platonic Idea', by self-forgetful and willless subject, who has transcended his personality.

In æsthetic experience, the subject, which passes into the object, that is free from all relations, becomes one with the object: for, the whole consciousness is nothing but perfectly distinct picture of the object. In it the subject and the object are no longer distinguished. They interpenetrate each other completely. Similarly the knowing and the known are undistinguishable.

IDEA AS OBJECT OF ART.

Art is concerned with what is outside and independent of all relations. It represents that which is really essential to the world, the true content of phenomena, that which is subject to no change and, therefore, is known with equal truth for all time. It reproduces eternal Ideas, grasped through pure contemplation. The classification has no reference to the content, but only to the material in which the content is represented. It is the way of viewing things independently of the principle of sufficient reason. It is distinct from science, which is the way of viewing things in accordance with the said principle. The scientific way of viewing things is rational and is of use in practical life. The artistic way of viewing things is the method of genius and is of use in art.

GENIUS.

The essential nature of genius consists in the pre-eminent capacity for such contemplation as ends entirely in the object, brings about the deindividualisation of both the subject and the object, makes the subject merge in the object. Genius alone can comprehend the Ideas. Such a contemplation requires that a man entirely forgets himself and the relations in which he stands. Genius is the objective tendency of the mind,

as opposed to the subjective, which is directed towards one's own self i. e. to the Will. It is the faculty of continuing in the state of pure perception, of losing one's self in perception and of enlisting in this service the knowledge, which originally existed for the service of the Will. It is the power of leaving one's own interests, wishes and aims entirely out of sight and of entirely renouncing one's own personality for a time so as to remain pure knowing subject. This transcendence of personality lasts for sufficient length of time with sufficient consciousness to enable the man of genius to reproduce in a medium of art what has thus been apprehended.

The common mortal is not capable of disinterested observation. He can turn his attention to things only so far as they have some relation to his will. He does not linger long over the object. He hastily seeks a concept under which it may be brought and then it interests him no further. The man of genius, on the other hand, whose knowledge occasionally is free from the service of Will, strives to comprehend the Idea, and not its relation to other things and to his own will. The action of genius is an inspiration. It is the action of superhuman being distinct from the individual himself.

Thus, genius consists in the capacity of knowing, independently of the principle of sufficient reason, not individual things, which have only a relative existence, but the Ideas of such things and of being oneself the correlative of the Idea and thus of becoming pure subject of knowledge. It is a gift of nature. It is inborn. But the technical skill in representing the Idea is acquired.

IMAGINATION AND GENIUS.

Imagination is an essential element of genius, but it is not identical with genius. As the objects of genius are eternal Ideas and as the knowledge of Ideas is necessarily through

perception, the knowledge of genius would be limited to the Ideas of the objects, actually present to his person, and would be dependent upon the chain of circumstances that brought these objects to him, if his imagination did not extend his horizon far beyond the limit of personal existence and thus enable him to construct the whole out of the little that comes to his own actual apprehension. Imagination lets almost all of life pass before genius in his own consciousness.

The actual objects are always very imperfect copies of the Ideas, expressed in them. The man of genius, therefore, requires imagination in order to see in things, not that which nature has actually made, but that which she endeavours to make. Imagination extends the intellectual horizon of the man of genius beyond the actual objects, which are actually present to him, as regards both quality and quantity. Therefore, extraordinary strength of imagination accompanies and is in fact the necessary condition of genius.

But strength of imagination does not necessarily coincide with genius. For, men, who have no touch of genius, may have much imagination : because it is possible to apprehend a real object in two different ways : (1) objectively, which is the way of genius and (2) subjectively i.e. in relation to other objects, in which it stands and to one's own will. The first is the means to the knowledge of the Idea, which art presents. The second is the means of building castles in the air, congenial to egoism and individual humour, which for a moment delude and gratify. The man, who indulges in such amusement, is a dreamer. If he writes down such fancies, he may produce a novel, which may entertain those who are dreamers like him. For, the reader imagines himself in the place of the hero and then finds the story agreeable.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENIUS AND CONNOISSEUR.

This capacity of viewing the Idea exists in a smaller degree in all men. For, in the absence of this, they would be incapable of enjoying the works of art; they would have no susceptibility for the beautiful and the sublime. Of course, we can assume its non-existence in those who are incapable of enjoying the work of art.

The man of genius excels connoisseur in possessing this faculty in a far higher degree and more continuously. He, while under the influence of this power, retains the presence of mind, which is necessary to represent what he has thus visualised. He communicates the Idea so grasped to others. This means of communication is the work of art.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE FROM A WORK OF ART AND NATURE.

According to Schopenhauer, æsthetic experience is the same, whether it be called forth by, got from, a work of art or an object of nature. It consists in the grasp of the Idea. But the Idea comes to us more easily from a work of art than from a product of nature. And this is due to the fact that the artist, who grasps the Idea, represents it in abstraction from the actual and omits all the disturbing accidents. He lets us see the world through his eyes.

ÆSTHETIC CONTEMPLATION.

The æsthetic contemplation has two inseparable constituent parts, (1) the 'Platonic Idea' and (2) pure willless subject of knowledge. The condition, under which both appear always united, is the abandonment of the method of knowing, which is bound to the principle of sufficient reason. And the æsthetic pleasure, which is produced by such contemplation, arises sometimes more from the subject and sometimes more from

the object, according to what the object of the æsthetical contemplation may be.

ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE DISINTERESTED.

All individual willing arises from want. Satisfaction of one wish leads to the rise of another. No attained object can give lasting satisfaction. Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled by our own will, we can have no lasting satisfaction. But when some external cause or inward disposition lifts us suddenly out of endless stream of willing, frees knowledge from the service of Will, the attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing, but comprehends the objects free from relation to will and thus observes them without personal interest.

CHAPTER XIII.

INTUITIVE ÆSTHETICS OF CROCE

IMPORTANCE OF CROCE FOR COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS.

Croce (1866-1952) is important from the point of view of comparative æsthetics, because he holds that in æsthetic experience the connoisseur becomes spiritually identical with the artist; that the connoisseur has to rise to the level of the artist and has to be one with the artist spiritually, if he is to reproduce artistic vision in himself; and that the reproductive activity presupposes the identity of the psychological conditions of the connoisseur with those of the artist. For, Indian æstheticians from Bhaṭṭa Tauta onward have admitted the identity of the experience of the connoisseur with that of the artist.[1] There is also complete agreement between him and Abhinavagupta, when he says that æsthetic experience does not involve comparison of one thing with another or any spatial or temporal relation[2] and that it is "intuition" without intellectual element.

CROCE AS A FOLLOWER AND CRITIC OF HEGEL.

Croce is both a follower and a critic of Hegel. He admits the importance of Hegel's contribution to the philosophic thought. According to him, Hegel's two great contributions are (i) Logic of Philosophy and (ii) Concrete Universal.

(i) Just as mathematics has its own method, which is studied in the Logic of Mathematics; and just as art and poetry have their own methods, which are studied in the Logic of poetry and art i. e. æsthetics; so philosophy in

*1. Dh. L., 92.
2. Com. Æ., Vol. I, 159-60.

general has its own method, which must be determined, though very few thinkers recognize it. Hegel's chief contribution, according to Croce, is the discovery and elaboration of the important principles to be followed in philosophic investigation. He brought to completion the Logic of Philosophy.

(ii) Another great contribution to philosophic thought which, according to Croce, Hegel has made, is his conception of concrete universal, in terms of which he solves the problem of opposite concepts. Croce accepts it to be the only solution of the problem of opposites. For, Hegel rejects the position of an abstract monist no less than that of a dualist. He holds that just as the reality, grasped by poet[1], holds within itself the opposition and yet is one and undivided ; so the reality, thought by philosopher, is a unity, which includes in it all multiplicity and opposition and retains its unity undisturbed. Hegel's Absolute is not abstract, but concrete. It is not pure unity, but unity in multiplicity. It is the synthesis of opposites. The opposites are opposites only to each other, but not to the Absolute. The Supreme Unity is not static but dynamic.

And in the solution of the problem of opposites Hegel follows the famous dialectical method. He holds that of the two terms, involved in opposition, the second is the negation of the first. But the third term, in which both of them are synthesised, is the negation of negation. The third term negates both in their separation, but at the same time preserves them as parts of organic whole, e. g. (i) Being (ii) Not-being (iii) Becoming.

But the point, which Croce emphasises in the present context, is that 'philosophic thought' is synthesis of distincts as well as synthesis of opposites. It is synthesis of distincts[2] in

1. Ph. Heg., 19.
2. Ph. Heg., 83.

so far as the 'philosophical idea' is not static but dynamic and, therefore, expresses or manifests itself in particular forms of its activity, attains to full and complete realisation of what is potential in it, what is essentially involved or implied in it. That specialisation in particular distinct forms is the way to full self-realisation or self-expression, is shown by the fact that philosophy itself can attain to full self-expression only through specialisation into æsthetics, logic, ethics, metaphysics etc. They are forms of philosophy and every one of them is quite distinct from the rest.

On a closer study of the Hegelian system, however, he finds that Hegel has failed to distinguish between the opposite and the distinct concepts, so much so that he classifies distinct concepts exactly in the manner of the opposite concepts.

The confusion of the theory of distincts with that of opposites, is a logical error of Hegel, which is at the root of all others. For a proper understanding of the fundamental error of Hegel, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the difference between the distinct and the opposite concepts.

DISTINCT AND OPPOSITE CONCEPTS DIFFERENTIATED.

Concepts are of two kinds (i) distinct and (ii) opposite. The one cannot be identified with the other. For, the logical category of distinction is quite different from the category of opposition.[1] Two distinct concepts unite with each other: but two opposite concepts exclude each other. A distinct concept is presupposed by and lives in the one that follows it in the sequence of ideas, e.g. fancy and intellect in relation to the concept of the spirit. They are particular philosophic concepts; but they are not outside the spirit. On the

1. Ph. Heg., 10.

contrary, they are the particular forms of the spirit.[1] Further, in regard to their mutual relation, fancy and intellect are not external to each other, but one passes into the other. Hence fancy is regarded as foundation of intellect and indispensable to it.

But the opposite concepts exclude each other. The presence of one means the absence of the other. One destroys the other, e.g. true and false, good and evil, beauty and ugliness.

According to the theory of distincts, the concept divides itself by a movement, which is internal to it and yet throughout these acts of self-distinction, self-divestment or self-alienation, it maintains its identity in tact. Further, the distincts, into which it expresses or manifests itself, are not in total isolation from one another but are related as higher and lower degrees or stages of the concept. The lower is implied in the higher.

It is distinct from the theory of opposites. Not only the terms, with which it is concerned, but also their relation is different from the terms and relation, involved in the theory of opposites In the theory of distincts, degrees or stages, one concept is both distinct from and united with another concept.[2] It involves a relation between two terms only, the first of which can be posited without the second, but the second cannot be posited without the first. For instance, in the case of the relation of distincts between two terms (i) art and (ii) philosophy, the first can be posited without the second, but the reverse is not true; philosophy cannot be posited without art; art does not include philosophy, but philosophy does include art; philosophy has an artistic side; it cannot exist without expression, which is its artistic side; unexpressed philosophy is inconceivable. The relation of

1. Ph. Heg., 9.
2. Ph. Heg., 88.

distincts is dyadic relation. But the relation of opposites is not dyadic but triadic. It is a relation, not of two but of three terms, thesis, antithesis and synthesis; e.g. being, not-being and becoming. In the case of relation of opposites the first two terms (i) being and (ii) not-being, in separation from the third, "becoming", are mere abstractions; they have no concrete existence, as distinct from each other. But in the case of relation of distincts, e.g. art and philosophy, the first term does have concrete existence in isolation from the second. In the relation of degrees, the first term is really overcome and yet preserved in the second e.g. art is really overcome and yet preserved in philosophy: philosophy suppresses art, as independent concrete concept, but preserves it as its own expressive form. But in the case of relation of opposites the first two terms are only metaphorically overcome and preserved; e.g. in the case of the triadic relation of being, not-being and becoming, the first two terms, being abstractions, have no independent existence; therefore, to say, that they are overcome and yet preserved in the third, is to use a metaphor. Thus, according to the dyadic theory, the theory of distincts, the real is one. It divides itself, expresses or manifests itself, passes through its ideal history; and in the last stage attains full self-realisation, gathering in itself all the preceding stages.

HEGEL'S ÆSTHETICAL ERROR.

Hegel committed a logical error, Croce holds, because he did not draw a distinction between the two relations (i) relation of distincts and (ii) relation of opposites, and consequently applied the theory of opposites to the cases, to which the theory of distincts alone is applicable: because he applied the theory of triadic relation to the cases of dyadic relation.

This logical error naturally led him to his æsthetical

error ; (i) because it led him to apply the theory of triadic relation to all the forms of subjective spirit ; it led him to think intuition as thesis, representation as antithesis and thinking as synthesis ; (ii) because it compelled him, when he came to the sphere of Absolute Spirit, to apply the same theory and to conceive (i) art as thesis, (ii) religion as antithesis and (iii) philosophy[1] as synthesis.

This application of triadic theory is an error. For, how can one think religion to be opposite of art ; how is religion negation of art ; how is art thesis and immediacy ; how can art and religion be spoken of as two abstractions, which possess truth only in the third, philosophy : or how can representation be spoken of as negation, antithesis, of intuition ? Application of triadic relation theory implies that just as being and not-being cannot be concretely thought in isolation from becoming, so art and religion are unthinkable in separation from philosophy.

Hegel applied the theory of opposites to the cases of errors no less than to those of truths. For example, he applied the theory of opposites to being and not-being, which in their abstraction and separation are two falsities or errors. In fact, according to Hegel himself, "being" corresponds to Eleatic conception of the Absolute as simple being ; and "not-being" corresponds to Buddhistic conception of the Absolute as "nothing", Śūnya. Thus, "Being" and "Not-being" are opposite. But they are philosophical errors in so far as they represent the Absolute to be indeterminate and abstract. And surprisingly enough, he applied the same theory to intuition and thought, which are not two falsities but two truths. For, the first sums up the whole imaginative activity of man and gives rise to Æsthetics ; and the second is the highest scientific activity and gives rise to

1. Ph. Heg., 97,

Logic. There seems to be a little lack of accuracy in Croce's presentation of Hegelian view on some points. Here, for instance, Croce speaks of intuition and thought as thesis and antithesis, though from strict Hegelian point of view, thought is not antithesis of intuition, but synthesis of intuition and representation.

CROCE'S OPINION ON HEGEL'S ÆSTHETIC THEORY.

It was because of the confusion in Hegel's mind between the theory of opposites and that of distincts, that he failed to recognise the true nature of æsthetic activity i.e. art.[1] His fundamental conception of art is erroneous. Although his treatment of the problem of art is full of very valuable remarks, yet they are not in consonance with his central conception of art. His fundamental concept of art is erroneous; because, in accordance with his triadic theory, to which he obstinately adhered, he could not conceive the various forms of spirit, excepting the last, in any other way than as provisional and contradictory ways of conceiving the Absolute. He failed to realise that the first form of theoretic spirit has nothing contradictory in it; that it is the region of intuition, of pure fancy and of language. He failed to discover the region of art. In fact, Croce holds that Hegel begins his "Phenomenology of Mind" with a phase of spirit, namely 'sensible certainty', which belongs to a region beyond that of "æsthetic". It is not really the first phase of spirit, because, according to Hegel's own statement, it seems to be richest and most true and, therefore, there is already an element of intellectual reflection in it. Croce consequently is of the opinion that Hegel failed to discover the region of æsthetic activity, the first theoretic form.

1. Ph. Heg., 121.

ÆSTHETIC THEORY OF CROCE.

According to Croce, æsthetic is the first theoretic form, not sensible certainty[1] as presented by Hegel, but genuine sensible certainty such as we have in æsthetic contemplation. It is marked by total absence of distinction between subject and object. It does not involve comparison of one thing with another or any *spatial or temporal relation.* It is pure subjective experience, free from even predicative relation. It is "*intuition*" without intellectual element. It is the emotion, which a poem communicates.

He holds that art is intuition and that art-experience is intuitive experience. Let us, therefore, find out what he means by "intuition". A fairly detailed account of his meaning of "intuition" is found in the very beginning of his "Æsthetic". But his idea of "intuition" can become clear only if it be put in the proper perspective of his philosophy. Croce has his own distinct system of thought, and gives a definite place to "Intuition" in it. Let us, therefore, briefly survey his system and see what place does intuition occupy in it.

CROCE'S PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT.

Croce is a follower of Hegel in so far as he accepts concrete monism of Hegel. But he is a critic of Hegel in so far as he criticises the triadic theory. Accordingly he has his own philosophy of Spirit. It is very important for a clear understanding of his theory of æsthetics. For, it is in terms of the forms of Spirit that he explains such tragic characters in Shakespearian tragedies as Hamlet and Iago. He is an intuitive æsthetician ; art, according to him, is "intuition." And "Intuition", in this philosophy of Spirit is the first, original, form of Spirit.

1. Ph. Heg., 123.

FOUR FORMS OF SPIRIT.

Croce's Philosophy of Spirit differs from that of Hegel, not in respect of conception of Spirit, but in respect of the forms of Spirit. He admits that the Real is Unity, but not abstract. It is concrete unity, such as holds all multiplicity within. It is unity in multiplicity. It is of the nature of thought. It expresses or manifests itself in multiplicity of forms. In our chapter on Hegel we have attempted to give a summary-view of various forms of Spirit, recognised by Hegel. In opposition to Hegel, Croce holds that there are only four forms of Spirit and no more.[1] Other forms, admitted by some other thinkers, are either ill-founded or are mixtures of these four: (i) intuition (ii) concept (iii) economic will and (iv) ethical will.

He criticises the triadic theory of Hegel and asserts that the relation of these forms to one another is not the relation of opposites but that of distincts. The spiritual forms are not related in the manner of being, not-being and becoming. They are related as one degree or stage is to another. While, according to Hegel, the Spirit manifests itself into a triad (i) Theoretical spirit, (ii) Practical spirit and (iii) Absolute spirit; according to Croce, the Spirit manifests itself in two forms only. He retains the names, given to these forms by Hegel, (i) Theoretical and (ii) Practical. Each of these two forms expresses itself in a dyad. There are two forms of theoretical spirit (i) intuition and (ii) concept. Similarly there are two forms of practical spirit (i) economic will and (ii) ethical will.

INTUITION AND ART.

Thus, intuition, according to Croce, is the first of the eternal forms of the Spirit and it is the sphere of art. Art is intuition and, therefore, as a form of spirit it is eternal. It is individual and not universal. It has no conceptual content.

1. Cro., 140.

It is not the presentation of the universal in the sensuous medium as Hegel held; but it is the presentation of the individual only. It is expression. Intuition is no intuition and, therefore, art is no art unless the impressions have been formed into an organic whole i.e. expressed in terms of language or non-verbal expression, such as those of line, colour, sound etc.[1]

INTUITION AND CONCEPT.

Knowledge, according to Croce, has two forms (i) intuitive and (ii) logical. Intuitive knowledge is the knowledge, obtained through imagination. It is the knowledge of the individual. It is productive of images. It is distinct from the logical knowledge inasmuch as the latter, in contrast to the former, is the knowledge that is got through intellect. Logical knowledge is the knowledge of the universal. It is not the knowledge of individual things, but of relations among them. It is productive, not of images, but of concepts.

KANT AND CROCE ON INTUITION.

We remember that, according to Kant, intuitive knowledge is sensuous knowledge. It is in immediate relation to object. It gives material to all thought. It is an affection of human mind by what is given. It necessarily conforms to the *a priori* forms of sensibility, time and space. It contains manifold of sense, arranged in temporal and spatial order. It is a form of knowledge prior to intellectual reaction. It involves two syntheses, (i) synthesis of apprehension and (ii) synthesis of reproduction. The most important thing to be noted in this connection is that, according to Kant, intuition without concept is blind.

Croce differs from Kant on the following points :—

He holds that intuition is perfectly independent of intellect. It does not need the eyes of intellect. It is

1. Cro., 8.

self-shining. He admits that often a concept may be found to be mixed up with an intuition. But he points out at the same time that there are intuitions, such as that of moon-light, seen by a painter, in which there is no trace of concept; the conceptual element in intuition, therefore, is not necessary but accidental.

Further, those concepts, which are fused with an intuition, may have been concepts but are no longer concepts. For, when fused with an intuition, they lose their independence. For instance, philosophical maxims, put in the mouths of tragic heroes, do not perform the conceptual function, but appear as the characteristics of the heroes; just as red colour in the face of a painted portrait does not represent the red colour of the physicist but a characteristic element of the portrait. He holds that whole determines the quality of parts and, therefore, asserts that though a work of art may be full of philosophical concepts, yet in spite of them the total effect of a work of art is an intuition.

According to him, the artistic intuition is free from spatial and temporal relations. In some intuitions spatiality may be found without temporality and in others the latter may be without the former; and even where both are found together they are perceived by later reflexion. The intuition, which is free from spatial and temporal relations, is true intuition.

But the assertion that intuition is independent of the intellectual concepts no less than of the forms of sensibility, does not mean for Croce that intuition, is mere sensation, mere formless matter. For, matter in its abstraction is mere mechanism. It is what the spirit of man suffers, but does not produce. It is vague and indefinite. It is that content of experience, of which we are conscious when we try to

understand clearly what is passing within us, of which we catch a glimpse as something, which does not appear as objectified and formed. According to Croce, sensations are intuitions only when they are subjected to spiritual activity, when they are formed, synthetised and expressed.

CROCE'S DIFFERENCE FROM HEGEL ETC. ON INTUITION.

Croce's view of intuition differs from that of Hegel etc. on the following points :—

1. He does not recognise the obscure region of spirit, in which æsthetics was generally put by German thinkers. The first form of spirit, according to him, is intuition, which is characterised by expression; and he identifies 'æsthetic' with it.

2. According to Croce, intuition is free from spatial and temporal relations, which were looked upon by both Kant and Hegel as essential.

3. Content of intuition, according to Croce, can be internal or external. But, according to Kant, it could be external only and according to Hegel, internal only.

4. In intuition, according to Croce, the intuitor does not oppose himself, as empirical being, to external reality, but simply objectifies the impressions whatever they may be. But, according to Hegel, in intuition, the mind acts against the content, with which it is in closest relation, with its particular self-feeling.

INTUITION AND PERCEPTION DIFFERENTIATED.

Intuition is not identical with perception or knowledge of the actual reality. Purely mental images in the mind of the artist are no less intuitions than those, stimulated by external objects. The distinction between reality and non-

reality is extraneous to the nature of intuition. Intuition is undifferentiated unity of the perception of the real and of the simple image of the possible. In our intuitions we do not oppose ourselves as empirical beings to external reality, but we simply objectify our impressions whatever they be.

INTUITION AND ASSOCIATION OF SENSATIONS DISTINGUISHED.

"Association" has three distinct meanings.

1. Relation of sensations brought about by memory; conscious recollection.

2. Simple relation of unconscious elements.

3. Productive association, the relation which gives a definite form to the sensations, which are related.

In the first case, that is, if association be understood to be a product of memory, it would be absurd to talk of its identity with intuition. For, in that case, association would presuppose intuition, because only that can be stored in memory and brought out of it, which has been intuited, distinguished and possessed by spirit. In the second case, that is, if it be taken to mean simple relation of unconscious elements, of sensations, which have not been distinguished and possessed by spirit, then it remains in the sphere of passivity of sensation and as such is distinct from intuition, which is spiritual activity. In the third case, that is, if association means productive association, the relation that gives a definite form to the related sensations, then the difference between association and intuition is only in name. For, association, in order to be productive or formative, has to rise above the level of passivity and mere sensations. It has to distinguish different elements, which are related, from one another in order to construct them into a definite form. Therefore, it does not belong to the passivity of sense but to the activity of spirit and as such is not different from intuition.

INTUITION AND REPRESENTATION DISTINGUISHED.

Ordinarily representation is supposed to be distinct from both sensation and concept. It is looked upon as a state, midway between sensation and concept. But the question is "Does it differ from sensation quantitatively only ? Does the difference of sensation from representation lie in the greater complexity of the latter as compared to the simplicity of the former ?" or "Is the difference qualitative and formal ? Does representation differ from sensation in so far as it is formed ?" In the first case, the difference being only quantitative, representation is not essentially different from sensation. Hence intuition is distinct from representation. In the second case, there being qualitative, formal and, therefore, essential difference from sensation, inasmuch as representation involves an elaboration of sensation, it is identical with intuition.

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF INTUITION.

Characteristic feature of intuition is expression. Intuition is not only sensation but expression also. Expression is the spiritual fact, which distinguishes intuition from mere mechanical and passive sensation. It is a spiritual manifestation of an artist, be he an orator, painter, musician or poet. It is the means of bringing the impression or feeling from the obscure region of mere sensation to the region of spiritual clarity. It is, when successful, followed by *internal illumination*[1].

Intuition is nothing but sensation, which has been subjected to spiritual activity, which has been objectified, formed and expressed. It arises when feelings or impressions pass, by means of words (inner speech and not external utterance)

1. Cro., 9.

from the obscure region of sensibility to the clear region of contemplative spirit. The medium of expression, whether it be language or merely sound, colour or line, is a matter of indifference to the essential nature of intuition.

Intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge. It is a synthesis and inner expression of sensations. It is independent of intellectual functions. It is free from concepts of even space and time. It is above the level at which we differentiate between reality and unreality. It is identical with æsthetic fact. The works of art are the examples of intuitive knowledge. They possess all the attributes of intuition.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ORDINARY AND ARTISTIC INTUITION.

Intuition is not an exclusive privilege of the artist. Every man intuits. In fact, intuition is the basis of practical life of humanity. But the world of intuitions, from which action springs, is a small thing as compared to that, which is externalised in works of art. It is made up of little expressions, the words in which we internally express our impressions, the silent judgements such as "Here is a man." "This is a horse." "This is heavy." etc. Every man is to a certain extent a poet, a painter, a sculptor, a musician and an architect. For, every one speaks and can paint, sing and build to a certain extent. But a genuine artist is head and shoulders above the average man; (i) because his sense is keener than that of non-artist and, therefore, he is able to observe facts, which remain unnoticed by persons of ordinary sensibility: and (ii) because he possesses the power of expression so as to intuit and externalise fully the observed facts. His vision extends over a wider field and his expression has a complexity, which can never be found in non-artist. Hence the difference between the ordi-

nary and the artistic intuition is only quantitative and, therefore, non-essential.

PRACTICAL SPIRIT.

The practical form of spirit is the will, the activity of spirit, which differs from theoretic form of spirit in so far as it is productive, not of knowledge, but of action. An action is action only in so far as it is voluntary. It includes what is usually called not-doing, the will to resist and to reject. It is dependent on the theoretic form of spirit. For, action is not possible without knowledge. It is not possible to will without intuition of the object, which the will aims at changing.

CHARACTER OF HAMLET IN THE LIGHT OF PRACTICAL SPIRIT OF CROCE.

Knowledge is an indispensable condition of action. Practical man, in his particular sphere of action, can act only if he has got a clear idea of the manner, in which he has to act, no less than that of the object, towards which his activity is to be directed. Howsoever ordinary an action may be, it cannot be willed without a clear intuition of the thing, willed. How can a politician, for instance, work for the amelioration of his country, unless he knows the real condition of the society and the ways and means to be adopted for its betterment. Therefore, when a practical man has no clear intuition of the object to be achieved or the ways and means wherewith to realise it, or is in doubt about the fitness of the contemplated action, action either does not begin or stops. At such a time the theoretical moment, which, in rapid succession of actions, is hardly noticed, occupies consciousness for a longer time. A character, like Hamlet[1], is a joint product of strong desire for action and lack of a clear knowledge of the situation and the

1. Cro., 49.

ways and means to be adopted for executing his purpose in the particular situation.

TWO FORMS OF PRACTICAL SPIRIT.

Practical spirit, as we have already indicated, has two forms (i) economic will and (ii) moral or ethical will. Of the two forms of theoretical spirit (i) intuition and (ii) concept, the second presupposes the first. The same holds good of the two forms of practical spirit also. The moral will presupposes economic will. For, to will economically is to will an end and to will morally is to will a rational end. But how can a person will a rational end unless he wills it also as his particular end ?

CHARACTER OF IAGO IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC WILL OF CROCE.

Croce holds that just as intuition is independent of concept, so economic will is independent of moral will. It is possible to will economically[1] without willing morally. It is possible to conduct oneself with perfect economic coherence in the pursuit of an objectively irrational end, which would be judged to be immoral at a higher grade of consciousness. A good illustration of economic will without even an iota of morality, is the character of Iago in Shakespeare's Othello. His strength of economic will, though it shows itself in perfect opposition to all conceptions of morality, is indeed admirable. He is totally devoid of moral consciousness. There is no antagonism between immorality and morality in him : for, the latter has not yet developed in him.

Just as there are four forms of spirit, so there are four forms of genius[2]. But while men, endowed with genius in art, in science and in moral will, have been universally recognised, genius in pure economic will has not found an equal recognition.

1. Cro., 57. 2. Cro., 61.

Croce, however, gives a definite place to evil genius, like that of Iago, assigning it a place in his system i.e. in the sphere of pure economic will. Such a genius is not directed to rational end. It excites admiration mingled with alarm.

CROCE'S CRITICISM OF HEGELIAN VIEW OF LANGUAGE.

According to Croce, Hegel has not only failed to grasp the true character of intuition and, therefore, of art, but he has also failed to assign the right place to language in the spiritual kingdom. From the point of view of Hegel, as presented in his Philosophy of Mind (pages 218-224), language is the product of theoretic mind or intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium[1]. A linguistic expression,[2] a word, according to him, stands for the universal. But Croce's view of language is fundamentally different from that of Hegel. Croce holds that language belongs, not to the sphere of intellect, but to that of intuition. For, the function of language is to present, not the universal but the individual. By means of language we grasp individual, which the spirit intuits and renders in sounds. Hegelian view of language is unsound, because it implies that such a human activity as language is a failure inasmuch as it tries to present the individual but always presents the universal.

But Hegel's position in regard to language, a system of signs, vocal, alphabetic or hieroglyphic, seems to be very sound, if properly understood. And Croce's criticism of it does not seem to be very reasonable. For, Hegel's position that individual word stands for universal,–as presented in "a simple immediate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything, and has for its soul function to signify and

1. Wal., 221.
2. Ph. Heg., 125.

represent sensibly the simple idea as such." (Wal., 224.)-is identical with that of the Indian Philosophy of Grammar, as presented by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīyam, and of the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir, presented in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśinī.

It seems to be true that Hegel has not explained the grasp of the particular or individual from a linguistic presentation. But that is because, as hinted in the reply to Herr Krug, his task is to explain the universal and not the particular.

And an important Indian system of thought, the Monistic Śaivaism of Kashmir, has attempted the problem "How do we grasp the individual or particular from a linguistic presentation, which consists of words which stand for the universals ?"

The problem is discussed in the context of Ābhāsavāda, the theory, according to which, the world is nothing but a configuration of Ābhāsas, which are manifested by the Absolute. The conception of Ābhāsa is very similar to that of 'idea' as conceived by Schopenhauer under the Platonic influence. Each isolated Ābhāsa is a universal and is signified by a word, which is recognised to stand for a universal. And the problem, that is raised in this context, is "How is the consciousness of the individual object to be accounted for ?" And the answer is that individual object is nothing but a configuration of Ābhāsas or ideas[1], united together by a man with a purposive attitude, on a common basis, constituted by external time and space. The monistic Śaiva, therefore, holds that a number of words, well redintegrated into a sentence, which presents the determinate consciousness of a configuration of Ābhāsas or ideas and necessarily relates it to time, expressed by the predicate, gives rise to the

1. Bh., Vol. II, 95-102, and Vol. III, 147-50.

consciousness of the individual or particular. For, the particularity is given by time or place or both.

It is interesting to note that Croce explains the grasp of the individual from a linguistic presentation in a way which has some similarity with the view, presented above, as the quotation, given in the next paragraph, shows.

In regard to the factors contributing to knowledge of the individual from linguistic expression, Croce says[1] "If I say: "This paper precisely" it is because I have it before me and am showing it to others; the words, that issue from my mouth, obtain their full meaning from the whole psychological situation in which I find myself and so from intention, intonation and gesture, with which I pronounce them." These factors have been discussed by Indian æstheticians, in the context of the Tātparya Śakti, the contextual power of language. These factors Hegel did not take into account in his treatment of language.

ART.

Croce attempts the problem of æsthetics, like Hegel, from three points of view (i) of art (ii) of artist and (iii) of connoisseur. His special contribution to æsthetics is his definition of intuition, in terms of which he presents his views on all the topics allied to æsthetics. Having, therefore, dealt with his conception of intuition, we proceed to present his conception of art.

According to Croce, as we have already hinted, art is intuition, but more exalted, more extensive and richer than ordinary intuition, which is the basis of practical life. It is an expression, which is complicated and difficult and, therefore, rarely achieved, because it is expression of a

1. Ph, Heg., 126.

complex state of soul. But we remember that the difference between ordinary intuition and poetic intuition, according to Croce, is only quantitative and, therefore, non-essential. Hence if we ask what is the line of demarcation between them, Croce's unhesitating reply is that it is impossible to draw such a line[1].

Art is pure intuition. It is distinct from intellectual knowledge as well as perception of the real. Intellectual knowledge alone is not knowledge. Intuition also is knowledge, though it is free from concepts and is more simple than the perception of the real. Therefore, art does not belong to the sphere of feeling or psychic matter, nor to that of concepts. It has its own independent territory.

RELATION BETWEEN CONTENT AND FORM IN ART.

We have stated above that art, according to Croce, is intuition and that the characteristic feature of intuition is expression of impression. Therefore, the question that arises, is "How are the two related in an artistic fact ?" Croce's answer to this question is that matter and form, impression and expression are not two distinct things, if by matter, impression or content we understand a pure spiritual affection, due to internal or external causes, which is not yet æsthetically elaborated ; and if by form we understand a formative spiritual activity. For, in the æsthetic fact expressive activity is not added to the fact of impression, but impressions are elaborated by expressive activity. Impressions reappear in expression "like[2] water put into filter, which reappears the same and yet different on the other side." In æsthetic fact, in intuition, the impression is just the starting point for spiritual activity of expression ; there is no distinct consciousness of impression apart from that of expression ;

1. Cro., 13. 2, Cro., 15,

there is no passage from the qualities of content to those of form. The content of æsthetic fact has no determinate quality until it has been formed or expressd. Thus, content and form, matter and expression, being not two distinct things, each with a distinct quality, the question of relation between them in an artistic fact has no meaning. Therefore, he holds that æsthetic fact is form, nothing but form.

UNITY OF ART.

Art, as intuition—expression, is an indivisible organic whole. It is a fusion of impressions into a unity, but not pure or abstract unity, but unity in multiplicity. It is a synthesis of multiple into one. It is not expression of expressions. Art as expression does not embody other expressions. It is not a compound of past and present expressions. It is a synthesis of impressions only. The past expressions must descend to the level of impressions in order that they may be synthesised into a new expression. Just as an old statue, in order that it may become an element in a new statue, has to be melted out of its present form and has to be converted into pure formless matter, so the old expressions, in order to embody them into a new, have to be brought to the level of impressions.

ARTISTIC INTUITION AND WORK OF ART.

Artistic intuition is an æsthetic fact. It is artistic vision[1]. But a work of art is a physical fact, which serves as an instrument, as an aid, in the reproduction of artistic vision. The relation between them is purely external. Associationistic theory of art, which identifies æsthetic fact with the association of two images (i) one, which represents a work of art and (ii) the other, which is called forth from within the mind by law of association, is not sound. For, it is against the fact of experience; because æsthetic experience is the experience of perfect unity and not of any duality.

1. Cro., 104.

The error of the associationists is due to the fact that they take physical and æsthetic facts separately. They treat them as two images. They draw a distinction between the image of physical stimulus and that of its meaning. Croce, however, holds (i) that in the course of æsthetic experience such two distinct images do not rise (ii) that the physical fact does not enter the spirit as an image, but simply causes the reproduction of artistic intuition, the æsthetic fact, of which it is a stimulant; and (iii) that a work of art is merely physical stimulant of reproduction. The spiritual energy of memory, with the help of a work of art, makes possible the reproduction of the original intuition of an artist in a connoisseur.

STAGES OF ÆSTHETIC PRODUCTION.

The process of æsthetic production is completed in four stages[1] (i) impressions (ii) expression or spiritual æsthetic synthesis of impressions (iii) hedonistic accompaniment or pleasure of the beautiful or æsthetic pleasure and (iv) translation of the æsthetic fact into physical phenomenon of sound or tone etc.

STAGES OF ÆSTHETIC REPRODUCTION.

The process, through which the æsthetic experience arises in an æsthete from a work of art, may be stated as follows[2] :—

1. Stimulation of æsthetic senses by a work of art.
2. Reproduction of the artistic intuition.
3. Hedonistic accompaniment.

ARTIST.

Just as the difference between ordinary intuition, which is the basis of practical life of humanity, and intuition, which

1. Cro., 96. 2. Cro., 97.

is really artistic, is only quantitative, so is the difference between ordinary man and artist. Some men have a greater aptitude, a more frequent inclination to express fully certain complex states of soul. These men are called artists.

The artist[1] has maximum of both sensibility and insensibility. He has great sensibility in so far as he absorbs the rich material into his psychic frame. He has also equally great insensibility or serenity. For, it is the serenity that enables him to subdue this material into a form.

The power of expression, the power to give definite form to intuition, is the chief characteristic of an artist. A poet[2] or painter, who lacks this power, is not entitled to be called an artist.

A true artist does not select an end,[3] that he has to present in his work; nor does he choose a content, to which he gives a form. For, choice of either end or content implies that impressions have already found expression; because selection is possible only from among the distincts and distinction is conferred upon impression by expression only. Art is a creation of free inspiration. It is not a product of will. A true artist finds himself big with a theme; and a work of art is born spontaneously when the moment comes. He cannot will it or not will it.

EXTERNALISATION OF ARTISTIC VISION.

Production of a work of art, which serves as a stimulus to reproduction of æsthetic intuition in connoisseur, presupposes an equipment[4] in the artist, which may be stated as follows :—

1. Vigilant will: It is the volitional power of artist, which does not allow certain artistic visions, intuitions, to slip out of mind. It acts as it were instinctively.

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1. Cro., 21. 2. Cro., 25.
3. Cro., 51. 4. Cro., 111.

2. Knowledge: Externalisation of artistic vision is possible only if the artist possesses knowledge of various kinds. For instance, before the practical activity of producing a work of art can start, it is necessary that artist should know the different means of production and the ways to utilise them.

3. Contemplation : Artist feels impression. He attempts to express it. He tries various words and phrases to express the impression, but finds them unsuitable. After a few vain attempts[1], suddenly the sought for expression comes to him. This gives him æsthetic pleasure. That activity of the artist, which leads to successful expression, is contemplation.

4. Genius : Artist should have imagination that is capable of creating artistic vision. The creative or productive imagination, which creates artistic vision, is called genius.

CONNOISSEUR.

The connoisseur, who seeks æsthetic experience[2] from a work of art, must place himself at the point of view of the artist and reproduce the artistic vision in himself with the help of the stimulus. And in order to be able to do so, he should free himself from haste, laziness[3], passion, theoretic prejudices and personal sympathies and animosities and must concentrate his mind and give himself up to contemplation. Æsthetic activity is nothing but reproduction. And the activity, that reproduces the æsthetic vision, is called taste, just as the activity which produces such a vision is called genius. Taste and genius are essentially identical.

Connoisseur, has to rise to the level of the artist and to be one[4] with him spiritually, if he is to be able to reproduce artistic vision in himself. In æsthetic experience connoisseur

1. Cro., 118.
2. Cro., 119.
3. Cro., 120.
4. Cro., 121.

and artist are spiritually identified. The reproductive activity presupposes also the identity of psychological conditions[1] of the connoisseur with those of the artist.

PLEASURE NOT IDENTICAL WITH ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE.

Feeling, according to Croce, means a special spiritual activity of non–cognitive nature. It is of two opposite kinds[2] (i) pleasure and (ii) pain. It is one of the four forms of activity of spirit, recognised by him. It is economic or useful activity. It consists of appetition and volition. It is an elementary practical activity. Therefore, feeling is not an essential part of æsthetic activity. It cannot be identified with intuition; because feeling belongs to the practical activity, while intuition is the original form of theoretic activity.

But feeling, though not identical with æsthetic activity or intuition, is a necessary accompaniment of it. For, Croce holds that all the forms of spiritual activity are closely related to one another and that every one of them is accompanied by the elementary volitional form and, therefore, has for its concomitant pleasure or pain. Pleasure is due to the attainment of the aim of a spiritual activity, whether it be theoretical or practical. But, in spite of the accompanying elementary volitional form being the same in the case of every spiritual activity, pleasure that accompanies one is different from those which accompany others. The difference, however, of one pleasure from another is not substantive, but due to what it accompanies; different forms of spirit, with which elementary volitional form is concomitant, colour the pleasure differently. Æsthetic, conceptual, economic and ethical pleasures are different from one another, because

1. Cro., 124.

2. Cro., 74.

the concomitant elementary volitional activity is differently coloured by different spiritual forms. We cannot talk of temporal or causal order in respect of spiritual activity and pleasure, because spirit is unity and its different forms are not related either causally or temporally.

APPARENT AND REAL FEELING.

The æsthetic feeling, the feeling that is aroused by a work of art,[1] is different from the real feeling, the one that is aroused by a real object of external world. But they are not essentially or qualitatively but only quantitatively different. We laugh, weep, fear and rejoice with the heroes of dramas. But our feelings of joy, sorrow etc. are not so deep as those caused by real objects. And the reason why the feeling, aroused by a work of art, does not affect us as deeply as does that caused by an object of nature, is that the artistic feeling is the feeling objectified, intuited and expressed. It is a mere form. Hence it is less intense than the real feeling, which is related to matter. It may, therefore, be called "apparent feeling" as distinct from real feeling.

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1. Cro., 81.

CHAPTER XIV

COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF INDIAN AND WESTERN ÆSTHETICS

ART OR KALĀ.

The Sanskrit word for 'Art' is "Kalā". It is derived from the root "Kala" which means "Saṅkhyāna". This word itself is derived, not from the root "Khyā" (Prakathane) to tell, declare, communicate, but from "Cakṣiṅ" (Vyaktāyāṁ vāci) to give clear expression, which is replaced by "Khyā". It also means to observe (Ayam darśanepi. S. K., 374). With the prefix "Sam" it means to count, calculate, reckon. As such it also means to contemplate, meditate, concentrate, as is evident from its use by Kālidāsa in his Kumāra Sambhava, III, 40.

"Śrutāpsarogītirapi kṣaṇesmin
Haraḥ *prasaṅkhyāna*-paro babhūva"

(At this moment Śiva alone, though the songs of the celestial nymphs entered into his ear, remained absorbed in deep contemplation.)

Thus, Kalā (Art) means that human activity, the characteristic features of which are observation, calculation, contemplation and clear expression. Hence the word "Kalā" itself indicates the basic principles of art, namely, observation, calculation, contemplation and clear expression.

The word "Kalā" stands for a work of art also. But when it means this, it is derived from the root "Kala" with passive implication (Kalyate asyām) i. e. that which is the product of the human activity, characterised by observation, calculation, contemplation and clear expression. As such it

is derived from the root "Kala" by affixing "gha" according to Pāṇini's rule (Puṁsi saṁjñāyām ghaḥ prāyeṇa. III, 3,118).

It can also be derived from the root "Lā", which, though ordinarily used to mean "to receive", according to a competent authority, Candra, may also be used to mean "to give" (Dvāvapi dāne iti Candraḥ. S. K., 378). Thus, Kalā in the sense of work of art means "that which gives pleasure" (Kaṁ lāti). Hence the word implies the hedonistic view of art. In this way from the etymological explanation of the word "Kalā" itself we get (i) the definition of art (ii) the conception of the characteristic activity that is responsible for the production of works of different arts (iii) the earliest theory of the aim of artistic production i. e. Hedonism.

ANTIQUITY OF ART-TRADITION IN INDIA.

India is one of the oldest countries with great cultural tradition. Its art-tradition goes back to hoary past, of which we can get an idea from the archaeological or literary sources.

Casting a glance at the Indus valley cultures and civilizations, the date of which is generally accepted to be 3000 B. C., we find that many of the material arts, such as architecture, sculpture, painting, pottery, smithy etc. were then well-known, as is made evident by archaeological finds such as forts of baked bricks and mortar, terracotta human and animal figurines, seals, bearing effigy of bull and legend, copper mirror, antimony stick, shell spoon, bangles, rings, painted pottery etc.

And turning to the literary evidence of the existence of various arts in India that is found in the Veda, perhaps the oldest existing literary monument of the world, we find that many of the arts, which the cultured nations of today know,

particularly the important ones among them, were known in the Vedic age, as is evident from references to arts, works of arts and the artists who produced them. Some of the important references may be stated as follows :—

(a) Weaving.—Sheep's wool was spun into yarns and woolen cloths were woven with them[1]. There were men who learnt the art of weaving, took it up as their profession and were called Vāya[2]. The loom was called Tantra[3].

(b) Carpentry.—There were carpenters (Taṣṭṛ[4] or Taṣkṣan[5]) who made chariots, wheels, boats and wooden vessels.

(c) Smithy.—There were smiths (Kārmāra[6]) who made agricultural implements and weapons of war.

(d) Pottery.—There were potters who made pots and vessels of clay, which were easily broken.[7]

(e) Goldsmithery.—There were goldsmiths who made gold ornaments such as necklace (Niṣka), ear-rings etc.[8]

(f) Tanning.—There were tanners (Carmamna[9]) and there are references to skin vessels which were manufactured by men who knew the art of tanning leathers and sewing them into shapes.

(g) Art of garland-making.—There were men whose profession it was to make flower-garlands or wreaths.[10]

(h) Hair-dressing.—There are references to barbers (Vaptā[11]).

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*1. R. V., X, 26, 6. *2. R. V., X, 26, 6. *3. R. V., X, 71, 9,
*4. R.V., X, 119, 5. *5. R. V., IX, 112, 1.
*6. R. V., IX, 112, 2. *7. R. V., X, 89, 7. *8. R. V., VIII. 47, 15.
*9. R.V., VIII, 5, 38, *10. R.V., VIII 47, 15, *11. R.V., X,142, 4,

(i) Medicine.—There were physicians (Bhiṣak[1]), who were eager to see the outbreak of diseases.

(j) Music.—There are references to drums (Dundubhi[2]). Three types of musical instruments, percussion, string and wind, represented by drum, lute and flute are referred to. And hymns themselves prove that singing was very much appreciated. Music of both types, instrumental and vocal, was well-known in the Vedic age. Karkari[3] was the name of musical instrument, which was perhaps something like a lute. Kṣoṇī, Vīṇā or Vāṇa was the musical instrument of Maruts.[4] Some interpreters take the word "Vāṇa" to mean flute.[5]

In the Sāma Veda, there are Gānas or "Song books" proper, which designate the melodies by means of musical notes and in which the texts are drawn up in the form which they take in singing. There is the designation of seven notes (Svaras) by means of the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

The details of the most ancient Indian music are found in the Ārṣeya Brāhmaṇa of the Sāma Veda and form the basis of the later development of Indian music down to the present day.

(k) Architecture.—In the Ṛgvedic age the architecture was highly developed. There are references to forts, palaces and houses. The rich and the nobles lived in forts, made of stones and other hard materials.[6] Beautiful palaces, in the construction of which plenty of wood was used, are also referred to.[7] Mitra and Varuṇa are represented to have owned

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*1. R. V., IX, 112, 1. *2. R. V., VI, 47, 29-31. *3. R. V., II, 43, 3.
*4. R. V., II, 34, 13. 5. R. I., 235. *6. R. V., IV, 30, 20.
*7. R. V., VII, 5, 3.

a palace with thousand pillars.[1] Iron forts or cities also are mentioned.[2] There are references to houses of different types, Gṛha,[3] Harmya[4] etc.

There are two hymns in the Ṛgveda, addressed to Vāstoṣpati or the deity presiding over the Vāstu or house (R. V., VII, 54 and 55). But the meaning of the word "Vāstu" was widened at some later time to stand for architecture and the science of architecture was called "Vāstu vidyā".

(l) Embroidery.—Maruts are described as wearing mantle, adorned with gold.[5] And Varuṇa also is represented as wearing a golden garment.[6] "Peśas" is the word for embroidered garment.[7]

(m) Dance.—Both men and women danced in the Ṛgvedic age. There is mention of men dancing with bamboo-sticks held aloft.[8] Dancer was called Nṛta. Indra danced through excitement at the time of battle. Female dancer was called Nṛtu. This word was probably used for professional female dancer, who had embroidered garment on at the time of dancing and bared her breasts for attraction.[9] In another passage[10] Nṛti (dancing) is found coupled with Hāsa (laughter) in the description of funeral ritual.

(n) Poetry.—The Ṛgveda itself sufficiently proves that in the Ṛgvedic age the poetic art was highly developed. Vedic poets were all seers or Ṛṣis, who saw and realised high moral and spiritual truths and gave expression to them in appropriate rhythmical

*1. R. V., II, 41, 5.
*2. R. V., VII, 3, 7, *3. R. V., III, 53, 6 *4. R. V. VII, 56, 16.
*5. R. V., V, 55, 6, *6. R. V., I, 16, 13. *7, R. V., II, 3. 6.
*8: R. V., I, 19, 1, *9. R. V., I, 92, 4. *10. R. V., X, 18, 3,

language. They were probably the oldest poets of the world. They had fine perception of nature.

In the Ṛgvedic poetry naturalistic and imaginative tendencies are harmoniously blended, as in the presentation of the Dawn (Uṣas), the Sun, the Moon and so on. It also deals with complex subjects, which are not apparent to our physical senses, but can be grasped by our intellectual, moral and spiritual faculties. Thus, there is the grand conception of Varuṇa,[1] which closely approaches the modern conception of God, who is the upholder of the moral order of the universe and punishes those who transgress it, but who at the same time is gracious and merciful to those who repent for their sins and implore His forgiveness.

The difference between the Ṛgvedic and the secular poetry is this : while the latter revels in pure and simple imagination, the former is real and earnest and is based on the cordinal principles of living faith. To a Vedic worshipper the Gods are as real as his human friends and neighbours and the future existence of the soul after death is as real as his own existence on earth. And this adds to the supreme value of the Vedic poetry.

The celebrated song of creation is probably the grandest of all similar songs. It reaches a height of imagination and speculation, unsurpassed by any similar song.

The Vedic poetry is not entirely without poetic ornaments (Alaṅkāra). There are magnificent similes, metaphors and personifications, as in the hymns to Uṣas etc.

(o) Drama.—In the Ṛgveda itself we find many dialogue-hymns, which present the earliest form of composition, from which the regular dramatic literature arose.

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*1. R. V., VII, 89, 5.

The most important among such hymns is that which consists of dialogue between Purūravas and Urvaśī. The former was a mortal and the latter was a nymph. Urvaśī lived on earth as the wife of Purūravas, but disappeared as soon as she became pregnant. He went out to seek her. At last he found her playing with other nymphs in a lake and the dialogue followed. This much of the story is found in the dialogue itself.

This myth of love is presented in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa in a more developed form and the verses of the Ṛgveda are woven into the narrative. It says that the nymph, when she consented to become the wife of Purūravas, stipulated three conditions, one of which was that she should never see him naked. After some time Gandharvas wanted to get back Urvaśī. Therefore, on one night they stole two little lambs, which she loved like her own children. Urvaśī cried that she had been robbed. Purūravas jumped up naked to pursue the thieves. Just at that time the Gandharvas caused a flash of lightning to appear. Urvaśī perceived the king and disappeared. When Purūravas returned and did not find her, he went mad with grief. He wandered about till he found her playing with other nymphs in a lake and the dialogue followed.

This story is retold in the Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra, the Bṛhaddevatā, the Harivaṁśapurāṇa, the Viṣṇupurāṇa etc. and finally it is modified and is given full dramatic form in one of the immortal dramas of Kālidāsa, the Vikramorvaśiyam.

But it appears that by the time of the Yajurveda the dramatic art was so advanced that dramas were presented by actors. For, the Chapter *XXX* of the white Yajurveda, —which enumerates the persons who are to be sacrificed at the Puruṣamedha or human sacrifice to various divine beings or to the beings and powers which are for the moment

elevated to divinity,—mentions actor (Śailūṣa) as one that is to be sacrificed to Dancing (Nṛttāya Śailūṣam). Besides, it refers to many of the arts, included in the traditional list of Sixty-four arts or practicians thereof. The important ones among them are as follows :—

(1) Māgadha (bard) (2) Nṛtta (dance) (3) Gīta (music) (4) Rathakāra (one who makes a chariot) (5) Takṣan (carpenter) (6) Maṇikāra (jeweller) (7) Iṣukāra (maker of arrow) (8) Dhanuṣkāra (maker of bow) (9) Jyākāra (maker of bow-string) (10) Rajjusarja (rope-maker) (11) Śvanin (hunter) (12) Vidalakārī (maker of wicker-work) (13) Peśaskarī (embroiderer) (14) Smarakārī (remembrancer) (15) Hastipa (elephant driver) (16) Aśvapa (horse groom) (17) Surākāra (distiller) (18) Agnyedha (fueller of fire) (19) Vāsaḥpalpūlī (washer woman) (20) Rajayitrī) (female dyer) (21) Añjanakārī (maker of collyrium) (22) Ajinasandha (sewer of leather) (23) Carmamna (tanner) (24) Hiraṇyakāra (goldsmith) (25) Carakācārya (master spy) (26) Āḍambaraghāta (beater of drum used in a battle) (27) Bīṇāvāda (player upon lute) (28) Tūṇavadhma (blower of bugle) (29) Śaṅkhadhma (blower of conch) (30) Vaṁśanartin (bamboo dancer).

Every work of art was appreciated if it was useful, and the original designer and artisan applauded. Thus, the Ṛbhus, the well-known skilful workmen, were rewarded with their exhaltation to divine honours[1] for accomplishing a most difficult feat in art, viz, making into four a single new sacrificial cup, which Tvaṣṭṛ had made. There seems also a reference to different types of genius or artistic skill (Dhī)[2].

There is no literary monument in the West as old as the Veda, with whose account of arts, the Vedic account of them may be compared.

*1, R. V., I, 161 *2. R. V., IX' 112, 1.

ŚAIVAISM AND ARTS.

Śaivaism as a religion has persisted since the prehistoric time of the archaeological finds of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro. It has a continuous history of at least Five Thousand years. The phallic emblem of Śiva, as found in the Indus valley cultures and civilizations, is an object of worship among the followers of Śaivaism even to-day. That there was dominant element of religion in the Indus valley cultures and civilizations is now well admitted[1]. And archaeological finds at Harappa (I) a conical terracotta object with a rounded top, which, even according to the opinion of Dr. R. E. M. Wheeler, represents "probably a phallus" and (II) a large thick ring representing "probably" a yoni (female principle), lead to a fair assumption that whatever other religion or religions may have been, Śaivaism in its characteristic prevalent form of worship of Śiva and Śaktī[2] in union in the symbolic form of a Lingam on Yoni, was there.

These finds lend some support to the view, expressed by Mr. R. D. Banarji, about a water reservoir, provided with narrow covered channel, found in Harappa, analogous to the one, found at Mohenjo-daro, that it was used as caraṇāmṛta-kuṇḍa, a receptacle for the holy water, used for washing the sacred image. For, such a reservoir is a common feature of temples of Śiva even today.

And if we accept the suggestion, made by an eminent archaeologist[3] that the walled cities of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro were destroyed by Indra, the leader of the invading Aryans, who, for that reason, is referred to as Purandara in the Vedas : and if we interpret in this light the contemptuous reference to phallus-worshippers (Śiśnadevāḥ. Ṛ. V., VII. 22, 5.) as referring to the original inhabitants of India, the

1. A. In., 76. 2. A. In., 129. 3. A. In., 82.

image-worship, which can at the most be said to be a doubtful feature of the Ṛgvedic culture, comes out to be the characteristic feature of the Indus valley cultures.

Thus, the relation between Śaivaism and the arts of architecture and sculpture seems to have existed even in the prehistoric time. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that there was a Śaiva art-tradition, in accordance with which the temples and images were built and made. The fact that there is no record of this tradition, as old as the Ṛgveda, available at present, is indeed to be regreted very much. But after the preceding discussion on the relation between Śaivaism and arts, it will not be unreasonable to suppose that whatever may have been the later interpolations in the Śaivāgamas, as we find them today, and howsoever late in our opinion may be the form of language in which we find them written, they present basically the original Śaiva art-tradition.

If we accept the view, presented above, the Śaivāgama is to be accepted to contain the earliest art-tradition in India so far as the arts of architecture and sculpture are concerned. For, many of the available Śaivāgamas, Kāmika, Kāraṇa, Suprabheda etc. , are divided into four parts: (i) Jñāna (ii) Yoga (iii) Caryā (iv) Kriyā : and the last deals with the technique of building temples and sculpturing images no less than with that of constructing dwelling of different types. The treatment of the subject is very detailed and compares well with that found in such works on architecture as Maya Mata, Mānasāra, Samarāṅgaṇa Sūtradhāra etc.[1]

Further, other fine arts also, such as dance, music, acting etc. are closely related to Śaivaism. In early Śaivaism there was no bifurcation between religion and philosophy. In fact the religious practice (Vidhi) was one of the

1. M. S., 86.

categories, recognised in early dualistic Pāśupata system, which flourished before the commencement of the Christian era. And in the Lakulīśa Pāśupata system, a dualistic-cum-monistic system, which was founded by Lakulīśa in the first half of the 2nd century A.D. as is evident from the epigraphical evidence, the five primary categories of the earlier Pāśupata system are retained, as is clear from the Pāśupata Sūtra of Lakulīśa. Here we find instructions regarding the religious practices of Śaivas. The devotee is enjoined to dance and to sing[1], standing to the South[2] of the image with face turned towards the North. He is also enjoined to act[3] as a lover at a public place. Thus, we find that fine arts of architecture, sculpture, dance, music and acting are very closely related to Śaivaism from a very early time.

ART AND THE APPETITIVE OBJECTIVE OF HUMAN LIFE (KĀMA).

(i) Dharma (acquisition of religious merit) (ii) Artha (acquisition of worldly possession) (iii) Kāma (satisfaction[4] of the sensuous appetite in general and of the sexual appetite in particular, such as is in perfect accord with religious and moral laws and does not stand in the way of the acquisition of worldly possession[5]) and (iv) Mokṣa (final emancipation) are traditionally recognised aims of human life in India. And in the post-vedic literature there are four branches of learning which show the ways to the realisation of them : (i) Dharmaśāstra, including works of Manu, Yājñavalkya etc. (ii) Arthaśāstra such as that of Bṛhaspati (iii) Kāmaśāstra, represented by works such as Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana, and (iv) Darśanaśāstra, presented in so many different systems of philosophy.

*1. P. S., 13. *2. P. S., 14. *3. P. S., 86.
*4. Ka. S., 14. *5. Ka. S., 26.

A tradition, recorded by Vātsyāyana in his Kāma Sūtra, says that for the continuance (Sthiti) of humanity, which he had created, the creator, Brahmā, presented the ways and means to the realisation of the three objectives of human life in Hundred Thousand Chapters. Of these the portion relating to Dharma was separated by Svāyambhuva Manu, and that relating to Artha by Bṛhaspati. But Nandī, the well-known attendant of god Mahādeva,[1] sitting at the door of his master, presented Kāma Sūtra in One Thousand Chapters, while Mahādeva was enjoying with Pārvatī within. This work was abridged in Five Hundred Chapters by Śvetaketu, son of Uddālaka. This also was summarised by Pāñcāla, son of Babhru, in Seven books, containing in all One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, dealing with Seven topics[2]: (i) Sādhāraṇam, (General) (ii) Sāmprayogika (The ways and means of realisation of Kāma) (iii) Kanyāsamprayuktakam (Laws relating to marriage, forms of marriage etc.) (iv) Bhāryādhikārika (Duties and obligations of wife) (v) Pāradārika (The ways and means of winning the love of another's wife) (vi) Vaiśika (Matters relating to prostitutes) (vii) Aupaniṣadika (Secret prescription).

Of these, the book, dealing with the house of concubine, was separately presented by Dattaka at the request of the prostitutes, living in Pāṭaliputra. And Cārāyaṇa, Survarṇanābha, Ghoṭakamukha, Gonardīya, Goṇikāputra and Kucumāra presented separately matter of one of the above books respectively.

Though the Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana is mainly based upon the work of Bābhravya Pāñcāla, as he himself says in one of the concluding verses in his own work[3]; it summarily gives all that is contained in all the works, mentioned above. This work also consists of Seven books,

*1. Ka. S., 4. *2. Ka. S., 5. *3. Ka. S., 381.

bearing the titles originally given to his books on the subject by Pāñcāla. It has Sixty-four sections (Prakaraṇa). Accordingly it mentains Sixty-four arts as auxiliaries[1] to the realisation of the appetitive objective of human life (Kāma).

This traditional account of the literature, dealing with the appetitive objective of human life, Kāma, is not entirely mythical. That the origin of literature on three objectives of human life (Dharma, Artha and Kāma) is mythical, admits of no doubt. And it is in keeping with Indian traditions relating to matters like this. But it is very probable that there was a work on Kāmaśāstra, attributed to Nandī, and formed a part of some Śaivāgama, which has not been discovered so far. For, there is the evidence of Śrīdhara Svāmin, as found in his commentary on the Bhāgavatam, (Ska. 10, Ch. 45, V. 36.) in support of the view that the list of Sixty-four Kalās, which is given by him and which generally agrees with that given by Vātsyāyana, originally belonged to the Śaivāgama or Śaiva Tantra : because he definitely says "as given in the Śaiva Tantra" (Śaivatantroktāḥ).

In any case, the existence of the works of the other authors, to which the tradition refers, is beyond all doubts. For, Vātsyāyana himself, in his Kāma Sūtra, refers to them at many places, as the following table shows :—

Earlier authorities referred to in the Kāma Sūtra :—

Pāñcāla, 68, 79, 94, 99, 135, 192, 238.
Auddālaki, (Śvetaketu) 76.
Cārāyaṇa, 47, 65.
Goṇikāputra, 60, 68.
Suvarṇanābha, 65, 114, 135, 137, 151.
Ghoṭakamukha, 65, 185, 187, 194, 200.

*1. Ka. S., 31.

Gonardīya, 65, 224, 227, 237.
Dattaka, 180.

LIST OF SIXTY-FOUR ARTS, FOUND IN THE ŚAIVA TANTRA AND IN THE KĀMA SŪTRA OF VĀTSYĀYANA.

1. Gītam. (Vocal music)
2. Vādyam. (Instrumental music)
3. Nṛtyam. (Dance) Vātsyāyana includes Nāṭya in Nṛtya.
4. Nāṭyam. (Drama) He follows the tradition, which divided Nṛtya into (i) Nāṭya and (ii) Anāṭya[1]. The former consisted in imitation of the deeds of beings, belonging to three regions, heaven, earth and nether region (Pātāla). The latter was representation of them in dance. Thus, Nṛtya seems to have been divided into (i) action-drama and (ii) dance-drama.
5. Ālekhyam. (Painting)
6. Viśeṣakacchedyam. (Art of cutting leaf (metalic ?) into different beautiful shapes for ornamenting forehead.)
7. Taṇḍula kusumavalivikārāḥ. (Art of lineal designing with rice or flowers)
8. Puṣpāstaraṇam. (Art of decorating bed with flowers.)
9. Daśanavasanāṅgarāgāḥ. (Art of colouring teeth, clothes and parts of the body.)
10. Maṇibhūmikākarma. (Jem-mosaicistry)
11. Śayana racanam. (Art of making bed)
12. Udakavādyam. (Art of playing upon water so as to produce musical melody similar to that of musical instrument.)
13. Udakaghātaḥ. (Art of striking others with water, thrown with a syringe.)

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*1, Ka, S., 30.

14. Citrayogaḥ. (Art of giving prescriptions for different purposes as given in the Kāma Sūtra in the section, called Citrayoga.)
15. Mālyagrathanavikalpāḥ. (Garland-making)
16. Śekharāpīḍayojanam. [Śekharakāpīḍayojanam (Vāt.)] (Art of decorating hair with wreath)
17. Nepathyayogāḥ. [Nepathyaprayogāḥ (Vāt.)] (Art of make-up)
18. Karṇapatrabhaṅgaḥ. (Art of making ear-leaf)
19. Gandhayuktiḥ. (Perfumery)
20. Bhūṣaṇayojanam. (Art of making ornaments)
21. Indrajālam. [Aindrajālaṃ (Vāt.)] (Jugglary)
22. Kaucumārayogāḥ. [Kaucumārāśca yogāḥ (Vāt.)] (Art of giving such prescriptions as make an unattractive lover attractive to his beloved. They are stated in the section, called Subhagaṅkaraṇa, according to the authority of Kucumāra.)
23. Hastalāghavam. (Sleight of hand)
24. Citraśākapūpabhakṣyavikārakriyā. [Vicitraśākayūṣa bhakṣyavikārakriyā (Vāt.)] (Art of preparing food and drink of different kinds)
25. Pānakarasarāgāsavayojanam. (Art of blending drinks, juices, colours and wines.)
26. Sūcīvāpakarmāṇi. [Sūcīvānakarmāṇi (Vāt.)] (Arts of sewing, darning and needlework.)
27. Sūtrakrīḍā. (Game of threads)

Vīṇāḍamarukavādyāni. It is not included in the list of arts given in the Śaiva Tantra, quoted by Śrīdhara. And the non-inclusion seems to be right, because it refers to only two musical instruments specifically and to others in general. It does not stand for any art.

28. Prahelikā. (Art of riddling)
29. Pratimālā. (Art of reciting a number of beautiful verses, each of the following of which begins with the last letter of the preceding. In such recitation two or more persons take part.)
30. Durvācakayogāḥ. (Art of composing verses, containing words, difficult to pronounce, and signifying what is equally difficult to get at.)
31. Pustakavācanam. (Art of reading books)
32. Nāṭikākhyāyikādarśanam. [Nāṭakākhyāyikādarśanam (Vāt.)] (Art of mastering short drama and story)
33. Kāvyasamasyāpūraṇam. (Art of completing a stanza, a part of which is proposed for completion.)
34. Paṭṭikāvetravāṇavikalpāḥ. [Art of weaving seat etc. with cane strips (Wicker-work)]
35. Tarkukarmāṇi. [Takṣakarmāṇi (Vāt.)] This seems to be a misprint. For, the commentary explains "tarkukarmāṇi". (Art of turnery, i.e. art of fashioning objects or designs by means of a lathe.)
36. Takṣaṇam. (Carpentry)
37. Vāstuvidyā. (Architecture)
38. Rūpyaratnaparīkṣā. (Art of examining coins, precious metals and jems.)
39. Dhātuvidyā. (Art of melting, purifying and mixing metals.)
40. Maṇirāgajñānam. [Maṇirāgākarajñānam (Vāt.)] (Art of colouring crystal and discovering the mines of jems)
41. Ākarajñānam. (Art of mining)
42. Vṛkṣāyurvedayogāḥ. (Art of curing plant-diseases)
43. Meṣakukkuṭalāvakayuddhavidhiḥ. (Art of training animals and birds to fight.)

44. Śukasārikāpralāpanam. (Art of training birds to speak)

45. Utsādanam. (Shampooing with feet)

46. Keśamārjanakauśalam. [Utsādane saṁvāhane keśa-mardane ca Kauśalam. (Vāt.)] Vātsyāyana does not mention Keśamārjana : instead he has Keśa-mardana and treats it as an aspect of the art of shampooing. It is of three kinds : (i) with feet (ii) with hands and (iii) of the hair. When it is done with feet it is called Utsādanam. (Art of cleaning hair)

47. Akṣaramuṣṭikākathanam. (Art of short-hand and of signalling i.e. of conveying information or direction to persons at a distance by means of pre-concerted signs.)

48. Mlecchitakavikalpāḥ. [Mlecchitavikalpāḥ (Vāt.)] (Art of conveying ideas or thoughts by means of words, the letters of which are transposed. The rules of such transposition are given by Kauṭilya. It is for exchanging ideas with confidants in the presence of others, without their coming to know the ideas so exchanged.)

49. Deśabhāṣājñānam. (Knowledge of foreign languages.)

50. Puṣpaśakaṭikā-nimittajñānam. [Here 'Nimittajñāṇam' is separately put in the commentary on the Kāma Sūtra.] (Art of making toy-carts or carts for flowers and of reading omens.)

51. Yantramātrikā. (Mechanics)

52. Dhāraṇamātrikā. (Art of remembering the learnt)

53. Sampāṭyam. [Sampāṭhyam (Vāt.)] (Art of chorusing)

54. Mānasī kāvyakriyā. [In the commentary on the Kāma Sūtra Mānasī and Kāvyakriyā are put separately.] (Art of composing and writing Citrakāvya i. e. a

verse, the letters of which admit of being arranged into the shape of lotus etc., and of reading it correctly.)

55. Kriyāvikalpāḥ. [Kriyākalpāḥ. (Vāt.)] (Poetics)

56. Chalitakayogāḥ. (Art of deceiving or art of creating illusion)

57. Abhidhānakoṣacchandojñānam. [Abhidhānakoṣa and chandojñānam are put separately by Vātsyāyana.] (Lexicography and prosody.)

58. Vastragopanāni. [Vastragopanaṃ (Vāt.)] (Art of dressing)

59. Dyūtaviśeṣaḥ. (Gambling)

60. Ākarṣakrīḍā. (Dice-playing or the art of pulling in tug of war)

61. Bālakakrīḍanakāni. (Children's plays)

62. Vaināyakīnām vidyānām jñānam. [Vainayikīnām Vaijayikīnām Vyāyāmikīnām ca vidyānām jñānam (Vāt.)] (Art of gentle demeanour)

63. Vaijayikīnām vidyānām jñānam. (Art of war)

64. Vaitālikīnām vidyānām jñānam. (Art of bard or bardic art)

This list of arts is found with slight variations in different works. Thus, in some works No. 26 and 27 are only one Kalā, named Sūcīvāpakarmasūtrakrīḍā, and after it Vīṇāḍamarukavādyāni is written.

WHY IS THE NUMBER OF ARTS TRADITIONALLY ADMITTED TO BE SIXTY-FOUR ?

The commentator on the Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana, Jayamaṅgala, answers this question from the point of view of the Kāma Sūtra itself. He asserts that the Sixty-four arts

are like the limbs of the body of the Kāma Sūtra and without them the rules, given therein, cannot be fully operative. The practice of instructions, given by Vātsyāyana, is not possible without them. (Catuḥ ṣaṣṭhiraṅgavidyāḥ Kāmasūtrasyāvaya-vinovayavabhūtāḥ. Tadabhāve Kāmasūtrasyāpravṛtteḥ. Ka.S., 40.)

Therefore, it will be wrong to think that only Sixty-four arts were known in ancient India. The Sixty-four arts, enumerated by Vātsyāyana, are the arts, which are of special importance in the context of the Kāma Sūtra. That there were many more arts, known at and about the time of Vātsyāyana, is beyond all doubts and the commentator himself refers to them.

An earlier authority, Pāñcāla, son of Babhru, who wrote a work on Kāmaśāstra in One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, admitted the number of arts to be Sixty-four. But he did so, because he considered Sixty-four arts, enumerated by him, to be basic (Mūlakalā). He divided Sixty-four arts into Four classes : (i) Karmāśraya (ii) Dyūtāśraya (iii) Śayanopacārikāḥ and (iv) Uttara Kalā.

(i) Karmāśraya arts are Twenty-four as follows :—

(1) Gītām (2) Nṛtyam (3) Vādyam (4) Kauśalalipijñānam (5) Vacanaṁcodāram (6) Citravidiḥ (7) Pustakarma (8) Patra-cchedyam (9) Mālyavidhiḥ (10) Gandhayuktyāsvādyavidhā-nam (11) Ratnaparīkṣā (12) Sīvanam (13) Raṅgaparijñānam (14) Upakaraṇakriyā (15) Mānavidhiḥ (16) Ājīvajñānam (17) Tiryagyonicikitsitam (18) Māyākṛtapāṣaṇḍasamayajñānam (19) Krīḍākauśalam (20) Lokajñānam (21) Vaicakṣaṇyam (22) Saṁvāhanam (23) Śarīrasaṁskāraḥ (24) Viśeṣakauśalam.

(ii) Dyūtāśraya arts are Twenty. The first Fifteen are called Nirjīva and the last Five Sajīva. They are as follows :—

(25) Āyuḥprāptiḥ (26) Akṣavidhānam (27) Rūpasaṅkhyā (28) Kriyāmārgaṇam (29) Bījagrahaṇam (30) Nayajñānam (31) Karaṇādānam (32) Citrācitravidhiḥ (33) Gūḍharāśiḥ (34) Tulyābhihāraḥ (35) Kṣipragrahaṇam (36) Anuprāptilekha smṛtiḥ (37) Agnikramaḥ (38) Chalavyāmohanam (39) Grahadānam (40) Upasthānavidhiḥ (41) Yuddham (42) Rutam (43) Gatam (44) Nṛttam.

(iii) Śayanopacārikāḥ arts are Sixteen as follows :—

(45) Puruṣasya bhāvagrahaṇam (46) Svarāgaprakāśanam (47) Pratyaṅgadānam (48) Nakhadantayorvicāram (49) Nīvīsraṁsanam (50) Guhyasya saṁsparśanānulomyam (51) Paramārthakauśalam (52) Harṣaṇam (53) Samānārthatākṛtārthatā (54) Anuprotsāhanam (55) Mṛdukrodhapravartanam (56) Samyakkrodhanivartanam (57) Kruddhaprasādanam (58) Suptaparityāgaḥ (59) Caramasvāpavidhiḥ (60) Guhyagūhanam.

(iv) Uttarakalās are Four as follows :—

(61) Sāśrupātam ramaṇāya śāpadānam (62) Svaśapathakriyā (63) Prasthitānugamanam (64) Punaḥpunarnirīkṣaṇam.

And according to Pāñcāla, the dependent arts, which are subsumed under the basic, are Five Hundred and Eighteen.[1] Thus, the total number of arts, referred to in the early literature on Kāmaśāstra, is Five Hundred and Eighty-two.

The list, that is given in the Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana, is the list of such Sixty-four arts[2] as are necessary for carrying out the instructions about the action and behaviour in relation to the object of love such as give rise to and heighten the passion of love (Tantra[3]) and completely win his or her heart (Āvāpa).

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* 1. Ka. S., 32. *2. Ka. S., 40. *3. Ka. S., 9-10.

Vātsyāyana's list is made up of the arts, given by Pāñcāla[1] under the two headings (i) Karmāśraya (ii) Dyūtāśraya, with some modifications, and includes some of the dependent arts also. Thus, there are two reasons for the admission of the number of arts to be Sixty-four.

(I) The basic arts are Sixty-four only.

(II) Arts, necessary from the point of view of the Kāma Sūtra are Sixty-four only.

SANCTITY OF THE NUMBER SIXTY-FOUR.

The contents of the Ṛgveda are divided in two ways: (i) into Maṇḍala, Anuvāka, Sūkta and Mantra : (ii) into Aṣṭaka, Adhyāya, Varga and Mantra. Thus, according to the first division, there are 10 Maṇḍalas, 85 anuvākas, 1018 Sūktas and 10589 Mantras. According to the second division, there are 8 Aṣṭakas, 64 Adhyāyas, 2024 Vargas and 10589 Mantras. But Sāyaṇa says that there are 10489 Mantras.

Sage Pañcāla gave the name Catuḥṣaṣṭhi to the Ṛgveda, because it contains Eight Aṣṭakas, each containing Eight Adhyāyas, while it has Ten Maṇḍalas. Thus, the number Sixty-four acquired sanctity and holiness. Therefore, in order to give sanctity and holiness to the Kāmaśāstra, similar to that of the Ṛgveda, the portion of the work of Bābhravya Pāñcāla, dealing with *Samprayoga* which has Ten principal parts, which are subdivided into Sixty-four, has been called *Catuḥṣaṣṭhi*, because its ten principal parts of Samprayoga correspond to Ten Maṇḍalas and its Sixty-four subdivisions correspond to Sixty-four Adhyāyas of the Ṛgveda.

Subsequently Kāmaśāstra itself was called 'Sixty-four' by competent authorities[2]. Accordingly the arts also, which are necessary from the point of view of the Kāma Sūtra,

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*1. Ka. S., 32. *2. Ka. S., 93.

came to be conceived to be Sixty-four, corresponding to the Sixty-four parts of Samprayoga, for the same purpose of giving sanctity and holiness to them also.

Thus, the additional reasons for admitting the number of arts to be Sixty-four seem to be that this number is holy[1]; that it corresponds with the number of the parts of Samprayoga[2]; that it agrees with the number of Prakaraṇas in the Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana[3] and also with that of the types of action in the context of love, which, though primarily of Eight types, yet each type being subdivided into Eight, is admitted to be of Sixty-four types. They are discussed in the Book, called Samprayoga[4].

CLASSIFICATION OF ARTS.

In the Vedic age no classification of arts seems to have been made. There was no division of them into basic (Mūla-kalā) and dependent (Antara-kalā). Every art was a useful art and work of art was appreciated, because it was useful, and the artisan was rewarded, because he produced something that was useful. Thus, Ṛbhus were rewarded with the exhaltation to divine honour, because, as has already been stated, they made into four a single new sacrificial cup.[5] Even poetry was useful art, because the verses, produced by poets, were useful in calling the gods and winning their favours.

At a later time, however, the arts were divided into (i) basic (Mūla) (ii) dependent (Antara). This division was made by Pāñcāla, son of Babhru, who was an earlier authority than Vātsyāyana and wrote a work on Kāmaśāstra consisting of One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. According to him, the basic arts were Sixty-four and the dependent arts were Five Hundred and Eighteen, as has already been stated.

*1. Ka. S., 93. *2. Ka. S., 92. *3. Ka. S., 93.
*4. Ka. S., 93-4. *5. R. V., I, 20, 6.

But Jayamaṅgala, a commentator on the Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyāyana, seems to disagree from Pāñcāla and points out that all the Sixty-four arts, mentioned by Pāñcāla under four heads, are not basic ; that the last Twenty arts, mentioned under two heads (i) Śayanopacārikāḥ and (ii) Uttarakalāḥ, are dependent arts, which have wrongly been added to the Forty-four basic arts to make up the total of Sixty-four[1].

A division of arts into the principal and subordinate seems to have been made by Bharata also. For, he holds that all other arts occupy a subordinate position to the dramatic inasmuch as they find their due places in it.[2] But Bharata also regarded even the dramatic art to be mainly useful art in so far as he thought it to be only a means of imparting moral instruction to all, of giving mental rest or peace to those afflicted with pain, sorrow or fatigue, and of acquisition of fame, religious merit and long life.

Subsequently, however, the dramatic art was conceived to be an 'absolute art' in so far as it was thought to give rise to an experience, which was recognised to be akin to the mystic experience of Brahman. This view, according to the present information, was first propounded by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, a commentator on the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata, though there is no denying the fact that Rasa had been recognised to be identical with Brahman as early as the time of Taittirīya Upaniṣad (Anu., 7.). And following this trend the exponents of two other arts asserted them to be 'absolute'. For, Bhoja in his Samarāṅgaṇa Sūtradhāra and Śārṅgadeva in his Saṅgīta Ratnākara[3] talk of Vāstu-Brahma and Nāda-Brahma respectively. Thus, finally three arts were recognised to be 'Absolute' independent or *Svatantra* as distinct from 'subjective' dependent, useful or Upayoginī.

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*1. Ka. S., 32. *2. N. S., 9. *3. S.R., 31.

HEGELIAN AND INDIAN CLASSIFICATION OF ARTS.

Hegel divides arts from three points of view, (i) content (ii) material medium and (iii) relation between content and form. From the first point of view he divides them into (i) subjective (ii) objective and (iii) absolute. In this context he talks of two relations to the products of arts : (i) utilitarian (ii) æsthetical. And he distinguishes between (i) mechanical or industrial and (ii) fine arts, including architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry, in terms of these relations. However, he puts music under objective arts and distinguishes it from the subjective art of poetry. The objective nature of the art of music, according to him, consists in the relation of the contemplating mind to what is objective, e.g. sound or tone, and is not spiritual. And the spiritual nature of poetry consists in the relation of the contemplating mind to what is spiritual i.e. the infinite idea, presented through the medium of language, which is merely symbol of the idea. Accordingly while in æsthetic experience from music, the sound or tone, the medium, is the essential content of the experience, in æsthetic experience from poetry, language does not form a content of the experience.

Thus, Hegel seems to improve upon the ancient Indian classification of arts in so far as he draws a distinction between the objective art and the absolute, which was not drawn in ancient India : but he agrees with the Indian classification into Svatantra and Upayoginī in so far as he admits that the distinction between the subjective on the one hand and the objective and the absolute on the other is based on the relation of the lover of art, which is recognised to be utilitarian in the former and æsthetical in the latter case.

TWO POINTS OF VIEW FOR HANDLING THE PROBLEM OF ART.

There are two distinct points of view, from which the problem of art can be attempted.

(I) External point of view: It is concerned with cataloguing the works of art in an historical order and commenting upon them, pointing out the external characteristics of the products of art at different periods and the external influences, which are reflected in them. Much commendable work has been done from this point of view in India, particularly during the British period, and in the West and is being continued.

(II) Internal or philosophical point of view: From this point of view one has to give one's self up to contemplation and to penetrate to the idea of the 'beautiful': one has to cognise the product of art in its universality, in its essential being, but not in its particularity: one has to concern one's self with the logical and metaphysical nature of the idea that a work of art presents. It is from this point of view that philosophers in the West, from Plato, the founder of philosophy of fine art, to Croce, have written and our contemporaries are still writing. And in India, this point of view has been maintained from the time of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, which asserted the identity of the æsthetic experience with the mystic experience of the Brahman and admitted the content of fine art, presumably of poetry and drama, to be the Absolute, (Raso vai saḥ. Tai. Upa., Anu., 7.) through Bhaṭṭa Tauta, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta, Mahima Bhaṭṭa etc. down to the present day.

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF ÆSTHETICS.

If we study the available literature on the subject, we find

that the problem of æsthetics has been approached from the technical, metaphysical, psychological, epistemic, logical and critical points of view. The theory of meaning is an essential part of Indian æsthetics. From the *technical* point of view the ways and means of producing works of art in different mediums, such as stone, paint, musical sound, linguistic expression and human body are discussed. From the *Metaphysical* point of view the object of presentation, the content, and the nature of the final experience, that a work of art arouses, are presented in terms of metaphysical categories. From the *psychological* point of view the entire psychological process, involved in the different levels of æsthetic experience, is explained. From the *epistemic* point of view the following points are discussed : (1) the true nature of the relation of the æsthete to the æsthetic object : (2) the subjective conditions necessary for interpreting the æsthetic presentation and for the rise of an experience in the connoisseur, similar to that which is embodied in the work of art : (3) the mental faculties which are operative in the course of the development of the æsthetic image in the spectator : (4) distinction of such faculties from those which operate at the empirical level : (5) elimination of the elements of the individuality of the subject and the object and their temporal and other limitations in æsthetic experience. From the *logical* point of view the æsthetic judgment is distinguished from the empirical, such as (a) right, (b) wrong, (c) dubious, (d) illusory etc. And from the *critical* point of view the problem "What is the soul of the artistic presentation ?" has been discussed.

It has also been approached from the point of view (1) of the end of art, (2) of the artist and (3) of the æsthete. The earliest theories of art (1) hedonistic and (2) pedagogic or moralistic represent the study of the problem from the

point of view of the end of art, of what the products of art aim at. The theories of (1) imitation, (2) illusion, (3) idealization etc. have been advanced from the point of view of the artist. They show what the artist does in artistically dealing with the object that inspires him. Similarly (1) confused or unclassifiable cognition, (2) inference, (3) katharsis and (4) mysticism are the theories of art from the point of view of the æsthete. They show the nature of experience that a work of art arouses in the æsthete and the means of knowledge which are employed by him in its acquisition.[1]

TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW.

Work of every art presupposes some technique. And in the early history of every nation, this technique is simply a matter of oral tradition. It gets a systematic form in works on different arts at a fairly advanced period of the history of a nation. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the tradition of the technique of different arts goes back to as early a time in the history of a nation as that to which the discovered works of arts belong. Hence the existence of the technique of arts of architecture, sculpture and painting in India is beyond all doubts in the prehistoric time of the archaeological finds at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro and of that of music, poetry and drama in the Vedic age, because in the Vedas there are references to these arts, their works and the artists who produced them. And so much of the literature on this subject as on every other is irrecoverably lost, as we know from references, that it is impossible to trace out the evolution of the ideas on any subject from the earliest form to that in which we find them in the available works. Hence the talk of the rise of any of the aforesaid arts as due to the

1. Ph. E. W., Vol. I, 472-3.

influence of a nation, the history of which does not go back to as early a time as that of India, is without any sound basis.

To illustrate that the field of comparison between Indian and Western Æsthetics extends to other arts than the poetic, including drama as the highest form of poetry, to which for the present we are confined, we deal with the technique of the architectural art and briefly refer to the points of similarity between the Indian architectural technique and the Roman. Presentation of Indian and Western views on every other fine art and their detailed comparison will be the subject-matter of a subsequent Volume.

ARCHITECTURAL TECHNIQUE.

There is fairly vast literature in India, available in print and MSS., on the technique of architecture. Among the important works on this subject may be mentioned the Śaivāgamas, such as Kāmika, Kāraṇa, Suprabheda etc., Mayamata, Mānasāra, Aṁśumadbheda, Viśvakarmaśilpa, Āgastya, Sanatkumāra Vāstuśāstra, Śilpaśāstra of Maṇḍana, Śilpaśāstra of Śrīkumāra, Samarāṅgaṇa Sūtradhāra of King Bhoja etc.

Taking for example the Kāmikāgama, we find that no less than Sixty Chapters are devoted to architectural matters, such as testing and preparation of soil, selection of sites, scheme of measurement, finding out the cardinal points by means of gnomons for orientation[1] of buildings, site-planes, details of buildings of twenty types, the styles of architecture such as Nāgara, Draviḍa and Vesara: shapes, such as masculine, faminine and neuter: material for building, such as single, mixture of two and amalgamation of many materials: selection of right proportion and so on. In other works on

1. M. S., Vol. VI, 85.

architecture similar topics on similar lines with some important additions and omissions are dealt with.

Many of the topics are common to works on architecture of other countries. And the approach to and treatment of architectural matters in the Mānasāra, an important work on Indian architecture, written probably about the 5th to 7th century A.D., and Vitruvius's work on Roman architecture, written about 25 years before the Christian era, because the author mentions Caeser as his patron, are so similar that they present very fruitful material for a comparative study. Casting a glance at the contents of the two aforementioned works, we find similarity between them in the introductory chapters as follows :—

1. The Mānasāra opens with a prayer to the creator, Brahmā. Vitruvius begins his work with a prayer to Caesar.

2. According to Vitruvius, 'an architect should be ingenious and apt in the acquisition of knowledge. He should be a good writer, a skilful draughtsman, versed in geometry and optics, expert at figures, acquainted with history, informed on the principles of natural and moral Philosophy, somewhat of a musician, not ignorant of the sciences, both of law and physic, nor of the motions, laws and relations to each other, of the heavenly bodies'.

In the Mānasāra artists are first divided into four classes. Together they form the guild of architects, each an expert in his own department, but possessing a general knowledge of the science of architecture as a whole. They consist of the chief architect (Sthapati), the draughtsman or the designer (Sūtragrāhin), the painter (Vardhaki) and the joiner (Sūtradhāra).

The chief architect is expected to be well versed in all the sciences. He must possess a knowledge of all the Vedas

and all the Śāstras. He must be proficient in law, mathematics, history, geography, painting, draughtsmanship, mechanics and deep 'in the ocean of the science of architecture'. Similarity is also found in the treatment of the following purely architectural[1] matters :—

3. Plans of towns.
4. Forms and species of buildings.
5. Foundations and columns.
6. Pillars.
7. Compounds and courts.
8. Proportions of doors and buildings.
9. Sculptural measures.

DRAMATIC TECHNIQUE.

The dramatic art was fairly developed in India long before Indian people came into close contact with the Greeks, consequent on Alexander's invasion in 326 B.C. For, Pāṇini, whose date is generally accepted to be the 4th century B.C., refers to two works on dramaturgy, one by Kṛśāśva and the other by Śilāli. And Sāriputra, a famous disciple of Lord Buddha, is said to have renounced the world and embraced Buddhistic asceticism in consequence of the effect that a dramatic presentation produced on him. Therefore, the view of some scholars that the rise of the dramatic art in India was due to the Greek influence does not seem to be sound.

But it is very unfortunate that no work on dramaturgy, to which such an early date can be assigned, has been discovered so far. We know them from references only. The earliest that is available is the Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharata, which has been assigned to the 6th century A.D. on the basis of its Paurāṇic style and language.

1. M.S., Vol. VI, 221.

To bring out the points of similarity between the technique of Sanskrit drama and that of Greek drama, we have devoted Chapter VI to the presentation of the former from the point of view of Bharata and his commentators in the 1st Volume and Chapter IV to that of the latter from the point of view of Aristotle in the present Volume. A careful study of them shows that both agree on the following points :—

(i) Both Bharata and Aristotle recognise the importance of fable, plot or Itivṛtta. The former holds it to be the body of drama and recognises Rasa to be the soul; because drama, according to him, primarily aims at presenting Rasa. But the latter recognises the fable to be the soul or end of tragedy, because drama or rather tragedy, according to him, is an imitation of action, but not a presentation of anything corresponding to Rasa in Indian dramaturgy.

(ii) Both talk of the stages of action. Bharata divides action into five stages: Prārambha, Yatna, Prāptyāśā, Niyatāpti and Phalāgama. Aristotle, in his Poetics, divides action into three stages at first, Beginning, Middle and End. But Middle, according to him, includes two parts (i) Complication and (ii) Resolution in a simple plot. And these two involve two more (i) Revolution and (ii) Discovery in a complex plot. Thus, Aristotle also seems to admit all the five stages, recognised by Bharata. In fact, the authors of the critical literature on Shakespearian dramas, who are definitely under Aristotelian influence, following the clue in the conceptions of complication and resolution, have divided action into five stages. In English the stages of action, presented in a comedy are generally called (i) cause, (ii) growth (iii) height (iv) consequence and (v) close. The last two stages of tragic action, however, are called fall and catastrophe, because of the difference in the fruit of action.

The Sanskrit words for the five stages of action have almost the same implication as the English words for the stages of action in a comedy.

(iii) Both divide the subject-matter of drama into presentable and unpresentable for the same reasons and employ dramatic machinery for conveying the information about what is not presented on the stage. The means of conveying information, according to Bharata, are, Viṣkambha, Cūlikā, Aṅkāsya, Aṅkāvatāra and Praveśaka. And, according to Aristotle, they are prologue, chorus, messenger, gods and prophets.

(iv) Both admit the importance of unities of time, place and action. Though Aristotle, as pointed out by Hegel, does not directly talk of the unity of place, yet it is attributed to him, because of the peculiar constitution of Greek drama, which could not permit the change of scene, because chorus, having once entered, remained on the stage throughout the drama.

(v) Both recognise the importance of music and scenic presentation for staging of drama.

(vi) Bharata recognises the importance of women for putting drama on stage. But in the West it has been recognised only recently.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTISTIC PRODUCTION.

In the present context by 'principle' we mean the general law, which guides an artist in the production of a work of art. It may refer to the action and the object to which it should be related or to an aspect of the object, or to the nature of the product. Thus, there are different principles of artistic production, such as imitation, illusion, reflection, idealisation, invention, verisimilitude, symbolisation,

concretisation etc. We shall try to put them in a logical order, showing how one seems to have led to another.

(I) IMITATION.

Imitation seems to have been the earliest principle of artistic production, because the imitative faculty is recognised to be inborn and delight in seeing the imitations of well-known objects is natural. It was a principle that the artists in Greece followed before the time of Sophist Gorgias (P. 8.).

Imitation primarily consists in producing a copy of an external object in an artistic medium such as has so close similarity with the original that the natural object may be recognised in the imitation of it. Such a principle is important for the production of works of the arts of painting and sculpture. For, one of the recognised purposes of the products of these arts is the preservation of memory. And Viṣṇu Dharmottara Purāṇa in the section, dealing with painting, recognises the production of likeness as the main purpose of painting.[1] The view that paintings such as led to the recognition of the original in the pictorial production, were actually produced in India in very distant past, is borne out by the following story of Uṣā and Aniruddha, narrated in Harivaṁśa Purāṇa (Chapters 175-190).

Uṣā, the daughter of the Asura-king, Bāṇa, beheld Aniruddha, son of Pradyumna and grandson of Kṛṣṇa, in a dream and became passionately enamoured of him. She took into confidence one of her maids-of-honour, Citralekhā, who had the natural gift of painting. She offered to paint the pictures of all the deities and great men of the time so that the youth of the dream might be identified. Thus,

*1. V. Dh., 335.

when Uṣā saw the portrait of Aniruddha, she recognised the youth of her dream in it. She had him carried to her city and was married to him.

The fact that imitation in the aforesaid sense was used as a principle of production of works of sculptural art is testified by the ancient practice of making the images of stone for the preservation of the memory of kings and great men. To this ancient practice there is a reference in the third act of the Pratimā Nāṭaka of Bhāsa, who was a predecessor of Kālidāsa. The purport of the scene, wherein the reference occurs, may be stated as follows :—

Bharata is returning to Ayodhyā from the home of his maternal uncle. He has learnt of the serious illness of his royal father, but does not know that he has died. He stops for a while in the vicinity of Ayodhyā and enters into the memorial of Kings (Pratimāgṛha) where the statues of the past kings of the dynesty of Ikṣvāku, beginning with Dilīpa, are kept. He admires the excellence of sculptured images in the pillars, in which divinity and humanity are thoroughly harmonised. He is wonder-struck at the expression of life and emotion in them. The keeper of the memorial recognises the family resemblance between the statues of the kings and the physical frame of Bharata. And Bharata, when he comes to the statue of Daśaratha, immediately recognises his father in it. And terribly shocked at the implication of it, he asks the keeper :

"Are the statues of the living also kept here ?"

Imitation in the dramatic presentation, such as aroused the consciousness of similarity of the representation with the original, was admitted by Patañjali, as is clear from Helārāja's reference in his commentary on the Vākyapadīyam[1].

*1. V. P., Kāṇḍa III, 177.

(II) REFLECTION.

Reflection, as a principle of artistic production, is closely related to imitation. It simply defines the field of imitation. It shows what the imitative artist is to concern himself with. It implies that imitative art presents no more of an external object than what is reflected on a smooth surface such as that of mirror or water. It refers to soullessness of the products of imitative art. It was because of such a conception of reflection that Plato refused art, which through imitation could produce nothing more than a mere reflection of an external object, a place in his ideal Republic (P. 20.).

Ānanda Vardhana in his Dhvanyāloka, chapter iv, while summing up the general instructions to good poets, refers to the following three types of similarity of one poetic production with another : (i) like that of reflection with that which casts it (Pratibimbavat) (ii) like that of a picture with the original (Ālekhyākāravad) (iii) like that of one soul with another. And he advises poets to avoid similarity of the first two types. For, the first is absolutely soulless (Ananyātma) and the second, though it seems to possess a soul, yet that is non-different from that of the original (Tucchātma). Thus, we find that Plato and Ānanda Vardhana, condemn reflective artistic production on similar ground.

(III) ILLUSION.

Illusion, as a principle of artistic production, is also closely connected with imitation. According to this, imitation should be so thorough that the spectator may take a work of art to be a real fact or product of nature, that he may be deluded or deceived. This principle was recognised by Sophist Gorgias

(P. 8). Plato condemned imitative art in general and painting in particular, because of its creating illusion (P. 21.). St. Augustine defended the illusion of theatre on conventional ground (P. 165-6.). And Locke seems to have recognised this principle in his presentation of æsthetic experience as pleasant deception (P. 232.).

In india also the principle of illusion was attributed to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and criticised (Vol. I, P. 33.). It seems to have been recognised by Śrī Śaṅkuka in his analogy of painted horse (Citraturaganyāya) (Vol. I, P. 58.). And Abhinavagupta definitely asserts that dramatic presentation is not an illusory object (Vol. I, P. 146.).

(IV) SELECTIVE IMITATION.

The principle of selective imitation presents an advance on those of imitation, reflection and illusion, because it paves the way to idealisation. It was propounded by Socrates. According to him, production of beautiful works of art depends on selective imitation, that is, the combination of beautiful points in different objects of perception. In India this principle seems to have been maintained by Kālidāsa (Vol. I, P. 8.).

(V) IDEALISATION.

If the artist is to select the beautiful points from the observed phenomena and to combine them into a whole, the question arises: "What is the principle, on the basis of which he has to make the selection to combine the selected into a whole?" And reply to this is "Idealisation". Aristotle propounded the theory of idealisation in art on the basis of his system. According to him, idealisation is the presentation of things, not as they are, but as they should be; not as they exist in the external world, but as they are to be under

the controlling force of 'ideas', which can be grasped through intellect only (P. 41.).

In India also idealisation, not in the Aristotelian sense, as has been stated just above, but in the sense of presentation of a thing, conceived as perfect of its kind, is a recognised principle of artistic production. In the context of drama, for instance, Bharata and his followers speak of three types of human nature or character: best or excellent (Uttama) middling (Madhyama) and low (Adhama). They advocate the view that the hero of drama (Nāṭaka) should be an ideal person. 'The types of hero' is an important topic in Indian dramaturgy.

(VI) INVENTION.

Plato in his Ion talks of invention in the context of poetic production. He seems to mean by invention the production of a poetic piece which is entirely new in respect of subject, idea and method of treatment. He holds that poets write poetry, not by wisdom, but by a sort of genius or inspiration, and asserts that there is no *invention* in them till they are inspired (P. 85). Thus, according to Plato, invention seems to be a principle of artistic production. This invention, however, he maintains, is due to poetic inspiration only. This seems to be a higher principle of artistic production than idealisation in so far as it emphasises the importance of a subjective element, namely, inspiration, which may be regarded to be higher than intellect, necessary for the visualisation of the ideal, according to Aristotle.

In India this principle of invention has been admitted by Ānanda Vardhana and his followers. And they agree that it is due to the possession by the poetic Muse (Sarasvatī[1]).

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*1. Dh., L. 91. and 537.

The followers of rationalism of Descartes, like Boileau etc., however, meant by invention, not the creation of something entirely new, but simply ordering, arranging and designing the selected material and dressing it so as to make it suited to the mood or occasion i. e. altering, adding to and abstracting from it (P. 222.).

Such a principle of artistic production has been recognised by Bharata and his followers, Dhanañjaya etc., who definitely say that whatever in the chosen theme is not in consonance with the Rasa, that is primarily to be presented, should be eliminated or modified.[2]

In such a case, invention is simply the presentation of things, not as they are, but as they should be and, therefore, is identical with idealisation from the rationalist point of view.

(VII) VERISIMILITUDE.

Naturalism and idealism are the two opposite artistic tendencies. The one in its extreme advocates imitation as the principle of artistic production; and the other in its extreme tends to depart from nature so as to lead to grotesqueness. Verisimilitude presents the 'mean' between the two extremes. It presents a compromise between the two. Philosophically it is a compromise between naturalism and rationalism. It is based on rational naturalism. It means right interpretation of nature in accordance with speculative philosophy. It involves the use of mental faculties from memory to contemplation. It is a fusion of naturalistic ideal of art with harmonious design (P. 171). It demands, according to Boileau etc., that poet should not run away from nature; he should not depart from life and nature (P. 223).

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*2. D. R., 70.

The idea that poet in his idealisation should not depart from life and nature seems to have been emphasised by Kuntaka in his Vakrokti Jīvita. The following points have to be remembered in this connection :—

(i) Poetics (Alaṅkāraśāstra) is an embodiment of the discoveries of the ways and means of the linguistic presentation of the ideal contents of a poetic vision. The progress of the science has, therefore, been marked by the discoveries of more and more ways and means of this type of presentation. It began with the discovery of some figures of speech. They have the capacity of adding to the conventional or natural image certain attributes, which it lacks, by putting one conventional word in some relation with another, the meaning of which possesses those attributes which that of the former lacks. Thus, in "moon like face" "moon" adds to "face" some attributes e. g. the capacity to give intense delight etc. which being fused with "face" make the configuration exactly correspond to the ideal image of it in the poetic vision (Vol. I, P. 209).

(ii) According to Kuntaka, Vakrokti is what adorns 'word' and meaning.[1]

(iii) He rejects the view that Svabhāvokti, presentation of the objects of nature as they are, is a figure of speech (Alaṅkāra)[2].

(iv) He considers Svabhāvokti to be the body, which has to be adorned by the figures of speech.[3]

(v) He advocates the view that ornamentation of nature should not be profuse, nor should it be done laboriously, i.e. the idealisation should be spontanious and not laboured.

(vi) He asserts that naturalness in the presentation should predominate and idealisation by means of the acquired

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*1. V. J., 22. *2. V. J., 23. *3. V. J., 24.

skill should be avoided.[1] Thus, it becomes clear that he holds the view that in poetic production proper balance between naturalism and idealism should be maintained.

(VIII) SYMBOLISATION.

The principles of artistic production, discussed so far, are such as can help mainly in the presentation of sensuous objects, whether found in nature or in the national history or epic, either as they are or as they should be. But the living objects of nature and the persons, connected with the events, presented in the national history or epic, are conscious beings and as such have feelings, passions and emotions, which are not sensuous but primarily mental. Therefore, if the artistic presentation is to include them, the question arises: "Is any one of the principles of artistic production, stated above, sufficient to represent them?" If not: "What is then that principle which is to be followed in representing them?" And the reply of the early thinkers is "It is symbolisation".

It appears that this principle was employed by the artists, who were contemporaries or predecessors of Socrates. For, he discovered the symbolic element in the works of art of his time. He found that the works of arts presented not only the sensible but the supersensible also, the states of mind such as sorrow, friendliness, joy etc. Therefore, he maintained that because the mental states do not admit of direct presentation, they have to be presented in terms of physical expressions thereof, which are the perceptible signs and, therefore, symbols of the inner states.

This implies that symbolisation, according to Socrates, consists in the presentation of the imperceptible cause, the state of mind in terms of the perceptible effect, the physical

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*1, V. J., 47.

changes, which are due to the psychological causes. Such physical changes as arise from different states of mind and in terms of which the emotions are presented in poetry and drama, are called Anubhāvas by Indian æstheticians.

Symbolisation, however, has come to mean very much more than what has been stated above. It means representation of an immaterial thing in and through the material, because the latter possesses analogous qualities or is associated in fact or thought with the former. Thus, purity and courage are symbolically represented as white and lion respectively. Plotinus seems to be an exponent of such symbolisation. He holds that a work of art symbolises an 'idea' in a material medium. It is, therefore, beautiful in proportion to its faithful representation of the real. For, the real is the ideal and the ideal is beautiful. It is a product of intellectual imagination, the sphere of whose activity extends to the supersensuous. Intellectual imagination, therefore, is capable of picturing up what is beyond the perceptual sphere and of creating images which are reflections of reason in her most exalted mood. And artistic forms merely symbolically represent such creations of intellectual imagination (P. 156).

We find that symbolisation as a principle of artistic production was followed in India also at a very early period of the history of art. For instance, in the Buddhistic art we find the holy wheel symbolising the eternal truth, revealed by Lord Buddha, and in Hindu art the third eye of god Śiva symbolising his distinctive power of destruction.

(IX) CONCRETISATION.

Concretisation is a higher principle of artistic production than symbolisation. Though both are concerned with the presentation of what is immaterial in a material medium or

of 'idea' in a sensible form ; yet in the products of symbolisation the coalescence of 'idea' with form is defective ; the product stands in an external relation to the idea ; and the idea is ill-defined and obscure and, therefore, does not possess the individuality which is necessary for sensuous presentation. But concretisation presupposes an idea which is well-defined, a universal that is not abstract but concrete and expresses or manifests itself in the world of sense. Concretisation, therefore, as a principle of artistic production, consists in the presentation of, not an ill-defined idea in an arbitrary sign, but of a well-defined idea in terms of its expressions in the physical world.

Concretisation is the principle of the highest art, which aims at presenting, not an object of nature, but the Absolute, not directly, but through its manifestations, the spirit in its freedom, the spiritual forces, the divine and true, the ideal and universal substance, which is at the root of human ends, conflicts and destinies, the universal emotions of our common humanity. It is effected by imagination, which clothes the ideas, feelings or emotions with events and actions, moods and exhibitions of passions and thus creates an object, which is complete in its external aspect as a phenomenon no less than in the ideal significance of its content. Hence concretisation consists in the presentation of the universal or rational principle, the spirit in its freedom and independence, in its self-expression or self-manifestation in its actions and emotions, which find expression in voluntary and involuntary physical changes in the midst of external natural environment. It presents an organic whole, every constituent of which is related to the spiritual principle exactly in the manner in which all that constitutes human body is related to the soul, the principle of life.

Concretisation as the principle of artistic production

is admitted by Bharata and his followers in the context of dramatic art and is adopted by the poeticians for the production of the works of poetic art. It is admitted that higher arts of drama, poetry, music and painting present Rasa, the Absolute, the Universal Self, (Raso vai saḥ) concretised in a universal or basic emotion (Sthāyibhāva) manifesting itself in the transient emotions (Vyabhicāribhāva) and physical expressions thereof (Anubhāva) in the situation that is responsible for the arousal of the basic emotion (Vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicāri saṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ).

(X) SUGGESTION.

Language is generally admitted to be more expressive of the artistic ideas than any other means of artistic presentation, because it possesses the conventional expressions for what is supersensuous, mental or spiritual. And it is generally recognised that the meanings which the words convey are not necessarily always conventional, but often secondary, contextual and suggested. C.K. Ogden, I.A. Richards, Croce and Demetrius are the authorities, which, besides many others, have discussed them. In India also these meanings are admitted and have been called Abhidheya, Lakṣya, Tātparya and Vyaṅgya (Vol. I, Ch. IV).

Confining ourselves to the suggested meaning, with which we are concerned immediately, we may point out that Demetrius talks of suggestion in the context of style, in dealing with which he generally follows Aristotle. The following instances will clarify the point :—

(i) Agreeing with Aristotle that the active metaphor is the best, he cites the following instance :—

"The keen arrow leapt forth among the crowd on eager

wings" and says that "on eager wings" suggests living activities[1].

(ii) After giving the following instance of a word, substituted for a sentence, from Xenophon :—

"It was impossible to catch a wild ass unless horses stood at intervals and hunted it by relays." he says that the Greek word for "by relays" suggests that those behind were pursuing, while the others rode in front to meet them, so that the ass was caught between the two parties.[2]

We have already referred to the views of Theophrastus, Stoics, Quintilian and Dionysius on allied topics (P. 112-13). But these authorities do not seem to touch the problem logically and psychologically. They do not discuss the suggestive power of language in such a way as to show that poetry and drama would be without the soul but for this power of language. They do not seem to emphasise the inadequacy of the conventional language to present the central fact, the soul, of the poetic vision. We have also drawn attention (i) to the view of Descartes that language is the immediate cause of emotions as much as the actual facts and have pointed out that Ānanda Vardhana also recognises the language to be such a cause in his conception of Asaṁlakṣya krama Vyaṅgya, but asserts that it is not the conventional but the suggestive power of the language that arouses emotions immediately, not in the sense that there is the complete absence of the successive stages in the rise of emotions, but that the succession is so quick that it is not noticed (PP. 214-6.) : and (ii) to that of Burke that the compound abstract words, such as those standing for emotions e.g., love and fear, arouse affections of the soul through sets

1. De. S., Para 81.
2. De. S., Para 93.

of sounds only without the intervening images of the corresponding objects and, therefore, arouse the emotions immediately. Such a view is criticised by Abhinavagupta in his Īśvara Pratyabijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī, as we shall soon show.

It was Baumgarten who seems to have realised the inadequacy of the ordinary language to present the poetic idea completely, in his conception of the obscure knowledge as obscure, the knowledge in the form of feeling, which, according to Bosanquet, means the knowledge that does not admit of adequate presentation in language (PP. 1 and 286.). And Hegel also, while speaking about the soul of artistic presentation in general, seems to admit that the soul of artistic presentation is not directly presented through or by the medium of art. For, he admits that the perceptible is simply a means to the realisation or recognition of the inward ideality or significance, which is beyond it, to which it points or attests and which enlivens it (P. 413.).

But even Baumgarten and Hegel seem to have merely asserted the inadequacy of the conventional power of the language to present the soul of work of art and to have pointed out that the external of a work of art simply points to the soul, which can be realised through artistic contemplation only. They do not explain the why of the inadequacy and the how of the pointing to and the realisation of the soul. This is just what the Indian æstheticians like Ānanda Vardhana and Abhinavagupta do. The works,-in which the problem of inadequacy of the conventional, secondary and contextual powers of the language to present the soul of poetry or drama and that of adequacy of the suggestive power of language, as distinct from the conventional, secondary and contextual, to lead to its realisation, are discussed,-are (i) Dhvanyāloka (ii) Locana (iii) Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī.

LOGICAL APPROACH TO SUGGESTION.

Ananda Vardhana divides the suggested or suggestible meaning into three types (i) objective (Vastu) (ii) figurative (Alaṅkāra) (iii) emotive etc. (Rasādi). And Abhinavagupta asserts that the last meaning can, under no circumstance, be presented in conventional expression (Yastu svapnepi na svaśabdavācyo.. ...Rasaḥ. Dh. L., 51.). The reason for this may be stated as follows :—

On close study of the works of great poets we find (i) that in some compositions the word, standing for the basic emotion, the central fact or the soul of æsthetic presentation, occurs ; in others it does not : (ii) that æsthetic experience arises from even such poetic presentation as does not contain the word for the emotion : (iii) that the æsthetic experience from those compositions, in which the word for the basic emotion occurs, is due, not to the word itself, but to the presentation of the situation, the mimetic changes and the transient emotions thereof : (iv) that there is no æsthetic experience from a composition which contains the word for æsthetic configuration or basic emotion (Śṛṅgāra or Rati etc.) only, but does not present the situation etc. of the basic emotion. Therefore, it is logical to admit that the central fact of the æsthetic configuration can be only suggested, but cannot be presented in conventional expression ; because we always get æsthetic experience from the presentation of the situation etc. and never from the word standing for æsthetic configuration or for the central fact thereof in isolation ; because æsthetic experience is invariably concomitant with the presentation of situation etc. and invariably non-concomitant with the use of the word for the central fact or for the entire configuration in isolation.[1]

1. Dh. L., 80-3.

It may be pointed out here that æsthetic experience, according to Indian æstheticians, in most cases, is due to the subjective realisation of a basic emotion, because of its emergence from the subconscious to the conscious level, in consequence of identification with the focus of the situation, presented in the midst of bewitching situation with the mimetic changes and transient emotion. And because the mere use of a word for the basic emotion cannot bring about its emergence, therefore, it is admitted that it is made to emerge or brought to light (Vyajyate or Prakāśyate) by the situation etc. They distinguish æsthetic experience from such pleasant experiences as are got from hearing the news of the birth of a son[1] to oneself. They also differentiate between the intellectual understanding of the nature of an emotion and its subjective realisation in consequence of contemplation on poetic or dramatic presentation. They hold, like Hegel, that the content of poetic work is spirit in its universality as affected by a basic emotion, free from all elements of individuality; but they assert that logically it does not admit of presentation in conventional terms and that it is only suggested through beautiful presentation of the situation etc. which looks beautiful because of the æsthetic susceptibility in the reader or spectator.[2]

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SUGGESTION.

And in the Īśvara Pratyabhijñā Vivṛti Vimarśinī it is psychologically explained why the word for æsthetic configuration such as Śṛṅgāra does not present æsthetic configuration in such a way as to give rise to æsthetic experience. To enable the reader to grasp the psychological explanation fully we present it below in the necessary context.

The basic view of Kashmir Śaivaism is that the highest principle, the Maheśvara, the Absolute, is not and cannot be

*1. Dh. L., 79. *2. Dh. L., 51-2.

made the object of knowledge and, therefore, the means of right knowledge (Pramāṇa) do not apply to it i.e. do not operate in relation to it.[1] But the question arises : "Is it not that in the course of spiritual instruction, as when a teacher makes it imparative on the disciple to know the Ultimate, the Ultimate is referred to as an object ?" e.g. "The Self ought to be grasped". (Ātmā Vā are dṛṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ. Vaj. Up., Ch. 4, Brā., 1.). And the reply that Abhinavagupta gives to this question is that it is not the true or ultimate Self that is referred to as object, but something that is created in imagination (Sṛṣṭa). But then another question arises : "Does the disciple get an idea of the true Self from it or not ?" And the reply is "He does". And the reason for this is that what is pictured up as an object is conceived as identical with that from which the objective image springs. And it is pointed out that such an identification is made in practical life. For instance, the mental image that arises in consequence of the contact of sense with an external object, though essentially mental, yet is conceived to be identical with external object in the perceptual judgement (Dṛśyavikalpyaikīkāranyāyena).

The above view may be elaborated as follows :—

Just as knowledge is of two types (i) indeterminate and (ii) determinate, so the meaning also is of two types (i) immediate (Avyavahita) and (ii) mediate (Vyavahita). The following illustrations will make the distinction of the two types of meaning clear :—

A word stands for either what is directly perceived or a general notion, which is derived from the observed facts, e. g. "white" (Śuklaḥ) or "quality" (Guṇaḥ). The meaning that we get from "white" is immediate; because

*1. I.P.V.V., Vol. I, 55-6.

the meaning arises in the mind of the hearer on hearing the word immediately without the mediation of any other picture, aroused in the mind, for the simple reason that the meaning of the word is fixed by common use in the practical life and refers to what is directly perceptible. But the meaning that arises in the mind of the hearer, when he hears the word "quality", does not arise immediately. On the contrary its rise is mediated by the rise of the images of "white" etc. on which the generalised concept of "quality" is based. Accordingly the mediate is accepted to be that to which the mind necessarily comes through the consciousness of the perceptible phenomena, on which the concept is based. (Yo hi parāmarśo yat parāmarśāntaram niyamena madhye sopānīkṛtya parāmarśanīyasamārohaṇena kṛtakṛtyatāmeti sa tena vyavahita ucyate. I.P.V.V., Vol. I, 56.).

Thus, the convention is represented to be of two types (i) based on the practical life and (ii) depending upon the agreement of a group of persons, which may be large or small.[1] (Parṣadopi saṅkocāsaṅkocādinā bhedāḥ. I.P.V.V., Vol. I, 57.).

In this context Abhinavagupta propounds the view that the words such as "Śṛṅgāra" which are highly technical, do not give rise to a clear meaning either immediately or even mediately. The reason, on which this view is based, may be stated as follows :—

The word "Śṛṅgāra", in order that it may give rise to a definite meaning such as may be responsible for the experience of a particular type of Śṛṅgāra, presupposes the consciousness of two definitions (i) the definition of Rasa in general as embodied in the famous definition, given by Bharata (Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ)

*1. I. P. V. V., Vol. I, 57.

and (ii) the definition of Sṛṅgārarasa as that which arises from the basic emotion of love (Ratisthāyibhāvaprabhavaḥ). But even the consciousness of these two definitions in itself is not sufficient to give rise to a clear consciousness of the meaning such as may enable the hearer to have the æsthetic experience ; because a clear consciousness of the meaning of a definition depends upon the picturing up of a clear illustration of it, such as is empirically known. But the illustration of the definition of Rasa does not belong to the empirical level. Therefore, the word standing for Rasa, though used in a poetic or dramatic composition, does not give rise to such a clear meaning as may lead to æsthetic experience. For, though it strives to give rise to the meaning, mediated by a clear picture of the illustration, on which depends the clear grasp of the definition, presupposed for getting at the required meaning, yet being unable to produce a definite picture, illustrative of the definition, which is the only means of æsthetic experience, fails to serve the required purpose. Hence it is admitted that the words like "Śṛṅgāra" have no conventional power to give rise to such meaning as may lead to æsthetic experience.[1] Hence the principal content of art, the spirit in its universality as affected by a universal emotion, is admitted to be unpresentable in conventional terms and presentable through suggestion only.

EMOTION IN ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE FROM POETRY AND DRAMA.

Æstheticians in both the East and the West have recognised emotion to be an essential element in the æsthetic experience, aroused by poetry or drama. In India it is the theory of Rasa, as the basic emotion, harmoniously united with the transient emotions, the mimetic changes and the situation, as incorporated in his famous definition of Rasa,

*1. I. P. V. V., Vol. I, 57.

that has been followed by all the subsequent æstheticians. They have recognised the basic or persistent emotion, the Sthāyin, to be the central fact in æsthetic experience. In the West also the theory of æsthetics has been discussed generally in reference to the emotions, which the works of the poetic or the dramatic art arouse.

Plato's condemnation of the dramatic art in particular is based upon the recognition of the fact that drama presents and arouses emotion (Ch. II). Aristotle admits that tragedy presents what arouses pity and fear and effects purification from such like passions. In early Christian era also emotion was recognised to be the essential element of æsthetic experience. St. Augustine, for instance, maintains that the aim of poetry is to melt and to arouse (P. 166). During the renaissance emotion retained its prominent position in the works of poetic art. For, the reply of the thinkers of this period to the question "What is the principle of unity in a work of poetic art ?" is that the emotion, that is primarily intended to be aroused in the spectator, serves as the unifying principle of the various parts of the whole (P. 170).

Coming to the modern period of the Western Philosophy, we find at its commencement that a person like Descartes admits the emotive element in æsthetic experience. For, he holds that theatrical or poetic presentation of strange adventures excites the imagination to build up a complete mental picture of the artistically presented. Consequently all sorts of passions and emotions are aroused in us, according to the diversity of objects, and we get intellectual joy, if the understanding is able to grasp the whole imaginative picture with all its implications and, therefore, is realised by the soul as its good possession (PP. 213-14).

Among the British thinkers we find that Locke, Addison, Hume and Burke recognise emotive element in æsthetic experience. Locke holds that figurative and other artificial applications of words, employed by a poet, indirectly arouse wrong ideas and move passions (P. 232). According to Addison, the more a work of art is capable of stirring emotions the more pleasant it is (P. 242). Hume approaches the problem of æsthetics from the points of view of (i) utilitarian rationalist and (ii) emotionalist. And from the latter point of view he holds that the æsthetic experience consists in agreeable passion, which is aroused by a well-composed poem or drama (P. 258). Burke also holds that poetry and drama present emotions (P. 271) and that æsthetic experience is an immediate emotive experience (P. 264).

Among the important German thinkers Baumgarten, Leibniz and Hegel recognise emotive element in æsthetic experience. For, according to Hegel the word 'æsthetic', adopted by Baumgarten, meant "The science of senses and emotion". For, during the period of Wolffian philosophy, works of art in Germany were studied with reference to feelings of pleasure, admiration, fear, pity etc., which they aroused in the connoisseur (P. 395). Leibniz holds that there are various levels in æsthetic experience, the lower of which leads to the higher; that we have sensory, emotive, intellectual and spiritual experiences in succession from a good piece of art. Poetry, according to him, has unbelievable power to move (P. 284). According to Hegel, emotion, its physiognomical expression and the situation are the important aspects of dramatic art. And he holds that tragedy excites fear, which refers to the might of the ethical power, and sympathy, which is an accordant feeling with the claim of ethical power, exercising itself on one who opposes it and, therefore, antagonises it (P. 447-49).

DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ON THE ÆSTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF FEAR.

Emotive element has been generally recognised in æsthetic experience by eminent thinkers of all ages in the East and the West. But emotions are of two types, pleasant and painful. The problem, therefore, arises: "Is the æsthetic experience from the artistic presentation of the terrible, which arouses fear, an unpleasant experience?" That it is not so is admitted by all. The question, therefore, arises: "Why is it not so in spite of the fact that fear is a painful emotion?"

LOCKE'S EXPLANATION AND ITS CRITICISM.

Locke was probably the first to raise the problem "How can such emotions as fear and pity, which are unpleasant in practical life, become pleasant when aroused by a work of art?" And his answer is that the unpleasant emotions become pleasant, when aroused by a work of art, because they are false, because they are aroused by the illusion that art creates, because the mind is so made that it likes to be deceived in such a way (P. 232). But it is an unsatisfactory explanation. For, the question arises: "Is the artistic presentation an illusion from the point of view of the spectator?" "Does the spectator know the presented to be unreal?" If so, fear cannot arise in him. For, when we know that the rope in darkness simply appears to be snake but is not actual snake, fear does not arise in us. But if he does not know it to be unreal, if he takes it to be real, the fear will arise, but it will be unpleasant. For, the fear caused by illusion in ordinary life is unpleasant.

ADDISON'S EXPLANATION AND ITS CRITICISM.

Addison simply evades the real issue. After asserting that not only those emotions, which are pleasant in practical

life, are more pleasant when aroused by art, but also those which are unpleasant in practical life become pleasant when stimulated to a high pitch by art: he says that pleasure from an artistic presentation of the terrible arises, not from the affection of imagination by what is terrible, but from the reflection that we make upon ourselves at such a presentation. When we see an artistic presentation of the terrible, our pleasure is due to the feeling of freedom from danger and sense of safety (P. 243). Does not this mean that the terrible arouses no fear? How then does it explain the pleasantness of an unpleasant emotion?

SELF-CONTRADICTION OF BURKE.

Burke simply contradicts himself when he attempts a solution of this problem. After saying that terror arises from the consciousness of possibility of pain and death and, therefore, operates in a manner so as to convert the possible pain into almost actual (P. 268): he asserts, while explaining the experience from tragedy, that terror is a passion that delights us, when it does not touch us very closely (P. 275). He does not explain the matter further. His meaning is obscure. How can the touch of terror, when not very close, make terror pleasant? This needs explanation. But he does not attempt it. According to him, if we desire to understand fully how tragedy affects us when it is poetically or dramatically presented, it is necessary to know how tragedies in real life affect us. That real suffering, to which we see another person subjected, is a source of high delight is proved by the following considerations:—

It is a fact that crowds are drawn to sights of real distress and suffering and that men do not shun such sights. This would have been impossible if such sights had been a source of unmixed pain, if there were no element of pleasure in the experience, which such sights arouse. Further, it is

also a fact that the greater is the person who suffers and the less deserving he is of the suffering, the greater is the delight that we have from the sight.

Hence, he asserts that it is evident that "terror" is a passion that delights us, when it does not touch us very closely and that pity is a passion which is always accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection.

Does he not contradict himself in saying "Terror is a passion that delights" after the assertion in the course of its definition "Terror arises from the consciousness of the possibility of pain and death and, therefore, operates in a manner so as to convert the possible pain into almost actual" ? Of course, he adds a proviso, but he does not explain it.

HEGEL'S EXPLANATION.

Hegel explains the pleasantness of such emotions as fear and sympathy, when aroused by presentation of tragedy, in terms of his own philosophy of right. He holds, like Aristotle, that tragedy excites and purifies fear and pity. But he asserts that the emotions, which a tragedy excites, are not merely concordant or discordant feelings with anybody's private experience and that tragic emotions are distinct from the ordinary in respect of their objective reference.

According to him, fear is possible in two ways : (i) It may be aroused when we are confronted with an object which is terrible but finite. (ii) It may also be excited by the visualisation of that ethical power, which is at the basis of all social phenomena, the power, which manifests itself as social institutions, like family, civil society and state. Human beings, who are distinct from animals chiefly by their rationality, have to fear, not a terrible external

power and its expression, which arouses fear in animals and is related to their instinct of physical self-preservation, but the ethical power, which is self-defined in its own free rationality, which is eternal and inviolable and which a man summons against himself, when he turns his back upon it. The fear, therefore, which a tragedy arouses, is, according to Hegel, of the latter type and refers to the might of the universal ethical power. Hence it is not unpleasant, because it is not related to the instinct of physical self-preservation.

Thus, Hegel explains the pleasantness of fear from presentation of a tragedy in terms of difference in the objective reference. According to him, it is not unpleasant, because it is not related to any finite external object but to the might of the universal ethical power. This seems to be a plausible explanation. For, while we do not wish to be in a state of fear of any external physical power, we, as moral beings, do wish to be in fear of the ethical power, because that alone improves us ethically.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S EXPLANATION.

Abhinavagupta also seems to draw a distinction between the pleasant and the unpleasant emotions. The æsthetic experience of the pleasant emotion, that is presented in the hero in a certain situation in a dramatic presentation, he explains in terms of identification with the focus of the situation. The spectator views the situation through the eyes of the hero and, therefore, gets affected by the emotion that is aroused by the situation. This has been explained in the Comparative Æsthetics Vol. I (PP. 161-63). But fear cannot be experienced in such a way, because the hero of Indian drama, being an ideal person, is not and cannot be afraid of anything that ordinarily arouses fear. Probably

with such an idea in his mind he definitely states how does fear arise from a dramatic presentation. To Explain it he takes the scene from Kālidāsa's Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, in which a hermitage-deer appears, pursued by king Duṣyanta in a chariot. It is running for life from the arrow of the king. It is in very great fear. As such it is represented to be responsible for the experience of the æsthetic emotion of terror "Bhayānaka Rasa" by the king and through him by the spectator, who has identified himself with the former.

The point that seems to be fit for emphasising is that the experience of fear is presented to be due, not to the subjective realisation of fear, because of the effect of a terrible external object, but to the objective perception of the object, the deer in terror. For, the king is not in terror, because there is no terrible object that confronts him. On the contrary, he himself is the terrible object that has caused terror in the deer.

Abhinavagupta in the Abhinavabhāratī (P. 280) explains the rise of Bhayānaka as follows, as has already been stated in the Comparative Æsthetics Vol. I (P. 164-5) :—

'The spectator hears the verse "Grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam" etc. The consciousness of the meaning of the verse as a whole arises in him. The inner visualisation of the whole takes place. The elements of time, place and so forth are inhibited, because of the element of contradiction. The time is the chief factor in the causal efficiency of the individual. The inhibition of that having taken place, the inhibition of individual naturally follows. The consciousness at this stage may be spoken of as "terrified" (Bhītaḥ). The terrified presupposes the cause of terror. That in the present case being without objective reality (apāramārthika) and therefore, the terrified, being free from objective relation, is reduced to terror. This terror, appearing in the consciousness

of the spectator, who is free from all elements of individuality, affecting his heart so as to seem to be penetrating it and being visualised so as to seem to be dancing as if it were before his eyes, is the Bhayānaka Rasa.' Thus, fear is not unpleasant, because it is completely universalised and is related to a subject, who is free from all elements of individuality.

A detailed treatment of the points of similarity of the æsthetic thoughts of the Western æstheticians with those of the Indian is the subject-matter of the Third Volume, "Indian and Western Æsthetics".

THE END.

APPENDIX A.

The Textual Authority indicated by foot-notes, marked with asterisks.

Page 3.

1. न तज्ज्ञानं न तच्छिल्पं न सा विद्या न सा कला ॥
न स योगो न तत्कर्म नाट्येऽस्मिन् यन्न दृश्यते ।
सर्वशास्त्राणि शिल्पानि कर्माणि विविधानि च ॥
अस्मिन्नाट्ये समेतानि तस्मादेतन्मया कृतम् ।

Page 11.

1. निर्मले म[मु]कुरे यद्वद्भान्ति भूमिजलादयः ।
अमिश्रास्तद्वदेकस्मिंश्चिन्नाथे विश्ववृत्तयः ॥
सदृशं भाति नयनदर्पणाम्बरवारिषु ।
तथा हि निर्मले रूपे रूपमेवावभासते ॥

2. संवादो ह्यन्यसादृश्यं तत्पुनः प्रतिबिम्बवत् ।
आलेख्याकारवत् तुल्यदेहिवच्च शरीरिणाम् ॥
तत्र पूर्वमनन्यात्म तुच्छात्म तदनन्तरम् ।
तृतीयं तु प्रसिद्धात्म नान्यसाम्यं त्यजेत्कविः ॥
तत्र पूर्वं प्रतिबिम्बकल्पं काव्यवस्तु परिहर्तव्यं सुमतिना । यतस्तदनन्यात्म, तात्त्विकशरीरशून्यम् । तदनन्तरमालेख्यप्रख्यमन्यसाम्यं शरीरान्तरयुक्तमपि तुच्छात्मत्वेन त्यक्तव्यम् । तृतीयं तु विभिन्नकमनीय-शरीरसद्भावे सति ससंवादमपि काव्यवस्तु न त्यक्तव्यं कविना । न हि शरीरी शरीरिणान्येन सदृशोऽप्येक एवेति शक्यते वक्तुम् ।

Page 28.

1. महेन्द्रप्रमुखैर्देवैरुक्तः किल पितामहः ।
क्रीडनीयकमिच्छामो दृश्यं श्रव्यं च यद्भवेत् ॥

Page 62.

2. ऊनद्विवर्षं निखनेन्न कुर्यादुदकं ततः ।
आश्मशानादनुव्रज्य इतरो ज्ञातिभिर्वृतः ॥

यमसूक्तं तथा गाथा जपद्भिर्लौकिकाग्निना ।
स दग्धव्य उपेतश्चेदाहिताग्न्यावृतार्थवत् ॥
सप्तमाद्दशमाद्वापि ज्ञातयोऽभ्युपयन्त्यपः ।
अपनः शोशुचदघमनेन पितृदिङ्मुखाः ॥

and

प्रवेशनादिकं कर्म प्रेतसंस्पर्शिनामपि ।
इच्छातां तत्क्षणाच्छुद्धिं परेषां स्नानसंयमात् ॥ (P. 302)

Page 164.

2. यथा नराणां नृपतिः शिष्याणां च यथा गुरुः ।
एवं हि सर्वभावानां भावः स्थायी महानिह ॥

3. सरस्वती स्वादु तदर्थवस्तु निःष्यन्दमाना महतां कवीनाम् ।
अलोकसामान्यमभिव्यनक्ति परिस्फुरन्तं प्रतिभाविशेषम् ॥
'प्रतिभा' अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा ।

Page 176.

1. स्वादः काव्यार्थसंभेदादात्मानन्दसमुद्भवः ।
विकाशविस्तरक्षोभविक्षेपैः स चतुर्विधः ॥
शृङ्गारवीरबीभत्सरौद्रेषु मनसः क्रमात् ।

Page 224.

1. विचित्रैवाभिधा वक्रोक्तिरित्युच्यते । तदिदमत्र तात्पर्यम् यत् शब्दार्थौ पृथगवस्थितौ केनापि व्यतिरिक्तेनालङ्करणेन (न ?) योज्येते, किन्तु वक्रतावैचित्र्ययोगितयाभिधानमेवानयोरलङ्कारः, तस्यैव शोभातिशयकारित्वात् ।

2. शब्दार्थौ सहितौ वक्रकविव्यापारशालिनि ।
बन्धे व्यवस्थितौ काव्यं तद्विदाह्लादकारिणि ॥

Page 358.

2. शक्तिर्निपुणता लोकशास्त्रकाव्याद्यवेक्षणात् ।
काव्यज्ञशिक्षयाभ्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे ॥

Page 460.

1. Same as the above.

Page 485.

1. यदुक्तमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन—"नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुः समानोऽनुभवस्ततः" ।

Page 514.

1. आधीषमाणायाः पतिः शुचा याश्च शुचस्य च ।
   वासो वायोऽवीनामा वासांसि मर्मृजत् ॥
2. Same as the above.
3. इमे ये नार्वाङ्न परश्चरन्ति न ब्राह्मणासो न सुतेकरासः ।
   त एते वाचमभिपद्य पापया सिरीस्तन्त्रं तन्वते अप्रजज्ञयः ॥
4. अहं तष्टेव वन्धुरं पर्यचामि हृदा मतिम्
   कुवित्सोमस्यापामिति ।
5. ना नानं वा उ नो धियो वि ब्रतानि जनानाम् ।
   तक्षारिष्टं रुतं भिषग्ब्रह्मा सुन्वन्तमिच्छतीन्द्रायेन्दो परि स्रव ॥
6. धरतीभिरोषधीभिः पर्णेभिः शकुनानाम् ।
   कार्मारो अश्मभिर्द्युभिर्हिरण्यवन्तमिच्छतीन्द्रायेन्दो परि स्रव ॥
7. जघान वृत्रं स्वधितिर्वनेव रुरोज पुरो अरदन्न सिन्धून् ।
   विभेद गिरिं नवमिन्न कुम्भमा गा इन्द्रो अकृणुत स्वयुग्भिः ॥
8. निष्कं वा घा कृणवते स्रजं वा दुहितर्दिवः ।
   त्रिते दुष्वप्न्यं सर्वमाप्त्ये परिदद्मस्यनेहसो व ऊतयः सु ऊतयो व ऊतयः ॥
9. यो मे हिरण्यसन्दृशो दश राज्ञो अमंहत ।
   अधस्पदा इच्चैद्यस्य कृष्टयश्चर्मम्ना अभितो जनाः ॥
10. Same as No. 8 above.
11. यदुद्वतो निवतो यासि बप्सत्पृथगेषि प्रगर्धिनीव सेना ।
    यदा ते वातो अनुवाति शोचिर्वप्तेव श्मश्रु वपसि प्रभूम ॥

Page 515.

1. Same as No. 5 on page 514.
2. उपश्वासय पृथिवीमुत द्यां पुरुत्रा ते मनुतां विष्ठितं जगत् ।
   स दुन्दुभे सजूरिन्द्रेण देवैर्दूराद्दवीयो अप सेध शत्रून् ॥
   आ क्रन्दय बलमोजो न आ धा निःष्टनिहि दुरिता बाधमानः ।
   अप प्रोथ दुन्दुभे दुच्छुना इत इन्द्रस्य मुष्टिरसि वीळयस्व ॥

आमूरज प्रत्यावर्तयेमाः केतुमद्दुन्दुभिर्वावदीति ।
समश्वपर्णाश्चरन्ति नो नरोऽस्माकमिन्द्र रथिनो जयन्तु ॥

3. आवदंस्त्वं शकुने भद्रमावद तूष्णीमासीनः सुमतिं चिकिद्धि नः ।
यदुत् पतन्वदसि कर्करिर्यथा बृहद्वदेम विदथे सुवीराः ॥

4. ते क्षोणीभिररुणेभिर्नाञ्जिभी रुद्रा ऋतस्य सदनेषु वावृधुः ।
निमेघमाना अत्येन पाजसा सुश्चन्द्रं वर्णं दधिरे सुपेशसम् ॥

6. शतमश्मन्मयीनां पुरामिन्द्रो व्यास्यत् ।
दिवोदासाय दाशुषे ॥

7. त्वद्भिया विश आयन्नसिक्नीरसमना जहतीर्भोजनानि ।
वैश्वानर पूरवे शोशुचानः पुरो यदग्ने दरयन्नदीदेः ॥

Page 516.

1. राजानावनभिद्रुहा ध्रुवे सदस्युत्तमे सहस्र स्थूण आसाते ।

2. यथा वः स्वाहाग्नये दाशेम परीळाभिर्घृतवद्भिश्च हव्यैः ।
तेभिर्नो अग्ने अमितैर्महोभिः शतं पूर्भिरायसीभिर्नि पाहि ॥

3. अपाः सोममस्तमिन्द्र प्र याहि कल्याणीर्जाया सुरणं गृहे ते ।
यत्रा रथस्य बृहतो निधानं विमोचनं वाजिनो दक्षिणावत् ॥

4. अत्यासो न ये मरुतः स्वञ्चो यक्षदृशो न शुभयन्त मर्याः ।
ते हर्म्येष्ठाः शिशवो न शुभ्रा वत्सासो न प्रक्रीळिनः पयोधाः ॥

5. यदश्वान्धूर्षु पृषतीरयुग्ध्वं हिरण्ययान् प्रत्यत्काँ अमुग्ध्वम् ।
विश्वा इत्स्पृधो मरुतो व्यस्यथ शुभं यातामनुरथा अवृत्सत ॥

6. बिभ्रद्द्रापिं हिरण्ययं वरुणो वस्त निर्णिजम् । परिस्पशो निषेदिरे ॥

7. साध्वपांसि सनता न उक्षिते उषासानक्ता वय्येव रण्विते ।
तन्तुन्ततं सवयन्ती समीची यज्ञस्य पेशः सुदुघे पयस्वती ॥

8. गायन्ति त्वा गायत्रिणोऽर्चन्त्यर्कमर्किणः ।
ब्रह्माणस्त्वा शतक्रत उद्वंशमिव येमिरे ॥

9. अधिपेशांसि वपते नृतूरिवापोर्णुते वक्ष उस्रेव बर्जहम् ।
ज्योतिर्विश्वस्मै भुवनाय कृण्वती गावो न व्रजं व्यु१षा आवर्तमः ॥

10. इमे जीवा वि मृतैराववृत्रन्नभूद्भद्रा देवहूतिर्नो अद्य ।
प्राञ्चो अगाम नृतये हसाय द्राघीय आयुः प्रतरं दधानाः ॥

Page 517.

1. यत्किं चेदं वरुण दैव्ये जनेऽभिद्रोहं मनुष्या३श्चरामसि ।
अचित्ती यत्तव धर्मा युयोपिम मा नस्तस्मादेनसो देव रीरिषः ॥

Page 519.

1. चकृवांस ऋभवस्तदपृच्छत क्वेदभूद्यः स्य दूतो न आजगन् ।
यदावाख्यच्चमसाञ्चतुरः कृतानादित्त्वष्टा ग्नास्वन्तर्यानजे ॥

2. Same as No. 5 on page 514.

Page 522.

1. हसितगीतनृत्तहुंडुंकारनमस्कारजप्योपहारेणोपतिष्ठेत् ।
2. देवस्य दक्षिणे पार्श्वे स्थितेनोदङ्मुखेन ।
3. श्रृङ्गारेत वा ।
4. श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षुर्जिह्वाघ्राणानामात्मसंयुक्तेन मनसाऽधिष्ठितानां स्वेषु स्वेषु विषयेष्वानुकूल्यतः प्रवृत्तिः कामः ।
5. किं स्यात्परत्रेत्याशङ्का कार्ये यस्मिन्न जायते ।
न चार्थघ्नं सुखं चेति शिष्टास्तत्र व्यवस्थिताः ॥

Page 523.

1. महादेवानुचरश्च नन्दी सहस्रेणाध्यायानां पृथक्कामसूत्रं प्रोवाच ।
2. तदेव तु पुनरध्यर्धेनाध्यायशतेन साधारण, सांप्रयोगिक, कन्यासंप्रयुक्तक, भार्याधिकारिक, पारदारिक, वैशिकौपनिषदिकैः, सप्तभिरधिकरणैर्बाभ्रव्यः पाञ्चालः संचिक्षेप ।
3. बाभ्रवीयांश्च सूत्रार्थानागमय्य विमृश्य च ।
वात्स्यायनश्चकारेदं कामसूत्रं यथाविधि ॥

Page 524.

1. चतुःषष्टिरङ्गविद्याः कामसूत्रस्यावयविनो (न्यो ?) ऽवयवभूताः ।

Page 525.

1. तद्द्विविधम् । नाट्यमनाट्यंचेति । तथोक्तम् :—
स्वर्गे वा मर्त्यलोके वा पाताले वा निवासिनाम् ।
कृतानुकरणं नाट्यमनाट्यं नर्तकाश्रितम् ॥

Page 531.

1. आस्वेवावान्तरनिविष्टानामन्तरकलानामष्टादशाधिकानि पञ्चशतान्युक्तानि ।
2. चतुःषष्टिरङ्गविद्याः कामसूत्रस्यावयविनो (न्यो ?) ऽवयवभूताः । तदभावे कामसूत्रस्याप्रवृत्तेः ।
3. शास्त्रं चेदं तन्त्रमावापश्चेति द्विधा स्थितम् । तत्र तन्त्र्यते जन्यते रतिर्येन तत्तन्त्रमालिङ्गनादि । तदुपदिश्यते येन तदपि तन्त्रं सांप्रयोगिक-मधिकरणम् । समन्तादावाप्यन्ते स्त्रियः पुरुषाश्च येन स आवापः । समागमोपाय इत्यर्थः ।

Page 532.

1. तत्र कर्मद्यूताश्रयाः प्रायश आबालं गच्छन्ति । ता एवान्यथा विभज्य चतुःषष्टिरत्रोक्ता ।
2. ऋचां दशतयीनां च संज्ञितत्वादिहापि तदर्थसंबन्धात् पञ्चालसंबन्धाच्च बह्वृचैरेषा पूजाऽर्थं संज्ञा प्रवर्तितेत्येके ।

Page 533.

1- Same as No. 2 on Page 532.
2. संप्रयोगाङ्गं चतुषष्टिरित्याचक्षते चतुःषष्टिप्रकरणत्वात् ।
3. कलानां चतुःषष्टित्वात्तासां च संप्रयोगाङ्गभूतत्वात्कलासमूहो वा चतुः-षष्टिरिति ।
4. आलिङ्गनचुम्बननखच्छेद्यदशनच्छेद्यसंवेशनसीत्कृतपुरुषायितौपरिष्टिकानाम-ष्टानामष्टधा विकल्पभेदादष्टावष्टकाश्चतुःषष्टिरिति बाभ्रवीयाः ।
5. उतत्यं चमसं नवं त्वष्टुर्देवस्य निष्कृतम् ।
अकर्त चतुरः पुनः ।

Page 534.

1. यास्तु शयनोपचारिका उत्तरकलाश्च ताः प्रायशस्तन्त्रस्याङ्गतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते, इति पाञ्चालिक्यामेव चतुषष्ठ्यामन्तरकला वेदितव्याः ।
2. लोकोपदेशजननं नाट्यमेतद्भविष्यति ।
न तज्ज्ञानं न तच्छिल्पं न सा विद्या न सा कला ॥
न स योगो न तत्कर्म नाट्येऽस्मिन् यन्न दृश्यते ।
सर्वशास्त्राणि शिल्पानि कर्माणि विविधानि च ॥
अस्मिन्नाट्ये समेतानि तस्मादेतन्मया कृतम् ।

3. चैतन्यं सर्वभूतानां विवृतं जगदात्मना ।
नादब्रह्म तदानन्दमद्वितीयमुपास्महे ॥

Page 544.

1. दृष्टं सुसदृशं कार्यं सर्वेषामविशेषतः ।
चित्रे सादृश्यकरणं प्रधानं परिकीर्तितम् ॥

Page 545.

1. शब्दोपहितरूपांस्तान् बुद्धेर्विषयतां गतान् ।
प्रत्यक्षमिव कंसादीन् साधनत्वेन मन्यते ॥

Page 548.

1. सरस्वती स्वादु तदर्थवस्तु निष्यन्दमाना महतां कवीनाम् ।
अलोकसामान्यमभिव्यनक्ति परिस्फुरन्तं प्रतिभाविशेषम् ॥

and

ध्वनेरित्थं गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यस्य च समाश्रयात् ।
न काव्यार्थविरामोऽस्ति यदि स्यात्प्रतिभागुणः ॥

Page 549.

1. यत्तत्रानुचितं किंचिन्नायकस्य रसस्य वा ।
विरुद्धं तत्परित्याज्यमन्यथा वा प्रकल्पयेत् ॥

Page 550.

1. उभावेतावलङ्कार्यौ तयोः पुनरलङ्कृतिः ।
वक्रोक्तिरेव वैदग्ध्यभङ्गीभणितिरुच्यते ॥

2. अलङ्कारकृतां येषां स्वभावोक्तिरलङ्कृतिः ।
अलङ्कार्यतया तेषां किमन्यदवतिष्ठते ॥

3. शरीरं चेदलङ्कारः किमलङ्कुरुतेऽपरम् ।
आत्मैव नात्मनः स्कन्धं क्वचिदप्यधिरोहति ॥

Page 551.

1. अम्लानप्रतिभोद्भिन्ननवशब्दार्थबन्धुरः ।
अयत्नविहितस्वल्पमनोहारिविभूषणः ॥
भावस्वभावप्राधान्यन्यक्कृताहार्यकौशलः ।
रसादिपरमार्थज्ञमनःसंवादसुन्दरः ॥

Page 557.

1. तथा हि वाच्यत्वं स्वशब्दनिवेदितत्वेन वा स्यात् विभावादिप्रतिपादनमुखेन वा। पूर्वस्मिन् पक्षे स्वशब्दनिवेदितत्वाभावे रसादीनामप्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः। न च सर्वत्र तेषां स्वशब्दनिवेदितत्वम्। यत्रापि अस्ति तत्, तत्रापि विशिष्टविभावादिमुखेनैषां प्रतीतिः। स्वशब्देन सा केवलमनूद्यते, नतु तत्कृता। विषयान्तरे तथा तस्या अदर्शनात्। न हि केवलशृङ्गारादिशब्दमात्रभाजि विभावादिप्रतिपादनरहिते काव्ये मनागपि रसवत्त्वप्रतीतिरस्ति। यतश्च स्वाभिधानमन्तरेण केवलेभ्योऽपि विभावादिभ्यो विशिष्टेभ्यो रसादीनां प्रतीतिः। केवलाच्च स्वाभिधानादप्रतीतिः। तस्मादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामभिधेयसामर्थ्याक्षिप्तत्वमेव रसादीनाम्। नत्वभिधेयत्वं कथञ्चित्।

Page 558.

1. नवायं रसादिरर्थः 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यतो यथा हर्षो जायते तथा। नापि लक्षणया। अपि तु सहृदयस्य हृदयसंवादबलाद्विभावानुभावप्रतीतौ तन्मयीभावेनास्वाद्यमान एव रस्यमानतैकप्राणः सिद्धस्वभावसुखादिविलक्षणः परिस्फुरति।

2. यस्तु स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारपतितः, किन्तु शब्दसमर्प्यमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभावसमुचितप्राग्विनिविष्टरत्यादिवासनानुरागसुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणाव्यापाररसनीयरूपोरसः, स काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरो रसध्वनिरिति।

Page 559.

1. प्रमेयप्रतिष्ठानं यतः प्रमाता, ततः प्रमेयो न भवति।......ननु दृष्टः प्रमातरि प्रमेयताव्यवहार उपदेशादौ। न असौ प्रमातरि अपि तु नीलादिस्थानीये सृष्टे वस्त्वन्तरे एव।..............प्रमातृत्वं च कथं सृष्टे संभवेत्। कथं च अतो वाक्यात् प्रमातरि आत्मनि प्रतिपत्तिर्भवेत्? सत्यमेवम्, किन्तु स्वप्रकाशस्वभावोऽनन्याधीनाहमिति विमर्शमयश्च प्रमाता। तत्स्वातन्त्र्यादुदितो यो मेयः, स तमेव मूलत्वेन अवलम्बमानो दृश्यविकल्प्यैकीकारन्यायेन विकल्परूपया सृष्ट्या तत्स्वप्रकाशरूपैकीकारेणैव सृज्यते।......न तु न प्रकाशते आत्मशब्दात् किंचित्, नापि व्यतिरिक्तमेव प्रकाशते, अपि तु आत्मैव, अहंपरामर्शसोपानव्यवधानेन तु, यथा गुणः

क्रिया शृङ्गार इति शब्दैः गुणाद्यर्थः, गुणोऽयं क्रियेयमिति हि विकल्पे यत् सूक्ष्मम् शुक्लः पटः पचतीत्येतत् विकल्पारूढवस्तुपर्यवसानेन सूच्यते। यो हि परामर्शो यत्परामर्शान्तरं नियमेन मध्ये सोपानीकृत्य परामर्शनीयसमारोहणेन कृतकृत्यतामेति, स तेन व्यवहित उच्यते।

Page 560.

1. संकेतवदनावलोकनप्राणितमात्रशब्दार्थव्यवहारवादिनोऽपि लोकदृढनिरूढव्यवहारसिद्धसंकेतकैरेव शब्दैस्तद्विकल्पैश्च व्यवहिता एव सामयिकप्रायाः संकेता भान्ति। पचति, शुक्लः पट इति लोकनिरूढशब्दव्यवहारोपरि पाकः पचनं क्रिया, वर्णो गुणो धर्म इति पार्षदप्रायसंकेतोपजीवीनि शब्दान्तराणि। तत्रापि पर्षदोऽपि संकोचासंकोचादिना भेदाः।

Page 561.

1. तथा च

'कृच्छ्रेणोरुयुगं व्यतीत्य·········।'

इति

'वक्त्रेन्दौ तव सति··············।'

इति

'यत्त्वन्नेत्र··········।'

इति अभिलाषसंभोगविप्रलम्भभिन्ने काव्यरसे 'विभावानुभाव' इत्यादि सामान्यलक्षणम्, 'रतिस्थायिभावप्रभव' इत्यादि विशेषलक्षणम्। तावता शृङ्गारशब्दस्य अर्थसंकेतनमिति लौकिकोदाहरणापेक्षिणि लक्षणवाक्यार्थे लोकनिरूढे पदवचनं पार्षदप्रायमिति सोदाहरणलक्षणवाक्यश्रवणप्रत्यये काव्यरसे शृङ्गारादिशब्दो निवेशितोऽपि तादृग्वाक्योचितपरामर्शव्यवहितामिव प्रतीतिं जिजनयिषुरपि नियतं किंचिद्वाक्यं लौकिकमनुस्मारयितुं सामर्थ्यमलभमानः सर्वार्पणस्वायत्तताऽप्रथनन्यायेन प्रधानब्रह्मभावापन्नभवन्यायेन च विशेषोल्लेखसाध्यास्वादाद्यर्थक्रियायोग्यपरामर्शसंपादनासमर्थत्वात् साक्षाद्वाचक एव।

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K. C. PANDEY

COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS VOL. I

INDIAN ÆSTHETICS

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BY

PROF. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

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Dr. GANGANATH JHA